The Tuttle Twit? Twenty Years of Connor Boyack Misunderstanding Preemptive War

        I first encountered Connor Boyack nearly twenty years ago. His writing reflected a familiar libertarian style. It was confident, combative, and heavy on slogans while light on careful definitions. Since then, he has become a successful children's book author and largely scrubbed his old website, but a recent "Musing" sounded strikingly familiar.

        After tracking down the original article he tried to erase, I discovered that, despite two being nearly twenty years old, Boyack is still relying on the same flawed talking points against preemptive war.[1]

        Below is a checklist of the arguments he made then and is still making now. I've included timestamps from his recent video to show just how little has changed. While some of this post revisits earlier research, my primary goal is to demonstrate how much relevant scholarship and little thought Boyack has engaged with and shown over the last twenty years:

Bad Definition (14:38)

Massive network of spies (14:45)

Perfunctory shout out to Just War and catch phrases without understanding key terms. Incorrectly treats preemption as incompatible with Just War theory.(15:07)

Severely out of context Eisenhower (15:17)

Cherry picked first presidency statement on “law of the jungle” (15:41)

Contextualizes the war chapters to exclude them (He didn’t repeat this point in his musings, he simply ignored the war chapters this time.)

Inappropriate use of terrorist (18:08)

De contextualizes 3 Nephi 3:20-21 Mormon 3:10 as evidence (18:18; 21:12)

Misuses A Brent Merrill, who was describing a strategic situation and not a command from the Lord (18:36)

Nephite battles take place in Nephite territory (22:23)

Misapplied use of Hugh Nibley (23:03)

        As you can see, his musings aren’t inspiring or insightful, just the same stale talking points based on unexamined assumptions from twenty years ago. More importantly, on every single point he has missed additional research that would have better informed his arguments.

        Before I show why, I might answer the overall question of his post "Where are all the peacemakers?" That’s a rather insincere question since his version of peace making is repeating the same sanctimonious and shallow talking points for twenty years while insulting his opponents as terroristic Gadiantons (the internet never forgets!) and war mongering propagandists.[2]

        The real peacemaking starts by taking the subject seriously, grappling with complex issues and respecting those who disagree with you by at least avoiding lazy name calling. Despite leading or contributing to multiple institutes, selling millions of books, and emphasizing those credentials on his website, Boyack hasn't done the intellectual work that genuine peacemaking requires such as engaging opposing arguments, refining his definitions, and responding to scholarship published since he first made these claims.

Boyack gets the definition wrong

        Let us start with his definition of preemptive war: Serious theorists going back 500 years have had a better definition than Boyack, who defined preemptive war as simply "fighting your enemy on your terms, before they (may or may not) fight you on theirs," or in short, "get them before they get us." But definitions matter as they distinguish between preventive and preemptive war using concepts like imminence, intent, and capability.  

        The early modern writer Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law, defined preemptive war as being "lawful to kill those who are planning to kill." He is the one that provided the criteria of means, intent, and imminency.[3] The last criteria, “imminency,” is particularly important in the modern age when some missiles can move 20,000 miles an hour or cross the US in about seven minutes. The line between preemptive and preventive war can therefore be measured in mere minutes, yet Boyack ignores that distinction entirely, preferring simplistic and sanctimonious talking points.

        Micheal Walzer, the leading modern theorist on just war that Boyack also ignored, best summarized the differences by talking about past, present, and future and only justified attacks based on present threats, not past aggressions or fear of future consequences.[4] It’s quite an interesting debate that brings a great deal of sophistication and nuance to the subject, and precisely the level of moral analysis absent from Boyack's discussion.

        Boyack mentions just war in perfunctory fashion, but doesn’t understand any details of the practice.  He relies on a few phrases, “true defense” “legitimate self-defense” and an improper understanding of last resort. Boyack only source is a link to a Wikipedia article.

        His shallow slogans are no substitute for engaging the actual literature. Simply invoking "legitimate self-defense", for example, proves very little. Nearly every aggressor in history has claimed to be acting defensively. Even Hitler justified invading Poland by citing alleged abuses of ethnic Germans in the Danzig Corridor.

        Applying the idea of legitimate law enforcement, Salamanca School scholars Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez argued that just as kings can send out a posse of law men to capture bandits, nations can preemptively send forces into lawless areas.[5] Thus, the Nephite desire to “search out…and destroy” the Gadianton bandits in their hiding places is a perfect representation of this just principle (Helaman 11:28). If you’ll excuse my bluntness, Gidgiddoni said “Lord Forbid” (3rd Nephi 3:21), because they were getting their asses kicked, not because it was wicked. Boyack's failure to move beyond the same talking points over the last twenty years reflects a remarkable lack of intellectual development.

Boyack ignores contrary evidence

        The evidence Boyack does present is so selectively chosen that his argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. His warning about a "massive network of spies" functions more as a libertarian talking point than a carefully argued objection. Ironically, overwhelming scriptural evidence cuts against Boyack's own example (Alma 43:23; 44:21; 56:22, 39). Helaman’s servant in Helaman 2:6-7 is most useful. After some night time spying, the servant killed Kishkumen before he killed the chief judge. Helaman’s servant might have righteously reported that “[I] got them before they got us.”[6] 

        As with Book of Mormon passages about spies, Boyack's interpretive framework effectively excludes the Book of Mormon's war chapters from consideration whenever they become inconvenient. Yet those chapters are precisely where the Book of Mormon wrestles the most with interstate conflict, preemption, deterrence, and the ethics of military action. They cannot simply be brushed aside because they complicate a preferred narrative

        Take Alma 46:30 for example, which describes reasoning for Moroni’s preemptive action. This is an extremely interesting verse because the narrative discusses future action: “Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any strength.”

        This verse is about the future, which makes it on the more radical end of the spectrum than the present imminence described by Walzer. Moroni was a man that could shake the foundations of Hell, so his actions should be analyzed instead of explained away. Rather than wrestle with Moroni's reasoning, Boyack gave excuses for ignoring them.

