Trump as Moroni?

[I shared this on facebook and though it deserved a more permanent place. As someone who specializes in military history and published extensively about Moroni and the Book of Mormon, I am uniquely qualified to comment.] 

People are spazzing out about Mike Lee's comparison of Trump to Captain Moroni when I think it was pretty good. Lee's comparison was pretty narrow to begin with, by pointing to a specific scripture that Trump is not seeking power but to tear it down. 

Trump has been a disruptive outsider against the Washington establishment. That word was used so much in 2016 that I thought I should start a restaurant called the establishment. I don't like the phrase deep state as it sounds fairly conspiratorial, but entrenched bureaucracy is what I use. We just had a Homeland security official come out as this deep throat type member of the resistance. The phrase resistance itself is rather arrogant as these people somehow thing that their intransigence is part of a noble effort to stop a dictator when they are really partisan hacks undermining the people's elected representative.  Even though he worked for Trump who was elected by the people, he bragged that he was part of this noble resistance. Nikki Haley wrote that people as high up as the Secretary of State thought it was their duty to contain and control Trump, as though the people were too dumb to choose a President and executive policy.  

Trump is draining a swamp that fights back on a constant basis, so comparing him to a stronger fighter figure and using a specific scripture where he is fighting the elites of his day is a good comparison. 

Most who object to the comparison do so because of their political opposition to Trump. But they are doing so by ignoring the narrow comparison above, and instead use the hagiographic depiction of him as a military stud muffin that ignores the real critiques of Moroni. 

The political opponents of Trump should realize that the political opponents of Moroni could credibly make even worse arguments against the latter. They could say he was an angry individual that preemptively seized territory in a time of peace, relied upon deception to win his battles, rejected peace offers to instead call his interlocuter a child of Hell and then threaten to arm child soldiers and pursue a war of extermination against that opponent. He threatened a coup against the government when it suited him and before he figured out all of the facts and seemed like a warmonger. While its not written down, my knowledge of military culture makes me suspect if we were on campaign with him we might find him laughing at the locker room humor similar to an Access Hollywood tape.   

We rightly revere Captain Moroni as a spiritual hero. But like Jessica Rabbit, he was written that way. A sober examination of his life and critical assessment of his policies, and most importantly, his fighter attitude against the entrenched opposition to his single minded goals, suggest that Trump is a fighter comparable to Captain Moroni.

Preemptive War in the Book of Mormon: Part VI Third Nephi and Mormon

This is part of a series. See part one, part two, part two (a), part three, part four, part five, part seven, part eight.

There seems to be several verses that forbid preemptive war.[1] In Third Nephi, Gidgiddoni claims that the Lord forbids them from preemptively going into their opponents lands ( 3rd Nephi 3:21). But considering the disastrous offensives against the robbers on their territory (Helaman 11:25-28) this was more likely strategic advice than a commandment from the Lord. In that same campaign, Gidgiddoni maneuvered offensively to cut off the robbers. His tactically offensive operations in a strategically defensive stance suggest, at least, a more flexible approach than an overly simplistic notion that offensive war is inherently immoral.

Mormon 3:15 also seems to prohibit preemptive war. However, the real sin recorded by Mormon was not the offensive tactics but rather the bloodlust and vengeance that dictated Nephite strategy (v. 14). One might also say it was their false oath (to a false god?) in Mormon 3:10 that finally forced Mormon into his utter refusal. Again, that doesn’t have much to do with their strategy. The seemingly unequivocal anti-war sentiment expressed in Mormon 4:4 does not record any saying of the Lord, but can just as easily represent a strategic description (that isn’t completely accurate, see below). If this is a command against offensive action it is also contradicted by other writings by Mormon. This is most clearly seen in a reevaluation of Alma 48:14. The traditional understanding of this verse is a prohibition against offensive warfare. But a slightly different reading suggests the Nephites are rather commanded to never “give an offense” except “against an enemy” and “to preserve their lives” (Alma 61:3).

Finally, there is Mormon’s statement that the wicked punish the wicked (Mormon 4:5). This seems to describe the inverse of the ideal to trust in the Lord and implies, unsurprisingly, that making strategic decisions while not “under the influence” of the Spirit results in lousy choices with equally horrible results. Here the German military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz can lend us assistance with his description of an essential element of leadership called Coup De’ Oeil.[2] This term is complex but it basically describes both a commander’s ability to “see the light” and his strength to follow it. Clausewitz did not have any spiritual implications in mind, but it certainly applies here. When the Nephites were spiritually darkened, their ability to make correct military decisions were severely impaired (though not completely destroyed, see below). Thus the military prohibition described in the Book of Mormon is not against offensive or even preemptive action, but it is rather a condemnation against passive stupor, lacking trust in the Lord, and lusting for vengeance—in short, a darkened mind.

In fact, leaving aside Mormon’s denunciation of his soldiers, he recorded their admirable qualities many times. The people were “arouse[d]…somewhat to vigor” and they did meet and beat their enemies (Mormon 2:24, 26). They “went forth” and won against the robbers and recovered their lands (Mormon 2:27). They “beat” the Lamanites in Mormon 3:8. Again, they “repulsed” the Lamanites, and again, the only sin is what Elder Neal A. Maxwell called a pronoun problem in taking credit for themselves instead of giving it to God (Mormon 4:8).[3] A short time later the Nephites stood with “boldness” which gained them another impressive victory (Mormon 4:15-20). If somebody was told that a somewhat vigorous army with bold soldiers repulsed and beat a much larger enemy multiple times to defend their territory, wives, children, and houses (Mormon 2:23) that person would think that army was incredibly skilled and maybe even praise worthy. But the descriptions of their sins were so pervasive that readers have failed to adequately assess their military strategy itself separately from faithfulness of those doing it.

Some might argue they shouldn’t be separated, but one of the difficulties in applying the Book of Mormon to a modern American context is the difference in political systems. The modern notion of separation of church and state precludes a prophet leading the United States and thus begs the question of what constitutes “righteous” leadership. Likewise, the concept of a civilian audit over the military excludes a prophet-general leading the country or even determining military policy in any significant degree. That leaves Latter Day Saints to assess strategies like preemptive war, at least somewhat independently from sin and righteousness.

While Mormon makes it seem as though the Nephites were hopeless (and in a spiritual sense they certainly were), their martial conduct and even the result of their offensive attack was not as disastrous as Mormon makes it seem. They had already repulsed the several Lamanites attacks. In the Nephite preemptive attack they debouched out of Desolation and had some initial success though they were ultimately pushed back. The arrival of a new army caused a further retreat to the city of Teancum. The Nephites (again) “repulsed” the Lamanites and then retook the city of Desolation. In the 8 verses of Mormon 4 that describe their supposedly horrible offensive, they ended up right back where they started.

