The Tuttle Twit? Twenty Years of Connor Boyack Misunderstanding Preemptive War

        I first encountered Connor Boyack nearly twenty years ago. His writing reflected a familiar libertarian style. It was confident, combative, and heavy on slogans while light on careful definitions. Since then, he has become a successful children's book author and largely scrubbed his old website, but a recent "Musing" sounded strikingly familiar.

        After tracking down the original article he tried to erase, I discovered that, despite two being nearly twenty years old, Boyack is still relying on the same flawed talking points against preemptive war.[1]

        Below is a checklist of the arguments he made then and is still making now. I've included timestamps from his recent video to show just how little has changed. While some of this post revisits earlier research, my primary goal is to demonstrate how much relevant scholarship and little thought Boyack has engaged with and shown over the last twenty years:

Bad Definition (14:38)

Massive network of spies (14:45)

Perfunctory shout out to Just War and catch phrases without understanding key terms. Incorrectly treats preemption as incompatible with Just War theory.(15:07)

Severely out of context Eisenhower (15:17)

Cherry picked first presidency statement on “law of the jungle” (15:41)

Contextualizes the war chapters to exclude them (He didn’t repeat this point in his musings, he simply ignored the war chapters this time.)

Inappropriate use of terrorist (18:08)

De contextualizes 3 Nephi 3:20-21 Mormon 3:10 as evidence (18:18; 21:12)

Misuses A Brent Merrill, who was describing a strategic situation and not a command from the Lord (18:36)

Nephite battles take place in Nephite territory (22:23)

Misapplied use of Hugh Nibley (23:03)

        As you can see, his musings aren’t inspiring or insightful, just the same stale talking points based on unexamined assumptions from twenty years ago. More importantly, on every single point he has missed additional research that would have better informed his arguments.

        Before I show why, I might answer the overall question of his post "Where are all the peacemakers?" That’s a rather insincere question since his version of peace making is repeating the same sanctimonious and shallow talking points for twenty years while insulting his opponents as terroristic Gadiantons (the internet never forgets!) and war mongering propagandists.[2]

        The real peacemaking starts by taking the subject seriously, grappling with complex issues and respecting those who disagree with you by at least avoiding lazy name calling. Despite leading or contributing to multiple institutes, selling millions of books, and emphasizing those credentials on his website, Boyack hasn't done the intellectual work that genuine peacemaking requires such as engaging opposing arguments, refining his definitions, and responding to scholarship published since he first made these claims.

Boyack gets the definition wrong

        Let us start with his definition of preemptive war: Serious theorists going back 500 years have had a better definition than Boyack, who defined preemptive war as simply "fighting your enemy on your terms, before they (may or may not) fight you on theirs," or in short, "get them before they get us." But definitions matter as they distinguish between preventive and preemptive war using concepts like imminence, intent, and capability.  

        The early modern writer Hugo Grotius, founder of modern international law, defined preemptive war as being "lawful to kill those who are planning to kill." He is the one that provided the criteria of means, intent, and imminency.[3] The last criteria, “imminency,” is particularly important in the modern age when some missiles can move 20,000 miles an hour or cross the US in about seven minutes. The line between preemptive and preventive war can therefore be measured in mere minutes, yet Boyack ignores that distinction entirely, preferring simplistic and sanctimonious talking points.

        Micheal Walzer, the leading modern theorist on just war that Boyack also ignored, best summarized the differences by talking about past, present, and future and only justified attacks based on present threats, not past aggressions or fear of future consequences.[4] It’s quite an interesting debate that brings a great deal of sophistication and nuance to the subject, and precisely the level of moral analysis absent from Boyack's discussion.

        Boyack mentions just war in perfunctory fashion, but doesn’t understand any details of the practice.  He relies on a few phrases, “true defense” “legitimate self-defense” and an improper understanding of last resort. Boyack only source is a link to a Wikipedia article.

        His shallow slogans are no substitute for engaging the actual literature. Simply invoking "legitimate self-defense", for example, proves very little. Nearly every aggressor in history has claimed to be acting defensively. Even Hitler justified invading Poland by citing alleged abuses of ethnic Germans in the Danzig Corridor.

        Applying the idea of legitimate law enforcement, Salamanca School scholars Francisco Victoria and Francisco Suarez argued that just as kings can send out a posse of law men to capture bandits, nations can preemptively send forces into lawless areas.[5] Thus, the Nephite desire to “search out…and destroy” the Gadianton bandits in their hiding places is a perfect representation of this just principle (Helaman 11:28). If you’ll excuse my bluntness, Gidgiddoni said “Lord Forbid” (3rd Nephi 3:21), because they were getting their asses kicked, not because it was wicked. Boyack's failure to move beyond the same talking points over the last twenty years reflects a remarkable lack of intellectual development.

