Monday, January 2, 2023

The Nazi's Veto

 


    Murray Rothbard was the father of modern libertarianism and in turn inspires many Latter Day Saint views of war, including this horrendous reading of the Book of Mormon. But the libertarian’s elevation of the individual at the expense of the state ends up creating what I call the “Nazi’s veto” that disallows any state war, and as a result, leaves the state and individuals with no real power to stop abuses.

    Rothbard’s fundamental axiom of libertarian theory “is that no one may threaten or commit violence (‘aggress’) against another man’s person or property.”[1] He explains this by using a private example that person A has no right to aggress against B because C is threatening. Rothbard claims that “give me liberty or give them death is a far less noble battle cry” and that simplistic theory sounds convincing.

    Those are nice ideas that falls apart upon even a cursory examination. Let’s go back to the fictional examples of people A, B, and C. There are moral differences that immediately make this far more complicated, and unworkable in practice. For example, lets say that person A is a police officer or sheriff, and he is responding to a bank robbery. The robber is doing what libertarians complain about the state, robbing the people of their money. But in stopping the robber, person C, maybe the police officer, person A, causes the robber to crash into another car, killing an innocent lady, person B. In this case, A was stopping C from violating rights, but did so at the expense of person B. That proves the libertarian case, right?

    The libertarian fear of an innocent third person having their rights aggressed would mean that almost no force could be used ever. But the bank robber, rapist, murder (or genocidal dictator below) must be stopped. Sometimes force is required and yet innocent people, (hypothetical person B) could still be hurt, or “aggressed” against. Instead of disallowing force, most people would still consider the actions of the police in this case just, if extremely tragic and regrettable. They might carefully monitor the use of force and ask if other tactics might have been more appropriate, but their use of force would still be just. (Before we continue, notice how this is the distinction between just cause and just conduct regarding warfare. The police can have every right to stop a robber, but not by any means necessary.)

    Now think of the same example, a bank robbery, but maybe the robber intentionally puts someone else in danger. They take a hostage. This would largely shift the immorality of the third person being hurt to the robber (though we would always hope that the robbery can be stopped without the loss of innocent life.) That still requires force, with even more risk to innocents, but if the innocents are hurt, that means the criminal and not the police are at fault.

    There are many different permutations we could do in this situation to assess morality and rights in stopping the criminal. But the point is clear, while the ideal is that no innocent third party should die in defense of your rights. If practiced to the libertarian extreme, it restricts the use of force to such a point that no force can be used. In this fictional example, the police would be so restricted by the danger of aggressing against other’s rights (and since he is government funded official, according to libertarians he is already aggressing against the citizen by living off of taxpayer money),[2] he couldn’t stop the robber.

    The difficulties in morality only get more complicated in war. The state, like the police, is empowered by the people it represents to protect the rights of its citizens under its care by using force. This is the basic contract in the constitution that promises to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, and in return they have the power to tax, print money, make laws, jail citizens, and conscript and fight wars.

    Once that right is recognized, it becomes necessary to determine which strategies are employed so that they don’t create new victims. That is the fundamental reason because justice in war. Because even if the cause of the war is just, it can’t be fought in a way that creates more victims of injustice. Libertarians would deny the state’s power and morality to send soldiers into war. But their ideas would leave much of the world impotent in the face, as the Book of Mormon would say, the “barbarous cruelty” of terrorists (Alma 48:24).

    Libertarians would argue for a limited right to self-defense, and if living under a tyrannical government that they should encourage rebellion in those unjust states. But the oppressed minorities often don’t have the means to resist. Forgot about possessing firearms or having the freedom to organize a rebellion, simply existing as a Bosnian Muslim, Volga German, or a Tutsi in Rwanda would be enough to warrant arrest and execution for many regimes. Much like the actual Warsaw uprising in 1944, Rothbard’s fictional example of Waldavia (225) would say good luck, and then like the Soviets, but because libertarians dislike the state, would stand by and watch them get slaughtered. That isn’t a good moral position to take.