Mormon blamed their offensive attack, saying that if it wasn’t for that the Lamanites would have no power over them (Mormon 4:4), yet the course of the fight and resulting status quo ante make this offensive essentially a draw and no worse than the annihilation they faced.[4] The skill of the soldiers that produced at least a draw makes it clear that the real sin was their, anger, vengeance, blood lust, and boasting which withdrew the divine strength of the Lord, and not their tactics or strategy. (Sensitive readers might also notice the weary matter of fact after action report in Mormon 4:9: And many thousands were killed on both sides.) In fact, one might say that no strategy except repentance could have save the Nephites, which is a great spiritual message but hardly a condemnation of preemptive war.

If the readers see this period of the war as a back and forth see saw, then a spoiling attack launched from a narrow point against a much larger enemy actually has a good deal of merit. In tactical combat, a narrow point that people must pass through is called a kill zone. If the Nephites knew the point of Lamanites attack, and knew that attack was imminent, they could see a good deal of value in launching an attack against a massed foe in a killing zone. Again, just like Zeniff, and the leaders in Ammon’s day, they could reasonably argue that fighting at a time and place of their choosing, with the advantage of surprise, was better than waiting to receive an imminent and inevitable attack from a much larger enemy (Mormon 5:6).

Returning to the beginning of the paper and the difference between a moral preemptive war and morally suspect preventive war, the justification or lack thereof is based on the relative imminence of the threat. The more imminent (or even ongoing) a threat, the more justified it becomes. Mormon says in the 362nd year they defeated the Lamanites and began to boast (Mormon 3:8). Their supposedly wicked and forbidden attack occurred in the 363rd year (Mormon 4:1). Arguably this event was less like the devastating catalyst for their destruction that Mormon makes it seem, and more like an attempt to recreate Moroni’s expulsion of Lamanites from the wilderness in Alma 50. They both occurred during a period of nominal peace but what really seemed like a simple lull in between phases of fighting. Arguably, the only difference in strategy seemed the relative enthusiasm for the conflict based on their spiritual condition (compare, Alma 48:23 and Mormon 3:9). The Nephites were only 14 years removed from ceding their land of inheritance by treaty and were only a year removed from the previous attack (Mormon 2:28-29 lists the 349th year which would be more recent to the Nephites than the 2000 election is to us at the time of this writing). With an existential threat gathering across a narrow pass, and a generation of warfare to suggest an attack was being launched from a land violently conquered within recent memory, even allowing for an irredentist faction that wanted to recover their homeland at any cost, this strategy had more justification than Moroni’s in Alma 50, and it becomes one of their most justified attacks.

There are several verses that make it seem as though the Lord clearly forbids preemptive war. Those scriptures are more likely strategic advice based on specific context, which are also contradicted without editorial dissent elsewhere in the text by its leading figures like Moroni. At other times it was contradicted by the unnoticed background of a story like in Zeniff’s case, or in the unexamined consequences such as those in Ammon’s case. Other verses clearly condemn blood lust, boasting, the pronoun problem, false swearing, and overall a darkened mind, and not the specific strategy of preemptive war. In fact, when the strategy used to defend the Nephites in their last days is assessed on its own merits, and compared to earlier actions by righteous figures, they actually have what is arguably the most justification for preemptive war in the scriptures. A careful reading of the text suggests the high operational tempo with almost nonstop fighting and loss of territory from year to year, with lulls in the fighting without true peace, leading to their final extinction, makes this a long series of attacks and counter attacks which erase the supposed dichotomy between righteous defensive action and horrible, demonic, and evil preemptive war.

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance author. Providing quality, ad free research for the last decade takes a good deal of time and effort. If you found value in this research please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page or buy one of my books linked in the top left. Thanks again! 
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[1] Jeffrey Johanson, “Wars of Preemption Wars of Revenge,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, vol.35, no.3 (Fall 202), 244-247. https://www.dialoguejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/sbi/articles/Dialogue_V35N03_244.pdf
[2] Clausewitz, On War, 101-102.
[3]Neal Maxwell, “Consecrate thy Performance,” April 2002, Ensign, 2002. https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2002/04/consecrate-thy-performance?lang=eng
[4] Of course, if the Nephites had a smaller population than the Lamanites the loss of Nephite soldiers would be harder to replace than their enemy, and thus fatally weaken their armies despite their retention of territory and battlefield victories. This is a major criticism of Confederate Robert E. Lee. His spectacular battlefield victories drained the South of manpower and lost a war of attrition.

Preemptive War in the Book of Mormon: Part V Helaman Chapter 1

This is part of an ongoing series. See part one, part two, part two(a), part three, part four, part six, part seven, part eight.

This chapter is one of the most interesting as it contains examples that support and undermine preemptive war. The record indicates that Paanchi was seized as he was “about to flatter” the people (Helaman 1:7-8). It’s not indicated how imminent his rebellion was. John Welch suggested he may have been in the open market place about to call for rebellion.[1] But he could have been meeting with key players among “the people” to ensure that his play for the judgeship was successful. The imprecise immediacy of his rebellion shows us the difficulty of judging the difference between preemptive and preventive wars assessing their relative merits.

The Nephites and those sympathetic to their cause would have viewed Paanchi’s rebellion as very imminent. The key leaders such as Moroni and Pahoran had recently died and the Nephites had unsettled or uncertain political and military leadership. A short time after Nephite leaders executed Paanchi the Lamanites invaded. At a state of dangerous unpreparedness (Helaman 1:18) the Lamanites marched quickly to capture the capital. The general was a dissenter from Nephite lands, ordered by the son of the dissenting Ammoron, brother of the arch dissenter, Amalickiah. Their attack showed that even a short time after the great victory of Moroni and during a time of peace the Nephite realm could face a speedy invasion that killed their chief judge and capture its capital. Not only did he die but he was unceremoniously “[smitten] against the wall (Helaman 1:21).”

Even with an army’s damage limited to what they could personally smash or kill, and a nation’s limitations in supplying its troops, the Lamanites could quickly desolate many cities before the Nephites “could raise a sufficient army” (Alma 16:2-3). In Helaman 1:19, the Lamanites marched “with such great speed” and captured the capital city, and eventually enacted genocide with these primitive means. This means that modern surprise attacks could be even more deadly and require active and preemptive measures as a defense. And just like ancient times, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrate that the United States’ “narrow strip of wilderness” is surprisingly thin. But unlike ancient times, strategic surprise in the modern age may not simply represent the destruction of a small ancient city, but could take the form of a nuclear attack in a highly populated metropolis. The power of nuclear weapons increases the ability of an opponent to “end the war at a stroke.”[2]

Attacking the Nephite’s desire for preemptive war ignores the strategic realities that the ancient Nephite and Lamanite nations faced as a result of geography and technology. It is even more foolish in the modern world. According to many neo isolationists and peace advocates that incorrectly apply scriptures like D&C 89, the United States must receive an attack three times before they could justifiably response. Yet the threat of a surprise attack from Pearl Harbor was traumatic enough, just one from a nuclear weapon would mean that millions would be killed, or we would have to accept three 9/11 attacks of perhaps even greater magnitude before we could righteously respond.[3]

