Holy Subversive Warfare

      

        I had a great post that I think would make a great journal article. Please read this Chatgpt summary of what I have thus far. 

        The central argument is that the Bible and Book of Mormon contain a recurring concept of “holy subversive warfare,” in which righteous actors sometimes use methods that would normally be considered dishonorable or immoral, including deception, infiltration, ambush, and assassination. Rather than judging these actions simply by whether they conform to conventional warfare, their morality depends on the actor, authority, purpose, target, circumstances, methods, and consequences.

        The central image is Jesus as the “Robber Messiah.” In Mark 3:27, Jesus describes his victory over Satan as entering the Strong Man's house, binding him, and taking his possessions. The unusual metaphor portrays Jesus not as a conventional soldier but as an infiltrating outlaw who invades Satan's domain and liberates those held by him. This connects with the temple being called a “den of thieves” and the Book of Mormon's portrayal of the Gadianton Robbers as agents of Satan.

        The biblical examples then develop this pattern. The story of John the Baptist's execution connects to Jesus' own death and victory over death, while Herodias is contrasted with Esther, Judith, and Jael. Judith and Jael use deception and stealth to kill powerful enemies, while Esther uses her influence to save her people. Together, these stories present subversive action as something that can serve either wicked or righteous purposes.

        The Book of Mormon provides another series of examples. Nephi kills the drunken Laban and obtains the brass plates through stealth; Gideon's secret passage involves drunken guards; Teancum infiltrates the tents of Amalickiah and Ammoron at night; Moroni uses ambushes, infiltration, and nighttime operations to liberate prisoners; and the unnamed servant of Helaman infiltrates the Gadianton Robbers and stops an assassin. These actions occur outside normal battlefield conventions, yet they are generally presented as serving righteous purposes rather than being inherently immoral.

        Augustine and Aquinas provide a Christian ethical framework for understanding these examples. Augustine argued that a just war could legitimately be conducted through ambush, while Aquinas argued that military plans could appropriately be concealed from an enemy. This creates a distinction between treachery and legitimate concealment or subterfuge.

        Classical Chinese thought provides a parallel tension. Confucian thinkers often associated virtue with openness and condemned treachery, while Sunzi treated deception as fundamental to warfare. Xunzi connected military strength to the moral and political order created by a righteous ruler. Deception could therefore be reconciled with morality when it served legitimate political purposes, particularly when it avoided the greater destruction of prolonged warfare. Mencius likewise emphasized that military strength alone could not preserve a state lacking moral order.

        The broader conclusion is that subversive warfare cannot be judged simply according to whether its methods are conventional or unconventional. Deception, ambush, or assassination is not automatically righteous because it is effective, but neither is it automatically unrighteous because it is deceptive or unconventional. The relevant questions concern intent, authority, target, method, circumstances, and likely consequences. This framework can also be applied to modern questions involving espionage, targeted attacks, and preemption.

        The final image returns to the distinction between the conventional warrior and the robber. The warrior wins on the battlefield, but the robber enters the house at night. The ultimate example is Christ, whose apparent surrender to death becomes the means by which death itself is defeated. The Robber Messiah therefore represents a broader conception of righteous power that does not always operate through conventional strength or conventional rules.

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Atomic Bombings Justified? Examining the even worse alternatives

 

August 6th marks the controversial day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. Critics of Hiroshima have long debated whether dropping the bomb was moral yet every realistic alternative would have killed far more people.

The Question Is Not Whether the Bombs Were Horrific

            Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[1] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[2]

The Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later.[3] Critics have argued that the bombings were intended not only to force Japanese surrender but also to demonstrate American military capability to the Soviet Union.

Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets. Critics also argue that Japanese peace overtures made the bombing unnecessary.

Critics of the bombings often focus on morality in isolation. The real moral question, however, is whether any realistic alternative would have produced fewer deaths.

Did Japan Actually Offer Peace?

            The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. The Japanese were ready for peace and the argument implied it was only the blood thirsty, American war mongers who kept the war going. Gar Alperovitz later argued that these peace efforts demonstrate the bombing was unnecessary. His interpretation, however, relies on selective evidence.[4] More importantly, this interpretation emphasizes evidence supporting its conclusion while overlooking later events.

            The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup.

Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[5] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

            Again, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting.

Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. It took two atomic bombs to convince them, and even then, just barely. American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions. Any idea of peace before dropping the bomb conflicts with the available evidence from Japanese decision making in 1945 and relies on assumptions about what Japanese leaders would have done under different circumstances. 

