The Tuttle Twit? Twenty Years of Connor Boyack Misunderstanding Preemptive War

        I first encountered Connor Boyack nearly twenty years ago. His writing reflected a familiar libertarian style. It was confident, combative, and heavy on slogans while light on careful definitions. Since then, he has become a successful children's book author and largely scrubbed his old website, but a recent "Musing" sounded strikingly familiar.

        After tracking down the original article he tried to erase, I discovered that, despite two being nearly twenty years old, Boyack is still relying on the same flawed talking points against preemptive war.[1]

        Below is a checklist of the arguments he made then and is still making now. I've included timestamps from his recent video to show just how little has changed. While some of this post revisits earlier research, my primary goal is to demonstrate how much relevant scholarship and little thought Boyack has engaged with and shown over the last twenty years:

Bad Definition (14:38)

Massive network of spies (14:45)

Perfunctory shout out to Just War and catch phrases without understanding key terms. Incorrectly treats preemption as incompatible with Just War theory.(15:07)

Severely out of context Eisenhower (15:17)

Cherry picked first presidency statement on “law of the jungle” (15:41)

Contextualizes the war chapters to exclude them (He didn’t repeat this point in his musings, he simply ignored the war chapters this time.)

Inappropriate use of terrorist (18:08)

De contextualizes 3 Nephi 3:20-21 Mormon 3:10 as evidence (18:18; 21:12)

Misuses A Brent Merrill, who was describing a strategic situation and not a command from the Lord (18:36)

Nephite battles take place in Nephite territory (22:23)

Misapplied use of Hugh Nibley (23:03)

        As you can see, his musings aren’t inspiring or insightful, just the same stale talking points based on unexamined assumptions from twenty years ago. More importantly, on every single point he has missed additional research that would have better informed his arguments.

        Before I show why, I might answer the overall question of his post "Where are all the peacemakers?" That’s a rather insincere question since his version of peace making is repeating the same sanctimonious and shallow talking points for twenty years while insulting his opponents as terroristic Gadiantons (the internet never forgets!) and war mongering propagandists.[2]

        The real peacemaking starts by taking the subject seriously, grappling with complex issues and respecting those who disagree with you by at least avoiding lazy name calling. Despite leading or contributing to multiple institutes, selling millions of books, and emphasizing those credentials on his website, Boyack hasn't done the intellectual work that genuine peacemaking requires such as engaging opposing arguments, refining his definitions, and responding to scholarship published since he first made these claims.

Boyack gets the definition wrong

        Let us start with his definition of preemptive war: Serious theorists going back 500 years have had a better definition than Boyack, who defined preemptive war as simply "fighting your enemy on your terms, before they (may or may not) fight you on theirs," or in short, "get them before they get us." But definitions matter as they distinguish between preventive and preemptive war using concepts like imminence, intent, and capability.  

        The early modern writer Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law, defined preemptive war as being "lawful to kill those who are planning to kill." He is the one that provided the criteria of means, intent, and imminency.[3] The last criteria, “imminency,” is particularly important in the modern age when some missiles can move 20,000 miles an hour or cross the US in about seven minutes. The line between preemptive and preventive war can therefore be measured in mere minutes, yet Boyack ignores that distinction entirely, preferring simplistic and sanctimonious talking points.

        Micheal Walzer, the leading modern theorist on just war that Boyack also ignored, best summarized the differences by talking about past, present, and future and only justified attacks based on present threats, not past aggressions or fear of future consequences.[4] It’s quite an interesting debate that brings a great deal of sophistication and nuance to the subject, and precisely the level of moral analysis absent from Boyack's discussion.

        Boyack mentions just war in perfunctory fashion, but doesn’t understand any details of the practice.  He relies on a few phrases, “true defense” “legitimate self-defense” and an improper understanding of last resort. Boyack only source is a link to a Wikipedia article.

        His shallow slogans are no substitute for engaging the actual literature. Simply invoking "legitimate self-defense", for example, proves very little. Nearly every aggressor in history has claimed to be acting defensively. Even Hitler justified invading Poland by citing alleged abuses of ethnic Germans in the Danzig Corridor.

