The Parable of the Two Princes

 

        The 9^th century Irish monk, Sedulius Scottus, wrote an interesting parable that interacts with the heart of just war and the Book of Mormon that I explained in my latest book. In his work he compares a righteous prince who sought peace for his enemies even after war with an evil prince.[1] In contrast with this righteous prince, the wicked prince continued to fight after refusing a sincere offer of peace. Sedulius wrote this to illustrate and expand upon the concept of the peaceful heart first elucidated by Augustine and Isidore of Seville.

        This interacts with the Book of Mormon and illustrates key concepts of just war within the text. The prince that prays for peace and his enemies even after war recall the Nephites who were “sorry” and “reluctantly compelled” to take up arms against the Lamanites (Alma 48:21-24). The Nephite felt sorry because they had to send so many unrepentant sinners into the afterlife. And they displayed the kind of hearts that welcomes Lamanite converts like the Anti Nephi Lehis and prisoners who make a covenant of peace into their midst (Alma 62:16-17), even after the many murders that the latter had committed. This reinforces the idea that the heart of the important wielding the sword is paramount and provides an illustration of the peaceful and violent heart.

        I described the violent heart of the second wicked prince in my first book. The story of a leader whose heart is so hard and warlike that they refused peace is found both within the Jaredite civil war and the Chinese War of the Eight Princes. Coriantumr saw the slaughter of the civil war which prompted him to repentance (Ether 15:2-6).

        This story contains the often-ridiculed number of two million people. Before we consider that number, it shows that critics would rather pettifog an inconsequential detail and miss the much more important morale of the story. Indulging that trivial detail, the number isn’t as implausible as the critics contend and shows us the savagery of the war and God’s wrath on the people. Ether 15 doesn’t refer to a single battle, but to the massive slaughter described in Ether 14. The losses of two competing factions over at least 8 battles of Ether 14,[2] plus numerous cities being overthrown (Ether 14:17), and multiple instances of women and children being slaughtered (Ether 14:17, 22), mean that two million is an entirely plausible number of dead. The ancient capital of China, Luoyang, had a population of 600,000 but only held a few thousand by the end of the War of the Eight Princes (see below.)  If the Jaredites had a few cities even a fraction of that size, the extirpation of “many” cities described in Either 14:17 and 22 easily accounts for many of those supposedly ludicrous “millions” of deaths.

        Returning to the more important moral of the story, after that slaughter Coriantumr began to repent, and wrote the leader of the side trying to find peace. But Shiz, showing the stone heart of the unrighteous warrior, demanded Coriantumr give himself up to be slain. The latter naturally refused, and both continued to fight until the bitter end.

        When I first studied this civil war, I compared it to the Chinese War of the Eight Princes because it had a very similar example. One of the eight princes in the civil war, Sima Yong, executed Zhang Fang and sent the head to the rival prince, Sime Yue, as part of a peace offer to no effect. The offer of peace might not have been sincere, but it was a chance to stop a war that was so devastating it turned one of the ancient great capitals of the world into a graveyard where “bleached bones covered the field.”

        The story shows the creativity of this Irish monk and reinforces the importance of Alma 48:21-24. I find those verses in Alma the most important of the war chapters and the most important scripture about warfare. The Title of Liberty really enthralls with its martial glory, but I’ve witnessed too many militant militia members with the Title of Liberty on their wall to fully rely on this story without significant caution from Alma 48. Being reluctant warriors is more important but far less romantic and hence less well known. It is only reading Sedulius that I realized those verses in Alma contrast with the rejected peace deal in Ether 15, to show different kinds of hearts.

        On a final note, it shows me once again that my instincts are very good. I’m not very famous. I can’t even make a list of lesser known Mormon scholars. (I’m Starlord man… Come on.) My posts on social media have more scammers than actual people liking them. I don’t have the right letters by my name, and I don’t work for any organizations that impress you. Lots of people look at my lack of worldly fame, credentials, and obscurity even within the Mormon community, and they cast me aside with a chortle and a few insults.

        But my ideas are solid. I regularly express ideas that are later validated by impressive scholars. The day I wrote this piece Robert Kagan, holding some endowed chair of geopolitics, agreed with my analysis on the use of human shields. In this and this post I explain key details about preemptive war that I later found in academic literature on the subject. I intuitively grasped the heart of just war here (about halfway down) and refuted the “renounce war, proclaim peace” cudgel a decade before I read any Christian thinkers.

