Moral Clarity on the Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings

Reposted yearly as a much needed part of the conversation. 

        August 6th marks the dubious day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark controversy. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. And a record low number of Americans are proud of their country. This is somewhat understandable as societal attitudes change and there is a great deal to critique over the decision. But it might also be what the editors at the National Review recently pointed out is part of the crisis of self-doubt gaining traction in America and what Wilfred McClay called a deeply unserious country that doesn’t believe in itself. Yet a proper study of the history surrounding the decision to drop the bombs and an examination of ethics finds the bombing was both justified and necessary.

        During the war both sides held a great deal of racial animus towards one another, which suggests the bomb might have been more willingly used because of racism.[1] Though, the bomb wasn’t ready in time to end the war against Germany so that is hard to gauge. Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3] After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4] (Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets.) Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese that made this completely unnecessary.

        As I will show below, these are all extremely flawed arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context and seem like excuses to blame American and undermine moral confidence today, instead of understanding the tragic but justified decisions of the past. Most importantly, every moral argument against the bombing fails because every blood soaked alternative was worse! 

        The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. Who doesn’t want the war to end early? This theory argues that the Japanese were ready for peace and only block headed, blood thirsty, and maybe even racist generals kept the war going. These were detailed by a revisionist historian, Gar Alperovitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5] More importantly, this theory cherry picks some information and leave out much more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent and U.S. officials were correct when they disregarded them.

        The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup. Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[6] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

        Let me stress, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. The idea is an ahistorical fantasy used by modern pundits to attack America. Moreover, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions.

        Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but really aren’t because these quotes also ignore historical context. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[7]

        With all due respect to Eisenhower and other leaders cherry picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear weapons since his New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[8] Those that blanche at the use of nuclear weapons and hate the national security state should probably avoid quoting a general that as president, threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crises, and unleashed CIA sponsored coups on democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala that still reverberate today.

        Other military critics were vocal against nuclear weapons not because of moral principles, but because of parochial rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[9] Thus it isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

        The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese) dying from an invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[10] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

        

        The various estimates are disputed, often based on ideological preference, but General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[11] If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. But somehow shallow sermonizers against the bomb would have us believe that was the better choice. 

        The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[12] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

        Even then, any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet they are drafted, out of context, into modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons. 

        The quick end to the war had the felicitous effect of forestalling a Soviet invasion. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. (Stalin was so petty he didn't even let allies use his airspace to drop supplies.) It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

        After looking at the other options and strategic context in late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact, ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why the allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[13] Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[14]

        In short, every other option was worse than using atomic weapons! Taken in a vacuum, of course nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral and it makes a nice bumper sticker to sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But that weapon wasn’t used in a vacuum. It was used against a horribly aggressive regime and it prevented other options that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war doesn't make a convenient bumper sticker, but its correct and morally superior to the alternatives. 

        It is both unfair and shallow to blame America for their barbaric use of atomic weapons while ignoring the context of that fierce war which compelled and justified their use. I bet that many of the pacifists today are descendants of servicemen and women that came home and had babies instead of dying because the atomic bombs prevented so much needless bloodshed. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

        Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II. Every American should strive to have the knowledge and tools to properly judge the morality of the past, which in turn provides the moral confidence to justly proceed in the present.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

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[1] For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.
[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.
[3] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)
[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks
[5] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth
[6] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.
[7] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)
[8] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.
[9] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.
[10] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.
[11] Frank, Downfall, 340.
[12] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.
[13] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.
[14] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197

Where will it lead? Dallin Oaks Supports Preemptive War

 

        Not too long ago the current member of the first presidency, Dallin H Oaks, gave a talk entitled, Where will this lead? He discussed the importance of basing current decisions on future events.

The setting was a beautiful college campus. A crowd of young students was seated on the grass…[T]hey were watching a handsome tree squirrel with a large, bushy tail playing around the base of a beautiful hardwood tree. Sometimes it was on the ground, sometimes up and down and around the trunk…

Stretched out prone on the grass nearby was an Irish setter. He was the object of the students’ interest, and the squirrel was the object of his. Each time the squirrel was momentarily out of sight circling the tree, the setter would quietly creep forward a few inches and then resume his apparently indifferent posture. This was what held the students’ interest. Silent and immobile, their eyes were riveted on the event whose outcome was increasingly obvious.

Finally, the setter was close enough to bound at the squirrel and catch it in his mouth. A gasp of horror arose, and the crowd of students surged forward and wrested the little animal away from the dog, but it was too late. The squirrel was dead.

        Personally, I would have let nature take its course. Any squirrel that wasn’t savvy enough to dodge a dog would probably ruin the gene pool anyway. But President Oaks then discussed the point of this true-life parable, not too different from the parable I offered:  

Anyone in that crowd could have warned the squirrel at any time by waving his or her arms or crying out, but none did. They just watched while the inevitable outcome got closer and closer. No one asked, “Where will this lead?” When the predictable occurred, all rushed to prevent the outcome, but it was too late. Tearful regret was all they could offer…

[This] applies to things we see in our own lives and in the lives and circumstances around us. As we see threats creeping up on persons or things we love, we have the choice of speaking or acting or remaining silent. It is well to ask ourselves, “Where will this lead?” Where the consequences are immediate and serious, we cannot afford to do nothing. We must sound appropriate warnings or support appropriate preventive efforts while there is still time.