Boyack strips sources of their context

        Other evidence is presented without the context necessary to evaluate it properly. We have already seen this with the strategic context surrounding "the Lord forbid." The same problem appears in Boyack's treatment of the First Presidency's prewar statement, which he quotes in isolation while ignoring the events that immediately rendered it incomplete. Pearl Harbor transformed both the strategic situation and the First Presidency's public position. Their 1942 statement offered a far stronger defense of the war effort, suggesting that Boyack is appealing to an isolationist argument the Church itself substantially abandoned once the realities of aggression became undeniable.

        By quoting Eisenhower, who also relied heavily on spies in his foreign policy, Boyack took a dilettantish approach, selecting quotations that appear supportive but prove far more nuanced in context. Boyack quoted Eisenhower opposing first strikes, but restored to his historical context, Eisenhower also said he would launch an all out preemptive attack without approval of congress if Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons were confirmed to be preparing to strike[7] In private documents, Eisenhower wrote that he would “shoot the enemy before they shoot you” if an imminent Soviet attack were confirmed. In Boyack's own terms, that is simply "get them before they get us." Yet Eisenhower rejected preventive war while unequivocally endorsing preemptive war against an imminent attack.

        This is why the definitions established in Section One matter. Boyack treats all first strikes as morally equivalent, with only the most minimal acknowlgement of the differences between prevention and preemption, but imminence fundamentally changes the moral calculus to the point that Eisenhower himself answered both "yes" and "no" to first strikes depending on the circumstances. Boyack slogan's never reach that level of nuance. 

       I have already discussed "the Lord forbid" and the use of spies, but Boyack's use of Mormon 3:10 ignores an even more important point. As I argued at the LDS National Security Professionals Conference, the Nephites had already endured far more than the three offenses required by D&C 98:39–40. Their failure was not strategic but moral. By this point they had become rapist cannibals, so any military campaign, including a preemptive one, was doomed to fail. Boyack mistakenly throws out preemptive war when the text is actually condemning the wickedness of those who employed it.

Boyack’s Odd Argument and Conclusion

        The oddest example is Boyack’s argument that because Nephite battles occurred in Nephite territory, any use of force outside U.S. borders is wrong. This collapses under basic examination. If a terrorist launches a nuclear missile from Cuba, Boyack’s logic suggests the United States cannot lawfully intercept it until it crosses American territory. Yet the threat, and the moral right of self-defense, is identical seconds before and after crossing an invisible border. As discussed in Section One, modern missiles move so quickly and cause such devastation that delay can be fatal. Basing nuclear defense on such a rigid interpretation of Nephite warfare is a dangerously imprudent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

        DC 98 is best understood as the LDS version of the Sermon on the Mount. Just like mainstream Christians, we should have a peaceful heart and renounce war. But we can and must reluctantly resort to arms when it becomes a tragic necessity to stop the massacre of brothers and families (Alma 48:21-23).

        The issue isn't that Connor Boyack and I disagree. The problem is that Boyack has become one of the topic’s loudest voices while remaining deeply unserious. His talking points have remained unchanged despite two decades of scholarship and personal study that should have refined them. Serious disagreement requires serious engagement with the strongest opposing arguments. Repeating slogans for twenty years while neglecting scholarship is not peacemaking, nor is it a serious contribution to the debate over preemptive war.

        Ideas about war are too important to leave to slogans. Lives depend on getting these questions right. If we are going to invoke scripture to guide questions of war and peace, we owe one another more than decades of recycled talking points.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buying on of my books. The last of which, To Stop a Slaughter, is a book length treatment of just war and the Book of Mormon. I also write fiction, check out my cyber punk thriller. 

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[1] He often calls it "preventive war," a common rhetorical tactic used to make the practice sound more objectionable by shifting the debate to the less defensibile preventive war. The problem is the "imminence" is often contested to the point the dinstinction becomes a reflection of one's bias. 

[2] The second link is to a different author than Boyack, but it contains the same tone, talking points, and spirit of Boyack. Literally in the first two minutes of Boyack's "musings" he called his opponents "war mongers." 

[3] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.

[4] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

[5] Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 163–165. Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J.: De Triplici Virtute Theologica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 740–743.

[6] There is some debate over the silence of the Book of Mormon about the morality of this action. I think a lack of editorial dissent means approval. Mark Henshaw believes the practice needs affirmative approval in the text. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that the simultaneous anonymity and silence surrounding Helaman’s servant, and the detailed exposition of the secret works, is a subtle but strong editorial comment that shows the secret works of darkness are known to God, and the righteous works of defense against them are not known to man.

[7] Implicitly stated in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d55

Trump, Moroni, and the Teancum Option

        Reading a take this week praising President Trump’s “decapitation” approach to terrorism, I couldn’t help but think of Book of Mormon — specifically the Amalickiah cycle and the campaigns of Captain Moroni.

        Amalickiah twisted and maneuvered his way to the top and instigated war through private assassination. Teancum tried to end the war by killing Amalickiah and then Ammoron. 

        While the tactic might have been the same, their hearts were far different. Targeted assassination is described as "necessarily offensive" by LDS National Security professional Ryan Chavez,[1] but Teancum's was a offensive tactic within a defensive war and it was aimed at ending the war. 

        Amalickiah was trying to gain power and start a war. The difference in intent is key in any discussion and why its the first chapter of my book. 

        Most importantly here, it diffuses the argument that Trump shouldn't have done this because "what if China or Russia did it too?" Based on intent, the US relying on a decapitation strategy against a state sponsor of terror is as great as the difference between Teancum and Amalickiah relying on assassination. 

        Decapitation strategies are not new. They show up in Roman campaigns against insurgent tribes, in early modern wars of succession, and in 20th-century counterinsurgency doctrine. The Spanish figured out that despite the Aztec's numerical superiority and scary visage, if they concentrated on the leader they could quickly scatter enemy forces.  