The Postwar Critics and the Context of Their Opposition

            Some critics rely heavily on statements from military leaders who opposed the bombing after the war. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

             Eisenhower's later criticism must be considered within its historical context and ultimately discounted. He commanded the war in Europe and wasn't privy to the intelligence or decision-making in the Pacific. Yet today his opinion is often treated as expert testimony on a campaign he didn't direct.

When he became President Eisenhower’s New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7]  He threatened the use of nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Strait Crises and was so interested in their deployment that he developed tactical nukes.

            The main source of opposition was parochial, interservice rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] 

It isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize what they called the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

    The Alternatives Were Not Bloodless

                Japan was unlikely to surrender without either atomic bombing or a catastrophic invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

            Estimates vary significantly depending on assumptions about Japanese resistance and invasion scenarios. But General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[10]

If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. Critics who focus primarily on the immediate destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki often do not account for the enormous human cost of alternative strategies.

Blockade and Starvation as Alternatives

            The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[11] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death.

That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

            Any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet their statements are often used as rhetorical props in modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons.

            Ending the War Before a Soviet Occupation

            The rapid end of the war also prevented a larger Soviet role in Japan. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

            The Least Harmful Choice Available

            Ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why some allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[12]

Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[13]

            Every other option was worse than using atomic weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral, and I’ve seen people sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But nuclear weapons were not used in a vacuum. They were used against a horribly aggressive regime, and they prevented alternatives that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war is not as catchy as the sarcastic claim that “Jesus nukes people,” but it reflects the moral reasoning used by Allied leaders who believed it was the least harmful option available.

            Any evaluation of the atomic bombings must account for both the destruction they caused and the alternatives available during the final months of World War II. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

            Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II.

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[1] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[2] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[3]  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[4] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[5] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.

[10] Frank, Downfall, 340.

[11] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.

[12] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.

[13] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197.

The Tuttle Twit? Twenty Years of Connor Boyack Misunderstanding Preemptive War

        I first encountered Connor Boyack nearly twenty years ago. His writing reflected a familiar libertarian style. It was confident, combative, and heavy on slogans while light on careful definitions. Since then, he has become a successful children's book author and largely scrubbed his old website, but a recent "Musing" sounded strikingly familiar.

        After tracking down the original article he tried to erase, I discovered that, despite two being nearly twenty years old, Boyack is still relying on the same flawed talking points against preemptive war.[1]

        Below is a checklist of the arguments he made then and is still making now. I've included timestamps from his recent video to show just how little has changed. While some of this post revisits earlier research, my primary goal is to demonstrate how much relevant scholarship and little thought Boyack has engaged with and shown over the last twenty years:

Bad Definition (14:38)

Massive network of spies (14:45)

Perfunctory shout out to Just War and catch phrases without understanding key terms. Incorrectly treats preemption as incompatible with Just War theory.(15:07)

Severely out of context Eisenhower (15:17)

Cherry picked first presidency statement on “law of the jungle” (15:41)

Contextualizes the war chapters to exclude them (He didn’t repeat this point in his musings, he simply ignored the war chapters this time.)

Inappropriate use of terrorist (18:08)

De contextualizes 3 Nephi 3:20-21 Mormon 3:10 as evidence (18:18; 21:12)

Misuses A Brent Merrill, who was describing a strategic situation and not a command from the Lord (18:36)

Nephite battles take place in Nephite territory (22:23)

Misapplied use of Hugh Nibley (23:03)

        As you can see, his musings aren’t inspiring or insightful, just the same stale talking points based on unexamined assumptions from twenty years ago. More importantly, on every single point he has missed additional research that would have better informed his arguments.

        Before I show why, I might answer the overall question of his post "Where are all the peacemakers?" That’s a rather insincere question since his version of peace making is repeating the same sanctimonious and shallow talking points for twenty years while insulting his opponents as terroristic Gadiantons (the internet never forgets!) and war mongering propagandists.[2]

        The real peacemaking starts by taking the subject seriously, grappling with complex issues and respecting those who disagree with you by at least avoiding lazy name calling. Despite leading or contributing to multiple institutes, selling millions of books, and emphasizing those credentials on his website, Boyack hasn't done the intellectual work that genuine peacemaking requires such as engaging opposing arguments, refining his definitions, and responding to scholarship published since he first made these claims.

Boyack gets the definition wrong

        Let us start with his definition of preemptive war: Serious theorists going back 500 years have had a better definition than Boyack, who defined preemptive war as simply "fighting your enemy on your terms, before they (may or may not) fight you on theirs," or in short, "get them before they get us." But definitions matter as they distinguish between preventive and preemptive war using concepts like imminence, intent, and capability.  