        What astounded me about this story is how closely it parallels the arguments that I’ve been making for years. The late 17th century theorist Samuel Puffendorf described the principle as a right to defend yourself from a “charging assailant with sword in hand.” The Book of Mormon implies this principle when it says Nephites were taught “never to raise the sword” except to preserve their lives (Alma 48:14). This is commonly assumed to mean defense. But there is a time between raising a sword and swinging the sword. As well as a time before swinging a sword and striking someone with a sword. Thus, defense doesn’t begin when the sword hits you or hits you three times as some inappropriately apply Doctrine and Covenants 98, but defense begins when the sword is raised but hasn't yet struck. Or as summarized by Grotius: when the attack is commenced but not carried out.

        The basic principle was best explained by the early modern scholar, and founder of international law, Hugo Grotius. He described the principles of intent, means and imminency. This applies personally and intentionally. A short time ago Israel saw thousands of Hezbollah rockets pointed at them. They had an avowed enemy with an expressed intent to exterminate Israel. The means consisted of thousands of rockets pointed at Israel. Those rockets were ready to launch, and Israel had solid intelligence that the launch was imminent. So, Israel exercised their God given right to defend themselves from a raised sword.

        Personally, this is just as applicable. A crazed men enters the subway. He yells about his intent that he wants to stab people and doesn’t care if he goes to jail. He waves around the knife in his hand. And he is so deranged an attack seems imminent. I’m not making any of this up, this was the Neely subway attack. Thankfully, a brave Good Samaritan that deserves a medal put the man in a choke hold and prevented an attack. He and other subway passengers didn’t stand around and say to themselves, “this is really dangerous, lets see where he’s going with this.” They didn’t wait until the attack was carried out, in which they or others would have already been hurt. They acted preemptively.

        Even comedians understand this principle! A young mother was at a sketchy motel in the movie, Manos: The Hands of Fate. When the strange motel employee, Torgo, started palming her hair the RiffTrax comedian jokingly added her line, “This is super creepy but I’ll just stand right here and see where he’s going with this.”

        And now, I found that one of the leaders of the church understands the principle as well. “Where the consequences are immediate and serious, we cannot afford to do nothing. We must sound appropriate warnings or support appropriate preventive efforts while there is still time.”

        This, dear readers, is the essence of justified preemptive war. I’ve been accused of being a warmongering, insane, deranged anti-Christ and war criminal with a stench of death for espousing these views.  All I want is for people to be safe and exercise their God given rights to defense. Now I find this view espoused by President Oaks.

        This principle has one more ironic note. Dallin H. Oaks is often quoted by peace advocates for his story about stopping a mugging by expressing tenderly, fatherly care.[1] The lesson gathered is somewhat misplaced, since an approaching bus distracted the mugger and seemed to have at least as much dissuasive power as Oak’s expressions of “assertive love.” On top of that, it’s rather condescending of pacifists to take one story and make it a general rule that should apply to everyone. Moreover, Dallin Oaks himself recognizes the need for preemptive action or else he wouldn’t have shared the parable of the squirrel years later.

        There is a great deal more evidence for preemptive war than many people realize. It has a strong theoretical basis based on solid reasons. The concept has implied scriptural support through Alma 48:14 and numerous other scriptures or stories. This includes Mosiah 9:1, the events after Alma 26:25, Helaman 1, Helaman 2, and even a careful reading of supposedly disqualifying verses like 3rd Nephi 3:21 or Mormon 4:4 support the practice. It works in the practical world ranging from the subway to missiles and it’s been practiced by everyone from Epaminondas to Moroni. Finally, its fundamental truth is explained by a supportive Dallin Oaks. We must ask where something will lead. When the cost of inaction is too dangerous, we are not only allowed, but commanded to take appropriate preemptive action.

Thanks for reading! If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page. Or you maybe purchase one of my books in the top left. 

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[1] Patrick Mason and David Pulsipher, Proclaim Peace: The Restoration’s Answer to an Age of Conflict, Maxwell Institute, Deseret Book, 2021) 109-113.

Grotius and the Book of Mormon

 Over at Mormon Dialog and Discussion Board there is a detailed discussion about methodology and if the 17th century philosopher, Hugo Grotius, wrote the Book of Mormon. As someone with a book on the subject and significant knowledge of Grotius I got tagged and felt obligated to respond. I also rarely get a chance to discuss the 17th century thinker Grotius and topics like preemptive war and my book so this was a good opportunity. This is copy and pasted from the board so I apologize for any weird formatting. 

        I appreciate being tagged on this. My newest book on just war in the Book of Mormon discusses Grotius a great deal. Its been well reviewed thus far and you can read those reviews and find a link to the book here: https://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2024/12/reviews-of-my-new-book.html

        I've been working a great deal so I can't go into extensive detail but I've got a few points worth mentioning about the topic.

        The major thrust of my book doesn't simply show congruency. As Ben has explained (many, many times) I think people tend to see what they want to see so the comparisons aren't very useful. What I did was use the keen insights of Grotius to better explain under studied elements in the Book of Mormon, and then in turn use those extra insights from the Book of Mormon to comment on matters of just war. Its a conversation among great thinkers more than finding comparisons. 