        We still don’t know exactly what happens next. We've been warned by isolationists, pacifists, and pointy headed pseudo scholars that we couldn't strike Iran. The risk of blowback or escalating into a war was too great. Or they'll call this a "mission accomplished" moment, invoking the specter of Iraq. 

        As a result, we had 50 years of some nice sounding policy papers as Iranian extremists took hostages, provided insurgents with deadly bombs, rained rockets on Israel and pursued nuclear weapons. 

        Yet there’s solid research that decapitation strategies can shorten wars, reduce violence, and increase the likelihood of victory when done successfully. Studies show that removing insurgent or militant leadership tends to reduce the intensity of conflict and increase chances of ending it quickly rather than dragging indefinitely, even if it’s controversial and not always decisive on its own.[2]

        More importantly, we've had Trump, the real estate developer, smash fears of "endless war", "escalation" and "mission accomplished" in a series of 12 day wars, decisive operations to capture Maduro, and decapitation strikes. 

        Those who read the Book of Mormon shouldn't be surprised. Decisive actions by Moroni weren’t just about winning battles — they broke their will to fight. After Moroni’s victories, Alma 47:2 records how many Lamanite were so afraid of facing Moroni that they fled and rebelled rather than take up arms. 

        We are constantly taught that Ammon and the Sons of Mosiah were the peacemakers. But Moroni and King Benjamin show that decisive force can be precisely what ushers in a longer peace. Moroni pacified thousands of bitter enemies and dissenters who moments before were fanatically devoted to killing him and let them leave with a covenant of peace. 

        If Amalickiah had simply been captured before seizing power (Alma 46:30),  the Nephites likely would have enjoyed a period of peace comparable to the golden age under King Benjamin.

        So the irony here, is that after Senator Lee was trolled and ratioed for comparing Trump to Moroni, Trump has acted like Moroni by blending the Teancum Option with Moroni's decisive victory in battle to produce peace.  

        Thanks for reading! If you liked this research please consider buying one of my books linked in the top left. I'm creative too! Please consider buying my creative work! 

1. Ryan Chavez, “The Teancum Option and Modern LDS National Security Thought,” Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth, Kerry Kartchner and Valerie Hudson eds.,(Brigham Young University Press, 2003), 87-100.

2. Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95–111.

David, Steven R. "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Mideast Security and Policy Studies 51 (September 2002): 1–25.

Frankel, Matt. "The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns against Insurgents and Terrorists." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 17–30.

Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2009): 719–755.

Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46.

Captain Moroni: The Just Warrior

 

        In the annals of the Book of Mormon, Captain Moroni stands above all other military leaders. Though not without controversy, he stands as a paragon of righteous military leadership. Naturally, we should examine his leadership in the light of just war. His actions and decisions provide a framework for understanding the principles of just war, demonstrating that warfare, when conducted with moral clarity and divine guidance, can be a force for good.

Reluctance to Engage in Battle

        Moroni's reluctance to engage in battle underscores the principle that war should be a last resort. Alma 43 through 45 repeatedly contrast the Nephite’s “better cause,” and simple desire for defense of their lands, liberty, and church with the Lamanites desire for aggression, plunder, and slaughter (Alma 43:29-30,45; 44:1). Once the Lamanites attacked the Nephites and the latter were faced with that massacre, they had a duty to love their neighbors enough to stop their slaughter. This is summarized in what is one of the most important verses in the Book of Mormon since it describes the duty and burden of a peaceful heart forced to wield the sword.

        In Alma 48:21–23, we read:

"Now they were sorry to take up arms against the Lamanites, because they did not delight in the shedding of blood; yea, and this was not all—they were sorry to be the means of sending so many of their brethren out of this world into an eternal world, unprepared to meet their God."

        This passage highlights that the Nephites, under Moroni's command, were compelled to fight reluctantly. Their sorrow was not rooted in fear but in the moral weight of taking life. Moroni's leadership was characterized by a deep sense of responsibility and a desire to avoid conflict whenever possible.

Mercy and the Pursuit of Peace

        Even in the heat of battle, Moroni sought opportunities for reconciliation. In Alma 44:1, after a significant victory, he addressed the Lamanite leader Zerahemnah:

"Behold, Zerahemnah, that we do not desire to be men of blood. Ye know that ye are in our hands, yet we do not desire to slay you."

        When he infiltrated the city of Gid he could have slain the drunken Lamanite warriors but he “did not delight in murder or bloodshed” (Alma 55:19).

        These statements reflect Moroni's commitment to mercy and the pursuit of peace. Latter Day Saints praise Ammon for offering the king mercy. But Moroni offered entire armies mercy shortly after the heat of battle. He offered the enemy a chance to make a covenant of peace, emphasizing that the Nephites' goal was not to destroy but to defend and preserve life.

Transforming Enemies into Allies

        Moroni is often attacked and dismissed as too militaristic. But Moroni's approach to warfare was not merely about defeating enemies but about transforming them. After battles, he allowed Lamanites who accepted the covenant to live in peace. This act of clemency not only reduced the number of adversaries but also integrated former enemies into society as peaceful tributaries, fostering long-term stability and unity. It can be called the Nephite version of the peace dividend.

The Danger of Overzealous Militancy

        While Moroni's actions were largely characterized by restraint and righteousness, there were moments when his fervor for justice led to harsh words. In his letters to Ammoron, he threatened severe retaliation, including the possibility of a war of extermination (Alma 54:12). These instances serve as a reminder of the fine line between righteous indignation and overzealous militancy. It should be remembered, however, that these are just words. While he threatened blood for blood, when given a chance a mere chapter later he spared Lamanite soldiers. Perhaps he knew Ammoron only responded to force and that weakness would simply encourage him to walk away from negotiations. While most people see anger, his letters contain sophisticated arguments and rhetorical skill.