        Applying the idea of legitimate law enforcement, Salamanca School scholars Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez argued that just as kings can send out a posse of law men to capture bandits, nations can preemptively send forces into lawless areas.[5] Thus, the Nephite desire to “search out…and destroy” the Gadianton bandits in their hiding places is a perfect representation of this just principle (Helaman 11:28). If you’ll excuse my bluntness, Gidgiddoni said “Lord Forbid” (3rd Nephi 3:21), because they were getting their asses kicked, not because it was wicked. Boyack's failure to move beyond the same talking points over the last twenty years reflects a remarkable lack of intellectual development.

Boyack ignores contrary evidence

        The evidence Boyack does present is so selectively chosen that his argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. His warning about a "massive network of spies" functions more as a libertarian talking point than a carefully argued objection. Ironically, overwhelming scriptural evidence cuts against Boyack's own example (Alma 43:23; 44:21; 56:22, 39). Helaman’s servant in Helaman 2:6-7 is most useful. After some night time spying, the servant killed Kishkumen before he killed the chief judge. Helaman’s servant might have righteously reported that “[I] got them before they got us.”[6] 

        As with Book of Mormon passages about spies, Boyack's interpretive framework effectively excludes the Book of Mormon's war chapters from consideration whenever they become inconvenient. Yet those chapters are precisely where the Book of Mormon wrestles the most with interstate conflict, preemption, deterrence, and the ethics of military action. They cannot simply be brushed aside because they complicate a preferred narrative

        Take Alma 46:30 for example, which describes reasoning for Moroni’s preemptive action. This is an extremely interesting verse because the narrative discusses future action: “Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any strength.”

        This verse is about the future, which makes it on the more radical end of the spectrum than the present imminence described by Walzer. Moroni was a man that could shake the foundations of Hell, so his actions should be analyzed instead of explained away. Rather than wrestle with Moroni's reasoning, Boyack gave excuses for ignoring them.

Boyack strips sources of their context

        Other evidence is presented without the context necessary to evaluate it properly. We have already seen this with the strategic context surrounding "the Lord forbid." The same problem appears in Boyack's treatment of the First Presidency's prewar statement, which he quotes in isolation while ignoring the events that immediately rendered it incomplete. Pearl Harbor transformed both the strategic situation and the First Presidency's public position. Their 1942 statement offered a far stronger defense of the war effort, suggesting that Boyack is appealing to an isolationist argument the Church itself substantially abandoned once the realities of aggression became undeniable.

        By quoting Eisenhower, who also relied heavily on spies in his foreign policy, Boyack took a dilettantish approach, selecting quotations that appear supportive but prove far more nuanced in context. Boyack quoted Eisenhower opposing first strikes, but restored to his historical context, Eisenhower also said he would launch an all out preemptive attack without approval of congress if Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons were confirmed to be preparing to strike[7] In private documents, Eisenhower wrote that he would “shoot the enemy before they shoot you” if an imminent Soviet attack were confirmed. In Boyack's own terms, that is simply "get them before they get us." Yet Eisenhower rejected preventive war while unequivocally endorsing preemptive war against an imminent attack.

        This is why the definitions established in Section One matter. Boyack treats all first strikes as morally equivalent, with only the most minimal acknowlgement of the differences between prevention and preemption, but imminence fundamentally changes the moral calculus to the point that Eisenhower himself answered both "yes" and "no" to first strikes depending on the circumstances. Boyack slogan's never reach that level of nuance. 

       I have already discussed "the Lord forbid" and the use of spies, but Boyack's use of Mormon 3:10 ignores an even more important point. As I argued at the LDS National Security Professionals Conference, the Nephites had already endured far more than the three offenses required by D&C 98:39–40. Their failure was not strategic but moral. By this point they had become rapist cannibals, so any military campaign, including a preemptive one, was doomed to fail. Boyack mistakenly throws out preemptive war when the text is actually condemning the wickedness of those who employed it.