        To cite one specific topic with two examples we might look at the concept of preemptive war. I know most people think the Book of Mormon dismisses the concept out of hand. But the most frequently cited verse in Mormon 4, actually condemns the heart that makes the strategy not the strategy. The Nephites lost a great deal on the defensive too. I found 9 other verses that discuss the concept and show its use. I don't want to get too off in the weeds but if you want you can read more about it here: https://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleDeaneKishkumenDagger.html

        Probably the most important scriptures for this discussion are Alma 46:30 when Moroni justifies his capture attempted capture of Amalickiah, and Helaman's servant in Helaman 2 that preemptively kills the assassin before he kills Helaman. 

        These are important for how they interact with Grotius. Most justifications for preemptive war, outside of some more extreme views like Vattel, Gentili, or the Chinese Shizi, focus on the present. According to these theorists, if a nation focused on the past to justify preemptive war leaders would claim that they are reacting to the nefarious nature of the opposing regimes that are warlike and bloodthirsty and thus must be attacked first before they attack again (see Epaminondas for example). A focus on the future would be similar to the Thucydides trap, where Athens, WW1 Britain, WW2 Germany are respectively worried about a rising Sparta, Germany, and Russia. They have to attack now to prevent some greater calamity in the future. But the present is the more accepted position. You can read this from Walzer or in the Caroline Standard, but Grotius' criteria is still the most useful when he said that an enemy must have intent, means  and the defending nation must face an imminent attack. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.

        This is where both examples from the Book of Mormon matter. If you read Alma 46:30, you see that all of Moroni's concern's are in the future. Amalickiah has been defeated and is running away, there is no imminent attack, only future problems:

        Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any more strength; therefore he thought to cut off the people of Amalickiah, or to take them and bring them back, and put Amalickiah to death; yea, for he knew that he would stir up the Lamanites to anger against them, and cause them to come to battle against them; and this he knew that Amalickiah would do that he might obtain his purposes.

        This might seem like really obscure theory, but if Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon he wouldn't include details and narratives that contradicted his ideas of imminency. In fact,  many people dissented from the Lamanite king and then seized the "place of arms" (Alma 47:2; 5). So you could argue Amalickiah didn't have means either and many Lamanites didn't have the intent. So Grotius wrote a narrative that contradicts his theory of preemption, and then provided narrative details where Amalickiah fulfilled every worry that Moroni had, thus undermining his own theories even more.      

        The second verse regards Helaman's servant who preemptively killed Kishkumen during his assassination attempt on Helaman. This one is even more clear because Grotius wrote about robbers as a reason for law enforcement and not deadly preemption: if the conspirators “formed a plot, prepar[ed] an ambuscade, poisoning, or readied a false accusation [the planner] cannot lawfully be killed either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if [the ruler] thought delays could afford remedies.” (Ibid.) In other words, if the plot can be neutralized by the defenders using other remedies, then they likely haven't gathered the means, shown intent, and attack it isn't imminent enough to warrant deadly force. 

        Yet the servant of Helaman didn't take any other remedies. He was "out by night" and seemingly had plenty of advanced notice (Helaman 2:6). Kishkumen let his guard down and there was time as they "were going forth" to the judgement seat (2:9). A chapter before Nephite leaders seized incipient rebels like Paanchi  and killed them (Helaman 1:8; notice the preemption of the Nephites leaders as they seized him when he was "about" to flatter). Yet the narrative says Helaman's servant killed Kishkumen. We don't exactly know why he didn't call for the guards instead of killing them. But if Grotius wrote the narrative, we would assume that he would clearly articulate his previously stated beliefs that there was enough time to "use other remedies." Some might argue that the narrative doesn't clearly endorse this story as righteous so why bother. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that Moroni's dramatic use of omission about Helaman's servant, while simultaneously detailing the nefarious Gadianton plot, highlights the righteousness of Helaman's servant: https://interpreterfoundation.org/nameless-mormons-dramatic-use-of-omission-in-helaman-2/ 

        Here are a couple examples where extremely specific details from Grotius are entirely contradicted by the Book of Mormon text. I don't like simply showing congruency, or authorship based on poorly thought out similarities. As you can see just from two small examples, a careful study of scriptures, and using those scriptures to have a conversation with the best philosophers, brings new insights and deepens faith. I know I'm biased, but given the positive reactions to my book, and how I've independently published or presented 7 different times based on material from the book, I think its incredibly fruitful. 

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance author. If you found value in my work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page. Or consider buying one of my books linked in the top left. 

Even Unto Ignorance: Boyce Wrongly Dismisses Just War Theory

        

        Duane Boyce wrote that the “modern just war framework …makes no explicit use of scripture…it seems obvious that it cannot be sufficient to address the concerns of Latter-Day Saints.”[1] This is a stunning admission and great error which abandons great thinkers throughout history that have direct bearing on the Latter Day Saint views of war. Reading just war thinkers allows a person to realize the contours of the LDS debate, organizes LDS thinking into a powerful core, and adds specific application and advancement of LDS thought.