        The early modern writer Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law, defined preemptive war as being "lawful to kill those who are planning to kill." He is the one that provided the criteria of means, intent, and imminency.[3] The last criteria, “imminency,” is particularly important in the modern age when some missiles can move 20,000 miles an hour or cross the US in about seven minutes. The line between preemptive and preventive war can therefore be measured in mere minutes, yet Boyack ignores that distinction entirely, preferring simplistic and sanctimonious talking points.

        Micheal Walzer, the leading modern theorist on just war that Boyack also ignored, best summarized the differences by talking about past, present, and future and only justified attacks based on present threats, not past aggressions or fear of future consequences.[4] It’s quite an interesting debate that brings a great deal of sophistication and nuance to the subject, and precisely the level of moral analysis absent from Boyack's discussion.

        Boyack mentions just war in perfunctory fashion, but doesn’t understand any details of the practice.  He relies on a few phrases, “true defense” “legitimate self-defense” and an improper understanding of last resort. Boyack only source is a link to a Wikipedia article.

        His shallow slogans are no substitute for engaging the actual literature. Simply invoking "legitimate self-defense", for example, proves very little. Nearly every aggressor in history has claimed to be acting defensively. Even Hitler justified invading Poland by citing alleged abuses of ethnic Germans in the Danzig Corridor.

        Applying the idea of legitimate law enforcement, Salamanca School scholars Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez argued that just as kings can send out a posse of law men to capture bandits, nations can preemptively send forces into lawless areas.[5] Thus, the Nephite desire to “search out…and destroy” the Gadianton bandits in their hiding places is a perfect representation of this just principle (Helaman 11:28). If you’ll excuse my bluntness, Gidgiddoni said “Lord Forbid” (3rd Nephi 3:21), because they were getting their asses kicked, not because it was wicked. Boyack's failure to move beyond the same talking points over the last twenty years reflects a remarkable lack of intellectual development.

Boyack ignores contrary evidence

        The evidence Boyack does present is so selectively chosen that his argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. His warning about a "massive network of spies" functions more as a libertarian talking point than a carefully argued objection. Ironically, overwhelming scriptural evidence cuts against Boyack's own example (Alma 43:23; 44:21; 56:22, 39). Helaman’s servant in Helaman 2:6-7 is most useful. After some night time spying, the servant killed Kishkumen before he killed the chief judge. Helaman’s servant might have righteously reported that “[I] got them before they got us.”[6] 

        As with Book of Mormon passages about spies, Boyack's interpretive framework effectively excludes the Book of Mormon's war chapters from consideration whenever they become inconvenient. Yet those chapters are precisely where the Book of Mormon wrestles the most with interstate conflict, preemption, deterrence, and the ethics of military action. They cannot simply be brushed aside because they complicate a preferred narrative

        Take Alma 46:30 for example, which describes reasoning for Moroni’s preemptive action. This is an extremely interesting verse because the narrative discusses future action: “Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any strength.”

        This verse is about the future, which makes it on the more radical end of the spectrum than the present imminence described by Walzer. Moroni was a man that could shake the foundations of Hell, so his actions should be analyzed instead of explained away. Rather than wrestle with Moroni's reasoning, Boyack gave excuses for ignoring them.

Boyack strips sources of their context

        Other evidence is presented without the context necessary to evaluate it properly. We have already seen this with the strategic context surrounding "the Lord forbid." The same problem appears in Boyack's treatment of the First Presidency's prewar statement, which he quotes in isolation while ignoring the events that immediately rendered it incomplete. Pearl Harbor transformed both the strategic situation and the First Presidency's public position. Their 1942 statement offered a far stronger defense of the war effort, suggesting that Boyack is appealing to an isolationist argument the Church itself substantially abandoned once the realities of aggression became undeniable.

        By quoting Eisenhower, who also relied heavily on spies in his foreign policy, Boyack took a dilettantish approach, selecting quotations that appear supportive but prove far more nuanced in context. Boyack quoted Eisenhower opposing first strikes, but restored to his historical context, Eisenhower also said he would launch an all out preemptive attack without approval of congress if Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons were confirmed to be preparing to strike[7] In private documents, Eisenhower wrote that he would “shoot the enemy before they shoot you” if an imminent Soviet attack were confirmed. In Boyack's own terms, that is simply "get them before they get us." Yet Eisenhower rejected preventive war while unequivocally endorsing preemptive war against an imminent attack.

        This is why the definitions established in Section One matter. Boyack treats all first strikes as morally equivalent, with only the most minimal acknowlgement of the differences between prevention and preemption, but imminence fundamentally changes the moral calculus to the point that Eisenhower himself answered both "yes" and "no" to first strikes depending on the circumstances. Boyack slogan's never reach that level of nuance. 