Strategic Preemption Against Threats

        This item is rarely noticed. But Moroni recognized the imminent danger posed by Amalickiah and took proactive measures to neutralize the threat (Alma 46:30). The standard interpretation of Nephite thought is that they were exclusively defensive. But the Book of Mormon is replete with preemptive action, and when meeting the criteria, it aligns with the just-war principle of ensuring security and peace despite its controversy. The rest of the war chapters support Moroni’s concern. Moroni asked, where will this lead, and his foresight in addressing potential threats before they materialized demonstrates strategic wisdom and a commitment to the safety of his people.

Mormon's Endorsement of Moroni

        Despite all his flaws, Mormon, the record keeper, provides a powerful endorsement of Moroni's character and leadership. In Alma 48:17, he writes:

"If all men had been, and were, and ever would be, like unto Moroni, behold, the very powers of hell would have been shaken forever; yea, the devil would never have power over the hearts of the children of men."

        This statement underscores Moroni's exemplary nature and the righteousness of his actions. While modern audiences might chafe at its militarism, and pacifists dislike his message. Mormon's praise indicates that Moroni's leadership was in harmony with divine principles. War itself is rarely as neat as we would like it to be. And when tragically faced with tough decisions, Moroni made them and brought peace. His leadership should be studied as a model of just conduct despite its flaws.

Conclusion

        Captain Moroni's life and leadership offer profound insights into the principles of just war. His reluctance to engage in battle, attempted preemption, pursuit of peace, and transformation of enemies into allies exemplify a righteous approach to conflict. While moments of overzealousness serve as cautionary tales, and people will always nitpick, the balance of his conduct aligns with the just-war tradition, demonstrating that warfare, when guided by moral clarity and divine principles, can be a force for good.

Where will it lead? Dallin Oaks Supports Preemptive War

 

        Not too long ago the current member of the first presidency, Dallin H Oaks, gave a talk entitled, Where will this lead? He discussed the importance of basing current decisions on future events.

The setting was a beautiful college campus. A crowd of young students was seated on the grass…[T]hey were watching a handsome tree squirrel with a large, bushy tail playing around the base of a beautiful hardwood tree. Sometimes it was on the ground, sometimes up and down and around the trunk…

Stretched out prone on the grass nearby was an Irish setter. He was the object of the students’ interest, and the squirrel was the object of his. Each time the squirrel was momentarily out of sight circling the tree, the setter would quietly creep forward a few inches and then resume his apparently indifferent posture. This was what held the students’ interest. Silent and immobile, their eyes were riveted on the event whose outcome was increasingly obvious.

Finally, the setter was close enough to bound at the squirrel and catch it in his mouth. A gasp of horror arose, and the crowd of students surged forward and wrested the little animal away from the dog, but it was too late. The squirrel was dead.

        Personally, I would have let nature take its course. Any squirrel that wasn’t savvy enough to dodge a dog would probably ruin the gene pool anyway. But President Oaks then discussed the point of this true-life parable, not too different from the parable I offered:  

Anyone in that crowd could have warned the squirrel at any time by waving his or her arms or crying out, but none did. They just watched while the inevitable outcome got closer and closer. No one asked, “Where will this lead?” When the predictable occurred, all rushed to prevent the outcome, but it was too late. Tearful regret was all they could offer…

[This] applies to things we see in our own lives and in the lives and circumstances around us. As we see threats creeping up on persons or things we love, we have the choice of speaking or acting or remaining silent. It is well to ask ourselves, “Where will this lead?” Where the consequences are immediate and serious, we cannot afford to do nothing. We must sound appropriate warnings or support appropriate preventive efforts while there is still time.

        What astounded me about this story is how closely it parallels the arguments that I’ve been making for years. The late 17th century theorist Samuel Puffendorf described the principle as a right to defend yourself from a “charging assailant with sword in hand.” The Book of Mormon implies this principle when it says Nephites were taught “never to raise the sword” except to preserve their lives (Alma 48:14). This is commonly assumed to mean defense. But there is a time between raising a sword and swinging the sword. As well as a time before swinging a sword and striking someone with a sword. Thus, defense doesn’t begin when the sword hits you or hits you three times as some inappropriately apply Doctrine and Covenants 98, but defense begins when the sword is raised but hasn't yet struck. Or as summarized by Grotius: when the attack is commenced but not carried out.

        The basic principle was best explained by the early modern scholar, and founder of international law, Hugo Grotius. He described the principles of intent, means and imminency. This applies personally and intentionally. A short time ago Israel saw thousands of Hezbollah rockets pointed at them. They had an avowed enemy with an expressed intent to exterminate Israel. The means consisted of thousands of rockets pointed at Israel. Those rockets were ready to launch, and Israel had solid intelligence that the launch was imminent. So, Israel exercised their God given right to defend themselves from a raised sword.

        Personally, this is just as applicable. A crazed men enters the subway. He yells about his intent that he wants to stab people and doesn’t care if he goes to jail. He waves around the knife in his hand. And he is so deranged an attack seems imminent. I’m not making any of this up, this was the Neely subway attack. Thankfully, a brave Good Samaritan that deserves a medal put the man in a choke hold and prevented an attack. He and other subway passengers didn’t stand around and say to themselves, “this is really dangerous, lets see where he’s going with this.” They didn’t wait until the attack was carried out, in which they or others would have already been hurt. They acted preemptively.

        Even comedians understand this principle! A young mother was at a sketchy motel in the movie, Manos: The Hands of Fate. When the strange motel employee, Torgo, started palming her hair the RiffTrax comedian jokingly added her line, “This is super creepy but I’ll just stand right here and see where he’s going with this.”

        And now, I found that one of the leaders of the church understands the principle as well. “Where the consequences are immediate and serious, we cannot afford to do nothing. We must sound appropriate warnings or support appropriate preventive efforts while there is still time.”

        This, dear readers, is the essence of justified preemptive war. I’ve been accused of being a warmongering, insane, deranged anti-Christ and war criminal with a stench of death for espousing these views.  All I want is for people to be safe and exercise their God given rights to defense. Now I find this view espoused by President Oaks.