The Contours

        One of the biggest ironies of reading just war theorists and thinkers from the last few thousand years is the realization that LDS debates are not new. We bring new scriptures to the debate, but they are proof texted in support of the same arguments. Christian pacifists quote the Sermon on the Mount and turn the other cheek, while just war proponents cite Jesus overturning the tables in the table and the Lord’s support for rulers who are agents of his wrath to the wrongdoers (Romans 13:14). Latter Day Saints offer “renounce war and proclaim peace” and “defend your families unto blood shed (D&C 98:16; Alma 43:47). Yet, it remains the same debate.

        Christian just war theorists offered an answer to that debate that became the first chapter of my book on just warfare. This was a command for warriors to have a peaceful heart, while recognizing the tragic, and occasional need to use the sword. This was espoused by just about every theorist from Augustine to Locke. With this in mind, Latter Day Saints can renounce war, proclaim peace, AND defend their families unto bloodshed.

        In a later piece he shows some awareness of the core of just war (see below), but it is in the third appendix of his piece, only one page long, and still almost exclusively focused on Augustine and Aquinas. Even though his entire piece is devoted to resolving a scriptural tension between Captain Moroni and the Sermon on the Mount, he presents the solution as though it wasn’t articulated by theorists for thousands of years before hand.[2]

        His ignorance concerning the contours of the debate is especially glaring in his discussion of the Sermon on the Mount. He spent an entire chapter discussing its personal application without mentioning the easily applicable question about the Good Samaritan, or the ample evidence of the need for a peaceful heart (see below). His solution, that the Sermon describes a personal attitude that doesn’t exclude the use of the sword, repeats one of the most common of the 36 different interpretations that theorists have offered in the last thousand years.[3] With a knowledge of the contours of the debate he might simultaneously have more humility and confidence in advancing his opinion while transcending the perception that LDS thinkers are “restricted to the (metaphorical) mountain valleys as Mormon communities once were.”[4]

The Core

        With the understanding of how we can both proclaim peace and wield the sword, we can simply ask, if the Good Samaritan happened upon the beaten traveler in the midst of the attack, what would he do? This is a simple but powerful question that cuts through the proof texts and demands that we ask what would Jesus do in a given situation. His example of perfect love wouldn’t stand idly by while someone is attacked. Thomas Aquinas called that an “evil peace.” We can reasonably conclude that the Good Samaritan would have a peaceful heart, but also feel morally compelled to intervene. In fact, despite peace advocates like Patrick Mason and David Pulsipher talking endlessly about love, and calling their theory, “assertive love,” they don’t mention Jesus’ example of how we should love our neighbor and fulfill the second great commandment. I suspect they don’t mention this because of its powerful implications.

        Additionally, I first read this argument while reading Catholic Theologian Paul Ramsey.[5] Along with Michael Walzer, he is the leading theorist of the modern age. Thus, this is a modern application of the just war framework, using a clear scripture, that is imminently applicable to modern problems and Latter-Day Saint questions. Once readers notice the importance of the heart they can see it permeates all of scripture. Boyce noticed this as well, but he missed a chance to place this argument as simple but powerful core, buttressed by some of the brightest thinkers of the last thousand years. I put this core in the first chapter and returned to its importance throughout the book. Even after summarizing just war at the beginning of the book, Boyce left a discussion of the heart until chapters 13 and 14. In discussing “right intent” on page eight, he mentioned defense of rights, but not the state of the heart. In chapter 14, the heart is only one of many points included in a discussion of Alma 48, and its brief because he also discusses Doctrine and Covenants 98. In short, despite nearly approaching this core and describing its features, he presents this as just one of many ideas when it could be a simple but powerful summary of the whole argument. He misses its importance because he only has an acquaintance with just war theorists.  

Specific Applications

        Being familiar with just war thinkers I immediately noticed several areas where Boyce’s analysis would have been enhanced by applying them. In discussing preemptive war he discusses the complexity of judging the immediacy of attacks and the intent of the attacker. After a lengthy, and needlessly complex discussion of philosophy he added the example of a machine gun armed attacker that is about to attack a person's family.[6] He does all this to show some examples where preemption is allowed.

        If he read just war theorists, though, he could simply use the example of a “charging assailant with sword in hand” described by the 17th century German thinker Samuel Puffendorf. The father of international law, Hugo Grotius, talked about intent, means, and imminency. Or all the elements listed by Boyce, but Grotius did so in more succinct fashion. These are not scriptures, but still a brilliant insight that forms the foundation of modern international law, and their keen insights make them relevant today. (I show how they are relevant and provide numerous scriptures about the principles in my article with Square Two.) The omission of Grotius seems especially odd because Boyce included Grotius in his bibliography. I can only guess the reasons for the omission, but it must be some combination of not reading Grotius carefully, excluding him due to some kind of dismissive attitude towards non restoration leaders and scriptures,[7] or a desire to explain the concepts himself.