Yet the justifications still have caveats. Kishkumen, his robbers, and those that were not sympathetic to Nephite rule, would have argued that Nephites actions were unjust. Welch did establish a legal precedent for executing conspirators against the crown. Yet he also pointed out how the feelings of “alienation and hostility” would have lingered among the political opponents of the Nephites.[4] I’ve discussed the social bandit ideology before, and it is a powerful and common motivation for all insurgencies against the government.[5] A critical reading of the text reveals plenty of possible reasons for simmering discontent. Helaman’s servant stabbed an assassin after nighttime spying (Helaman 2:6), and Nephi exposed another killer in Helaman 9:6. Lawyers and leaders within the Nephite nation were known to beat confessions out of criminals (Alma 14:17-22), and both Lamanites and Nephties attempted to poison each other with wine (Alma 55:13). The Nephites even tested the wine on their prisoners first (Alma 55: 31-32)! Gaining and keeping power in Nephite society required significant cunning and craftiness from even righteous leaders. It’s no surprise then that the trial and execution was the catalyst for Kiskumen and his band to begin their campaign of assassination and rebellion.

Helaman 1 shows the danger of preemptively attacking somebody, as that action further inspired opponents of the government. But in the same chapter Nephite passivity in defending their lands was rewarded with a devastating invasion. The threat was always hanging over them, and preemptive war to remove or lesson that threat was a legitimate and even righteous action, albeit one with potentially explosive consequences. It’s also important to note that this was an internal matter just like the preemptive war against Amalickiah. But the imminence of his rebellion, and the desire to preemptively nip it in the bud and avoid costly consequences, represent the major attraction behind the strike. The threat of surprise terrorist or nuclear attacks in the modern world only increases the allure and justification for preemptive war.

Thanks for reading. Providing high quality, ad free research for over a decade takes time and effort. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or you can buy one of my books using the Amazon link in the top left. Thanks!! 

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[1] John Welch, “The Case of Paanchi,” Legal Cases in the Book of Mormon, (Provo, Salt Lake City: Brigham Young University Press, 2008).
[2] Carl Von Clausewitz, On War,( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)363.
[3] Boyce, Even Unto Bloodshed, 157.
[4] Welch, The Case of Paanchi.
[5] Morgan Deane, “Climbing a Tree to Find a Fish: Insurgency in the Book of Mormon”, Provo FAIR Presentation, August 4th, 2016.

Notes on Book of Mormon Insurgency from Late Roman History

I’ve been trying to go through the entire thing, but I haven’t made it through yet. I have found some great material that reinforces what I’ve said about insurgency before and provides insights into the Book of Mormon generally. Amminaus Marcellinus was a late Roman historian that provides valuable insight and as Hugh Nibley said, when we come to expect an outrageous collection of potpourri we instead find confirming context.

14.2.1-2: For the Isaurians  too, whose way it is now to keep the peace and now put everything in turmoil by sudden raids, abandoned their occasional secret plundering expeditions and, as impunity stimulated for the worse their growing boldness, broke out in a serious war. For a long time they had been inflaming their warlike spirits by restless outbreaks, but they were now especially exasperated, as they declared, by the indignity of some of their associates, who had been taken prisoner, having been thrown to beasts of prey in the shows of the amphitheatre at Iconium, a town of Pisidia—an outrage without precedent.

And, in the words of Cicero,  as even wild animals, when warned by hunger, generally return to the place where they were once fed, so they all, swooping like a whirlwind down from their steep and rugged mountains, made for the districts near the sea; and hiding themselves there in pathless lurking-places and defiles as the dark nights were coming on-the moon being still crescent and so not shining with full brilliance—they watched the sailors….[then attacked] and since their natural ferocity was fired by greed, they spared no one, even of those who surrendered, but massacred them all and without resistance carried off the cargoes, led either by their value or by their usefulness.

The key comparisons are in bold. This list could get quite long but just a brief look includes “being stirred up to anger” (Helaman 11: 24) and the next verse was “murder and plunder…done from wilderness and secret places” (11:25). They, or their lambskins, were died in blood being great and terrible and recalls wild beasts (3^rd Nephi 4:7). Speaking of beasts Gildas described mountain insurgents as a hive of bees (1.26). They used their tough terrain to hide and defeat Nephite armies: “sally forth from the hills, and out of the mountains, and the wilderness, and their strongholds,” (3^rd Nephi 4:1). (More on the Nephite army’s defeat below) “Get gain” (Helaman 7:21) is repeated frequently throughout the books of Helaman and 3^rd Nephi speaking to their greed.

The most interesting part might be the outrage that stoked them to war. It’s not very popular to say it, (I’ve been called a Marxist Schmuck for doing so) but a critical reading suggests that Nephite misrule gave the robbers legitimate complaints.

From my 2016 FAIR presentation:  

There is evidence that the Gaidnaton Robbers were really just seeking land reform. At the end of this phase of conflict in 3 Nephi 6:3, the peace treaty specifically included distribution of land. It reads that Nephite leaders granted unto those robbers who had entered into a covenant to keep the peace… “lands, according to their numbers, that they might have, with their labors, wherewith to subsist upon; and thus they did establish peace in all the land.” That’s a rather odd peace treaty. If we take a straight forward reading of the text, the Gadianton Robbers revolt for no good reason beyond being influenced by the devil, and having a lust for money and mayhem. After many years of battle and devastation they caused, when they are finally defeated in epic battle they got…more land? And the next verse described the “equity and justice” of the peace (3 Nephi 6:4), which at least infers that those qualities were lacking in Nephite laws and might have inspired the insurgency in the first place.

Moving back to Amminaus:

14:2.5-6 Anger at [the slaughter of their people by the robbers] aroused the [Roman] soldiers quartered in the numerous towns and fortresses which lie near those regions, and each division strove to the best of its power to check the marauders as they ranged more widely, now in solid bodies, sometimes even in isolated bands. But the soldiers were defeated by their strength and numbers; for since the Isaurians were born and brought up amid the steep and winding defiles of the mountains, they bounded over them as if they were a smooth and level plain, attacking the enemy with missiles from a distance and terrifying them with savage howls. 

And sometimes our infantry in pursuing them were forced to scale lofty slopes, and when they lost their footing, even if they reached the very summits by catching hold of underbrush or briars, the narrow and pathless tracts allowed them neither to take order of battle nor with mighty effort to keep a firm footing; and while the enemy, running here and there, tore off and hurled down masses of rock from above, they made their perilous way down over steep slopes; or if, compelled by dire necessity, they made a brave fight, they were overwhelmed by falling boulders of enormous weight.