Boyack’s Odd Argument and Conclusion

        The oddest example is Boyack’s argument that because Nephite battles occurred in Nephite territory, any use of force outside U.S. borders is wrong. This collapses under basic examination. If a terrorist launches a nuclear missile from Cuba, Boyack’s logic suggests the United States cannot lawfully intercept it until it crosses American territory. Yet the threat, and the moral right of self-defense, is identical seconds before and after crossing an invisible border. As discussed in Section One, modern missiles move so quickly and cause such devastation that delay can be fatal. Basing nuclear defense on such a rigid interpretation of Nephite warfare is a dangerously imprudent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

        DC 98 is best understood as the LDS version of the Sermon on the Mount. Just like mainstream Christians, we should have a peaceful heart and renounce war. But we can and must reluctantly resort to arms when it becomes a tragic necessity to stop the massacre of brothers and families (Alma 48:21-23).

        The issue isn't that Connor Boyack and I disagree. The problem is that Boyack has become one of the topic’s loudest voices while remaining deeply unserious. His talking points have remained unchanged despite two decades of scholarship and personal study that should have refined them. Serious disagreement requires serious engagement with the strongest opposing arguments. Repeating slogans for twenty years while neglecting scholarship is not peacemaking, nor is it a serious contribution to the debate over preemptive war.

        Ideas about war are too important to leave to slogans. Lives depend on getting these questions right. If we are going to invoke scripture to guide questions of war and peace, we owe one another more than decades of recycled talking points.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buying on of my books. The last of which, To Stop a Slaughter, is a book length treatment of just war and the Book of Mormon. I also write fiction, check out my cyber punk thriller. 

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[1] He often calls it "preventive war," a common rhetorical tactic used to make the practice sound more objectionable by shifting the debate to the less defensibile preventive war. The problem is the "imminence" is often contested to the point the dinstinction becomes a reflection of one's bias. 

[2] The second link is to a different author than Boyack, but it contains the same tone, talking points, and spirit of Boyack. Literally in the first two minutes of Boyack's "musings" he called his opponents "war mongers." 

[3] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.

[4] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

[5] Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 163–165. Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J.: De Triplici Virtute Theologica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 740–743.

[6] There is some debate over the silence of the Book of Mormon about the morality of this action. I think a lack of editorial dissent means approval. Mark Henshaw believes the practice needs affirmative approval in the text. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that the simultaneous anonymity and silence surrounding Helaman’s servant, and the detailed exposition of the secret works, is a subtle but strong editorial comment that shows the secret works of darkness are known to God, and the righteous works of defense against them are not known to man.

[7] Implicitly stated in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d55

Antisemitism 101

 

A German poster from the early 1940s about shadowy Jews conspiring to instigate war, and a modern meme about Jews controlling the pharmeceutical industry and conspiring to force vaccines on you. 

        I never thought I would have to write a post like this. I used to take an off-ramp that had a giant sign reminding people of the Holocaust and warning us not to let it happen again. I always thought that was overwrought. I mean, who is going to start casually spouting rhetoric that eventually leads to something like the Holocaust?

        Then Hamas waged a campaign of rape, torture, kidnapping, and terror on October 7th. When Israel tried to fight the terror group hiding behind its own women and children, and retrieve hostages being sexually abused, tortured, and murdered, including a mother and her two toddlers who were beaten to death, Israel was accused of uniquely monstrous war crimes simply for defending itself. While every death in war is tragic, Israel was fighting what one Modern War Institute scholar called the most restrained war in history in response to a terror attack.

        Even more sadly, Israel’s justified self-defense reignited some very old antisemitic tropes. Jewish people experienced a 200-500 percent increase in hate crimes. And I now regularly encounter enough Jew-hating nonsense that I’m forced to write a post about it.

        Antisemitism is often cloaked in the camouflage of “criticizing Israeli policy”. As a military analyst, I find genuinely informed criticisms quite rare. More often, “criticizing Israel” or “criticizing Netanyahu” is the bumper sticker used as a shield against valid charges of antisemitism. That phrase then becomes a socially acceptable way to recycle ancient bigotry with updated language.