        This section of his book is one of the densest philosophically, but scripturally sparse. It didn’t have to be with a knowledge of just war theorists. I’ve since found at least nine scriptures that discuss the topic which aren’t included in his book. For example, Puffendorf discussed the charging assailant with sword in hand, which made me think of the phrase, “raise a sword” in Alma 48:14. This verse describes when the Nephites could preserve their lives by "raising a sword" to their attackers. Only the text doesn't use the words attack or defense which is vitally important to the concept of preemptive war. The text instead says, “raise the sword,” not smite, strike, slay, or any other word to denote that the sword had been swung and met flesh. That isn’t simply an evocative phrase but illustrates a fundamental truth. Mormon didn’t have to explain the distinction between a raised sword and a sword strike because the two concepts are so closely related that they are the same.

        Thus, while not explicitly stated in the Book of Mormon, if a Nephite attack is called “raising the sword,” Alma 48:14 suggests that righteous defense applies when a Lamanite soldier simply “raised his sword” to attack, and not after the first (or third) actualized attack. That means the Nephite standard for defense only requires an incipient attack, or someone that “raise[s] the sword.” The basic premise applied to both thought Alma 48:14 and Pufendorf, is that an individual who sees an attack in progress doesn’t have to wait for the first blow to assert their God-given right to defend themselves. They can preemptively defend themselves.

        Boyce quotes the first half of Alma 48:14 in a discussion of offensive and defensive war.[8] Without a knowledge of just war theorists his arguments sound more strained and needlessly complex, while missing scriptural support a mere clause away from the scripture he cited.

        He not only repeated the contours of an old debate while thinking he was original, but he also diminished the most important verses about warfare in the Book of Mormon. In a chapter separate from the Sermon on the Mount, and in a chapter that centered on Alma 48, he lists the important qualities of a peaceful heart. Only at the end of that section, perhaps as a capstone, but seemingly because it was least important, he describes how the Nephites were “sorry” to take up arms but reluctantly compelled" to do so(Alma 48:21-23.) With a knowledge of just war that should be the lead in the first chapter and constantly reinforced and referenced in every other part of work. For example, when Boyce rebutted the use of Mormon 7:4, “lay down your weapons of war,” he would have known that the second half, “and delight no more in the shedding of blood,” was a direct application of just war theorists on the war, and an easy refutation of a pacifist proof text. One searches in vain for any mention of a peaceful heart in the bibliography.[9]

Conclusion

        I endorsed his book in my review and I don’t withdraw that endorsement. Yet the text is most useful as a philosophical rebuttal to pacifist theories and rather short about an LDS framework for just war. Since I first read his book, I realized that a knowledge of just war vastly enriches LDS discussion on the topic and we should make a positive and thorough case for it because it’s so strong and easy to do. (I don't consider myself particularly bright, but I'm a leading LDS thinker on the topic, I've published or presented eight times on the topic in the last two years, because I seem to be the only one that has actually read just war thinkers.)  Boyce missed a similar chance in his book. Sadly, like pacifist writers such as Patrick Mason,[10] he only includes a smattering of just war theorists in his writings, such as Augustine and Aquinas while demonstrating little to no awareness of the applicable theory.[11] It is sad to see another writer diminish the importance of just war as “insufficient” at the same time his arguments and understanding of LDS scripture would benefit from those dismissed theorists.

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance writer and if you liked these ideas please consider supporting my research. You can use the paypal button at the bottom of the screen or buy one of my books in the top left. 

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[1] Duane Boyce, Even Unto Bloodshed, (Greg Kofford Books: 2015), 223.

[2] Duane Boyce, “Captain Moroni and the Sermon on the Mount: Resolving a Scriptural Tension,” BYU Studies, 60:2 (2021), 127-162.

[3] Craig Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Social Rhetorical Commentary, (Erdmans: 2009), 160-162.

[4] Benjamin Hertzberg, “Just War and Mormon Ethics,” Mormon Studies Review, 1:1 (Article 15) 2014.

[5] Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), (New York: Scribner, 1968),143.

[6] Boyce, Bloodshed, 194, 197, 202.

[7] Perhaps he has similar views to Mark Henshaw, who gave lip service to the importance of just war theorists but never applied them in 20 years, even though his work would clearly benefit from those thinkers. He did take time in those decades to scoff at those thinkers for being “medieval Catholics.” Mark Henshaw, Murder to Get Gain: LDS Thoughts on US Elements of National Power, 6509. Mark Henshaw, “A Response to ‘Kishkumen’s Dagger: First Strike in the Book of Mormon’ by Morgan Deane,” SquareTwo, Vol. 16 No. 1 (Spring 2023). Mark Henshaw, “On just peace,” in Perspectives on National Security in a Time of Upheaval, Latter Day Saint National Security Conference, Provo Utah, March 2023.

[8] Boyce, Unto Bloodshed, 238.

[9] Boyce does list peace in the index, but since his book is largely designed to philosophically oppose pacifism that is expected and too broad.

[10] Patrick Mason often uses secondary sources to quote church fathers which suggests he isn’t familiar with or hasn’t read them. See fns. 6-10 in Patrick Mason, "Zionic Non Violence as Christian Worship and Practice," in How and What you Worship: Christology and Praxis in the Revelations of Joseph Smith, Rachel Cope, Carter Charles, Jordan T. Watkins eds., (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book), 2020. In fact, every footnote in that piece referencing Christian fathers refers to a secondary source. See also fn. 4 in, Patrick Mason, “Rethinking Righteousness in the Shadow of War,” Public Square Magazine, August 4th, 2023. That footnote lists the primary and secondary source, suggesting he only found it in the latter: Idolatry 19, p. 73, quoted in Lisa Sowle Cahill, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Pacifism, Just War, and Peacebuilding (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2019), 77.