In addition to reinforcing the view of the Isaurians as a scary other and the ethno centric stereotypes we see about Lamanites from the Nephites in the Book of Mormon, I think this is simply a more detailed version of the defeat of the Nephites in Helaman 11:27-30:

Now behold, these robbers did make great havoc, yea, even great destruction among the people of Nephi, and also among the people of the Lamanites. And it came to pass that it was expedient that there should be a stop put to this work of destruction; therefore they sent an army of strong men into the wilderness and upon the mountains to search out this band of robbers, and to destroy them. But behold, it came to pass that in that same year they were driven back even into their own lands… And it came to pass in the commencement of the eighty and first year they did go forth again against this band of robbers, and did destroy many; and they were also visited with much destruction.

The Book of Mormon doesn’t say explicitly say this but the defeat recorded above implies it and the history Ammianus’ record provides the likely details. If I were asked to comment on terrain in general I would have suggested that rough mountain terrain would prohibit the deployment of broad military fronts, and mountain dwellers with specialized weapons (slings and boulders), as well as sure footing would prevail. In fact, in discussing the effects of Moroni’s reforms on the Nephites after he passed away as a national hero, I suggested that their heavy armor was a negative in fighting these bands. As I summarized on page 112:

It gave [the Nephites] a tactical advantage in some areas, but also made them more susceptible to fatigue and the hit and run tactics of their enemies. This cost them strategic mobility which allowed robbers to flourish in more inhospitable regions. The heavier infantry may have inspired the hit and run tactics and mountain hideouts of the insurgents. The greater logistical need of the heavy infantry couple with their inability to operate in rough terrain led to an increase of banditry in the land.

14.2.7: Therefore extreme caution was shown after that, and when the marauders began to make for the mountain heights, the soldiers yielded to the unfavourable position. When, however, the Isaurians could be found on level ground, as constantly happened, they were allowed neither to stretch out their right arms nor poise their weapons, of which each carried two or three, but they were slaughtered like defenceless sheep

 As I just wrote, heavy infantry is great on the plains and gives the counter insurgent forces a tactical advantage. The Romans gained the advantage by luring them out on level ground, and the Nephites won their climatic battles against the Gadianton Robbers by doing the same thing.

Conclusion:

This has been a brief overview of what I see as a typical insurgency found in a few short verses from a late Roman historian. The Isurians were viewed as a barbaric and ferocious other, who subsisted on plunder, with complaints against the central government. They were excellent in the mountains and could defeat armies there but when they tried to plunder in the plains they could be caught and defeated.

On a larger point, this once again shows that my writings about insurgency in the Book of Mormon are not radical revisions for those who know history and military history. Heavy infantry has trouble in the mountains, ancient historians depict other ethnic groups negatively, states have trouble extending control in difficult terrain, rebellious groups can cause problems but often don’t have the state apparatus (taxes, agriculture, military) to overthrow the central government. The Book of Mormon fits comfortably within the context of an ancient insurgency and we need to the read the book with the same critical eye that we read other ancient histories. 

Notes on a Curious Verse- Helaman 11:33

The Rape of the Sabine Women.

Due to the narrative complexity, debates or its origins, and somewhat enigmatic narrative, many verses in the Book of Mormon can provide a multitude of ideas often in direct contrast to how short the text is. One of those is late in the Book of Helaman, and 11:33 reads: Yea, for they did visit many parts of the land, and did do great destruction unto them; yea, did kill many, and did carry away others captive into the wilderness, yea, and more especially their women and their children.

What follows is a summary and explanation of ideas and implications of this verse. I see four interconnected ideas possible in the verse that come from a critical historical perspective.[1]

Captive Brides:

Bride kidnapping is common among many ancient cultures across the world. The Book of Mosiah already described a clearer example of this practice (Mosiah 20:1-5). It is in line with many norms of ancient war. The winner of a conflict had jurisdiction over its inhabitants, and usually slew the men while taking the women and children captive.[2]

The capture of women and children could represent the need for labor of an arms industry (mining metal), additional soldiers for their army, or increased agricultural production.[3] But the practice of captive brides also has several economic implications. According to sources, sometimes the practice of stealing brides was simply a cover for a couple’s elopement in order to satisfy cultural expectations. Many more times, the practice occurred because “the men who resort to capturing a wife are often of lower social status [see below], because of poverty, disease, poor character or criminality. They are sometimes deterred from legitimately seeking a wife because of the payment the woman’s family expects, the bride price [emphasis added]…”[4]

People Over Land:

During periods of massive economic and social turmoil, a decline in population means that people become more valuable than land. The most famous instance is probably Europe after the Black Death. The population decline by as much as a third, meaning the law of supply and demand made existing workers more valuable.

The Chinese period of disunion faced a similar challenge. During the fourth century AD as I write in my book: [A]s a consequence of the partial depopulation of North China, the various regimes that arose…placed greater value on the control of persons than control of territory…. During [this period,] empty cultivable land could be found in abundance…while the labor power to make that land productive was often in short supply. Human populations, therefore, were prominent among the spoils of victory.[5]

The resulting power of the people necessitated compromises between the emperor and various local power holders ranging from former officials of dynasty, towns that mobilized their own militia under a magnate, and robbers that gained unofficial and (eventually,) official power. The compromise between the emperor and submitting warlords or Confucian officials allowed the emperor to strengthen his position, reduce the threats against him, and gain greater legitimacy as an emperor. It also allowed the warlord, bandit chief, or army leader to keep power, have his position legitimized, and have a chance to amass greater wealth and power. The wins of the emperor produced a positive feedback loop. The initial winner received the submission of various warlords and leaders. This increased the ruler’s tax base and the number of farmers he could call on to supply his army, and it made him look like a mandated ruler in the eyes of the Confucian officials who helped him govern and the people over whom he governed. But there were significant limits to this power. A single defeat would break the success loop. The rival generals still held their armies, so they could easily sense which way the wind was blowing and rebel, and because of the ideology surrounding the Mandate of Heaven, they could claim a powerful justification for their actions by arguing that the ruler had lost the mandate.[6]

State Formation:

The first two points suggest the attempted creation of a rival state. The stealing of Lamanite women by the priests of Noah started a new “ite” in competition with the Nephites. And the power of the Gadianton Robbers to take women and children suggests they had the basics of a state apparatus. Again, Giddianhi was educated; there were many “waste places” in Nephite lands (Helaman 11:20), and it appears as though Nephites traded land for peace with the Gadianton Robbers (3 Nephi 6:3). Even later in Nephite history the record mentions a treaty with them but provides little about their state (Mormon 2:28).

The fragility of both states might again take a cue from Chinese history. Both the Nephites and Gadianton Robbers had trouble consolidating their rule and protecting the people. As I’ve discussed previously, the rise of Robbers represented competing centers of power fighting for control. The conquest dynasties such as those from the period of disunion were even more fragile than Gadianton Robbers. Tribes like the Di didn’t have skilled bureaucrats who could collect taxes, administer rituals of leadership, conduct a census that taxes households, and raise their armies. On top of this, the Di tribe had only gained power within recent memory. There were still many gaps to their rule, which might specifically apply to weakening Nephite power. The various hilltop fortresses were only nominally loyal to the government. They still provided potential centers of opposition should the ruler falter and they shield peasants from taxes and the imposition of corvee labor. This weakened the government, as it couldn’t pay its army and didn’t have enough labor to build its own fortresses. Again, recalling Helaman 11:33, the most potentially damaging effect on a would-be emperor’s power was the tendency to relocate the population of defeated enemy states to areas around the capital. In times of severe chaos when central authority was weak or nonexistent, people often became more important than empty territory. By the time of the Battle of Fei River (383), there were over one hundred forty thousand households from the Xianbei and Qiang tribes stationed around the capital. They were easier to tax and control there, but they became a large sea of hostile people if the strength of the capital faltered, which it did in defeat at Fei River.