        This principle has one more ironic note. Dallin H. Oaks is often quoted by peace advocates for his story about stopping a mugging by expressing tenderly, fatherly care.[1] The lesson gathered is somewhat misplaced, since an approaching bus distracted the mugger and seemed to have at least as much dissuasive power as Oak’s expressions of “assertive love.” On top of that, it’s rather condescending of pacifists to take one story and make it a general rule that should apply to everyone. Moreover, Dallin Oaks himself recognizes the need for preemptive action or else he wouldn’t have shared the parable of the squirrel years later.

        There is a great deal more evidence for preemptive war than many people realize. It has a strong theoretical basis based on solid reasons. The concept has implied scriptural support through Alma 48:14 and numerous other scriptures or stories. This includes Mosiah 9:1, the events after Alma 26:25, Helaman 1, Helaman 2, and even a careful reading of supposedly disqualifying verses like 3rd Nephi 3:21 or Mormon 4:4 support the practice. It works in the practical world ranging from the subway to missiles and it’s been practiced by everyone from Epaminondas to Moroni. Finally, its fundamental truth is explained by a supportive Dallin Oaks. We must ask where something will lead. When the cost of inaction is too dangerous, we are not only allowed, but commanded to take appropriate preemptive action.

Thanks for reading! If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page. Or you maybe purchase one of my books in the top left. 

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[1] Patrick Mason and David Pulsipher, Proclaim Peace: The Restoration’s Answer to an Age of Conflict, Maxwell Institute, Deseret Book, 2021) 109-113.

Grotius and the Book of Mormon

 Over at Mormon Dialog and Discussion Board there is a detailed discussion about methodology and if the 17th century philosopher, Hugo Grotius, wrote the Book of Mormon. As someone with a book on the subject and significant knowledge of Grotius I got tagged and felt obligated to respond. I also rarely get a chance to discuss the 17th century thinker Grotius and topics like preemptive war and my book so this was a good opportunity. This is copy and pasted from the board so I apologize for any weird formatting. 

        I appreciate being tagged on this. My newest book on just war in the Book of Mormon discusses Grotius a great deal. Its been well reviewed thus far and you can read those reviews and find a link to the book here: https://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2024/12/reviews-of-my-new-book.html

        I've been working a great deal so I can't go into extensive detail but I've got a few points worth mentioning about the topic.

        The major thrust of my book doesn't simply show congruency. As Ben has explained (many, many times) I think people tend to see what they want to see so the comparisons aren't very useful. What I did was use the keen insights of Grotius to better explain under studied elements in the Book of Mormon, and then in turn use those extra insights from the Book of Mormon to comment on matters of just war. Its a conversation among great thinkers more than finding comparisons. 

        To cite one specific topic with two examples we might look at the concept of preemptive war. I know most people think the Book of Mormon dismisses the concept out of hand. But the most frequently cited verse in Mormon 4, actually condemns the heart that makes the strategy not the strategy. The Nephites lost a great deal on the defensive too. I found 9 other verses that discuss the concept and show its use. I don't want to get too off in the weeds but if you want you can read more about it here: https://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleDeaneKishkumenDagger.html

        Probably the most important scriptures for this discussion are Alma 46:30 when Moroni justifies his capture attempted capture of Amalickiah, and Helaman's servant in Helaman 2 that preemptively kills the assassin before he kills Helaman. 

        These are important for how they interact with Grotius. Most justifications for preemptive war, outside of some more extreme views like Vattel, Gentili, or the Chinese Shizi, focus on the present. According to these theorists, if a nation focused on the past to justify preemptive war leaders would claim that they are reacting to the nefarious nature of the opposing regimes that are warlike and bloodthirsty and thus must be attacked first before they attack again (see Epaminondas for example). A focus on the future would be similar to the Thucydides trap, where Athens, WW1 Britain, WW2 Germany are respectively worried about a rising Sparta, Germany, and Russia. They have to attack now to prevent some greater calamity in the future. But the present is the more accepted position. You can read this from Walzer or in the Caroline Standard, but Grotius' criteria is still the most useful when he said that an enemy must have intent, means  and the defending nation must face an imminent attack. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.

        This is where both examples from the Book of Mormon matter. If you read Alma 46:30, you see that all of Moroni's concern's are in the future. Amalickiah has been defeated and is running away, there is no imminent attack, only future problems:

        Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any more strength; therefore he thought to cut off the people of Amalickiah, or to take them and bring them back, and put Amalickiah to death; yea, for he knew that he would stir up the Lamanites to anger against them, and cause them to come to battle against them; and this he knew that Amalickiah would do that he might obtain his purposes.

        This might seem like really obscure theory, but if Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon he wouldn't include details and narratives that contradicted his ideas of imminency. In fact,  many people dissented from the Lamanite king and then seized the "place of arms" (Alma 47:2; 5). So you could argue Amalickiah didn't have means either and many Lamanites didn't have the intent. So Grotius wrote a narrative that contradicts his theory of preemption, and then provided narrative details where Amalickiah fulfilled every worry that Moroni had, thus undermining his own theories even more.      

        The second verse regards Helaman's servant who preemptively killed Kishkumen during his assassination attempt on Helaman. This one is even more clear because Grotius wrote about robbers as a reason for law enforcement and not deadly preemption: if the conspirators “formed a plot, prepar[ed] an ambuscade, poisoning, or readied a false accusation [the planner] cannot lawfully be killed either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if [the ruler] thought delays could afford remedies.” (Ibid.) In other words, if the plot can be neutralized by the defenders using other remedies, then they likely haven't gathered the means, shown intent, and attack it isn't imminent enough to warrant deadly force. 

