Reading a take this week praising President Trump’s “decapitation” approach to terrorism, I couldn’t help but think of Book of Mormon — specifically the Amalickiah cycle and the campaigns of Captain Moroni.
Amalickiah twisted and maneuvered his way to the top and instigated war through private assassination. Teancum tried to end the war by killing Amalickiah and then Ammoron.
While the tactic might have been the same, their hearts were far different. Targeted assassination is described as "necessarily offensive" by LDS National Security professional Ryan Chavez,[1] but Teancum's was a offensive tactic within a defensive war and it was aimed at ending the war.
Amalickiah was trying to gain power and start a war. The difference in intent is key in any discussion and why its the first chapter of my book.
Most importantly here, it diffuses the argument that Trump shouldn't have done this because "what if China or Russia did it too?" Based on intent, the US relying on a decapitation strategy against a state sponsor of terror is as great as the difference between Teancum and Amalickiah relying on assassination.
Decapitation strategies are not new. They show up in Roman campaigns against insurgent tribes, in early modern wars of succession, and in 20th-century counterinsurgency doctrine. The Spanish figured out that despite the Aztec's numerical superiority and scary visage, if they concentrated on the leader they could quickly scatter enemy forces.
We still don’t know exactly what happens next. We've been warned by isolationists, pacifists, and pointy headed pseudo scholars that we couldn't strike Iran. The risk of blowback or escalating into a war was too great. Or they'll call this a "mission accomplished" moment, invoking the specter of Iraq.
As a result, we had 50 years of some nice sounding policy papers as Iranian extremists took hostages, provided insurgents with deadly bombs, rained rockets on Israel and pursued nuclear weapons.
Yet there’s solid research that decapitation strategies can shorten wars, reduce violence, and increase the likelihood of victory when done successfully. Studies show that removing insurgent or militant leadership tends to reduce the intensity of conflict and increase chances of ending it quickly rather than dragging indefinitely, even if it’s controversial and not always decisive on its own.[2]
More importantly, we've had Trump, the real estate developer, smash fears of "endless war", "escalation" and "mission accomplished" in a series of 12 day wars, decisive operations to capture Maduro, and decapitation strikes.
Those who read the Book of Mormon shouldn't be surprised. Decisive actions by Moroni weren’t just about winning battles — they broke their will to fight. After Moroni’s victories, Alma 47:2 records how many Lamanite were so afraid of facing Moroni that they fled and rebelled rather than take up arms.
We are constantly taught that Ammon and the Sons of Mosiah were the peacemakers. But Moroni and King Benjamin show that decisive force can be precisely what ushers in a longer peace. Moroni pacified thousands of bitter enemies and dissenters who moments before were fanatically devoted to killing him and let them leave with a covenant of peace.
If Amalickiah had simply been captured before seizing power (Alma 46:30), the Nephites likely would have enjoyed a period of peace comparable to the golden age under King Benjamin.
So the irony here, is that after Senator Lee was trolled and ratioed for comparing Trump to Moroni, Trump has acted like Moroni by blending the Teancum Option with Moroni's decisive victory in battle to produce peace.
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1. Ryan Chavez, “The Teancum Option and Modern LDS National Security Thought,” Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth, Kerry Kartchner and Valerie Hudson eds.,(Brigham Young University Press, 2003), 87-100.
2. Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95–111.
David, Steven R. "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Mideast Security and Policy Studies 51 (September 2002): 1–25.
Frankel, Matt. "The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns against Insurgents and Terrorists." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 17–30.
Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2009): 719–755.
Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46.


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