[11] The mentions of historical just war thinkers across LDS literature often seem limited to perfunctory references of St. Augustine and Aquinas before much longer analysis of LDS scripture or descriptions of modern international law and the UN charter. Michael Young, Chapter 19, Times of War Times of Peace: LDS Ethics of War and Diplomacy, Valerie Hudson, Eric Talbot Jenson, Kerry Karchner, (BYU Kennedy Center, 2018.) line 6509.

Newest Book on Just War Released, Ten Year Anniversary of my First Book!

 

    I’m excited to announce that my new book, To Stop a Slaughter: Just War in the Book of Mormon is published and available on Amazon! Those of you that read this blog already have a good sense of the material that is in it. You might remember posts about the importance ofthe heart, preemptive war, and the Nephite wars at the end of their nation. Here is the back cover blurb:

    In a world filled with what seems like "one continual round of bloodshed and murder" (Mormon 8:8) the debates in how to stop that slaughter are filled with partisan talking points, competing vociferous voices, unexamined assumptions about the use of force, fearful hot takes, and self-serving politicians and media narratives that only serve to increase the tension.

    In this the war of words and tumult of opinions (JS History 1:10) acclaimed military historian Morgan Deane applies a Hugh Nibley like command of numerous Christian and Chinese philosophers to engage the rich, intellectual debates from history, and apply them to the ethics of war and peace within the Book of Mormon. The result shows that Book of Mormon offers robust comments on such pertinent topics as the paramount importance of the heart, when and how a nation should use force, the limits of the word and the sword, the intent of people making war, preemptive war, insurgency, and a resolution between, instead of cross talk and proof text citations of oft cited pacifist and isolationist verses and those that support the use of force. This book amplifies the clarion call of the Book of Mormon to love your neighbor enough to be like the Nephites, reluctantly compelled to use arms to stop their slaughter (Alma 48:21-23).

    I’ve sent the book out for reviews, and if you’re interested in a review copy feel free to send me a message. 

    My first book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon has reached its ten year anniversary! I just received a message the other day about how it has helped strengthen testimonies. As I wait for new reviews to come in, here are some more over the years:

    Deane’s work is well-written and thought provoking, required reading for those interested in warfare in the Book of Mormon as warfare, rather than just spiritual analogy. David Spencer, author of Captain Moroni’s Command.

    Hugh Nibley’s understudy. …an absolute must for anyone studying the Book of Mormon... [ties] wide ranging examples from the ancient world in remarkable efficiency. Deane's personal experience also gives a strong eye to military aspects so often neglected... This is a book that will be talked about for years to come by any serious student of the Book of Mormon...” David West, award winning author of Heroes of the Fallen

    Deane is an excellent scholar with fresh ideas and is always worth reading. Matthew Roper, Scripture Central.

    [Deane helps provide analysis] equal of any rabbinical quarrel or Jesuitical casuistry…[and] a fitting springboard for robust and lively debates.” Robert Wood, Chester M. Nimitz Chair Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College.

    The book successfully uses the battles as a means to understand the evolution of Chinese military culture, doctrine, and tactics. The battle maps are well drawn and helpful for those who are not familiar with China’s geography and history. The author has designed the book for general readers, including high school seniors and college freshman, so they can quickly grasp the complex security concerns and strategic calculations often underlying China’s decision-making process. Li Xiaobing, Journal of Chinese Military History

    China’s increased presence on the global stage has attracted greater interest in its long military history. With five millennia behind it, East Asia’s dominant power is certainly no stranger to armed conflict. While that immense scope may seem daunting, author Morgan Deane offers a highly accessible survey with Decisive Battles in Chinese History. Army History

    This astute history clearly reveals the development of China’s military and martial spirit. Military Officer

    I look forward to reading more positive reviews of my latest book and I’ll share them as they come in.

Moroni's Extreme Aggression? Notes on Alma 46:30

 

I'm busy making final edits on my next book. As I make those edits I thought this is an interesting nugget you might enjoy reading. 

        When Moroni’s thoughts are summarized by Mormon those thoughts not only suggest his behavior was a preemptive military action, but it was on aggressive side of what just war theorists consider acceptable. Moroni reasoned in the text that Amalickiah would inspire the Lamanites to war in the future when they are stronger. Alma 46:30:

Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any more strength; therefore he thought to cut off the people of Amalickiah, or to take them and bring them back, and put Amalickiah to death; yea, for he knew that he would stir up the Lamanites to anger against them, and cause them to come to battle against them; and this he knew that Amalickiah would do that he might obtain his purposes.