    The idea of rebellion from citizens denied their rights also contradicts the Book of Mormon which taught that if people are oppressed it is because of their wickedness and the Lord will deliver them in his own time. Mosiah 21:15 explains:

15 And now the Lord was slow to hear their cry because of their iniquities; nevertheless the Lord did hear their cries, and began to soften the hearts of the Lamanites that they began to ease their burdens; yet the Lord did not see fit to deliver them out of bondage.

    This is in part because the people would only be slaughtered. (Think of the three failed attacks from the people of Limhi [Mosiah 21:6-12], or the Melian Dialogue.) Philosophers were also wary of rebellion because the chaos and slaughter from a rebellion had a good chance of being worse than the injustice that caused the rebellion!! (It is no surprise that the person who witnessed these blood drenched revolts, Martin Luther, didn’t give any right for the people to revolt. See his text, The Murderous Thieving Hordes of Peasants.) The Salamanca school scholar Francisco Suarez wrote, revolt is just “if essential for liberty…always provided that there is no danger of the same or worse evils falling on community as result of the tyrants death.”[3]  Hugo Grotius, often called the founder of international law, wrote about the same right to revolt if the king alienates his people, but also placed limits on potential usurpers because it would lead to fighting among various factions.[4] From a libertarian standpoint then, the advice for citizens to revolt, not only caused their own deaths in futile revolts, but could result in even more bloodshed, and aggressing against rights, than the always condemned “state war.” 

    Even saying that, America rains death from above which is still horrible right? Let us go back to the A, B, Cs from earlier. Killing a civilian by accident is different than deliberately targeting him or her. If they happen in the course of legitimate acts of war (similar to legitimate police functions designed to save people from our earlier example) and the direct intention is a morally acceptable military target, then unintentionally killing civilians is within the realm of just war. That probably sounds like lame justifications to many libertarians. Those deaths are still tragic and a horrible loss of life and unless you’re okay with genocide and mass murder it doesn’t forbid war.[5] Like the police stopping the robber, the public should reasonably ask if the military should have been more cautious and use better judgement (not to mention aim) during the situation. But disallowing any state use of force is a poor strategy against groups that have far more power than individuals and is often state sponsored themselves.

    To conclude, let us get even more specific about the damning consequences of the fundamental libertarian axion. The ideas that “it is impermissible to violate the rights of other innocent people and war “only proper…when the exercise of violence is rigorously limited to the individual criminals,” lead to the conclusion, “State wars are always to be condemned (220, 222).” (Notice how libertarian ideology elevates personal rights but excludes the collective rights of people represented and expressed by their government.)  Libertarian theory then would have the rights of the most ardent Nazi sympathizer staffing the German war machine veto any moral, humane, just, and even righteous impulse to stop massive slaughter and genocide of innocents. 

    J. Reuben Clark, often quoted by libertarians because of his staunch isolationism displayed the Nazi's veto during World War II. He was so isolationist that he repeatedly advocated for a negotiated peace with Germany that would have left them in control of much of Europe.[6] He did so after multiple reports from death camps such as Auschwitz. According to libertarian philosophy, the United States could not wage war because it might aggress against the rights of innocent third parties, and those third parties should sponsor their own revolt. But it is ridiculous to think that German libertarians would have any collective power against the Gestapo, let alone European Jews already in concentration camps.  It was only state power that could stop the genocide of a totalitarian government. Libertarians, so concerned about being violated by taxes, would ensure that so many others get slaughtered by disallowing any intervention by another state.

    That isn’t a moral or workable philosophy for the evil in the world. In fact, their philosophy only marginal works for individuals in relatively isolated areas like the American mountain west, long ago tamed by agents of the state, such as sheriffs, and protected actions of the state such as defeating Nazi Germany. I kind of wish libertarians would take the same passion they have for hating the government and taxes and spare at least some dislike for the massive slaughter of Ukrainians. If they did, then maybe they would have some Christlike compassion for their brothers and try to stop their slaughter, instead of an ideological zealotry against the state that gives Nazis a veto against that impulse.  

I work as a free lance author. Producing ad free research takes time and effort. If you found value in this work, please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] Murray Rothbard, “War, Peace and the State,” We Who Dared Say No To War: American Anti War Writing from 1812 to Now, Murray Polner, Thomas Woods Eds., (Basic Books, 2009,) 217-226.

