Holy Subversive Warfare

      

        I had a great post that I think would make a great journal article. Please read this Chatgpt summary of what I have thus far. 

        The central argument is that the Bible and Book of Mormon contain a recurring concept of “holy subversive warfare,” in which righteous actors sometimes use methods that would normally be considered dishonorable or immoral, including deception, infiltration, ambush, and assassination. Rather than judging these actions simply by whether they conform to conventional warfare, their morality depends on the actor, authority, purpose, target, circumstances, methods, and consequences.

        The central image is Jesus as the “Robber Messiah.” In Mark 3:27, Jesus describes his victory over Satan as entering the Strong Man's house, binding him, and taking his possessions. The unusual metaphor portrays Jesus not as a conventional soldier but as an infiltrating outlaw who invades Satan's domain and liberates those held by him. This connects with the temple being called a “den of thieves” and the Book of Mormon's portrayal of the Gadianton Robbers as agents of Satan.

        The biblical examples then develop this pattern. The story of John the Baptist's execution connects to Jesus' own death and victory over death, while Herodias is contrasted with Esther, Judith, and Jael. Judith and Jael use deception and stealth to kill powerful enemies, while Esther uses her influence to save her people. Together, these stories present subversive action as something that can serve either wicked or righteous purposes.

        The Book of Mormon provides another series of examples. Nephi kills the drunken Laban and obtains the brass plates through stealth; Gideon's secret passage involves drunken guards; Teancum infiltrates the tents of Amalickiah and Ammoron at night; Moroni uses ambushes, infiltration, and nighttime operations to liberate prisoners; and the unnamed servant of Helaman infiltrates the Gadianton Robbers and stops an assassin. These actions occur outside normal battlefield conventions, yet they are generally presented as serving righteous purposes rather than being inherently immoral.

        Augustine and Aquinas provide a Christian ethical framework for understanding these examples. Augustine argued that a just war could legitimately be conducted through ambush, while Aquinas argued that military plans could appropriately be concealed from an enemy. This creates a distinction between treachery and legitimate concealment or subterfuge.

        Classical Chinese thought provides a parallel tension. Confucian thinkers often associated virtue with openness and condemned treachery, while Sunzi treated deception as fundamental to warfare. Xunzi connected military strength to the moral and political order created by a righteous ruler. Deception could therefore be reconciled with morality when it served legitimate political purposes, particularly when it avoided the greater destruction of prolonged warfare. Mencius likewise emphasized that military strength alone could not preserve a state lacking moral order.

        The broader conclusion is that subversive warfare cannot be judged simply according to whether its methods are conventional or unconventional. Deception, ambush, or assassination is not automatically righteous because it is effective, but neither is it automatically unrighteous because it is deceptive or unconventional. The relevant questions concern intent, authority, target, method, circumstances, and likely consequences. This framework can also be applied to modern questions involving espionage, targeted attacks, and preemption.

        The final image returns to the distinction between the conventional warrior and the robber. The warrior wins on the battlefield, but the robber enters the house at night. The ultimate example is Christ, whose apparent surrender to death becomes the means by which death itself is defeated. The Robber Messiah therefore represents a broader conception of righteous power that does not always operate through conventional strength or conventional rules.

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The Outlaw Messiah: Jesus, Violence, and the Strong Man

 

Chatgpt 2026, "Parable of the Strongman" 

        For the longest time Mark seemed like a shorter version of Luke or Matthew with less back story, polish, and interest. Jesus enters with no backstory, and Mark repeatedly uses the word immediately. His miracles often produce fear, and he commands the recipients of those miracles to secrecy. The apostles frequently misunderstand and then deny and abandon Him. The story ends abruptly with no dramatic reveal of Christ’s resurrection but only a mysterious promise.[1]

        But then I read a book, picked up for several dollars at a gas station thrift library, called The Bible as Literature. It provided a new lens that turned what had seemed incomplete and frustrating, suddenly became one of the most interesting Gospels. The speed, secrecy, fear, misunderstanding, and abrupt ending all contribute to the same portrait of Jesus as something almost too powerful and strange for the people around him to comprehend.