        The future tenses are highlighted. Moroni sought to stop Amalickiah from gaining more strength and attacking later so he justified attacking now. Capture and kill him now, before they get more strength and attack us later, is a classic motivation for instigating war, but is more concerned with the future than the present.[1] Micheal Walzer summarized the many theorists of preemptive war and the varying justifications for the practice by using a term called the anticipation spectrum. In that spectrum he suggested that the only just preemptive wars are concerned with the present alarm of an immediate attack such as a charging assailant with sword in hand, nuclear armed planes already on their way to targets, or planes full of terrorists on their way to the Twin Towers. Walzer argues that unjust preemptive wars are concerned with stopping a gathering threat (Sparta, Germany, or the Lamanites will be stronger in the future so Athens, Britain, or the Nephites must attack now), or punishment for past actions (this nation is so unjust, greedy, prideful, ambitious, and aggressively expansionist it is too dangerous not to attack.)[2]

        By this measure Moroni’s use of preemptive war is more expansive than most just war theorists concerned with the imminent threat, because Moroni focused on the future threat and not the present. This leaves most students of the Book of Mormon in a unique situation, especially for those that use the infection model and place restoration scriptures as always superseding non-LDS theorists. Because in this case Moroni and the Book of Mormon seem more aggressive and less justified than what many commonly assume, especially compared to just war theorists that moderate the practice of preemptive war. This additional analysis becomes a much-needed caution to those that fail to do what Brigham Young advised and find truth even among professed infidels. There is much more in my book about theory and practice, and Walzer’s description serves as an excellent summary of just war theories regarding preemptive war as I discuss those details. In short, his desire for seeking battle places him on the aggressive extreme of justified preemptive war and serves as a reminder of the immense benefit of studying the great thinkers on the topic.

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[1] Graham Allan, “The Thucydides trap,” Foreign Policy, June 9^th, 2017,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/ (Accessed, May 14^th, 2024.)

[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

Parable of the Bad Neighbor: What would you do?

 

    For the longest time I wish I could locate one of the worst examples I had ever read about pre-emptive war. It turns out I had looked in the right spot, but the website for a long time was defunct. (It’s still a bit funky to be honest.) The parable was vague, and a poorly written attack on me, but it did make me think. And after a brief foreword, I’ll provide my own parable that should be much better.

    As a preamble, I have to point out a few ways this parable is limited regarding international relations. That’s because those that live in a state have a series of criminal and civil remedies. If one neighbor is noisy, nosey, threatening, or violent in any way the other neighbors can do anything from filing a restraining order to calling the police. Even threats of violence, or “making terroristic threats,” can result in arrest so there is no need for preemptive self-help violence.

    The state doesn’t have most of those recourses in international relations. There are some limited remedies ranging from the World Court, Interpol, diplomats, and some international organizations, but it is the military that delivers protection and justice for its people. When the citizens of one nation find themselves threatened by another, the leaders of the state are the ones responsible for protecting the rights of their citizens. Unlike the parable of the neighborhood dispute, there are no police to call or restraining orders to file. I assume my interlocuter chose the example of neighbors because it seemed especially ridiculous to preemptively shoot one.

    Without further ado, let’s assume that this neighborhood doesn’t have legal and civil remedies. This is apocalyptic Australia, there are no police and Mad Max is chasing down a biker gang a continent away.

    A new guy moves into the neighborhood and despite your best efforts your relationship sours. But this isn’t what you see on Judge Judgy about barking dogs or a loud party. The new neighbor, Fred, believes the property line is misaligned, or maybe he thinks he was legitimately wronged in having a valuable fruit tree just over the line. For whatever reason, he is openly antagonistic towards you.

    After some time Fred finally says, “I will kill you.” The aggressive neighbor gives a speech that their problem will soon be solved.[1] You see Amazon truck after Amazon truck drop off giant boxes from the gun store.[2] He tracks you in the sights of his machine gun every time you leave the house. He repeatedly crosses the property line to see how quickly you react.

    Despite your best efforts to diffuse the situation, after some time his friends pull up in pickup trucks and armed with machine guns they surround your house. They step forward with their weapons loaded and racked with a round in the chamber but haven’t fired yet. They take aim, and they fire. Your house is Swiss cheese from all the bullets, but this is still the first attack (D&C 98:23-26). They reload, and attack two more times for a total of three attacks.

    The question becomes, at what point would the good follower of Jesus Christ attack?

    Remarkably, there are some people who would wait until the end of the parable to attack. They mistakenly apply Doctrine and Covenants 98 to assume that it is a guide to foreign policy. They believe that Mormons must patiently bear three trespasses (usually interpreted as attacks) and lift a standard of peace before attacking. This group of people sound strong when they quote the scripture to “renounce war and proclaim peace” (v.16). But their position falls apart with the first bullet as you think about what it truly means to bear three attacks such as the massed fire in the parable, three nuclear strikes, or three sword thrusts. Its completely ridiculous to think that Jesus requires suffering three Pearl Harbors or 9/11 attacks before defending yourself.

    The most likely answer is that you are justified in defending yourself after the first attack. This is a reasonable position to take in response to a clear attack. But there are problems with this position. Returning fire under these circumstances places the defender at a severe disadvantage. Remaining on the pure defensive allows the attacker to choose the time and place of the attack. The attacker could choose to strike when the defender is asleep or gone to the store or before the defender supplied his own guns and reinforcements. Once the attack commenced, the defender would have to return fire in the face of incoming gunfire. Ceding the initiative places you at in a reactionary and weaker position, much like the Nephites after the Lamanite attack in Alma 16. There is a significant chance that your defense at this point will not be enough to save your life. So again, waiting to receive the attack seems as strong as it is simplistic. But it can be a poor and dangerous standard. It’s the equivalent of having a deranged homeless man brandishing a knife on your subway train, but waiting to see what he does with it next (See below).