[2] 222 “Any war against another State, therefore, involves the increase and extension of taxation-aggression over its own people.”

[3] Andre Azevedo Alves, Jose Moreira, John Meadowcroft, The Salamanca School, (Bloomsbury Academic Pro, 2013), 53. Suarez.

[4] Grotius said on page, 73 “if king alienates the people, he invites retributions.” But places limits on usurpers, 76. Stephen Neff trans., Grotius on the Laws of War and Peace, (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[5] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Examples, (Basic Books, 2015,) 153-155.

[6]  D. Michael Quinn, “Pacifist Counselor in the First Presidency: J Reuben Clark Jr., 1933-196” in War and Peace in Our Times: Mormon Perspectives, Patrick Mason, J. David Pulsipher, Richard Bushman eds. (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), 153-154.  


Thursday, December 15, 2022

Sunzi and the Moral Low Ground

    


    Whenever I'm not working and have some free time I like to read. I love to engage ideas and usually I engage enough to make a post out of it. In this case I couldn't make it to page 3 of this book (The Choice of War: Iraq and the Just War Tradition) before I found a howler. This author claims that Sunzi "laid great stress on moral aspects of war" as proof the author cites the claim of Sunzi (using an old translation), “to win without fighting.”

    I was so ready to pounce on this incorrect statement I reminded myself of the Office character Dwight Schrute yelling “false.” Sunzi's admonition wasn't out of some moral, pacifistic desire to avoid war. But an amoral desire to avoid costly conflict. His amoral teachings were one reason why Confucians really didn’t like him. His desire to avoid battle was somewhat similar to the legalists in worrying about the productivity of the soon to be conquered province. Dead men don’t pay taxes, burnt farms can’t supply soldiers, and thus the cost of men and material spent in even a victorious battle was astounding and the legalists wanted to avoid costly battle for that reason.

    Sunzi did advise the invading army to seek profit as a way to entice the enemy into battle,[1] (or hopeless prebattle position), and take provisions from invaded territory to lower the cost of war. But these measures were mostly applied to lowering the cost of the invading army. He didn’t talk about ways to incorporate the province and quickly it make it a profitable part of the empire. For example, one of the lesser-known writers of the Seven Military Classics said of the conquered territory: “do not destroy material profits nor agricultural seasons, be magnanimous towards his government officials, stabilize people’s occupations, and provide relief for the impoverished.”[2]  

    Notice the last line that seems in almost direct contradiction of Sunzi. It said to provide relief to the impoverished, while Sunzi advised armies to literally plunder them. The treatment of the people is a huge factor that distinguishes Sunzi from others. My book had three chapters on this subject because it was visited so often and in so many variations by classical Chinese theorists. But outside of a perfunctory statement about winning the people, Sunzi’s writing often relied on pure calculation, force, profit, and throwing soldiers into places which they cannot fleet to stimulate the greatest effort.

    His first line is that warfare is the greatest affair of state, which ignores the second part quoted by most Confucians about protecting the altars of the ancestors.[3] As one writer said, “When a state loses its priorities, the altars of soil and grain will be wronged.” [4] Sunzi instead spoke mostly about tactical positional advantage (designed to produce victory without battle) and not about the Mandate of Heaven, righteousness, or benevolence. He discussed calculations in the temple, but only to assess the prospects of victory, not to pray or invoke Heaven's favor.

    Sunzi's theories were criticized by thee Confucian Xunzi as tactics for a bandit army and day laborers, or like stirring boiling water with a finger.[5] Even Wuzi, a fellow military writer often lumped in with Sunzi thought bandit armies that pursued profits were a weakness that could be exploited. He said that armies based on rewards ‘’scatter and individually” engage in combat, and when enticed with profit “will [greedily] abandon their generals to pursue it.”[6]

    Sunzi’s statement about avoiding the loss of life was not a moral high ground. But the results of base temporal concerns like profit and greed. It was disheartening to read such a major mistake so early in the book, and in print which means it got by an editor. But quoting Sunzi is an easy way to spice up a piece and few people know better so everyone from editors, to readers, and generals just go with it. I’ve seen bad quotes and interpretations from the financial review a Master’s thesis, and even General Petraeus. His terse writing and simple profundity lend itself to a wide variety of interpretations. But when compared to dozens of other classical writers a reader can better understand his theories and eliminate the bad interpretations such as Sunzi having some kind of moral objection to slaughter.