One final note is geographic specific, and that is how Mesoamerican rulers often needed a quick strike to legitimize their rule and provide captives for sacrifices. If we accept the notion that the Robbers weren’t just robbers but rather a rival state, then view could hold some merit. The warfare was needed on an economic basis but also for a cultural and political basis. Victory in battle, from Constantine seeing the Cross at the Battle of Milvian Bridge to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven, to the ritual ball court sacrifices of the Mayans was often the best divine diagnostic.

Ethnic Tension:

The final point would likely be the lowered social status of The Gadianton Robbers. Assuming these weren’t captive brides, economically important workers, or a need to show divine sanction of the state, their capture could just be part of the ethno history of the Nephites. The Greeks thought the Persians were weak and effeminate, the Romans thought the Greeks were duplicitous, mountain men often were perceived as brutish and darker skinned. The Nephites believed their opponents were cursed, indolent, bloodthirsty, and living in tents. Ethnic beliefs would hardly condone intermarriage with those that were considered ethnic others and mere robbers to boot.

The capture of women and children then is not a mere footnote or ambiguous verse sandwiched between speeches, but rather indicative of larger trends such as economic importance of people, but also the fragility of the states involved often in islands of power surrounded by seas of hostile people only loyal as long as they feared the military might of the leaders.

All of the factors are highly speculative and based on single verses combined with an overall picture presented in Helaman and an extensive knowledge of history. But the book of Helaman is shorter than the war chapters yet covers some 50 years. While some of the ideas in this section are extremely tenuous, they offer tantalizing clues into the nature of Nephite society, the underlying societal factors that drove prophetic warnings, and even possible sexual violence in the text.

What do you think?

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[1] There are many more ways to look at the text, and those that think the text is a fiction would find this silly. But I’m not having the same debate over and over again.

[2] Morgan Deane, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon, (Ebookit Press, 2014), chapter 2.

[3] William Hambling, Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History, (New York: Routledge Press, 2006), 113, 205.

[4] Daniel G. Bates, “Normative and Alternative Systems of Marriage among the Yörük of Southeastern Turkey,” Anthropological Quarterly 47, no. 3 (1974), 270–287. You might also examine the practices of Boko Haram and ISIS who are doing the same thing in the modern age.

[5] David Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare:300-900AD,(New York: Routledge Press, 2001), 60.

[6] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History,(New York, Westholme Press, 2018), 40.

From Sinners to Saints: Reassessing the Book of Mormon.

From Sinners to Saints: Reassessing the Book of Mormon is now available on Amazon. I'm a bit sheepish to admit it, but I haven't figured out how to add another box on the side of my blog, so this link will have to do for now. If you haven't had a chance, Decisive Battles in Chinese History is also available and has received glowing reviews. (Except for that two star review, but who's counting?) 

The baptism of Clovis in 496 AD. The combination of religious, political, and military power highlights the themes of the new book very well. 

As I work on how to get new boxes for the right hand of my blog, here is the book blurb:

Believers in the Book of Mormon contend it is an account of real people that existed in history. From Joseph Smith’s plural marriage to Brigham Young’s statements on race, as we study the complexity of history we develop a deeper appreciation for struggling leaders moving, sometimes imperfectly, through a tragic and fallen world. Morgan Deane, a professor of history and author of Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon, uses the best of modern scholarship and military history to mine indirect traces in the text to identify the complexity and ambiguity that we would expect from the actions of historical people. Extensive historical examples, including the campaigns of the Byzantine general Belisarius, "evil gangs" of Samurai, and purposeful manipulation of records by Chinese dynastic historians, combine with detailed analysis of subtle clues to provide additional insight into the militarization of the Nephites by their spiritual leaders, the futility of their battlefield victories, the deadly machinations even righteous rulers needed to gain and keep political power, the possibly unjust actions of Nephite rulers, the reconstruction of arguments used by Amalickiah, and Captain Moroni’s innovative and winning tactics leading to rapacious taxation and insurgency to make a book that offers a unique reinterpretation of both heroes and villains.
From Sinners to Saints: Reassessing the Book of Mormon is the first of its kind to fully reassess the narrative found in the Book of Mormon. During a time of increased militancy in foreign affairs and vitriolic domestic politics, the increasing economic and social costs of war, and the spread and acceptance of fake political narratives this text will revolutionize the way readers understand the Book of Mormon and help them apply its message for our day.

Thanks for reading and I hope you get a copy! 

The Gadianton Robbers in the Syrian Civil War

War on the Rocks is a great website that posts nuanced policy papers and military analysis. They recently published an article about Syria describing the decay of Bashar Al Assad’s regime.  This post briefly highlights how that article’s main points underscore what I’ve been arguing about the Gadianton Insurgency.  The current disintegration of the regime in the real world highlights and supports my subtle and nuanced reading of the Book of Mormon.  

Thesis Statement: Robbers Both a Cause and Collapse

As I wrote in my first book, “The various historical uses of the term robber when applied to the Book of Mormon suggest that the Gadianton Robbers contributed to and resulted from the weakening control of the central government over its territories and armed forces.”[1] 

War on the Rocks:  Today, where briefing maps now show solid red across Syria’s western governorates, they ought to distinguish dozens and perhaps even hundreds of small fiefdoms only nominally loyal to Assad. Indeed, in much of the country, loyalist security forces function like a grand racketeering scheme: simultaneously a cause and consequence of state collapse at the local level.

The State’s Reliance on Bandits:

I wrote on my blog here about a really cool letter I written by the Communists insurgents in China to a secret society. In assessing its significant I offered these words:  

Thus the line between bandits, militia of a hated rival, private bodyguards, deputized law enforcement officers, or insurgents, became incredibly blurred….On the local level that meant there were competing groups vying for power. Labels are very powerful, and labels like bandit were used to stigmatize. Yet early Communist forces had large components of bandits, including the entire forces of the two largest bandit groups nearest the Jinggangshan mountain base.  So when Chiang Kai-Shek labelled his campaign as bandit suppression and encirclement, it reflected an overt political attack on Communists, but it also reflected the way a political military fight can blur the boundaries with and reflect lawless banditry.

Both ancient historian Susan Mattern and Sinologist Stephen Averill talked about the way that bandits could be adopted into government forces or created as allies.[2] Mao Zedong incorporated bandits into his army but then warned against “banditry” within Communist forces.[3]  Indeed, even the United States saw this during the Anbar Awakening. We managed to convince many of the most ardent Sunni supporters of the insurgency to join our side. This is because they knew how to fight the insurgents. We worked with the Iraqi government to legitimize them as militia.   