        For example, one thing I had never noticed, is that while defending His authority to cast out demons, Jesus compares Himself to a robber who enters a strong man's house, binds him, and plunders his possessions. Mark 3:22-27:

²² And the scribes which came down from Jerusalem said, He hath Beelzebul, and by the prince of the devils casteth he out devils.

²³ And he called them unto him, and said unto them in parables, How can Satan cast out Satan?

²⁴ And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand.

²⁵ And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.

²⁶ And if Satan rise up against himself, and be divided, he cannot stand, but hath an end.

²⁷ No man can enter into a strong man's house, and spoil his goods, except he will first bind the strong man; and then he will spoil his house.

        The salient part is the image itself. Jesus described someone entering a house, overpowering its ruler, binding him, and taking his goods. There may even be a wordplay here involving Beelzebul and the “house,”[2] which makes the passage even more interesting.

        Jesus is saying that he isn't casting out demons by the devil's power. He is overpowering the devil with His own power. Like a robber, he is invading the strong man's domain and taking back what belongs to him. The “goods” are, figuratively, the people whom Jesus is liberating from demonic power.

        This makes it rather striking regarding the theology surrounding the use of force. Jesus doesn't describe his victory over Satan as a process of peace building dialogue. He described it as an invasion, the binding of an enemy, and the seizure of his possessions. But his invasion did not produce the political revolution or military victory associated with traditional concepts of the Jewish Messiah, nor did it fit the traditional definition of “gospel” as the good news of a military victory.

        While Jesus rejected those traditional concepts, he did not reject the righteous use of personal force. If Jesus wanted that, He likely would have referenced a far more conciliatory option than home invasion, binding, and seizing. Moreover, the fact that Jesus compared himself to a robber rather than a soldier suggests something socially subversive about His assault on the devil’s kingdom. It it was simply about violence he could have described himself as a soldier. But perhaps there was a bit of Markan irony in describing his mission in subversive terms. And it could have described some of his subversive tactics like healing or dining with publicans and lebers. It was also a way for him to say that His mission was more important than societal rules and cleanliness rituals of the Law of Moses. 

        The use of robber is especially striking considering he called the temple a “den of thieves”, or “robbers” in some translations (Mark 11:17). And the Book of Mormon depicts Gadianton Robbers as founded by Satan (Helaman 6:26-27; Ether 8:15-16, 25). Jesus uses this parable to proclaim that He is beating the devil at his own game by adopting the role of the outlaw instead of noble king or soldier, particularly during the cleansing of the temple when He is the socially disreputable figure who uses force and transgressive means to accomplish his ends.

        In Just War terms, this might initially seem to undermine the concept of Just Authority. That authority is what distinguishes legitimate force from banditry. Yet Jesus deliberately uses the imagery of a robber to describe his assault on the devil’s kingdom, operating outside any earthly state authority. The tension is resolved by the fact that Jesus Himself is the divine authority that ultimately grounds legitimate human authority. His use of force against Satan does not eliminate the requirement of Just Authority for human beings or justify banditry. It instead demonstrates that divine authority is not dependent upon earthly political institutions and norms.

        The robber imagery may point to a deeper irony in Mark’s portrayal of Jesus. He subverts expectations of a conventional conquering Messiah, and adopts the role of an outlaw who infiltrates and overthrows his enemy from within. Yet this unconventional Messiah was still subversive enough for Rome to perceive him as a threat and crucify him.

        The Parable of the Strong Man joins a long list of scriptures that suggest the pacifist reading is rather limited and contested at best. When talking to soldiers neither John the Baptist (Luke 3:10-18) nor Jesus commanded soldiers to lay down their arms (Matthew 8:5-13). Jesus praised the centurion for his faith!  Jesus described parables where the master used force to compel servants to enter (Luke 14:23).