        The tale of the two princes highlights my intuitive grasp of the heart found in Alma and Ether. The story from Seludius further solidifies and shows examples of the hearts that renounce war and proclaim peace, but also shows how the righteous wield the sword. It contrasts with those that are hardened beyond feeling, even though the warfare of both types of people might look similar. I hope it helped you think more deeply about the matter. Thanks for reading.

I work as a free lance writer. If you found value in this work, please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. 
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[1] Sedulius Scottus, Liber De rectoribus Christianis, 47.

[2] Ether 14:3, 4, 5 (a siege with combat), 11, 14, 16, 22 (multiple slaughters of soldiers and civilians, “shedding blood to shedding blood”), and 26.

Sunzi and the Moral Low Ground

    

    Whenever I'm not working and have some free time I like to read. I love to engage ideas and usually I engage enough to make a post out of it. In this case I couldn't make it to page 3 of this book (The Choice of War: Iraq and the Just War Tradition) before I found a howler. This author claims that Sunzi "laid great stress on moral aspects of war" as proof the author cites the claim of Sunzi (using an old translation), “to win without fighting.”

    I was so ready to pounce on this incorrect statement I reminded myself of the Office character Dwight Schrute yelling “false.” Sunzi's admonition wasn't out of some moral, pacifistic desire to avoid war. But an amoral desire to avoid costly conflict. His amoral teachings were one reason why Confucians really didn’t like him. His desire to avoid battle was somewhat similar to the legalists in worrying about the productivity of the soon to be conquered province. Dead men don’t pay taxes, burnt farms can’t supply soldiers, and thus the cost of men and material spent in even a victorious battle was astounding and the legalists wanted to avoid costly battle for that reason.

    Sunzi did advise the invading army to seek profit as a way to entice the enemy into battle,[1] (or hopeless prebattle position), and take provisions from invaded territory to lower the cost of war. But these measures were mostly applied to lowering the cost of the invading army. He didn’t talk about ways to incorporate the province and quickly it make it a profitable part of the empire. For example, one of the lesser-known writers of the Seven Military Classics said of the conquered territory: “do not destroy material profits nor agricultural seasons, be magnanimous towards his government officials, stabilize people’s occupations, and provide relief for the impoverished.”[2]  

    Notice the last line that seems in almost direct contradiction of Sunzi. It said to provide relief to the impoverished, while Sunzi advised armies to literally plunder them. The treatment of the people is a huge factor that distinguishes Sunzi from others. My book had three chapters on this subject because it was visited so often and in so many variations by classical Chinese theorists. But outside of a perfunctory statement about winning the people, Sunzi’s writing often relied on pure calculation, force, profit, and throwing soldiers into places which they cannot fleet to stimulate the greatest effort.

    His first line is that warfare is the greatest affair of state, which ignores the second part quoted by most Confucians about protecting the altars of the ancestors.[3] As one writer said, “When a state loses its priorities, the altars of soil and grain will be wronged.” [4] Sunzi instead spoke mostly about tactical positional advantage (designed to produce victory without battle) and not about the Mandate of Heaven, righteousness, or benevolence. He discussed calculations in the temple, but only to assess the prospects of victory, not to pray or invoke Heaven's favor.

    Sunzi's theories were criticized by thee Confucian Xunzi as tactics for a bandit army and day laborers, or like stirring boiling water with a finger.[5] Even Wuzi, a fellow military writer often lumped in with Sunzi thought bandit armies that pursued profits were a weakness that could be exploited. He said that armies based on rewards ‘’scatter and individually” engage in combat, and when enticed with profit “will [greedily] abandon their generals to pursue it.”[6]

    Sunzi’s statement about avoiding the loss of life was not a moral high ground. But the results of base temporal concerns like profit and greed. It was disheartening to read such a major mistake so early in the book, and in print which means it got by an editor. But quoting Sunzi is an easy way to spice up a piece and few people know better so everyone from editors, to readers, and generals just go with it. I’ve seen bad quotes and interpretations from the financial review a Master’s thesis, and even General Petraeus. His terse writing and simple profundity lend itself to a wide variety of interpretations. But when compared to dozens of other classical writers a reader can better understand his theories and eliminate the bad interpretations such as Sunzi having some kind of moral objection to slaughter.