       I have already discussed "the Lord forbid" and the use of spies, but Boyack's use of Mormon 3:10 ignores an even more important point. As I argued at the LDS National Security Professionals Conference, the Nephites had already endured far more than the three offenses required by D&C 98:39–40. Their failure was not strategic but moral. By this point they had become rapist cannibals, so any military campaign, including a preemptive one, was doomed to fail. Boyack mistakenly throws out preemptive war when the text is actually condemning the wickedness of those who employed it.

Boyack’s Odd Argument and Conclusion

        The oddest example is Boyack’s argument that because Nephite battles occurred in Nephite territory, any use of force outside U.S. borders is wrong. This collapses under basic examination. If a terrorist launches a nuclear missile from Cuba, Boyack’s logic suggests the United States cannot lawfully intercept it until it crosses American territory. Yet the threat, and the moral right of self-defense, is identical seconds before and after crossing an invisible border. As discussed in Section One, modern missiles move so quickly and cause such devastation that delay can be fatal. Basing nuclear defense on such a rigid interpretation of Nephite warfare is a dangerously imprudent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

        DC 98 is best understood as the LDS version of the Sermon on the Mount. Just like mainstream Christians, we should have a peaceful heart and renounce war. But we can and must reluctantly resort to arms when it becomes a tragic necessity to stop the massacre of brothers and families (Alma 48:21-23).

        The issue isn't that Connor Boyack and I disagree. The problem is that Boyack has become one of the topic’s loudest voices while remaining deeply unserious. His talking points have remained unchanged despite two decades of scholarship and personal study that should have refined them. Serious disagreement requires serious engagement with the strongest opposing arguments. Repeating slogans for twenty years while neglecting scholarship is not peacemaking, nor is it a serious contribution to the debate over preemptive war.

        Ideas about war are too important to leave to slogans. Lives depend on getting these questions right. If we are going to invoke scripture to guide questions of war and peace, we owe one another more than decades of recycled talking points.

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[1] He often calls it "preventive war," a common rhetorical tactic used to make the practice sound more objectionable by shifting the debate to the less defensibile preventive war. The problem is the "imminence" is often contested to the point the dinstinction becomes a reflection of one's bias. 

[2] The second link is to a different author than Boyack, but it contains the same tone, talking points, and spirit of Boyack. Literally in the first two minutes of Boyack's "musings" he called his opponents "war mongers." 

[3] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.

[4] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

[5] Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 163–165. Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J.: De Triplici Virtute Theologica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 740–743.

[6] There is some debate over the silence of the Book of Mormon about the morality of this action. I think a lack of editorial dissent means approval. Mark Henshaw believes the practice needs affirmative approval in the text. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that the simultaneous anonymity and silence surrounding Helaman’s servant, and the detailed exposition of the secret works, is a subtle but strong editorial comment that shows the secret works of darkness are known to God, and the righteous works of defense against them are not known to man.

[7] Implicitly stated in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d55

Prooftexting War: Even the Pope Gets It Wrong

        

        Recently, Pope Leo XIV weighed in on the Iran war and declared that God cannot be used to justify war. Quoting Isaiah 1:15, "He does not listen to the prayers of those who wage war, but rejects them, saying: 'Even though you make many prayers, I will not listen: your hands are full of blood.’”

        Calls for peace are understandable. War is ugly, costly, and often tragic and we all want peace. But it’s discouraging to see the Pope of all people prooftext a single verse and present it as if it settles the entire moral question of warfare.

        That kind of selective reading sounds nice, but it doesn’t hold up. The Babylon Bee joked that "God Does Not Listen To People Who Wage War So Long As You Don’t Count Moses, David, Joshua, Elijah, Saul, Gideon, Samson, Or Anyone Else In The Bible."

        I could stop there as the Bee presents the fundamental problem with the Pope's words in that the Bible and LDS scripture are not so easily presented as anti war. If anything, they reflect a strong just war sensibility. 

        That's because I can name Christian fathers like Cyprian, Tertullian, and Origen,[1] who prayed for the success of the emperor and his armies, and many scriptures, such as D&C 98:37, say the Lord will join His people in battle.

        This sentiment is frequently repeated in scripture, including many Biblical verses the Pope didn't include: 

“And I the Lord would fight their battles” (D&C 98:37).

“As I said in a former commandment, even so will I fulfill- I will fight your battles” (D&C 105:14).

“Thou will fight for thy people as thou didst in the day of battle, that they may be delivered from the hands of all their enemies” (D&C 109:28).

“The Lord your God which goeth before you, he shall fight for you” (Deut 1:30).