        All four gospels describe Jesus using whips to cleanse the temple (Mark 11:15-19). By driving out the money changers, stopping people from using it as a shortcut, and shutting down business, Jesus is binding the strong men (the high priests and elites) who are running an exploitative system. He then "plunders" their authority by teaching the crowds right under their noses and liberates their goods, the exploited poor like the widow (Mark 12:41-44).

        Emblematic of many pacifists, Mason and Pulsipher tried to explain this away as “only” violence against objects and animals. But similar violence in the Book of Mormon was enough for Ammon to maim and kill people.[3] Digging deeper, the key to understanding Jesus’ use of force is to realize that he disrupted temple sacrifices that were supposed to mediate sin and replaced them shortly thereafter with the great and lasting sacrifice of Jesus’ Atonement. So, force at the temple wasn’t an unfortunate and isolated incident to explain away. But one more action central to His mission because it pointed to the atonement of Jesus Christ. It was subversive like a robber, but Mark then used irony to point out how Jesus’ subversive behavior countered and would eventually atone for their subversive sins.

        Moreover, the Markan account of the temple cleansing is sandwiched by another use of force when Jesus smote a fig tree for only appearing to be fruitful (Mark 11:12-14, 20-25). This wasn’t a capricious act of violence by Jesus or random fragment of an ancient text, but His use of force created a powerful teaching moment about the appearance of righteousness among the people of Israel that masked their deep sins and wholly corrupt society that had a veneer of righteousness centered in the temple.[4]

        Jesus said that he didn’t bring peace but brought the sword (Matthew 10:34), and in another instance, fire and division (Luke 12:49). When struck, Jesus didn’t turn the other cheek (John 18:22-23).

        A broader look at the New Testament continues this pattern. Paul says the rulers are appointed by God as “agents of his wrath to the wrong doer” (Romans 13:4). And Jesus promises in revelation that he will kill so many people that the blood will flow like a wine press for 200 miles (Rev 14:20).

        We can comfortably add Jesus’ parable of the strong man in Mark 3:22-27 to this list. He could have described his victory over Satan as reconciliation or persuasion. In this case Jesus didn’t use an example of nonviolence or assertive love. Instead, he describes himself as a robber who entered the strong man's house, overpowered him, bound him, and liberated his captives.

        The enigmatic use of a strong man brings me back to the comet analogy. The comet and this parable might be confusing, mystifying, and even upsetting, but they are significant, understandable, and even beautiful after consideration. And that might be the true beauty of the Book of Mark as the apparent incompleteness of Mark is part of the point. The readers, like the disciples, are left trying to figure out exactly who this terrifying, miraculous, misunderstood figure really is and we grow into better people and disciples as we do so.

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[1] Though Jesus commanded Peter, James, and John not to share the secrets of what happened on the Mount of Transfiguration until after his resurrection (Mark 9:9-10). Because readers have that knowledge, it would argue that Jesus was now resurrected.

[2] Jesus’ wordplay on house might have invoked the word play of Elijah when the latter mocked the Master of the House, Beelzebul, as Lord of Flies, Beelzebub. If this was deliberate by Mark, he is showing how Jesus used word play to invoke the greatest prophet, Elijah (2 Kings 1:3-4).

This is also an example of how dense and subtle Mark is. In a few lines Jesus responded to the Pharisees by sharing a parable with subtle word play that mocked the demon and invoked Elijah. Mark started his account by describing John the Baptist in such a way that invoked Elijah (Mark 1:6; 2 Kings 1:8), which also made the Strong Man parable a thematic touchstone and callback!

[3] Patrick Q. Mason and J. David Pulsipher, Proclaim Peace: The Restoration’s Answer to an Age of Conflict (Provo, UT: Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship; Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 2021), 161.