War on the Rocks: The real story of the Tiger Forces is…instructive to those trying to understand the regime. During the early days of the uprising against Assad, Hassan coordinated the suppression of protests in Hama, an effort that relied on a collection of ordinary thugs, air force officers, and area tribal leaders… in due time, this early network of enforcers would evolve into the so-called Tiger Forces. While the unit has since developed a more stable core of permanent quasi-soldiers, Tiger loyalists today still hail from a vast web of militias, criminals, and smugglers stretching across Syria’s central and arguably most strategic province of Hama.

Weak Government Incorporates them:

I discussed many great things in my FAIR presentation it included the point that a weak government tried to co-opt and control local bandit leaders in order to bolster their power. This is related to the above concept about the very blurry line between bandit force and legitimate government militia or army:[4] 

Historically, the chaos that resulted from political weakness resulted in actors that can be divided into three camps. The first group is the predatory bandits that fit the typical image associated with robbers. Yet the second two, local elites that assume power, and former officials that take advantage of the power vacuum, can assist in our understanding of Nephite society.

The Roman sources called many groups ‘robbers,’ but it seems probable that they were actually the private forces of local magnates maintaining order and control outside of Roman public authority. [Even the great warlords such as Childeric, Clovis, and Alaric..held official offices in the Roman Empire.] Historian David Graff adds a similar point from Chinese history:

To protect themselves and their communities against the [predators], local elites organized their kinsmen and neighbors into militia forces. Many also followed the time honored response to trouble times and relocated to forts built on hilltops or in other easily defensible locations. One leader of protective forces was Lu Zushang…. He was the son of a [dynasty] general, and his family was wealthy and locally influential. Though still a teenager Lu recruited ‘stalwart warriors’ and pursued the bandits, with the result that they no longer dared to enter his district. [The remaining weakened government] eventually established him as governor of [the province].

War on the Rocks:  Apparently too weak to coerce and too broke to bribe those who fight under its banner, Assad has made efforts to tie his subordinates closer to his Damascus by political means instead. This April’s parliamentary “elections” further indicated the structural transformation of the regime from a centralized state to a loose hodgepodge of warlord. A number of long-serving Ba’athist rubberstamp bureaucrats and local dignitaries, pillars of the regime’s traditional rentier system, lost their seats in favor of upstart smugglers, militia leaders, and tribal chiefs.

Self-interested Soldiers:

In my new book (still forthcoming), I wrote about the decline of soldiers and how they likely became a parasitic cast, which would only fuel unrest and an insurgency against the government:[5]

The prophets in the book of Helaman continually lambasted the need to “get gain” (Helaman 6:8, 17) as the chief sin of Gadianton robbers, and the major prophetic discourses of Nephi and Samuel the Lamanite attack the materialism of Nephite society (Helaman 7:5, 21, 26; 13: 19-23, 32-36).  In describing the impotence of Moronihah’s army, Mormon said this about Nephite society, which might apply even more to the increasingly self-interested soldiers:

And it was because of the pride of their hearts, because of their exceeding riches, yea, it was because of their oppression to the poor, withholding their food from the hungry, withholding their clothing from the naked, and smiting their humble brethren upon the cheek, making a mock of that which was sacred, denying the spirit of prophecy and of revelation, murdering, plundering, lying, stealing, committing adultery, rising up in great contentions, and deserting away into the land of Nephi, among the Lamanites (Helaman 4:12).

…Considering the cost of equipping for war, and how plundering was the best pay day in the ancient world the soldiers would be rich, or at least the elites that used force to enrich themselves would be “exceeding[ly] rich.” They would also find that  “desert[ing] unto the Lamanites” with their war like policies (Mormon 8:8) promised a more lucrative environment. And it could easily refer to the soldiers of fortune and large bands of soldiers who thought the same. Moreover, the victims of this aggrandizement from out of control soldiers, or armies of elites would see it as “oppression, “smiting their...brethren upon the cheek,” stealing food from the hungry (remember the connection between famine and war in Helaman 11:1-5), could easily refer to the abuse of power by the military against civilians. 

In fact, the second half of Helaman 4:12 explicitly referred to murder, stealing, plunder, and great contentions.  Nephite military forces were led by prophets during times of righteous leadership (3 Nephi 3:19) so “denying the spirit of prophecy” could refer to rejecting righteous military leaders.   On top of this, in the next chapter when the prophets Nephi and Lehi were preaching, they were seized by an army and thrown in prison (Helaman 5:21).  Yet the Nephite record doesn’t mention a current war, which suggests the army was doing something else. This could be private aggrandizement, a war against “others” only hinted at by the text, or general plunder by a free booting company. Whatever their activity, it strengthens the suggestion that Helaman 4: 12 referred to a rapacious and predatory military that is not controlled by a righteous central government.

War on the Rocks:  Rather than attempt to capture resource monopolies, certain armed groups have taken to making a profit by exploiting the suffering population directly… Despite guarantees by the government, local loyalist militias tasked with manning the checkpoints in the area have recently begun levying a tax of 100 Syrian Pounds per kilogram on all incoming food products. Even a conservative estimate would put the monthly revenue of such a levy into the millions of U.S. dollars. This is enough to feed and supply the thousands of fighters manning the cordon, as well as their families. The watchdog group “Siege Watch” has put the number of civilians encircled by regime forces at an additional 850,000 across Syria. In these stricken areas, the cost of living has multiplied, with the difference syphoned off by those manning the bottlenecks. Put differently, with Damascus nowhere near able to finance and feed the families of loyalist militiamen, the encircling and taxation of civilians has an economic necessity for the regime to keep many of its most important frontline troops supplied and happy.

Conclusion:

I’m becoming more and more convinced that regardless of the time period, geography, and culture, there are a set of specific principles that govern the course of an insurgency and the composition of their army.  It is incredibly rewarding to see the arguments I’ve made about the Book of Mormon referenced in secular academic literature. The Book of Mormon clearly shows the Gadianton Robbers as an insurgency that features nuanced relationships and power brokering between the government, local leaders, the people, and military groups.  The government weakness was a cause of and results from the robbers, they alternatively relied upon and tried to co-opt them.  The soldiers enriched themselves upon the population and justified their looting as taxes. 

[Thanks for reading. I write as a free lance author, if you found value in this work please consider making a small monthly subscription or lump sum donation using the pay pal buttons at the bottom of the page.]

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[1] Morgan Deane, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon, (Ebookit, 2014), 37.

[2] Susan Mattern, “Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, Victor Davis Hanson eds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 169 (163-184). Stephen Averill, Revolution in the Highlands: The Jinggangshan Base Area 1927-1929. (New York, Rowan and Littlefield, 2007), 57.

[3] Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy, Part 4”, Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong, (Bejing: Foreign Language Press, 1971,) 112.