    If you want to have a much better defense, you should fire before they do! This option would preemptively attack between the point when the neighbors gather around your house and when they first fire at you. It might be when they first pull up, or when they aim their guns, but the defending neighbor knows when an attack is happening (or commenced) and he doesn’t have to wait for it to be carried out.

    And this gets to the crux of preemptive war. Preemptive war is the right to attack between the point when the attack is commenced but not carried out. Or as the Book of Mormon implies, when the sword is raised, but hasn’t yet struck (Alma 48:14). The key is the phrase “raise a sword,” which compares to the theoretical standard of preemptively striking a charging assailant with sword in hand.[3]

    But there are arguments that you could launch a just attack even earlier. What if your neighbor wasn’t importing more rifles, but instead was importing tactical nukes? Just the transfer of nuclear weapons to a place where an avowed enemy could quickly strike the continental US was enough to justify the blockade of Cuba. If your neighbor has vowed to strike and has the weapons, then there are other theorists that suggest the attack doesn’t have to be imminent.[4]  For example, if the US waited until the 9/11 strikes were commenced but not carried out, they still would destroy four airplanes filled with innocent Americans. These are variations that don’t change the right to preemptive war, only the application of that right regarding difficult issues like striking terrorists.

    So what does the parable of the Bad Neighbor teach us? Well the parable as originally given is too vague to be of much use except as a strawman perception of preemptive war. The specifics matter. The real-life application of the preemptive right is clearly seen in the New York Subway incident. An aggressive and disturbed person comes on board a train waving around a knife and screaming that he doesn’t care if he goes to jail. No rational person would say to themselves, “This is creepy, but let’s see where it’s going.” “The restored gospel is clearly superior to and excludes preemptive just war theory.” “The gospel says renounce war and proclaim peace.” Or maybe “we should wait until he tries to stab someone because after all, we only believe in defensive war.” Daniel Penny clearly and correctly anticipated an attack, so he subdued the dangerous would-be assailant.

     When these ideas are presented in a specific scenario, like a brandished gun about to be fired, or drawn knife in a closed subway, the Parable of the Bad Neighbor shows that most people intuitively agree with the concept of preemptive war. That strong intuition is a sense of your natural rights. When the neighbor has shown intent (they announce their intent to kill you), means (they have imported a devastating number of weapons), and the attack is imminent (they’ve surrounded your house and march towards it with raised weapons),[5] the sword is raised, and the attack is commenced but not carried out. As a result, the defending neighbor has a God given right to defend themselves preemptively.

    Exactly when that point is reached is often disputed. In fact it’s common in debates around the justified use of preemptive war to manipulate and rearrange details to make an attack seem less or more likely and hence more or less justified. In the parable that would be like an analyst claiming that the aimed weapons of Fred and his friends were really just target practice or warning shots, so the defending neighbor was overreacting. You'll see that both in the original parable below as I’m supposedly cool with randomly killing someone and Mark Henshaw tried to rearrange the details of Kishkumen’s attack as a rebuttal to my use of the story. Preemptive war can also be abused by Putin or Bush, but that doesn’t diminish the right. Again, these individuals are often invoked as stop think boogeymen.

    For kicks and giggles I've included  the original example. You’ll notice its far vaguer than my parable and filled with loaded language (panic, paranoid, snooping). I really hate the phony use of the word friend. It builds a straw man big enough to blaze at Burning Man and is included here as an illustration of the limited thought on the matter. At least it helped me to crystalize the key ideas behind the right to preemptive war:

How would our friend Morgan respond to the following situation? A new guy moves into the neighborhood, and after a few months of snooping and spying you determine that Fred…has an arsenal of weapons. You have a meeting with all your neighbors and decide that he might use them against you. You have no proof of this, yet the neighborhood is in a panic and everyone is paranoid that it might be them first. You collectively decide to use force to apprehend Fred’s arsenal, and when he politely refuses the situation escalates and a fellow neighbor shoots Fred with a 30-06 from 300 yards. Problem solved. No judge, no jury, just an executioner. Everyone is safe right? But was it moral? Did you not kill Fred before he had done anything wrong? Obviously this scenario is absurd, but what is the difference when nations do the same thing in the name of patriotism and nationalism?

Asked and decisively answered. Thanks for reading. For a more official and in depth version of scriptures, theory, and preemptive war see my article in Square Two, Kishkumen’s Dagger.

Producing ad free, high quality research is time consuming. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or by purchasing one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] The Communists clearly indicated they wanted to take islands in the Taiwan Strait Crisis which led to preemptive US intervention. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-Strait_relations#Military_stalemate_to_diplomatic_war_

[2] The transfer of nuclear weapons to Cuba was enough for President Kennedy to consider a first strike. He said, “we no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in deployment may well be regarded as a threat to peace.” Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),71.

[3] Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 129-146.

[4] Totten, First Strike, 136. 

[5] These are the expanded criteria given by Grotius. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.