[4] The money changers are the traditional targets of Jesus’ wrath, but it goes much deeper. The money they used often had the deified Roman Emperor on it, which made it idolatrous.

The money was likely gained through unethical practices, such as failure to pay taxes owed to a landlord. After committing their crimes, thieves would flee to a den for safety. Hence, they had fled to the temple, giving the appearance of righteousness while really making it a “den of thieves.” Jesus’ statement is likely a reference to Jeremiah 7:11, where the prophet condemned wicked Israelites who felt they could commit all sorts of evil acts but then flee to the temple for safety, as though it were a lucky charm that automatically covered all their sins. And that made the temple a "den of thieves."

Their unethical practices in this case were likely connected to the merchants and elites at the temple because Jesus uses the Parable of the Tenants immediately after his temple cleansing, sandwiched by the cursed fig tree (Mark 12:1-12). There he compared the elites to tenants that didn’t pay rent and beat the servants/prophets of the Landlord/God the Father, before the Landlord/Father sends his beloved son/Jesus, whom the wicked tenants kill.

Many people may have used the courtyard as a shortcut for secular business (Mark 11:16). The Gentiles were supposed to be allowed in the outer courtyard, but they had been displaced by the animal marketplace. This is likely the first reference in Jesus’ statement before calling them a den of thieves: Isaiah 56:7: “My house will be called a house of prayer for all nations.”

Finally, in the story of the Widow’s Mite (Mark 12:41-44), the widow gives all her money, two mites or pennies, to support the temple when the temple funds should have been used to support widows like her.

Clearly, like the fig tree that Jesus cursed for only having the appearance of fruit, Israel was rotten to its roots.

 

Atomic Bombings Justified? Examining the even worse alternatives

 

August 6th marks the controversial day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. Critics of Hiroshima have long debated whether dropping the bomb was moral yet every realistic alternative would have killed far more people.

The Question Is Not Whether the Bombs Were Horrific

            Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[1] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[2]

The Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later.[3] Critics have argued that the bombings were intended not only to force Japanese surrender but also to demonstrate American military capability to the Soviet Union.

Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets. Critics also argue that Japanese peace overtures made the bombing unnecessary.

Critics of the bombings often focus on morality in isolation. The real moral question, however, is whether any realistic alternative would have produced fewer deaths.

Did Japan Actually Offer Peace?

            The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. The Japanese were ready for peace and the argument implied it was only the blood thirsty, American war mongers who kept the war going. Gar Alperovitz later argued that these peace efforts demonstrate the bombing was unnecessary. His interpretation, however, relies on selective evidence.[4] More importantly, this interpretation emphasizes evidence supporting its conclusion while overlooking later events.

            The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup.

Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[5] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

            Again, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting.

Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. It took two atomic bombs to convince them, and even then, just barely. American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions. Any idea of peace before dropping the bomb conflicts with the available evidence from Japanese decision making in 1945 and relies on assumptions about what Japanese leaders would have done under different circumstances. 

The Postwar Critics and the Context of Their Opposition

            Some critics rely heavily on statements from military leaders who opposed the bombing after the war. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

             Eisenhower's later criticism must be considered within its historical context and ultimately discounted. He commanded the war in Europe and wasn't privy to the intelligence or decision-making in the Pacific. Yet today his opinion is often treated as expert testimony on a campaign he didn't direct.

When he became President Eisenhower’s New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7]  He threatened the use of nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Strait Crises and was so interested in their deployment that he developed tactical nukes.

            The main source of opposition was parochial, interservice rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] 

It isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize what they called the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

    The Alternatives Were Not Bloodless

                Japan was unlikely to surrender without either atomic bombing or a catastrophic invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

            Estimates vary significantly depending on assumptions about Japanese resistance and invasion scenarios. But General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[10]

If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. Critics who focus primarily on the immediate destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki often do not account for the enormous human cost of alternative strategies.