        The most basic rule of antisemitism is simple: if you believe a shadowy group of powerful Jews is secretly behind your problems, you’re antisemitic.

        Modern buzzwords about bankers, media elites, globalists, or pedophiles don’t make it any less conspiratorial and wrong. Conspiracy theories thrive by misusing the inevitable gaps in human knowledge to create the illusion of hidden insight. And it feels comforting to imagine yourself as one of the enlightened few uncovering secret truths hidden from the masses. But go back to rule number one: if your explanation for world events ultimately boils down to secret powerful Jews, then you are trafficking in antisemitism.

Dual Loyalty Trope:

        This trope claims that Americans who support Israel must be doing so because they are manipulated, bribed, or controlled by Israel or Jews. You can already see rule number one appearing again here, because the implication is that Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of a country roughly the size of New Jersey and widely criticized internationally, somehow secretly controls world leaders and American foreign policy.

        This is especially odd considering Trump himself publicly styled himself the “daddy” of NATO, and when Netanyahu violated a ceasefire Trump reportedly helped broker, Trump openly said on camera, “[Bibi] doesn’t know what the f-ck he’s doing.” Several times in the war with Iran he has publicly rebuked Netanyahu, which is a rather odd thing to do if Netanyahu was the public facing leader of the cabal of powerful Jews pulling the strings. But antisemitism often falls apart upon cursory thought because it relies on stoking powerful emotions instead of calm and rational examination. 

        This trope comes closest to a potentially sincere foreign policy disagreement. People can absolutely debate whether the United States should support Israel to the extent it does. But  the problem is how quickly legitimate disagreement mutates into the insinuation that Jews are secretly controlling governments, media, or finance from behind the curtain, and that they don’t have a right to exist. Unfortunately, the line between valid, substantive disagreed about US foreign policy consistently crosses into Jews controlling the US, which is the fundamental feature of antisemitism. 

“All About the Benjamins”:

        “Money grubbing” Jews is an old stereotype that portrayed Jews as greedy, manipulative, and obsessed with money. Historically, many Christians considered lending money at interest to be sinful usury. Jewish communities often operated under different legal and religious traditions regarding trade and finance, and, like many middleman minorities throughout history, some Jewish communities became economically successful in certain sectors.

        That success frequently became the object of resentment and jealousy. Combined with conspiracy thinking about secret Jewish power, it produced centuries of scapegoating, persecution, expulsions, and violence. The stereotype survives today anytime people reduce Jews to caricatures about money, banking, influence, or financial manipulation.

Blood Libel:

        This is one of the oldest and ugliest antisemitic tropes. Historically, blood libel referred to false accusations that Jews kidnapped and murdered Christian children for ritual purposes. The accusation was completely fabricated, but it spread throughout medieval Europe and helped justify massacres and persecution.

        The modern versions usually revolve around claims of secret Jewish depravity, hidden abuse networks, sexual perversion, or elaborate conspiracies involving harm to children. It is the same basic structure repeated across centuries: secretive Jews committing monstrous acts behind closed doors.

        A recent example was the New York Times running a deeply irresponsible story implying Israeli handlers trained dogs to sexually assault prisoners — published the same day detailed reports were emerging documenting the mass sexual violence committed against Jews on October 7th.

        This post was difficult to write because the experience reminds me of Ellis from Die Hard. For those who remember the movie, Ellis was a sleazy 1980s corporate cokehead who suddenly started throwing around ethnic slurs I had never even heard before. I had to look some of them up afterward.

        The sudden resurgence of antisemitism has felt similar. I was generally familiar with Jew-hatred in the abstract, but I found myself having to study the tropes more carefully just to identify, refute, and ultimately shun antisemites when they surface in supposedly respectable conversations.

        The uncomfortable truth is that antisemitism rarely presents itself honestly. It almost never announces itself as hatred of Jews outright. Instead, it disguises itself as criticizing foreign policy, “anti-elite” politics, anti-globalism, anti-Zionism, complaints about elite pedophiles, conspiracy thinking, or moral outrage selectively applied only to Jews and the Jewish state.