[4] Morgan Deane, “ Climbing a Tree to Find a Fish: Insurgency in the Book of Mormon”, FAIR Mormon Conference, Provo, Utah. August 2016.

[5] Morgan Deane, Evil Gangs and Starving Widows: Reassessing the Book of Mormon, (Forthcoming.), 149-151. 

A Short History of Robbers and Insults

[Crossed posted at Wheat and Tares.]

The Oregon standoff has included the frequent use of the word “terrorism” to describe the Bundys and their associates. Because of my research into revolutionary warfare, I’m not surprised that words like “terrorists” are used as tools to delegitimize political actors.[1]  My research projects have included insurgencies into the Late Roman Empire, samurai warfare in medieval Japan and the Chinese Civil War from 1927-1934.[2] (The latter of which is my proposed dissertation topic at Kings College London.)   In every period I found that the use of the term robber or bandit connoted specific differences in power between the central government and the perceived illegitimacy of new actors and centers of power.  As a result, this led to the use of words that were far more emotional than accurate. 

What was most interesting is that the new powers were often a mix of local officials with private soldiers that gained autonomy in the chaos, invading barbarians (or revolutionaries) that were alternatively courted and opposed by the government and often given official titles, protective groups of war bands, and some old fashioned predatory robbers that fit the traditional idea behind the term.  To cite one example, Mao Zedong actively courted local groups of bandits, and echoing Giddiahni’s letter located in the Book of Mormon (3^rd Nephi 3), he even offered their secret societies forgiveness and an oath of friendship in exchange for rejoining the revolution.[3]

Roman elites had private soldiers called bucellarii loyal to them and not the government, because those armed bands operated independently of government control historians often called them robbers.[4]  As de facto power holders the far off Eastern Roman emperor eventually courted these leaders and granted many of them official status, including such war lords as Childeric, Clovis, Alaric, and the Scourge of God Attila the Hun. and he eventually rose to become an official governor of the provenance.   In medieval Japan, local power holders jealously guarded their rights, and often labelled agents of the Shogun as “akuto” or “evil gangs.” Those that were labelled Akuto sometimes formed economic cartels to strengthen their power, and used hired muscle to ensure the cooperation of local farmers, collect taxes, and resist rival akuto. Despite these activities, often their only crime was being an agent of a government not recognized by local court officials![5] 

In short, there is a great deal of confusion between illegal bandits and rival armies and the legitimate use of force directed by government officials. As Susan Mattern said in describing anti Roman insurgencies,  “The difference between a bandit, a tribal chief, a petty king, or the leader of a rebellion could be open to interpretation; many individuals are located in more than one of these categories by the ancient sources.”^[6]  Often times, especially in ancient history, but always in contested lawless regions, the only difference between a robber (bandit, or member of an evil gang) and a tax collector was the perceived legitimacy of the actors.  Chiang Kai Shek for example found his strongest tactic during the Fifth Bandit Suppression and Encirclement Campaign was to harness the locals’ ability to shakedown merchants to and from Communist base areas and call it a tax.[7] Despite most of the “robbers” having at least some form of legitimacy they were stigmatized with the dismissive and often inaccurate term. 

These terms are used in such non clinical ways because as historians John Shy and Thomas Collier wrote that:

                Words themselves are weapons…Language is used to isolate and confuse enemies, rally and motivated friends, and enlist the support of  wavering bystanders… Revolutionary soldiers are often called ‘bandits’, in effect denying them the legal status of combatants, and their supporters described as ‘criminals’ or ‘traitors’. Government forces become ‘enemies of the people’ or ‘mercenaries’ the government itself being ‘fascist,’ corrupt,’ or a ‘puppet regime’….In revolutionary war there can be no neutral, apolitical vocabulary.^[8]

We see the potency of words today as well.  Policy makers debated over whether to call anti-American forces in Iraq “insurgents” or “terrorists.”[9]  Many Americans felt a great deal of frustration when the sectarian conflict in Iraq was labeled the demoralizing term “civil war.” It explains why the surge led by General Petraeus was labeled an escalation by some critics who were trying to invoke the ghoul of Vietnam. A blockade during the Cuban Missile crisis would have been an act of war, but a quarantine of the island prescribed the same action without the accompanying baggage.  In the prelude to the Bosnia deployment, each side avoided the term “genocide” to evade the treaty obligations associated with it. Thus policy makers use the rose-by-any-other-name term “ethnic cleansing” instead.

In conclusion, most people who accuse the Bundys of terrorism do so utterly unware of the long history of using emotionally charged words that obscure more than they clarify.  I certainly disagree with their actions, but I’m even more bothered by the casual use of emotional charged words that do little to accurately describe behavior or prescribe public policy. They instead simply seek to incite public opinion by using emotionally charged words instead of marshalling clear evidence and thoughtfully articulated positions.

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[1] For the record, I think their general demeanor, lack of education, radical militant libertarianism, and attempted revolt do plenty to deny them legitimacy. 

[2] Morgan Deane, “Groping in the Dark: Reassessing the Military Leaderhips of Mao Zedong during the Jiangxi Period; 1927-1924, New Research in Military History Conference, London September 25^th, 2015. https://thoughtsonmilitaryhistory.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/conference-new-research-in-military-history/

[3] CCP Kwang-Chang Central Committee, A Few Words to the Brethren of the Big Sword Society, December 22nd, 1933. Chen Cheng Collection, Reel III, no. 16, Hoover Library, Stanford California.

[4] Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, 6.45; Sevirnius, The Life of St. Sevirniua, 31, 42.

[5] Lorraine Harrington, “Social Control and the Significance of the Akuto.” Court and the Bakufu in Japan: Essays in Kamakura History (Yale Press, 221-250). Ed Jeffrey Mass and William Hauser.

[6] Susan Mattern, “Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, Victor Davis Hanson eds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 169 (163-184).

[7] Notice the use of the term “bandit suppression” in what were essentially campaigns in a civil war.  William Wei. Counterrevoluation in China: Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet Period. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985) 120-130.

[8] John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary war” in The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age Peter Paret Ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1986) 815-862, (821).

[9] In reality there were a mix of trans national terrorists aggravating local insurgencies, see David Kilcullen,  The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big Ones (Oxford University Press: 2011). 

Responding to RT's Review of Traditions of Our Fathers

          I appreciated RT’s lengthy post and review of Brant Gardner’s work, Traditions of our Fathers: The Book of Mormon As History, at Faith Promoting Rumor. I haven’t had a chance to read the book yet, though the previews I’ve seen and the review here suggests that Gardner has used some my work into military history. I’m also not a biblical scholar but my work into military history might inform a few of RT’s points. Unfortunately, upon closer examination and comparison with my research RT shows a stunning lack of knowledge concerning insurgency. At points he indicates a lack of awareness or skill in the tools used by historians, and in some places seems unaware of  Book of Mormon scholarship. (All block quotes from RT's post.)