I work as a free lance author. If you found value in this ad free, high quality, research please consider donating using the pay pal button below, or buying one of my books linked in the top left, particularly Beyond Sunzi: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft. 

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[1] “Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits from the enemy is material goods.” And, “With profit [the general] moves them” Ralph Sawyer trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China: Sunzi (Westview Press, 1993), 160, 165.

[2] Sawyer, Wei Liaozi, 273.

[3] Sawyer, Tai Kong, 64-65.

[4] Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huanglao, and YingYang in Han China, Robin Yates trans., New York City, Ballantine Books, 1997.

[5] Basic Writings of Xunzi, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 1963,) 64.

[6] Sawyer, Wuzi, 210.

New Book! Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft

    I'm proud to announce my new book, Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft is available for preorder. My research into Chinese military history supplies many of the great ideas found for free on this blog. I have unique insights into the nature of warfare, insurgency, military theory, just warfare and so much more. If you find value in this blog, please make sure and check out the book. I keep the prices low so it is a great stocking stuffer for you and your loved ones.

Here is the blurb:

Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) is one of the most popular and widely known military writers in all of history. His ideas have influenced statesmen, generals, and businessmen for hundreds of years in the West and thousands of years in China. But Sun-Tzu was only one of many competing voices in Warring States China, and many Chinese philosophers and leaders, as well as a few modern Western military historians have questioned the privileged status of his theories. Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft, is the first book to systematically examine the chaotic debates among philosophers in the pivotal Warring States Period.

Military historian Morgan Deane examines scores of texts from the philosophers of Legalism, Confucianism, Daoism, the Seven Military Classics, and many others to find the truly dominant ideas of Chinese thinkers, areas of disagreement, surprising points of agreement, and a sophisticated synthesis. The result forces us to fundamentally reexamine Chinese military theory and gives us the tools to understand contemporary matters. This "broad knowledge" of Chinese military theory becomes an invaluable tool to help readers better assess the strength of Communist China, the relative unimportance of super weapons, the primacy of winning the allegiance of the people to your government, the importance of timeless counter insurgency methods, and so much more.

    I'm looking for reviews so if you'd like a free copy and have a blog or significant social media following feel free to drop me a line. Thanks!

    I work as a freelance author. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or you can buy one of my books.

The Atomic Bombing Was Necessary and Justified

 

    August 6^th marks the dubious day in 1945 when America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark controversy. There was a great deal of racial animus during the war with both sides holding disdainful views of the other.[1] Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3] After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealing that the trains ran normally a mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4] Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese that made this completely unnecessary. These are all extremely flawed arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context, and seem like excuses to blame instead of understand.  

    The strongest attacks seem to be the peace overtures. This theory argues that the Japanese were ready for peace and only block headed generals kept the war going.  These were detailed by a revisionist historian, Gar Alperowitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5] More importantly, they cherry pick some information and leave out much more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent and the U.S. was correct when they disregarded them.

    The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After the bombs dropped and the emperor wanted peace the military challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup. It’s incredibly unlikely that minor officials would have produced peace when the atomically convinced emperor almost couldn’t. Let me stress, even AFTER the atomic bomb dropped there were significant factions in Japan that wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. Plus, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have gotten them more concessions.

    Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but really aren’t. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

    But with all due respect to Eisenhower and other generals cherry picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear weapons since his New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7] 

    Other critics were more vocal against nuclear weapons because they were delivered by bombers and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] Their opposition had little to do with the qualms of modern pacifists and posting quotes from them ignores the historical context from which they were produced.

    The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese) dying from an invasion. An estimated two hundred thousand Chinese a month were dying at this point in the war. The Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] An invasion by American forces on the Japanese homeland would have skyrocketed those figures.

    There was the option not to fight which would have left China and much of Asia in the hands of a regime as bad as Hitler’s. You also have to wonder how long they would have felt comfortable with the U.S. in Hawaii so they would probably have attacked America again anyway. The U.S. could have continued to bomb them. The firebombing of Tokyo and conventional attacks actually caused more deaths than the nuclear bombs so that couldn’t have been a better option.

    The U.S. could have blockaded the country. Scholars argue that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[10] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would have caused more deaths and in a slow manner arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. It also would have given the Japanese time to kill more Chinese soldiers and civilians. So between deaths from famine and deaths from the Greater East Asian War that option would have killed millions more. Even then, any peace offering from the Emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings.