        That is why people need to learn the patterns. Because once you recognize the structure of the rhetoric, you start seeing the same old poison recycled over and over again with slightly updated branding. Never again is right now, and every decent person should call out antisemitism when they see it.

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The Limits of Peace Building Theory

 

        I’ve been interacting with pacifists for quite a while and noticed several patterns.  Rather than addressing any single author specifically, this post identifies the biggest issues in whether pacifist framework clarifies the text or try to rewrite it.

        While ambitious and addressing an important theme, many contemporary “peacebuilding” readings tend to rely more heavily on modern peace theory than on sustained scriptural exegesis. In many cases, key scriptural figures are interpreted in ways that often contradict their divine role as prophets, including the role of rebuking as well as justified force in establishing or preserving peace.

        The strongest sections of these approaches are those that remain closely grounded in the scriptural text and offer direct analysis rather than extended theoretical scaffolding. However, close scripture readings often end up being only a portion of the argument. When that happens, interpretation begins to derive from modern peace theory, instead of peace theory being derived from scripture.

        One consistent oversight is the role of rebuke in scripture, both in the Old Testament and in the teachings of Christ. Prophets were repeatedly commanded to rebuke:

        Nathan confronting David (“Thou art the man,” 2 Samuel 12:7), Elijah’s confrontation with Ahab (1 Kings 18), Isaiah’s prophetic warnings (Isaiah 6), all fit in a tradition where prophetic calling includes direct confrontation, not only reconciliation.

        Christ himself continued this pattern:

        He rebuked the Pharisees directly (Matthew 23), drove out the money changers with force (Matthew 21:12–13; John 2:15–16), and pronounced both blessings and woes (Luke 6:20–26). Even his language toward Herod (“that fox,” Luke 13:32) was not soft consensus-building.

        And this didn't disappear in the apostolic era. Paul rebuked Peter openly (Galatians 2:11–14). Peter rebuked Simon Magus (Acts 8:20–23). John sharply condemned false teachers in his epistles (1 John 2). The apostles are not portrayed as avoiding conflict—they were commanded to teach, expound, and exhort (D&C 20:42), and historically, most are understood to have died violently because of uncompromising preaching.

        Against that backdrop, criticizing Nephi (or any other prophet) for being harsh, seems a fundamental rejection of Nephi’s mission to call sinners to repentance. Nephi was not operating as a conflict mediator in the modern sense; he operated as a covenant prophet, including rebuke, warning, and at times justified force (1 Nephi 4; 2 Nephi 4-5). Readings that suggest Nephi or other prophetic figures ought to have adopted a more consistently “peacebuilding” posture risk missing the claims of the text itself.

        A similar concern appears in readings of King Benjamin. The text explicitly ties peace to both righteousness and defensive action:

        He “gathered together his armies… and did fight… with the sword of Laban, in the strength of the Lord” (Words of Mormon 1:13–14). Yet peace building interpretations minimize or ignore his use of the sword in favor of peace building interpretations.

        There is also a recurring issue where just war reasoning is treated as if it necessarily implies sanctification through violence. In fact, the only mention of just war is often to dismiss it or, provide a strawman of the theory and then dismiss it.

        But just war never makes the claim it is sanctifying. Classical just war theory, as Augustine frames it in City of God (Book XIX), is not about sanctifying violence but about acknowledging tragic necessity under moral constraint in a fallen world. Treating it otherwise risks making a straw man.

        This becomes relevant in readings of Doctrine and Covenants 98 as well, where the Lord says: “I… would fight their battles” (D&C 98:37). The text shows divine sanction of defense, but it does not clearly construct a category of sanctifying violence. Expanding it in that direction goes beyond what the passage itself states.

        A common argument is that responses to conflict worsen under conditions of fear which leads to an escalating “cycle of violence.” There are many problems with that theory, including ignoring just and frequently repeated reasons for war. The argument also seems to cast Nephi as a hapless figure who couldn’t master his fear when the Lord told him to take the sword and get the plates. (In How to Read the Bible and Still Be a Christian, Dominic Crossan makes a similar claim about God.)