Blockade and Starvation as Alternatives

            The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[11] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death.

That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

            Any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet their statements are often used as rhetorical props in modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons.

            Ending the War Before a Soviet Occupation

            The rapid end of the war also prevented a larger Soviet role in Japan. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

            The Least Harmful Choice Available

            Ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why some allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[12]

Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[13]

            Every other option was worse than using atomic weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral, and I’ve seen people sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But nuclear weapons were not used in a vacuum. They were used against a horribly aggressive regime, and they prevented alternatives that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war is not as catchy as the sarcastic claim that “Jesus nukes people,” but it reflects the moral reasoning used by Allied leaders who believed it was the least harmful option available.

            Any evaluation of the atomic bombings must account for both the destruction they caused and the alternatives available during the final months of World War II. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

            Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

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[1] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[2] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[3]  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[4] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[5] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.

[10] Frank, Downfall, 340.

[11] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.

[12] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.

[13] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197.

The Tuttle Twit? Twenty Years of Connor Boyack Misunderstanding Preemptive War

        I first encountered Connor Boyack nearly twenty years ago. His writing reflected a familiar libertarian style. It was confident, combative, and heavy on slogans while light on careful definitions. Since then, he has become a successful children's book author and largely scrubbed his old website, but a recent "Musing" sounded strikingly familiar.

        After tracking down the original article he tried to erase, I discovered that, despite two being nearly twenty years old, Boyack is still relying on the same flawed talking points against preemptive war.[1]

        Below is a checklist of the arguments he made then and is still making now. I've included timestamps from his recent video to show just how little has changed. While some of this post revisits earlier research, my primary goal is to demonstrate how much relevant scholarship and little thought Boyack has engaged with and shown over the last twenty years:

Bad Definition (14:38)

Massive network of spies (14:45)

Perfunctory shout out to Just War and catch phrases without understanding key terms. Incorrectly treats preemption as incompatible with Just War theory.(15:07)

Severely out of context Eisenhower (15:17)

Cherry picked first presidency statement on “law of the jungle” (15:41)

Contextualizes the war chapters to exclude them (He didn’t repeat this point in his musings, he simply ignored the war chapters this time.)

Inappropriate use of terrorist (18:08)

De contextualizes 3 Nephi 3:20-21 Mormon 3:10 as evidence (18:18; 21:12)

Misuses A Brent Merrill, who was describing a strategic situation and not a command from the Lord (18:36)

Nephite battles take place in Nephite territory (22:23)

Misapplied use of Hugh Nibley (23:03)

        As you can see, his musings aren’t inspiring or insightful, just the same stale talking points based on unexamined assumptions from twenty years ago. More importantly, on every single point he has missed additional research that would have better informed his arguments.

        Before I show why, I might answer the overall question of his post "Where are all the peacemakers?" That’s a rather insincere question since his version of peace making is repeating the same sanctimonious and shallow talking points for twenty years while insulting his opponents as terroristic Gadiantons (the internet never forgets!) and war mongering propagandists.[2]

        The real peacemaking starts by taking the subject seriously, grappling with complex issues and respecting those who disagree with you by at least avoiding lazy name calling. Despite leading or contributing to multiple institutes, selling millions of books, and emphasizing those credentials on his website, Boyack hasn't done the intellectual work that genuine peacemaking requires such as engaging opposing arguments, refining his definitions, and responding to scholarship published since he first made these claims.

Boyack gets the definition wrong

        Let us start with his definition of preemptive war: Serious theorists going back 500 years have had a better definition than Boyack, who defined preemptive war as simply "fighting your enemy on your terms, before they (may or may not) fight you on theirs," or in short, "get them before they get us." But definitions matter as they distinguish between preventive and preemptive war using concepts like imminence, intent, and capability.  