        Yet the servant of Helaman didn't take any other remedies. He was "out by night" and seemingly had plenty of advanced notice (Helaman 2:6). Kishkumen let his guard down and there was time as they "were going forth" to the judgement seat (2:9). A chapter before Nephite leaders seized incipient rebels like Paanchi  and killed them (Helaman 1:8; notice the preemption of the Nephites leaders as they seized him when he was "about" to flatter). Yet the narrative says Helaman's servant killed Kishkumen. We don't exactly know why he didn't call for the guards instead of killing them. But if Grotius wrote the narrative, we would assume that he would clearly articulate his previously stated beliefs that there was enough time to "use other remedies." Some might argue that the narrative doesn't clearly endorse this story as righteous so why bother. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that Moroni's dramatic use of omission about Helaman's servant, while simultaneously detailing the nefarious Gadianton plot, highlights the righteousness of Helaman's servant: https://interpreterfoundation.org/nameless-mormons-dramatic-use-of-omission-in-helaman-2/ 

        Here are a couple examples where extremely specific details from Grotius are entirely contradicted by the Book of Mormon text. I don't like simply showing congruency, or authorship based on poorly thought out similarities. As you can see just from two small examples, a careful study of scriptures, and using those scriptures to have a conversation with the best philosophers, brings new insights and deepens faith. I know I'm biased, but given the positive reactions to my book, and how I've independently published or presented 7 different times based on material from the book, I think its incredibly fruitful. 

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Even Unto Ignorance: Boyce Wrongly Dismisses Just War Theory

        

        Duane Boyce wrote that the “modern just war framework …makes no explicit use of scripture…it seems obvious that it cannot be sufficient to address the concerns of Latter-Day Saints.”[1] This is a stunning admission and great error which abandons great thinkers throughout history that have direct bearing on the Latter Day Saint views of war. Reading just war thinkers allows a person to realize the contours of the LDS debate, organizes LDS thinking into a powerful core, and adds specific application and advancement of LDS thought.

The Contours

        One of the biggest ironies of reading just war theorists and thinkers from the last few thousand years is the realization that LDS debates are not new. We bring new scriptures to the debate, but they are proof texted in support of the same arguments. Christian pacifists quote the Sermon on the Mount and turn the other cheek, while just war proponents cite Jesus overturning the tables in the table and the Lord’s support for rulers who are agents of his wrath to the wrongdoers (Romans 13:14). Latter Day Saints offer “renounce war and proclaim peace” and “defend your families unto blood shed (D&C 98:16; Alma 43:47). Yet, it remains the same debate.

        Christian just war theorists offered an answer to that debate that became the first chapter of my book on just warfare. This was a command for warriors to have a peaceful heart, while recognizing the tragic, and occasional need to use the sword. This was espoused by just about every theorist from Augustine to Locke. With this in mind, Latter Day Saints can renounce war, proclaim peace, AND defend their families unto bloodshed.

        In a later piece he shows some awareness of the core of just war (see below), but it is in the third appendix of his piece, only one page long, and still almost exclusively focused on Augustine and Aquinas. Even though his entire piece is devoted to resolving a scriptural tension between Captain Moroni and the Sermon on the Mount, he presents the solution as though it wasn’t articulated by theorists for thousands of years before hand.[2]

        His ignorance concerning the contours of the debate is especially glaring in his discussion of the Sermon on the Mount. He spent an entire chapter discussing its personal application without mentioning the easily applicable question about the Good Samaritan, or the ample evidence of the need for a peaceful heart (see below). His solution, that the Sermon describes a personal attitude that doesn’t exclude the use of the sword, repeats one of the most common of the 36 different interpretations that theorists have offered in the last thousand years.[3] With a knowledge of the contours of the debate he might simultaneously have more humility and confidence in advancing his opinion while transcending the perception that LDS thinkers are “restricted to the (metaphorical) mountain valleys as Mormon communities once were.”[4]

The Core

        With the understanding of how we can both proclaim peace and wield the sword, we can simply ask, if the Good Samaritan happened upon the beaten traveler in the midst of the attack, what would he do? This is a simple but powerful question that cuts through the proof texts and demands that we ask what would Jesus do in a given situation. His example of perfect love wouldn’t stand idly by while someone is attacked. Thomas Aquinas called that an “evil peace.” We can reasonably conclude that the Good Samaritan would have a peaceful heart, but also feel morally compelled to intervene. In fact, despite peace advocates like Patrick Mason and David Pulsipher talking endlessly about love, and calling their theory, “assertive love,” they don’t mention Jesus’ example of how we should love our neighbor and fulfill the second great commandment. I suspect they don’t mention this because of its powerful implications.

        Additionally, I first read this argument while reading Catholic Theologian Paul Ramsey.[5] Along with Michael Walzer, he is the leading theorist of the modern age. Thus, this is a modern application of the just war framework, using a clear scripture, that is imminently applicable to modern problems and Latter-Day Saint questions. Once readers notice the importance of the heart they can see it permeates all of scripture. Boyce noticed this as well, but he missed a chance to place this argument as simple but powerful core, buttressed by some of the brightest thinkers of the last thousand years. I put this core in the first chapter and returned to its importance throughout the book. Even after summarizing just war at the beginning of the book, Boyce left a discussion of the heart until chapters 13 and 14. In discussing “right intent” on page eight, he mentioned defense of rights, but not the state of the heart. In chapter 14, the heart is only one of many points included in a discussion of Alma 48, and its brief because he also discusses Doctrine and Covenants 98. In short, despite nearly approaching this core and describing its features, he presents this as just one of many ideas when it could be a simple but powerful summary of the whole argument. He misses its importance because he only has an acquaintance with just war theorists.  

Specific Applications

        Being familiar with just war thinkers I immediately noticed several areas where Boyce’s analysis would have been enhanced by applying them. In discussing preemptive war he discusses the complexity of judging the immediacy of attacks and the intent of the attacker. After a lengthy, and needlessly complex discussion of philosophy he added the example of a machine gun armed attacker that is about to attack a person's family.[6] He does all this to show some examples where preemption is allowed.