I work as a free lance author. If you found value in this ad free, high quality, research please consider donating using the pay pal button below, or buying one of my books linked in the top left, particularly Beyond Sunzi: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft. 

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[1] “Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits from the enemy is material goods.” And, “With profit [the general] moves them” Ralph Sawyer trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China: Sunzi (Westview Press, 1993), 160, 165.

[2] Sawyer, Wei Liaozi, 273.

[3] Sawyer, Tai Kong, 64-65.

[4] Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huanglao, and YingYang in Han China, Robin Yates trans., New York City, Ballantine Books, 1997.

[5] Basic Writings of Xunzi, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 1963,) 64.

[6] Sawyer, Wuzi, 210.


Wednesday, November 30, 2022

Research Update: Isolationism, First Strike, Sacrifice, Ambushes Oh My!


Hey everyone. I haven't been able to post here, but that doesn't mean I don't have any great writing out there. Here is a list of current projects in various stages of publication: 

To Stop a Slaughter: The Book of Mormon and Just War: This is being considered by a publisher right now. I've heard that JK Rowling and Frank Herbert's Dune both went through many publishers before getting picked up. So I know its a good manuscript and it will get its day...just some day. 

Am I My Brothers Keeper: This is a piece that discusses the continuing isolationism from American analysts regarding Ukraine. I argue that many people are sadly like Cain, and dismissing the problem in Ukraine as someone else's problem because they aren't their brother's keeper. Its submitted to the same place that published my piece at the beginning of the war so I think it has a good shot. 

Kiskkumen's Dagger: I thought this blogpost was so good I took that skeleton, cut the fat, strengthened some arguments, added more, and submitted it for publication. The concept of first strike is an important modern concern and Helaman 2 probably has the most detailed and applicable account. Its currently at Square Two, since I thought national security professionals might appreciate this the most. 

Maxwell Institute Theology Seminar: This great seminar is back and in Harvard's Divinity School this year. I've applied in the past and this year is on Alma 34, which just happens to be part of my book, and an article for Public Square I've already written. So I think I have a good shot at this, but I say that every year, so yeah. If I'm not one of the participants I'll post my application, consisting of a creative reading of Alma 34:7, here as soon as possible. It is about the use of ancient law regarding witnesses and penal sacrifice in Amulek's sermon about Christ's atonement. (That sounds complicated, but they give me one verse to work with and ask for a creative reading so that's what I do.) 

Moroni's Letter: I've got this one pretty close to journal ready. Its about some of the unique arguments that Moroni makes and addresses in his letter. This includes the proper military strategy that interprets waiting on the Lord for deliverance, interpreting military defeat, and the use of sinfulness of ambushes. Moroni's strategy was much more active, for example, which I contend was a rebuke of previously more passive Nephite strategy. I'm still working on a better title and debating who I should submit to. 

As you can see I have some great things in the works. None of them make a great blog post which is why the blog has been fairly quiet for the past little while. But I've been writing like crazy. If all goes well I'll be announcing many publications soon. They are all pretty connected as well, so even if just a few are published I can still build buzz for my book.

Thanks for reading. What are you most looking forward to?

I work as a free lance writer. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page, or buying one of my books linked at the top left. 

Monday, October 24, 2022

Modern Problems Ancient Solutions

 


  

 I almost named my first book modern problems to ancient solutions. I’ve also mentioned before that I find classical Chinese theory some of the most thorough that I’ve seen outside of maybe Clausewitz. It is all the more amazing because in some cases these theories were expressed thousands of years ago. I was reading a new book Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by James Dubik. I’ve got a book coming out on just war, and there are so many other books on the subject I want to keep abreast as much as I can. The book itself was a bit of a dud.[1] But the important part was that the book brought up important ideas that were addressed a long time ago, hence the title of this post.