    Dropping the atomic bomb quickly ended the war which prevented the Soviets from invading as well. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and he invaded a a day after the second bombing. We saw how well Eastern Europeans were treated show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, the Soviet army’s refusal to help the free Poles in the Battle of Warsaw etc., so that wasn’t a good option. You can easily argue that the Japanese Constitution and rebuilding under MacArthur was far preferable to Soviet occupation.

    After looking at the other options and strategic context in late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact, ending the war at about 170,000 deaths compared to the abject blood bath that awaited all sides is the reason why the allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. The same prominent ethicist that condemned the bomb also said that ending the war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[11]  Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified this idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[12]

    Thus, every other alternative was far worse, but you have your pacifist, blame America, soldiers are barbaric Nazis storyline. THAT is the made up history. Again, considering every option and the context of their war the dropping of atomic weapons was justified and necessary. I hope you can use this as a resource the next time someone attacks America for this eminently defensible action.

I work as a freelance writer. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or purchase one of my books using the link to your top left. 

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[1] For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.

[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[3] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24.  Though it should be noted that Nagasaki was home to one of the most important military garrisons and was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained a valid military target. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6.  https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[5] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5^th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.  

[10] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.  

[11] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.  

[12] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197

 

Bad Quotes and Good Ideas

 

    I have a new book coming out, someday, called Beyond Sunzi: Classical Debates on Chinese War and Statecraft. The book was exciting to write as I showed how various strands of Chinese thought interact with each other. I mention it here, besides venting my frustration at glacial publishers, because I see lots of false quotes with somewhat catchy ideas with no sources that don't pass the smell test. Here is a link to many of the worst quotes.

    What’s interesting though is that many of these lousy or fake points are related to good points found in Chinese writing. This post lists a bunch of fake quotes followed by good ideas that are represented in classical Chinese theory (and sometimes elsewhere.)  Because I’m so often responding to memes that have no sourcing at all, I’m making sure to show you the translation and page number I take it from.

 "A leader leads by example, not by force?"

    This has some relation to the teachings of Shen Pu Hai (Shenzi.) He talked about a ruler's need to display inaction or a placid mirror, so his ministers don't try to change their opinions to curry favor. This is more of a Daoist kind of actionless action.[1]

"Sweat more during peace: bleed less during war."

    This sounds a bit like a description of the Roman army by Josephus where he says that Roman training maneuvers were like bloodless battles, and battles like bloody maneuvers.

"If quick, I survive. If not quick, I am lost. This is 'death.'"

    The cadence sounds correct. Classical writing often follows something called the four-character formula. Mao’s basic rules for guerilla warfare was so popular and easier to remember because they were 4 sets of 4 character formulas. Because of the strong stylistic resemblance, it could be from a bad translation of Sunzi though I’ve read multiple translations and still don’t recognize it. 

    Sunzi often talked about quick wars, fast movement, and seizing something the enemy wants. On quick wars, “a victory that is long in coming will blunt their blades and dampen their ardor.”[2] On forcing enemy movement, “One who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers [or seizes according to Sun Bin] something which the enemy must seize.[3] Moving quickly was something that Confucians valued.

"Victory is reserved for those who are willing to pay its price."

    The points sounds like this from the Wei Liaozi, though this line is disputed (see the next point). "I have heard that in antiquity those who excelled in employing the army could bear to kill half of their officers and soldiers."[4]

"Who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits."

    I don't know ANY author that would say this. Sunzi stressed the benefits of winning without battle mostly due to the high material cost of warfare (see above). Confucians would point to the needless loss of life. Legalists would be upset at the economic impact of losing so many farmers/ taxbase. I tried to get, "wading through blood and treading through guts" into my title because that summarizes how pretty much every writer found battle.

"When you understand what suits the terrain…investigate the rules for marching and formation…White blades meet; flying arrows are exchanged; you wade through blood and tread through guts; you cart the dead away and support the wounded; the blood flows for a thousand li; exposed corpses fill the field; thus victory is decided. This is the lowest use of the military."[5]

    Sun Bin, a purported lineal descendant of Sunzi, advised against commanders that employ them like tossed chunks of earth and grass.[6]

    The writer considered the prototypical Confucian minister, Guanzi, said that if the people were forced to crack the bones of their children for cooking then the state uproots itself.[7]

"The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate them into deeds."