        The early modern writer Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law, defined preemptive war as being "lawful to kill those who are planning to kill." He is the one that provided the criteria of means, intent, and imminency.[3] The last criteria, “imminency,” is particularly important in the modern age when some missiles can move 20,000 miles an hour or cross the US in about seven minutes. The line between preemptive and preventive war can therefore be measured in mere minutes, yet Boyack ignores that distinction entirely, preferring simplistic and sanctimonious talking points.

        Micheal Walzer, the leading modern theorist on just war that Boyack also ignored, best summarized the differences by talking about past, present, and future and only justified attacks based on present threats, not past aggressions or fear of future consequences.[4] It’s quite an interesting debate that brings a great deal of sophistication and nuance to the subject, and precisely the level of moral analysis absent from Boyack's discussion.

        Boyack mentions just war in perfunctory fashion, but doesn’t understand any details of the practice.  He relies on a few phrases, “true defense” “legitimate self-defense” and an improper understanding of last resort. Boyack only source is a link to a Wikipedia article.

        His shallow slogans are no substitute for engaging the actual literature. Simply invoking "legitimate self-defense", for example, proves very little. Nearly every aggressor in history has claimed to be acting defensively. Even Hitler justified invading Poland by citing alleged abuses of ethnic Germans in the Danzig Corridor.

        Applying the idea of legitimate law enforcement, Salamanca School scholars Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez argued that just as kings can send out a posse of law men to capture bandits, nations can preemptively send forces into lawless areas.[5] Thus, the Nephite desire to “search out…and destroy” the Gadianton bandits in their hiding places is a perfect representation of this just principle (Helaman 11:28). If you’ll excuse my bluntness, Gidgiddoni said “Lord Forbid” (3rd Nephi 3:21), because they were getting their asses kicked, not because it was wicked. Boyack's failure to move beyond the same talking points over the last twenty years reflects a remarkable lack of intellectual development.

Boyack ignores contrary evidence

        The evidence Boyack does present is so selectively chosen that his argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. His warning about a "massive network of spies" functions more as a libertarian talking point than a carefully argued objection. Ironically, overwhelming scriptural evidence cuts against Boyack's own example (Alma 43:23; 44:21; 56:22, 39). Helaman’s servant in Helaman 2:6-7 is most useful. After some night time spying, the servant killed Kishkumen before he killed the chief judge. Helaman’s servant might have righteously reported that “[I] got them before they got us.”[6] 

        As with Book of Mormon passages about spies, Boyack's interpretive framework effectively excludes the Book of Mormon's war chapters from consideration whenever they become inconvenient. Yet those chapters are precisely where the Book of Mormon wrestles the most with interstate conflict, preemption, deterrence, and the ethics of military action. They cannot simply be brushed aside because they complicate a preferred narrative

        Take Alma 46:30 for example, which describes reasoning for Moroni’s preemptive action. This is an extremely interesting verse because the narrative discusses future action: “Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any strength.”

        This verse is about the future, which makes it on the more radical end of the spectrum than the present imminence described by Walzer. Moroni was a man that could shake the foundations of Hell, so his actions should be analyzed instead of explained away. Rather than wrestle with Moroni's reasoning, Boyack gave excuses for ignoring them.

Boyack strips sources of their context

        Other evidence is presented without the context necessary to evaluate it properly. We have already seen this with the strategic context surrounding "the Lord forbid." The same problem appears in Boyack's treatment of the First Presidency's prewar statement, which he quotes in isolation while ignoring the events that immediately rendered it incomplete. Pearl Harbor transformed both the strategic situation and the First Presidency's public position. Their 1942 statement offered a far stronger defense of the war effort, suggesting that Boyack is appealing to an isolationist argument the Church itself substantially abandoned once the realities of aggression became undeniable.