    One of the dominant themes of Reconsidered is that a large reason for having a moral strategy determined by high level leaders is to make sure the soldier’s executing it are not dying in vain for it. President Lincoln considered this idea in the Gettysburg Address. Dubik said the soldiers should know that commanders care about soldiers (p. 52). And on page 99 that soldiers are expected to risk their lives, but know their lives are not thrown away, wasted in missions “without achieving something that would give their sacrifices meaning.”

    That sounds nice but isn’t new. Numerous classical Chinese authors, (between 400 and 200 BC) commented on the connection between goals and methods. One of the reasons the great military theorist Sunzi advised that the pinnacle of victory is winning without a fight, was to avoid needless casualties when they swarm over city walls like ants.[2]

    The purported descendant of Sunzi, Sun Bin, said simply that when commander “employs them like earth and grass,” they won’t respect or follow him.[3] One of the leading Confucians, Mencius attacked the leaders who treat ministers like grass.[4] In both cases they referred to the clumps of dirt and grass that were often cast aside without a thought by shoveling day laborers. These examples focused more on battlefield leadership. But they shared high level responsibility of modern civilian leaders and high-level military strategists. 

     The next comparison from Dubik’s book was between the idea about civil control of the military. The founders were concerned about an Oliver Cromwell type figure which is why they required military funding on a yearly basis done by the House. After World War II the civilians in the government passed the National Security Act as a further safeguard. In this case, Dubik said that militaries strong enough to protect were often strong enough to overthrow the government (57).

    This was a classic Chinese dilemma. The generals of the Southern Jin dynasty of the mid-5th century AD could often sweep down the Yangtze River and overthrow their civilian leaders. The An Lushan rebellion (755 AD) started in the periphery because of a powerful general gained power while protecting the frontier. And the final defection of the Lu Wende, inspired by civilian officials fearful of growing power, doomed the defeat of the Southern Song in the 13th century to the powerful Mongol invasion.

    To solve this, Chinese leaders often had what was called Tiger Tallies, which were two halves of a totem that needed to be combined by the civilian and martial leader, or provincial official and representative from the central government before the provincial military leader could muster the military.

    On top of this, there were various ceremonies that reinforced the need to remove a general from his command and source of power before meeting civilian officials. The historical background for one of the seven military classics, Methods of Sima, included this:[5]

[After taking command and hearing news of the enemy’s withdraw] thereupon [the general] pursued and attacked the [enemy], subsequently retaking all the territory within the borders of the old fief, returning with the soldiers. Before [the general] reached the state capital he disbanded the units, released them from military constraints, swore a covenant, and thereafter entered the city. Duke Ching (547-490BC) and the high officials greeted him in the suburbs, rewarding the troops and completing the rites, only afterward returning to rest.

    The footnote explains that removal of military constraints consists of the loyalty required of soldiers to their commander. This has obvious implications and recalls Caesar crossing the Rubicon as the most famous example of a military commander using the army for political purposes. I also noted how there was both a ceremony, implied ritual, before Amalickiah could enter the capital and meet the queen ( Alma 47:33).

    Just  like military officials shouldn’t use their military power to intimidate civilian officials or seize power,  there are multiple examples of how the military commander should not face interference in the field from officials in the court with their often out of date and faulty information. Dubik wrote about the example of President Johnson who brow beat and demeaned his generals to the point that dissuaded the kind of sustained discussion and debate needed for good high-level policy (61,95).

    The military theorist Tai Kong explained it well here:

After the General has received his mandate, he bows and responds to the ruler: ‘I have heard that a country cannot follow the commands of another state’s government, while an army [in the field] cannot follow central government control. Someone of two minds cannot properly serve his ruler; someone in doubt cannot respond to the enemy. I have already received my mandate and taken sole control of the awesome power of the fu and yueh axes [symbols of authority similar to the tiger tally discussed above]. I do not dare return alive. I would like to request that you condescend to grant complete and sole command to me. If you do not permit it, I dare not accept the post of general.’ The king then grants it, and the general formally takes his leave and departs.[6] 

    But the Tai Kong only discussed the general being free from meddling. Johnson (and other poor modern leaders) denigrated their advisers. The classical Chinese military theorist Wuzi discussed this danger as well. In my book about classical Chinese thought, I described the danger that theorists described as being the smartest man in the room:

[The general Wuzi] attended a meeting in court where the ruler was often dismissive of his ministers...After the meeting he expressed his concern to the ruler by sharing the story about the King of Chu and the value of ruler receiving wisdom from ministers: I have heard it said there are no lack of Sages in the world and no shortage of Worthies in a state. One who can get them to be his teachers will be a king, while one who has them as his friends can become a hegemon. Now I am not talented, yet none of my ministers can even equal me in ability…This is what the King of Chu found troublesome, yet you are pleased by it. I therefore dare to be fearful.[7]

    As usual, Wuzi seems to bridge the divide between various camps to produce a sound and practical synthesis. In contrast to legalists he is a military official that seems supportive of the ministerial class, but not so much so like Confucians. He supported the basic concept that a ruler should learn from his advisers in order to create the best strategy which doesn’t needlessly sacrifice his soldier’s lives. Wuzi simply argued that a ruler can be far more powerful by listening to his ministers and side stepped the advice of Taoist rivals about being unknowable.

    Supporting a sustained debate to achieve good strategy is offered by Dubik as a much-needed reassessment but he was simply repeating good ideas elucidated thousands of years ago. This good debate was formed, by what he said, was generals that possessed a “broad understanding.” This term was immediately explained to mean an analytic mind that can see coherence amid fog [a possibly Clausewitz term][8] and listen to extended discourse (101).

    This is an exhortation about military leaders could penetrate the bureaucracy. The writings of Guanzi, often seen as the prototype of a good Confucian minister also gave parameters for penetrating fog, but his “broader approach” suggested moving beyond than super weapons or a larger number of soldiers. I chose to include hit here because, Guanzi’s use of the term is broader than the ability of keen generals to offer good policy advice:

The art of conducting warfare consists… of acquiring a broad knowledge of the realm and an understanding of strategy- all to an unrivalled degree… It is impossible for [the ruler] to hope to bring order to the realm if his material resources do not excel those of the rest of the realm. It is [also] impossible even if he excels in material resources, but fails to excel in [the skill of] his artisans, or if he excels in [the skill] of artisans, fails in weaponry. [Likewise] it is impossible even if he excels in weaponry, but fails in [the quality of] his knights, or if he excels in [the quality of] his knights, fails in his instructions. It remains impossible even if he excels in his instructions, but fails to do so in training, or if he excels in training, but fails in terms of having a broad knowledge of the realm, or excelling in terms of broad knowledge, fails in his understanding of strategy….[9]

    The good ideas of the past being so applicable to modern problems is the major reason why I would rather read older books for their wisdom and avoid being so quick to abandon or ignore those texts in favor of modern ideas. One of the most enjoyable parts of being a historian is reading the wise words of an ancient scholar and being impressed by their keen intellect and wisdom. It is the conceit of every modern age to think that they alone have solved all the world’s problems. Yet they only do so by abandoning the past. Such reasoning has resulted in the reign of terror, massacres in the great leap forward, and the folly of pacificism overriding just war theories. I hope I’ve provided even a small part of their wisdom and I hope I’ve inspired you to read them more.

    Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. (If you liked this piece, you might enjoy Beyond Sunzi: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft.)

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[1] It discussed the moral burden resting on politicians and top generals involved in creating a winning strategy. But it focused a great deal on bureaucracy which was fairly typical for a top general trying to offer something new.

[2] Sunzi, in The Seven Military Classics, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Basic Books, 1993), 161.

[3] Ralph Sawyer trans., Sun Bin’s Military Methods, (New York: Westview Press, 1995),200.

[4] Mencius: A New Translation Arranged and Annotated For the General Reader, W.A.C.H. Dobson trans., University of Toronto Press, 1963), 16.

[5] The Methods of Sima, in Seven Classics, 114.

[6] Six Secret Teachings of Tai Kong, The Seven Classics, 64.

[7] Wuzi, Seven Classics, 210.

[8] Eugenia C. Kiesling (2001). "On War Without the Fog" (PDF). Military Review. October 2001.

[9] Guanzi: Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans., (Princeton University Press, 1985,) 132.