        If he read just war theorists, though, he could simply use the example of a “charging assailant with sword in hand” described by the 17th century German thinker Samuel Puffendorf. The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, talked about intent, means, and imminency. Or all the elements listed by Boyce, but Grotius did so in more succinct fashion. These are not scriptures, but still a brilliant insight that forms the foundation of modern international law, and their keen insights make them relevant today. (I show how they are relevant and provide numerous scriptures about the principles in my article with Square Two.) The omission of Grotius seems especially odd because Boyce included Grotius in his bibliography. I can only guess the reasons for the omission, but it must be some combination of not reading Grotius carefully, excluding him due to some kind of dismissive attitude towards non restoration leaders and scriptures,[7] or a desire to explain the concepts himself.

        This section of his book is one of the densest philosophically, but scripturally sparse. It didn’t have to be with a knowledge of just war theorists. I’ve since found at least nine scriptures that discuss the topic which aren’t included in his book. For example, Puffendorf discussed the charging assailant with sword in hand, which made me think of the phrase, “raise a sword” in Alma 48:14. This verse describes when the Nephites could preserve their lives by "raising a sword" to their attackers. Only the text doesn't use the words attack or defense which is vitally important to the concept of preemptive war. The text instead says, “raise the sword,” not smite, strike, slay, or any other word to denote that the sword had been swung and met flesh. That isn’t simply an evocative phrase but illustrates a fundamental truth. Mormon didn’t have to explain the distinction between a raised sword and a sword strike because the two concepts are so closely related that they are the same.

        Thus, while not explicitly stated in the Book of Mormon, if a Nephite attack is called “raising the sword,” Alma 48:14 suggests that righteous defense applies when a Lamanite soldier simply “raised his sword” to attack, and not after the first (or third) actualized attack. That means the Nephite standard for defense only requires an incipient attack, or someone that “raise[s] the sword.” The basic premise applied to both thought Alma 48:14 and Pufendorf, is that an individual who sees an attack in progress doesn’t have to wait for the first blow to assert their God-given right to defend themselves. They can preemptively defend themselves.

        Boyce quotes the first half of Alma 48:14 in a discussion of offensive and defensive war.[8] Without a knowledge of just war theorists his arguments sound more strained and needlessly complex, while missing scriptural support a mere clause away from the scripture he cited.

        He not only repeated the contours of an old debate while thinking he was original, but he also diminished the most important verses about warfare in the Book of Mormon. In a chapter separate from the Sermon on the Mount, and in a chapter that centered on Alma 48, he lists the important qualities of a peaceful heart. Only at the end of that section, perhaps as a capstone, but seemingly because it was least important, he describes how the Nephites were “sorry” to take up arms but reluctantly compelled" to do so(Alma 48:21-23.) With a knowledge of just war that should be the lead in the first chapter and constantly reinforced and referenced in every other part of work. For example, when Boyce rebutted the use of Mormon 7:4, “lay down your weapons of war,” he would have known that the second half, “and delight no more in the shedding of blood,” was a direct application of just war theorists on the war, and an easy refutation of a pacifist proof text. One searches in vain for any mention of a peaceful heart in the bibliography.[9]

Conclusion

        I endorsed his book in my review and I don’t withdraw that endorsement. Yet the text is most useful as a philosophical rebuttal to pacifist theories and rather short about an LDS framework for just war. Since I first read his book, I realized that a knowledge of just war vastly enriches LDS discussion on the topic and we should make a positive and thorough case for it because it’s so strong and easy to do. (I don't consider myself particularly bright, but I'm a leading LDS thinker on the topic, I've published or presented eight times on the topic in the last two years, because I seem to be the only one that has actually read just war thinkers.)  Boyce missed a similar chance in his book. Sadly, like pacifist writers such as Patrick Mason,[10] he only includes a smattering of just war theorists in his writings, such as Augustine and Aquinas while demonstrating little to no awareness of the applicable theory.[11] It is sad to see another writer diminish the importance of just war as “insufficient” at the same time his arguments and understanding of LDS scripture would benefit from those dismissed theorists.

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance writer and if you liked these ideas please consider supporting my research. You can use the paypal button at the bottom of the screen or buy one of my books in the top left. 

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[1] Duane Boyce, Even Unto Bloodshed, (Greg Kofford Books: 2015), 223.

[2] Duane Boyce, “Captain Moroni and the Sermon on the Mount: Resolving a Scriptural Tension,” BYU Studies, 60:2 (2021), 127-162.

[3] Craig Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Social Rhetorical Commentary, (Erdmans: 2009), 160-162.

[4] Benjamin Hertzberg, “Just War and Mormon Ethics,” Mormon Studies Review, 1:1 (Article 15) 2014.

[5] Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), (New York: Scribner, 1968),143.

[6] Boyce, Bloodshed, 194, 197, 202.

[7] Perhaps he has similar views to Mark Henshaw, who gave lip service to the importance of just war theorists but never applied them in 20 years, even though his work would clearly benefit from those thinkers. He did take time in those decades to scoff at those thinkers for being “medieval Catholics.” Mark Henshaw, Murder to Get Gain: LDS Thoughts on US Elements of National Power, 6509. Mark Henshaw, “A Response to ‘Kishkumen’s Dagger: First Strike in the Book of Mormon’ by Morgan Deane,” SquareTwo, Vol. 16 No. 1 (Spring 2023). Mark Henshaw, “On just peace,” in Perspectives on National Security in a Time of Upheaval, Latter Day Saint National Security Conference, Provo Utah, March 2023.

[8] Boyce, Unto Bloodshed, 238.

[9] Boyce does list peace in the index, but since his book is largely designed to philosophically oppose pacifism that is expected and too broad.