“The reason the Lamanites suddenly attacked Ammonihah was to obtain sacrificial victims (p. 309-10)? And yet the BoM claims that “every living soul of the Ammonihahites was destroyed” (Alma 16:9).”

          There are actually two slightly different versions of the story. As Grant Hardy described in “Mormon the Editor,” Hardy contends that Mormon emphasized the complete destruction because he was acting as Mormon the prophet.  He sacrificed historical accuracy, (the “others taken captive”), to amplify the spiritual message that disobeying the prophets leads to destruction. But Mormon the historian had to be accurate and included the idea the comment: “And taken others captive into the wilderness” (Alma 16:3).  Thus, the scriptures don’t reject Gardner’s reading as RT suggests. Its also the first instance of a strange literalism that some show when commenting upon the Book of Mormon. At some points critics can offer rather ingenious fantasies about how Joseph Smith might have written the Book of Mormon as fiction and copied maps, but then they hold to a rather obtuse reading of the text to deny other theories. In his post RT spends the bulk of his organized review justifying the only acceptable framework for studying the Book of Mormon as a 19^th century one, and concludes anything else is begging the question.  Instead of disputing methodology (and essentially repeating anti Mormon techniques of dismissing evidence by saying it’s a 19^th century book at face value then disqualifying anything else), in this instance RT simply had to read the entire account carefully, and perhaps read some of that dreaded FARMS material like Hardy's chapter to show how flimsy his argument really was.

“By contrast [to Biblical type scenes], the historical and political contexts in which secret combinations appear in the BoM are significantly different from one another, ranging from military (Ether 14), to political intrigue (Hel 2), to insurrection (3 Ne 2-3), to infestation (Morm 1:18). For most of BoM history, the name of this secret society is the same, the Gadiantons.”

          I don’t know much about Biblical type scenes but I have studied insurgencies for years. (Well and trained for a counter insurgency even longer.)  At some points they seem like a rural based military conflict. In fact, “infestation” is a rather common term from ancient history to describe them.   And yet other times they seem to act as rival states. The bands of “robbers,” (as they were called by contemporary historians) commanded by local Roman elites often become the basis of power for lords in early medieval period for example.  Sometimes they seem more like local cartels or mafia with selected hits and use of muscle as part of their political intrigue against the central government. The Akuto (translated as evil gangs) of Medieval Japan for example often competed with Shoen (local landlords) for economic control of lands.  These evil gangs participated in a variety of activities ranging economic collusion, use of muscle to collect rent or make selected hits against enemies, law suits, and hit and run tactics against rival forces (government or otherwise.) Mao’s insurgency featured an intense argument over the location (urban or rural) and tactics such as selected assassinations from urban based elements, swift preemptive strikes on cities from rural bases,  or rural based mini states.

          In short, when RT says those scriptures are “significant differences,” I see them as closely related and often overlapping elements of the same type of conflict. Thus it would make sense to group and associated them with the same label. 

“The numbers reported for people who died in battle may be generic round numbers, but that does not justify concluding they are exaggerations equivalent to the colloquial expression, ‘I have seen a movie a thousand times’”

          I have a whole chapter on this coming up in my second book and those who read this blog know I’ve discussed it many times. Hans Delbruck was one of the first modern historians, and criticall examining numbers was one of the first things he did.  Numbering soldiers historically has always been inexaxct.  Eye witness chroniclers often eye balled and guessed about the numbers of soldiers. Contemporary historians often had to rely on innuendo and rumor as well as tendentious sources with motive to distort numbers. Later scribes and historians sometimes deliberately exaggerated to amplify the magnitude of the loss or victory. Other times it wrong numbers could be as simple as scribal errors in translation. On top of that, many unit names doubled as numbers. So Roman Centuries (that don't have 100 soldiers) and Greek Myriads both add to the confusion. Modern historians can also use things like logistical studies and military participation ratio to modify the numbers.   RT talks about a framework for judging information, and within mine I found Gardner’s argument about the colloquial use of numbers very strong and RT’s just as weak.  

“Further, Gardner is surely correct that the claim the groups are all somehow organically linked to one another is historically implausible (p. 327-41). But unfortunately for Gardner, that is exactly what the BoM indicates, that the devil revealed certain oaths and secret alliances to the Jaredites and did so again to the Nephites (Hel 6).”

          Just because Mormon and Nephite historians prescribed a specific cause of the Gadianton Robbers doesn’t make it an accurate depiction of what actually happened. This is another instance of RT’s obtuse literalism when it suits him. It’s fairly standard practice for historians to get origin stories wrong, and try to incorporate them with existing cultural beliefs.  Medieval historians for example often linked the Mongols to apocalyptic Christian themes. There were perfectly natural explanations such as the expanding population of the steppe and a particularly charismatic and militarily skilled leader. But if we accept RT’s literalism we would have to reject far stronger and more historical explanations in favor of either the bias and limited knowledge of an ancient editor, or fictional editor created by Joseph Smith. Instead of creating an elaborate fiction, I think its stronger to believe Mormon’s “mistake” by linking every instance of Gadianton Robbers to Satan is actually a consistent practice among ancient historians. TT and others attacked John Gee attacked after he suggested a lack of rigorous historical training in religious studies programs, yet RT seems to lack some of the basic analytical tools that historians regularly use.

“Gadianton is not a generic label, but a specific label for an organization with a coherent identity and agenda that operated for most of Nephite history”

          In my second quote RT said that the political and historical contexts were significantly different, but now he or she says they are a specific label with specific identity. I would need RT to describe these two different points in greater detail. I’ve read, researched, written, and published about dozens of insurgencies in different geographies and time periods.  I see different facets of the same type of political revolutionary warfare consistently and without exception in history and throughout the Book of Mormon. Again, not to beat a dead horse (or tapir), but when I compare RT’s statements to my research I find his arguments incredibly facile and unconvincing.      

“Finally, the Gadiantons are emphatically not a foreign entity, but rather an organization that grew up within Jaredite, Nephite, and Lamanite societies.”

         Chapter 2 of my first book discusses this in detail and provides evidence that they represent a separate ethnic group. I show how the term “robber” from history is a stigmatizing term used to delegitimize new power actors. [See here for a more comprehensive explanation.]  In fact, from RT’s description of Gardner’s argument it sure seems like Gardner agrees with me.  The British historian Gildas, late Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus among others used the same and similar terms as Nephite historians to describe what they considered social inferiors, ethnic others, and robbers.

          In conclusion, I often enjoy RT’s columns even when I disagree with them. In many cases and for a variety of reasons I demur on commenting. But this post had several glaring errors and omissions that I've directly addressed in my research.  At several other places (see bullet points 23 and 46), he dismisses Gardner’s comparisons to warfare as vague and unconvincing. I haven’t read the book so I can’t say if they are or not. I’m also not a Biblical scholar.  Yet based upon my years of research into military history and its intersection with the Book of Mormon, it is RT’s review and engagement with military matters that strikes me as weak, vague, and unconvincing.  

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