“The Lord fought for Israel” (Joshua 10:14).

“The battle is not yours, but God’s” (2 Chron. 20:1-29).

        So it seems odd to say that the Lord doesn't hear the prayers of those who make war and whose hands are covered in blood, while the Lord Himself says so many times he'll fight our battles. The answer in the supposed contradiction is that the verse cited by the Pope, (Isaiah 1:15) described a wicked Israel, condemned not simply for violence, but for hypocrisy, injustice, and unrepentant sin. It is not a blanket condemnation of all warfare in every context.

        Unfortunately, a random scripture taken out of context and used as a sanctiminous bumper sticker is quite common. See, for example, how many pacifists invent a new category of "sanctified" behavior in D&C 98, or how often someone quotes only the first half of Mormon 7:4.[2] 

        But with a full framework that doesn't pick and choose which scriptures to turn into bumper stickers, one that accepts both the pro- and anti-war passages, the real question becomes motives, what is being defended, methods, and the justice of the cause. In that light, it’s not hard to conclude that God hears prayers of those who wage war. His record throughout scripture is one of justified warfare and strengthening his people in battle. The apostle Paul himself describes rulers as “agents of God’s wrath” (Romans 13:4), tasked with punishing evil.

        In short, the quote is nice, and it's ironic to see how many unbelievers suddenly like the Pope because he provided a quote that can bash Trump and their political opponents. But even the strongest sentiment backed by a single scripture, even when delivered from the Pope himself, isn't enough to settle a question as complex as war.

        If we’re going to take scripture seriously, we have to take all of it seriously, not just the verses that fit the mood of the moment and are useful for bashing our opponents. 

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1. Tertullian, Apologia 32, 33. Gordon Heath, "The Church Fathers and the Roman Empire," in Empire in the New Testament, Stanley Porter ed., (Pickwick Publications, 2011,) 267 (259-282). David Corey, J. Daryl Charles, Just War Tradition: An Introduction (ISI Institute, 2012), chapter 1. (Page number forthcoming. I packed all my notes for an upcoming move.) 

2. See also, Patrick Mason, David Pulsipher, Proclaim Peace: The Restoration’s Answer to an Age of Conflict, (Deseret Book, 2021), preface. (Page number forthcoming. I packed my library too.) 

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Love, Law, and War in the Old Testament

 

        In between their regular insults of me, the Latter Day Saint Peace Studies group on Facebook asked: How do you reconcile the Old Testament God with Jesus of the New Testament? They ignored my response but it’s worth reading here:

        It’s funny you ask this because it shows a point I’ve made for years, that pacifists have to discount scripture, and can't wrap their minds around a God that uses violence. Patrick Mason and David Pulsipher in their book offered convoluted theories about divine violence that relies on texts that called God a terrorist. Or they suggest that you rely on modern scholarship that disputes the "historical reliability" of the Hebrew Bible. Other pacifists call God schizophrenic over the destruction of 3 Nephi 8.

        The top line summary for those that don’t ignore the nature of God argue that violence is regrettable but sometimes necessary and even exhibited by God. With that point of view Divine violence isn't "incongruous" with a merciful God but part of his character.

        Christians for thousands of years thought they should have a peaceful and conciliatory heart, more representative of the New Testament, while showing enough love for their neighbor to wield the sword and stop their slaughter, which is more like the Old Testament. 

        In fact, God commanded Noah after the flood that "by man shall the blood [of murderers] be shed." As explained by Dennis Praeger in his commentary on the Hebrew Bible: When you compare the flood to similar stories you see a God that is imminently concerned with morality and justice. But you can't rely on eventual love and justice from God. You're commanded to use the death penalty, just as God exhibited in the flood.

        Abraham is blessed a prince of peace (Genesis 14:18-20), but he didn't lift a standard of peace or bear three trespasses before he launched a sneak attack as supposedly required by Doctrine and Covenants 98. Praeger in fact, called Abraham a righteous man of war.

        In Exodus 21, a chapter after the Ten Commandments, God gave laws concerning justifiable homicide. That's why a better translation of the Ten Commandants is "thou shall not murder." The text in the two chapters literally describes justified homicide. The Exodus laws give protection to slaves and offers a route to emancipation that was incredibly progressive for its time.

        This law is often diminished as "an eye for an eye." But the law was fairly progressive because often society would seek a scape goat sacrifice. As in, someone that took your eye would have the eyes of their entire household forfeited. Thus it was more more just that only the person who committed the crime would suffer punishment. Moreover, unlike society at large, the penalties didn't vary between the eye of a noblemen or the eye of a commoner. Everyone was treated equally. Finally, few actually took an eye as punishment. There were financial penalties and fines that acted as substitutes. Even in the Old Testament, the whole world wasn't blind. (Thanks to Dennis Praeger for the extensive and enlightening commentary.)