    This one sounded close to something but is not in Sunzi’s text. It is in the history about him. After executing the king’s concubines because they failed to follow orders correctly the king dismissed the army. Sunzi responded to him, “Your majesty only likes the words, he is not able to realize their substance.”[8] That is a close enough translation, but it is not in the Art of War!! Moreover, his concept of punishment was disputed by many, including Sun Bin who said it wasn’t urgent.[9]

"Convince your enemy that he will gain very little by attacking you; this will diminish his enthusiasm."

    The general point is echoed in many places. Sunzi talked about displaying profit to entice the enemy and dampening their chi by waiting to attack. Sun Bin and Wuzi talked about how to manipulate the enemy. Here is the former:

The enemy’s generals are courageous and difficult to frighten. Their weapons are strong, their men numerous and self-reliant. All the warriors of their Three Armies are courageous and untroubled. Their generals are awesome, their soldiers are martial, their officers strong, and their provisions well supplies. None of the feudal Lords dares contend with them. How should we strike them?

To strike them, announce that you do not dare fight. Show them that you are incapable; sit about submissively and await them in order to make their thoughts arrogant and apparently accord with their ambitions. Do not let them recognize your ploy. Thereupon strike where unexpected, attack where they do not defend, apply pressure where they are indolent, and attack their doubts.[10]

"In peace, prepare for war. In war, prepare for peace."

    At first glance this sounded like a Latin phrase, and it is indeed: If you want peace prepare for war.

"Even the finest sword plunged into salt water will eventually rust."

    This echoes a point that Confucians would make about the importance of character, proper rites, filial piety and the dangers of a corrupt state. Xunzi talked about nations that had the sharpest swords, highest mountains, toughest armor, and yet because they forfeited the mandate of heaven they fell.

"The men of Ch’u make armor out of sharkskin and rhinoceros hides, and it is so tough it rings like metal or stone. They carry steel spear made in Yuan, sharp as the sting of a wasp, and move as nimbly and swiftly as a whirlwind. [Notice the reference to swift movement.] And Chu’s troops were defeated at Chiu sha and their general Tang Mei, was killed; and…the state was ripped apart. Surely this did not come about because Chu lacked stout armor and sharp weapons. Rather it was because its leaders did not follow the proper way."[11]

    Confucius wrote that "an inhumane man cannot long abide in comfort."[12] And: "Only when the year turns freezing cold do we realize that pine and cypress are the last to winter."[13]

    Wei Liaozi wrote: The perfected man [chunzi] does not stop criminals more than five paces away….If you flog a person’s back, brand his ribs, or compress his fingers in order to question him about the nature of his offense, even a state hero could not withstand this cruelly and would falsely implicate himself.[14]

    As you can see, these are bad quotes but good ideas. Some are real quotes that are attributed to someone else. But most of these are bastardized ideas that have little relation to Sunzi and some relation to Chinese thought if you know Chinese well enough. Luckily, I do and have a book about it coming out soon. The zi/ tzu ending in Chinese means master, and they were masters of their craft. It’s a shame people don’t put much energy into learning from such great texts, many of which are translated and easily available, but rely on diluted ideas and fake quotes.

Thanks for reading! I work as a free lance author. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page, or you can buy one of my books using the link in the top left. 

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[1] Herlee Creel trans., Shen Pu Hai: A Chinese Philosopher of the 4th Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 249, 351.

[2] Ralph Sawyer trans., The Art of War, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (New York: Westview Press, 1993), 159.

[3] Ralph Sawyer trans., Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare,(Westview Press, 1995), 165, 186. One line reads: cause the enemy to roll up his armor and race far off.

[4] Sawyer, Wei Liaozi in the Seven Classics, 276.

[5] Andrew Seth Meyer trans., Huainanzi, by Liu An, chapt 15, (New York: Columbia University Press), 103.

[6] Sawyer, Sun Bin, 200.

[7] W. Allyn Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophic Essays from Early China v.1, (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1985), 294.

[8] Spring and Autumn Annals as quoted by Sawyer, Seven Classics, 151.

[9] Sawyer, Sun Bin, 90.

[10] Sawyer, Sun Bin, 169.

[11] Burton Watson trans., Xunzi: Basic Writings, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 71-73.

[12] Chicung Huang, The Analects of Confucius, (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 67.

[13] Ibid., 107.

[14] Sawyer, Wei Liaozi, 258.