        There are nuances in that story that could support the author’s argument. For example, Lehi may have made a kind of sin offering when Nephi returned (1 Nephi 5:9), but those key scriptures are often neglected in favor of pacifist theory.

        It also ignores other scriptures. Zeniff wasn’t “responding to fear” when he went to the land of Nephi but he was attacked anyway. The record shows someone naively unafraid and dangerously unprepared. He admits he was “overzealous” in seeing good in the Lamanites, failed to make weapons, trusted a “crafty” enemy, and nearly died for it (Mosiah 9:1–17). Only after the first attack did he arm his people (Mosiah 10:1). And the priests' emphasis on scriptural "good tidings" and "joy" when questioning Abanadi seem to indicate the people saw themselves as quit hopeful fullfilment of prophecy (Mosiah 12:21-24).  This example of war being thrust upon non fearful people is aside from clearer passages clearly supporting the just use of force like Alma 43:47; 48:21–23; 61:12–14. Pacifists rarely mention these scriptures, and when they are they are minimized.

        This neglect and radical reinterpretation of scriprures are major reasons why peace theory is rarely convincing to those outside of a small group of pacifists. The framework feels strained, even insulting, toward prophets,[1] suggesting those who take up the sword are merely reacting in fear, rather than acting as righteous, even brave leaders with scriptural support, defending their families.

        The claim that peacemaking is currently absent from LDS discourse is overstated and a result of poor, existing pacifist scholarship. If pacifists wish to frame the topic as understudied, it will help to acknowledge possible reasons for hesitation, including concerns that contemporary peace rhetoric often appear politically inflected or insufficiently attentive (or just dismissive) of scriptural passages that affirm justified defense. They often offer strained alternative readings that are unconvincing. Recognizing these tensions would strengthen their analysis.

        The strongest direction forward is not replacing scriptural categories with contemporary peace frameworks, but letting scripture set the terms, including prophetic rebuke, covenant judgment, repentance, and justified defense. Any model that cannot hold those together risks rebuking the text it claims to interpret.

Thanks for reading. If you liked this research please consider donating using the paypal button below. Or consider buying one of my books, linked in the top left. 

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[1] Speaking of insulting, pacifists often use the phrase, “moral imagination” when discussing peace theory. As though traditional prophetic voices lack sufficient moral vision for peacemaking. The phrase seems to imply implying that the pacifist author’s theoretical commitments place them as a stronger moral arbiter than the prophets themselves, which is not an argument most readers will find persuasive. John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), ix.

America Has Lost the War with Iran! A Case Study in Bad Analysis

 

        Every crisis produces a bevy of speculative analysis that is often untethered from facts on the ground and good reasoning.

        The popular claims from “Astrado” at LDS Freedom forum provide an excellent example. He claimed the United States and Israel are on the verge of running out of defensive missiles, Iran is unleashing thousands more with escalating capability, the Strait of Hormuz is closed, information is being censored, and unless there’s a ceasefire within days, we face total collapse—military defeat, economic ruin, or nuclear war.

        That sounds incredible dramatic. Material like this is very popular, often repeated, the center of attention, and it’s also wrong.

        The author started his click bait fear mongering with only partially true points about missiles. “They’ve fired thousands, they have tens of thousands more, therefore we’re about to be overwhelmed.” Yet that’s an example of straight line projections, one of the most common mistakes. When I was in grade school back in the 80s, my teachers warned that Japan and Germany had strong economies that would quickly overtake us. But both countries stagnated and struggled since then, with Japan experiencing “lost decades.” In the 90s I remember Time’s Magazine showing pictures of a Red China and warning of their ascendence. But among other factors, they had a real estate bubble and population collapse that suggest they won’t. (Note how Japan’s lost decades also started with a real estate bubble.) And every politician assumes the good times will always continue and they spend money instead of saving for disaster.