        Overall the journey to the land God chose for his servants is the basis for the City of God and just war described by Augustine.

        Augustine and Aquinas (as well as Captain Moroni if you look closely enough) discussed the ambush in Joshua 8:2 and found Christlike reasons to support ambushes. If it was for a just cause like defending your people, just like Christ withheld some information leaders may move in secret.

        Even the most problematic chapter, Deuteronomy 20 tells us to "proclaim peace" and provides an off ramp to deescalate violence. (Ironically, I only noticed this after reading the Muslim father of international law, Al Shaybani.) The chapter says "thou shalt utterly destroy,” but in practice told the people to lift a standard of peace and give both sides a chance to accept peace.

        The text doesn't focus on justifying violence. It commands you to love your neighbor, (Leviticus 19:18) and through stories like Lot and his guests, or by command in Exodus, strangers and foreigners are to be treated with hospitability and respect.

        The stories of the patriarchs give us extensive lessons in how to be peaceful and recognize the regrettable, but just use of the sword. Unlike pacifists, the above attitude doesn't need to diminish God or ignore the Hebrew Bible to do it. It enhances our understanding and appreciation of God, and we should study the Old Testament more carefully. 

Just War Theory in the Age of Political Violence

My recent article, Just War Theory in the Age of Political Violence has just been published at Public Square Magazine. I'm happy to take part in a very important conversation when so many people feel justified in taking the law into their own hands. The article is an edited version of this post from several months ago. 

I hope you enjoy reading it. If you like my ideas please consider purchasing one of my books linked in the top left. 

Throw Granny in Front of the Bus: The Ethics of Violence in Gaza

        

        Many people claim that all violence is equally wrong, as if harm alone defines morality, but this is a misunderstanding; violence must be judged by context, intention, method, and purpose, and failing to make these distinctions obscures the difference between deliberate terror and defensive action, which is why comparing Israel’s military campaign to Hamas’ attacks demonstrates how moral evaluation depends entirely on circumstances and objectives.

        This is precisely why, in my military ethics class, we spend time on examples that force students to confront how intent, circumstances, and foreseeable outcomes shape moral judgment.

        One example we use is the case of the grandmother and the bus. Imagine you are standing on a street corner and a grandmother is about to be struck by an oncoming bus. You push her out of the way, she breaks her hip but survives, and you are rightly called a hero. Now imagine an almost identical situation, except this time the bus is a few seconds earlier and the grandmother is still standing near the curb. You push her, she breaks her hip, falls into the street, and is run over and killed. You are now a villain.

        The physical action is the same, a grandmother being pushed. The injury is nearly the same, a broken hip. Yet the moral evaluation could not be more different. The difference lies entirely in context, intention, and the relationship between the act and its outcome. Ethics has always understood that harm alone does not determine moral guilt, and anyone pretending otherwise is either unserious or willfully evasive.

        This distinction matters when discussing Israel and Hamas. There is a profound difference between deliberately moving through civilian neighborhoods like Kfar Aza and Kibbutz Be'eri, burning families alive, including infants and children, beheading civilians with garden tools, and taking civilians hostage to torture, starve and kill them, and conducting a military campaign in one of the most densely populated urban environments on earth against those same terrorists who use their own people as human shields and deliberately embed themselves in churches, hospitals, and schools.

        In both cases women and children die, and that fact is tragic, but tragedy does not erase moral distinctions. One campaign is targeted butchery pursued for the sake of terror itself. The other is a state under siege attempting to dismantle an enemy that openly celebrates rape, torture, and slaughter, while trying, however imperfectly, to protect its own population and limit civilian casualties under extraordinarily difficult conditions. Complaints about Israeli settler violence or other Israeli imperfections are largely attempts to obfuscate that difference and function as apologies for terrorists rather than serious moral analysis.

        The goals, attitudes, and methods used by the two parties remain entirely different, despite both using violence, and those differences matter. Israel’s use of force and the resulting deaths of Gazans are regrettable, they are still just in the moral sense because they are directed at stopping future atrocities and defending a population from an enemy that has made clear its intent to repeat them.

        Ultimately, the responsibility for the suffering of Palestinian civilians lies with Hamas. Israel’s campaign is imperfect, as all wars are, and many of the alleged crimes attributed to Israel rely on casualty figures and narratives produced by wildly Gazan sources and uncritical and even propagandist international organizations. Even where mistakes occur, a mistake made in pursuit of a just cause is morally different from deliberate evil.