[10] Patrick Mason often uses secondary sources to quote church fathers which suggests he isn’t familiar with or hasn’t read them. See fns. 6-10 in Patrick Mason, "Zionic Non Violence as Christian Worship and Practice," in How and What you Worship: Christology and Praxis in the Revelations of Joseph Smith, Rachel Cope, Carter Charles, Jordan T. Watkins eds., (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book), 2020. In fact, every footnote in that piece referencing Christian fathers refers to a secondary source. See also fn. 4 in, Patrick Mason, “Rethinking Righteousness in the Shadow of War,” Public Square Magazine, August 4th, 2023. That footnote lists the primary and secondary source, suggesting he only found it in the latter: Idolatry 19, p. 73, quoted in Lisa Sowle Cahill, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Pacifism, Just War, and Peacebuilding (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2019), 77.

[11] The mentions of historical just war thinkers across LDS literature often seem limited to perfunctory references of St. Augustine and Aquinas before much longer analysis of LDS scripture or descriptions of modern international law and the UN charter. Michael Young, Chapter 19, Times of War Times of Peace: LDS Ethics of War and Diplomacy, Valerie Hudson, Eric Talbot Jenson, Kerry Karchner, (BYU Kennedy Center, 2018.) line 6509.

The Parable of the Two Princes

 

        The 9^th century Irish monk, Sedulius Scottus, wrote an interesting parable that interacts with the heart of just war and the Book of Mormon that I explained in my latest book. In his work he compares a righteous prince who sought peace for his enemies even after war with an evil prince.[1] In contrast with this righteous prince, the wicked prince continued to fight after refusing a sincere offer of peace. Sedulius wrote this to illustrate and expand upon the concept of the peaceful heart first elucidated by Augustine and Isidore of Seville.

        This interacts with the Book of Mormon and illustrates key concepts of just war within the text. The prince that prays for peace and his enemies even after war recall the Nephites who were “sorry” and “reluctantly compelled” to take up arms against the Lamanites (Alma 48:21-24). The Nephite felt sorry because they had to send so many unrepentant sinners into the afterlife. And they displayed the kind of hearts that welcomes Lamanite converts like the Anti Nephi Lehis and prisoners who make a covenant of peace into their midst (Alma 62:16-17), even after the many murders that the latter had committed. This reinforces the idea that the heart of the important wielding the sword is paramount and provides an illustration of the peaceful and violent heart.

        I described the violent heart of the second wicked prince in my first book. The story of a leader whose heart is so hard and warlike that they refused peace is found both within the Jaredite civil war and the Chinese War of the Eight Princes. Coriantumr saw the slaughter of the civil war which prompted him to repentance (Ether 15:2-6).

        This story contains the often-ridiculed number of two million people. Before we consider that number, it shows that critics would rather pettifog an inconsequential detail and miss the much more important morale of the story. Indulging that trivial detail, the number isn’t as implausible as the critics contend and shows us the savagery of the war and God’s wrath on the people. Ether 15 doesn’t refer to a single battle, but to the massive slaughter described in Ether 14. The losses of two competing factions over at least 8 battles of Ether 14,[2] plus numerous cities being overthrown (Ether 14:17), and multiple instances of women and children being slaughtered (Ether 14:17, 22), mean that two million is an entirely plausible number of dead. The ancient capital of China, Luoyang, had a population of 600,000 but only held a few thousand by the end of the War of the Eight Princes (see below.)  If the Jaredites had a few cities even a fraction of that size, the extirpation of “many” cities described in Either 14:17 and 22 easily accounts for many of those supposedly ludicrous “millions” of deaths.

        Returning to the more important moral of the story, after that slaughter Coriantumr began to repent, and wrote the leader of the side trying to find peace. But Shiz, showing the stone heart of the unrighteous warrior, demanded Coriantumr give himself up to be slain. The latter naturally refused, and both continued to fight until the bitter end.

        When I first studied this civil war, I compared it to the Chinese War of the Eight Princes because it had a very similar example. One of the eight princes in the civil war, Sima Yong, executed Zhang Fang and sent the head to the rival prince, Sime Yue, as part of a peace offer to no effect. The offer of peace might not have been sincere, but it was a chance to stop a war that was so devastating it turned one of the ancient great capitals of the world into a graveyard where “bleached bones covered the field.”

        The story shows the creativity of this Irish monk and reinforces the importance of Alma 48:21-24. I find those verses in Alma the most important of the war chapters and the most important scripture about warfare. The Title of Liberty really enthralls with its martial glory, but I’ve witnessed too many militant militia members with the Title of Liberty on their wall to fully rely on this story without significant caution from Alma 48. Being reluctant warriors is more important but far less romantic and hence less well known. It is only reading Sedulius that I realized those verses in Alma contrast with the rejected peace deal in Ether 15, to show different kinds of hearts.

        On a final note, it shows me once again that my instincts are very good. I’m not very famous. I can’t even make a list of lesser known Mormon scholars. (I’m Starlord man… Come on.) My posts on social media have more scammers than actual people liking them. I don’t have the right letters by my name, and I don’t work for any organizations that impress you. Lots of people look at my lack of worldly fame, credentials, and obscurity even within the Mormon community, and they cast me aside with a chortle and a few insults.

        But my ideas are solid. I regularly express ideas that are later validated by impressive scholars. The day I wrote this piece Robert Kagan, holding some endowed chair of geopolitics, agreed with my analysis on the use of human shields. In this and this post I explain key details about preemptive war that I later found in academic literature on the subject. I intuitively grasped the heart of just war here (about halfway down) and refuted the “renounce war, proclaim peace” cudgel a decade before I read any Christian thinkers.

        The tale of the two princes highlights my intuitive grasp of the heart found in Alma and Ether. The story from Seludius further solidifies and shows examples of the hearts that renounce war and proclaim peace, but also shows how the righteous wield the sword. It contrasts with those that are hardened beyond feeling, even though the warfare of both types of people might look similar. I hope it helped you think more deeply about the matter. Thanks for reading.

I work as a free lance writer. If you found value in this work, please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. 
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[1] Sedulius Scottus, Liber De rectoribus Christianis, 47.

[2] Ether 14:3, 4, 5 (a siege with combat), 11, 14, 16, 22 (multiple slaughters of soldiers and civilians, “shedding blood to shedding blood”), and 26.