        By quoting Eisenhower, who also relied heavily on spies in his foreign policy, Boyack took a dilettantish approach, selecting quotations that appear supportive but prove far more nuanced in context. Boyack quoted Eisenhower opposing first strikes, but restored to his historical context, Eisenhower also said he would launch an all out preemptive attack without approval of congress if Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons were confirmed to be preparing to strike[7] In private documents, Eisenhower wrote that he would “shoot the enemy before they shoot you” if an imminent Soviet attack were confirmed. In Boyack's own terms, that is simply "get them before they get us." Yet Eisenhower rejected preventive war while unequivocally endorsing preemptive war against an imminent attack.

        This is why the definitions established in Section One matter. Boyack treats all first strikes as morally equivalent, with only the most minimal acknowlgement of the differences between prevention and preemption, but imminence fundamentally changes the moral calculus to the point that Eisenhower himself answered both "yes" and "no" to first strikes depending on the circumstances. Boyack slogan's never reach that level of nuance. 

       I have already discussed "the Lord forbid" and the use of spies, but Boyack's use of Mormon 3:10 ignores an even more important point. As I argued at the LDS National Security Professionals Conference, the Nephites had already endured far more than the three offenses required by D&C 98:39–40. Their failure was not strategic but moral. By this point they had become rapist cannibals, so any military campaign, including a preemptive one, was doomed to fail. Boyack mistakenly throws out preemptive war when the text is actually condemning the wickedness of those who employed it.

Boyack’s Odd Argument and Conclusion

        The oddest example is Boyack’s argument that because Nephite battles occurred in Nephite territory, any use of force outside U.S. borders is wrong. This collapses under basic examination. If a terrorist launches a nuclear missile from Cuba, Boyack’s logic suggests the United States cannot lawfully intercept it until it crosses American territory. Yet the threat, and the moral right of self-defense, is identical seconds before and after crossing an invisible border. As discussed in Section One, modern missiles move so quickly and cause such devastation that delay can be fatal. Basing nuclear defense on such a rigid interpretation of Nephite warfare is a dangerously imprudent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

        DC 98 is best understood as the LDS version of the Sermon on the Mount. Just like mainstream Christians, we should have a peaceful heart and renounce war. But we can and must reluctantly resort to arms when it becomes a tragic necessity to stop the massacre of brothers and families (Alma 48:21-23).

        The issue isn't that Connor Boyack and I disagree. The problem is that Boyack has become one of the topic’s loudest voices while remaining deeply unserious. His talking points have remained unchanged despite two decades of scholarship and personal study that should have refined them. Serious disagreement requires serious engagement with the strongest opposing arguments. Repeating slogans for twenty years while neglecting scholarship is not peacemaking, nor is it a serious contribution to the debate over preemptive war.

        Ideas about war are too important to leave to slogans. Lives depend on getting these questions right. If we are going to invoke scripture to guide questions of war and peace, we owe one another more than decades of recycled talking points.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buying on of my books. The last of which, To Stop a Slaughter, is a book length treatment of just war and the Book of Mormon. I also write fiction, check out my cyber punk thriller. 

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[1] He often calls it "preventive war," a common rhetorical tactic used to make the practice sound more objectionable by shifting the debate to the less defensibile preventive war. The problem is the "imminence" is often contested to the point the dinstinction becomes a reflection of one's bias. 

[2] The second link is to a different author than Boyack, but it contains the same tone, talking points, and spirit of Boyack. Literally in the first two minutes of Boyack's "musings" he called his opponents "war mongers." 

[3] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.

[4] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

[5] Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 163–165. Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J.: De Triplici Virtute Theologica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 740–743.

[6] There is some debate over the silence of the Book of Mormon about the morality of this action. I think a lack of editorial dissent means approval. Mark Henshaw believes the practice needs affirmative approval in the text. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that the simultaneous anonymity and silence surrounding Helaman’s servant, and the detailed exposition of the secret works, is a subtle but strong editorial comment that shows the secret works of darkness are known to God, and the righteous works of defense against them are not known to man.

[7] Implicitly stated in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d55