        Hamas deliberately uses its own people as shields, operating from hospitals, schools, and residential buildings precisely because civilian deaths serve its propaganda goals. Despite this, Israel takes measures that are historically rare in urban warfare. According to John Spencer at the Modern War Institute, Israel has fought the most careful war in history. Israel provides advance warnings of operational zones, allows vaccination campaigns for children, and according to the United Nations itself facilitates the entry of millions of tons of food into Gaza. Israel possesses the military capability to kill the entire population of Gaza several times over, and supposedly seeks their genocide, yet it continually restrains itself and conducts a limited campaign aimed at dismantling a terrorist organization while simultaneously providing aid to the very population that organization endangers.

        In a perfect world violence would not be necessary, but we do not live in that world. In the end, recognizing the moral difference between deliberate terror and measured military defense is not a theoretical exercise but a practical imperative; Israel’s campaign is imperfect and tragic, but it is conducted with restraint, guided by the goal of protecting its citizens and dismantling an enemy that celebrates mass murder, while Hamas’ violence is indiscriminate, celebratory, and aimed at civilians, and anyone who refuses to distinguish between the two fails to grapple with the realities of war and the obligations of moral judgment, and the only responsible stance is to condemn the perpetrators of terror rather than those who act to stop them.

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When Pacifism Met Reality: A Response to Ward Radio's Jonah Barnes

      

         I recently spent over an hour watching a debate among Jonah Barnes and Luke Hansen at the podcast, Doctrine and Governance. It was illuminating mostly for what was left out and engaged. Since I literally wrote the book on the subject I felt it was worth explaining those points.

Failure to Define

        Barnes never defined pacifism beyond vague gestures toward “having a peaceful heart” and disliking violence. Having a peaceful heart is important, it's literally the first chapter of my book, but he never fully explains his position which makes it more sentiment than consistent theology. Nor did he ever explicitly state if he believed all violence is immoral. If he does believe that he’ll have to explain many, many, examples of divine violence. This is usually done using the pacifists’ favorite tactic of minimizing or discounting most scriptures.

        Barnes claimed, many, many times, he took a “non-accusatory” position on pacifism, even as he accused others of “twisting the scriptures” or just being “idiots.” Yet when he claimed he was on “The Lord’s Side” the moral framing was clear: if his view is the righteous one, then those who disagree must be immoral. That’s a great deal of posturing that might be good for a debate but makes for very poor dialog and ignores the need for justice in this world. In a massive case of projection he minimized clear war chapter verses (Alma 48:14; 43:47) a great deal, offered a tortured reading of D&C 98 and ignored clear statements that we are not command to lay down our arms (Alma 61:12-13).  Barnes never considers that if warfare were inherently sinful, why would the Lord direct His people in how and where to defend themselves (Alma 48:15; Exodus 14:14; Deuteronomy 20:4)? Why would the Lord join them in battle in DC 98:37, and bless them with victory if warfare was so sinful?

        I’ll return to this below, but a better reading is to see how all the scriptures fit together. So instead of discounting the Old Testament, the war chapters, and the command to use force in DC 98, a person should understand what it means to renounce war, proclaim peace, and know when to wield the sword. The answer to that seeming contradiction is the center of my writing, the first chapter of my book, and a subject of frequent discussion.

Pacifism Meets Reality

        The greatest weakness of Barnes' position was the failure to offer hypothetical but likely real world examples, even while claiming that pacifism “thrives in the real world.” To me, that was a tacit admission that pacifist theories don’t work in the real world. Reading scripture isn’t designed to articulate grand castles in the sky, it’s supposed to help us “liken the scripture” to everyday life (1 Nephi 19:23).

        Moreover, Jesus used parables, and the hypothetical example of the Good Samaritan, Lost Sheep, Talents, Wise and Foolish Builder, and Sower, to explain His principles. The Book of Mormon is full of examples where hypothetical beliefs met the sharp edge of the sword where faithful believers were commanded to defend their families and freedom. Alma 43:47, 48:21–23, and 61:12–14 all affirms the divine duty to protect the innocent, “even unto bloodshed.”

        I’m particularly interested in Abraham’s rescue of Lot. D&C 98:32 says the Lords Law of War was also revealed to Abraham. And yet when raiders captured Lot, Abraham didn’t lift a standard of peace and wait for three trespasses. He launched a sneak attack! But he was blessed by a prince of peace (Alma 13:18). Clearly, the Old Testament's explanation of D&C 98 differs from that of Barnes. The famous command “thou shall not kill” should read, “thou shall not murder.” That’s because Exodus 21–22, immediately after the Ten Commandments, discusses multiple instances of justified defensive killing.