        Additionally, you might add a dose of common sense to the straight-line problem. Early in conflicts, you often see spikes in activity. Generally, a country doesn’t get stronger as a war continues, so they send large salvos to probe defenses, saturate systems, or create psychological shock. (As you’ll see below, Iran also had a use or it or lose it incentive.) Treating those spikes as a sustainable baseline is how you end up predicting collapse that never comes.

        More importantly, it ignores how missile capabilities can be degraded. While defending against launched missiles, the U.S. and Israel aggressively targeted the systems that launch them. Launchers, stockpiles, factories, and command-and-control nodes are all part of the battlefield. The US doesn’t have to worry about dwindling stockpiles of counter missiles when they actively and dramatically reduced Iran’s ability to launch them.

        There’s a historical analogy here. Alexander the Great didn’t defeat the Persian fleet in a decisive naval battle. He marched along the coast and captured the ports that sustained it. Without docking, resupply and repair the fleet quickly became a non-factor in the war.

        Once you account for straight line projections, initial burst, and America’s degradation strategy, you find the author’s confidently asserted claims of solid analysis are both shaky and paltry.  Their analysis is based on incomplete information, incorrect assumptions, and ignores dynamic interaction between offense and defense.

        Second, the supporting claims—like the Strait of Hormuz being closed or widespread censorship—are asserted but not meaningfully developed. Even if we take them seriously, they’re not one-directional in their effects. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economic lifelines as much as anyone else’s. That doesn’t make it impossible, but it does make it far more complicated than a simple “checkmate” move. Except for higher gas prices, there doesn’t seem to be much impact from restricted traffic through the strait.

        At the lowest point, the author parenthetically claims AI agrees with him. But AI relies on a people pleasing and sycophantic design. Combined with bad inputs outlined above, AI becomes little more than a yes man for analysis no matter how incredulous it becomes.

        Speaking of incredulous, the author claimed that the lack of missiles would result in the use of the nuclear, or Samson Option. This is the classic fear escalator. When conventional arguments feel shaky analysts jump to the worst-case scenario. They expect the emotionally charged language and general unease to bypass arguments while commanding attention.

        But deterrence doctrines exist precisely to prevent their use. Israel has faced existential threats for decades, including from Iran and its proxies, and has not used nuclear weapons. That track record matters and it suggests the doctrine functions as intended. Nuclear weapons remain a last-resort deterrent, not a trigger waiting to be pulled because of an initial flurry of missiles.

        The final mistake is the cascading collapse scenario. The author claims “all U.S. bases will be destroyed, carriers sunk, the petrodollar gone, global economic ruin.” This is where the analysis fully detaches from reality. Iranian missile forces have demonstrated they can inflict some damage, but not at the scale required to produce that kind of systemic collapse. After the initial flurry Iran’s ability to damage their enemies has collapsed.

        As I’ve written in my book on modern Chinese strategy, missiles today are simply the newest version of technology that has been around since World War II. Regardless of the number of missiles or improvements fielded, counter defenses have also improved. AEGIS Destroyers have better radar, carriers increasingly employ rail guns and missiles, F35’s can actively seek out and destroy launchers from longer distances than ever before. That is why I wasn’t surprised when more reputable analysts concluded that the Iran showed us the threat of missile swarms are overblown.

        You didn’t have to be an analyst to see through most of the smoke and fear mongering. A simple browsing of recent history in the area shows we’ve seen versions of this before. During the Gulf War, there were similar fears about regional escalation and economic shock. Oil prices spiked but then they stabilized. Markets adjusted. The war was disruptive, but only for a short period of time and not automatically apocalyptic.

        To summarize, the bad analysis does the following things:

        They extrapolate linearly from peak data. Ignore counter reactions and adaption. They assert instead of demonstrating key claims. (This is frequently accompanied with various insults and posturing.) They lean on worst case scenarios and present them as likely outcomes.

        Good analysis is uncomfortable because it requires vast amounts of study along with uncertainty, tradeoffs, and competing variables. This makes it seem dry and is often lost in the noise. Bad analysis is confident, simple, and catastrophic which makes it as loud and popular as it is wrong. This example falls squarely into the second category.