        Discussion of the New Testament often focuses on the supposed pacifism of the Sermon on the Mount, but Jesus supported the use of force as well. When talking to soldiers neither John the Baptist (Luke 3:10-18) nor Jesus commanded soldiers to lay down their arms (Matthew 8:5-13). (John the Baptist addressed hypothetical future situations when told soldiers to be content with their pay instead of extorting the people for more.) Jesus praised the centurion for his faith!  Jesus described parables where the master used force to compel servants to enter during a hypothetical banquet (Luke 14:23). All four gospels describe Jesus using whips to cleanse the temple. (Mason and Pulsipher tried to explain this away as “only” violence against objects and animals. But similar violence in the Book of Mormon was enough for Ammon to main and kill people.) Jesus said that he didn’t bring peace but brought the sword (Matthew 10:34), and in another instance, fire and division (Luke 12:49). Jesus killed a fig tree for not being fruitful (Mark 11:12-14). When struck, Jesus didn’t turn the other cheek (John 18:22-23).

        Expanding to look at New Testament more broadly, Paul says the rulers are appointed by God as “agents of his wrath to the wrong doer” (Romans 13:4; see below). And Jesus promises in revelation that he will kill so many people that the blood will flow like a wine press for 200 miles (Rev 14:20).

        Last but not least, our new prophet, Dallin H. Oaks gave a talk where he described how we must ask ourselves, "where will it lead?" His entire talk was based on hypothetical situations where a person might take preemptive action. 

Twisting

        In addition to misreading scriptures, the claim of twisting scriptures with overburdened reasoning is a frequent tactic of internet sophists to sound simple but decisive, and make opponents look manipulative and weak with mental gymnastics.

        But matters of war and peace are not decided by who has the best slogan. That might sound strong on a discussion board, but ethics of war and peace are best determined by how dozens of scriptures interact with each other. (Such as how someone might “renounce war” and “resist bloodshed with your sword” at the same time.)

        For those who claim to be experts on peace and love, and pacifists are among the most arrogant people I've met, they should be able to move beyond bumper stickers to explain their point using scriptures, including likely hypotheticals. It’s not quite a bumper sticker, but Barnes’ catch phrases are an indictment of his shallowness, not my depth.

Moral Logic and Justice

        Finally, there was a singular point where Barnes declared: “Justice is the last thing I want.” That is an astoundingly privileged comment from someone who has never experienced a grave injustice. The victims whose blood “cries from the ground” (Genesis 4:10; 2 Nephi 28;10) deserve more than passive compassion. It sounds a bit like Game of Thrones but it’s accurate, until the afterlife, the only justice a person receives is what is delivered to people by a secular government. That is why God said that rulers are “agents of wrath to the wrong doers,” and Thomas Aquinas cited ruler’s need to “deliver the poor and needy” (Psalms 81:4).

        Justice entirely deferred to eternity is justice denied on earth. In short, tell the families of 9/11 victims or Jews in Europe during the Holocaust justice is the last thing they should receive.  They should be okay with the perpetrators of heinous rape, mutilation, and murder living their entire lives, smiling with the sun on their face, having meals and every joy they could have. Meanwhile the victims spend countless hours in tears, feeling like a storm cloud is always raining on them…all because Jonah Barnes has a vague aversion to violence to the point he says that he doesn’t want “justice.” But the Book of Mormon directly repudiates that opinion when Alma taught that mercy can’t rob justice (Alma 42:25). That is even more important in matters of war and peace, and explains why Bib Netanyahu, for example, seems so motivated to pursue war. Only eliminating Hamas, (or the less perfect peace deal that disarms them and bars them from power) was justice for the innocent victims of Hamas’ barbaric rampage and a defense against future attacks. 

Conclusion

        I didn’t even get to many other topics. For example, Barnes drew shaky parallels between modern conflicts and ancient wars, equating acts like Hiroshima or Pearl Harbor defense with evil. War is terrible but pretending that all use of force is immoral doesn’t make us holy, it makes us irresponsible and idle witnesses to slaughter. Scripture, history, and reason converge on a simple truth that peace sometimes requires courage.

        We can wield the sword with clean hearts, but we cannot lay it down while evil thrives. We should abandon bumper stickers like “war is bad” or Barnes’ favorite, “we aren’t commanded to pick up arms.” And realize that we must love our neighbor enough to stop their slaughter using our God given right to defense ourselves. 

Thanks for reading. If you liked this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or purchase one of my books linked in the top left. 

You can find my thoughts on war and politics on twitter @DeaneOnWar 

I'm creative too! You'll find my fiction under the pen name MT Deane.