Boyack ignores contrary evidence

        The evidence Boyack does present is so selectively chosen that his argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. His warning about a "massive network of spies" functions more as a libertarian talking point than a carefully argued objection. Ironically, overwhelming scriptural evidence cuts against Boyack's own example (Alma 43:23; 44:21; 56:22, 39). Helaman’s servant in Helaman 2:6-7 is most useful. After some night time spying, the servant killed Kishkumen before he killed the chief judge. Helaman’s servant might have righteously reported that “[I] got them before they got us.”[6] 

        As with Book of Mormon passages about spies, Boyack's interpretive framework effectively excludes the Book of Mormon's war chapters from consideration whenever they become inconvenient. Yet those chapters are precisely where the Book of Mormon wrestles the most with interstate conflict, preemption, deterrence, and the ethics of military action. They cannot simply be brushed aside because they complicate a preferred narrative

        Take Alma 46:30 for example, which describes reasoning for Moroni’s preemptive action. This is an extremely interesting verse because the narrative discusses future action: “Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any strength.”

        This verse is about the future, which makes it on the more radical end of the spectrum than the present imminence described by Walzer. Moroni was a man that could shake the foundations of Hell, so his actions should be analyzed instead of explained away. Rather than wrestle with Moroni's reasoning, Boyack gave excuses for ignoring them.

Boyack strips sources of their context

        Other evidence is presented without the context necessary to evaluate it properly. We have already seen this with the strategic context surrounding "the Lord forbid." The same problem appears in Boyack's treatment of the First Presidency's prewar statement, which he quotes in isolation while ignoring the events that immediately rendered it incomplete. Pearl Harbor transformed both the strategic situation and the First Presidency's public position. Their 1942 statement offered a far stronger defense of the war effort, suggesting that Boyack is appealing to an isolationist argument the Church itself substantially abandoned once the realities of aggression became undeniable.

        By quoting Eisenhower, who also relied heavily on spies in his foreign policy, Boyack took a dilettantish approach, selecting quotations that appear supportive but prove far more nuanced in context. Boyack quoted Eisenhower opposing first strikes, but restored to his historical context, Eisenhower also said he would launch an all out preemptive attack without approval of congress if Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons were confirmed to be preparing to strike[7] In private documents, Eisenhower wrote that he would “shoot the enemy before they shoot you” if an imminent Soviet attack were confirmed. In Boyack's own terms, that is simply "get them before they get us." Yet Eisenhower rejected preventive war while unequivocally endorsing preemptive war against an imminent attack.

        This is why the definitions established in Section One matter. Boyack treats all first strikes as morally equivalent, with only the most minimal acknowlgement of the differences between prevention and preemption, but imminence fundamentally changes the moral calculus to the point that Eisenhower himself answered both "yes" and "no" to first strikes depending on the circumstances. Boyack slogan's never reach that level of nuance. 

       I have already discussed "the Lord forbid" and the use of spies, but Boyack's use of Mormon 3:10 ignores an even more important point. As I argued at the LDS National Security Professionals Conference, the Nephites had already endured far more than the three offenses required by D&C 98:39–40. Their failure was not strategic but moral. By this point they had become rapist cannibals, so any military campaign, including a preemptive one, was doomed to fail. Boyack mistakenly throws out preemptive war when the text is actually condemning the wickedness of those who employed it.

Boyack’s Odd Argument and Conclusion

        The oddest example is Boyack’s argument that because Nephite battles occurred in Nephite territory, any use of force outside U.S. borders is wrong. This collapses under basic examination. If a terrorist launches a nuclear missile from Cuba, Boyack’s logic suggests the United States cannot lawfully intercept it until it crosses American territory. Yet the threat, and the moral right of self-defense, is identical seconds before and after crossing an invisible border. As discussed in Section One, modern missiles move so quickly and cause such devastation that delay can be fatal. Basing nuclear defense on such a rigid interpretation of Nephite warfare is a dangerously imprudent misunderstanding of the principles involved.

        DC 98 is best understood as the LDS version of the Sermon on the Mount. Just like mainstream Christians, we should have a peaceful heart and renounce war. But we can and must reluctantly resort to arms when it becomes a tragic necessity to stop the massacre of brothers and families (Alma 48:21-23).

        The issue isn't that Connor Boyack and I disagree. The problem is that Boyack has become one of the topic’s loudest voices while remaining deeply unserious. His talking points have remained unchanged despite two decades of scholarship and personal study that should have refined them. Serious disagreement requires serious engagement with the strongest opposing arguments. Repeating slogans for twenty years while neglecting scholarship is not peacemaking, nor is it a serious contribution to the debate over preemptive war.

        Ideas about war are too important to leave to slogans. Lives depend on getting these questions right. If we are going to invoke scripture to guide questions of war and peace, we owe one another more than decades of recycled talking points.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buying on of my books. The last of which, To Stop a Slaughter, is a book length treatment of just war and the Book of Mormon. I also write fiction, check out my cyber punk thriller. 

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[1] He often calls it "preventive war," a common rhetorical tactic used to make the practice sound more objectionable by shifting the debate to the less defensibile preventive war. The problem is the "imminence" is often contested to the point the dinstinction becomes a reflection of one's bias. 

[2] The second link is to a different author than Boyack, but it contains the same tone, talking points, and spirit of Boyack. Literally in the first two minutes of Boyack's "musings" he called his opponents "war mongers." 

[3] Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84.

[4] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.

[5] Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectiones, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. John Pawley Bate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 163–165. Francisco Suárez, Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suárez, S.J.: De Triplici Virtute Theologica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 740–743.

[6] There is some debate over the silence of the Book of Mormon about the morality of this action. I think a lack of editorial dissent means approval. Mark Henshaw believes the practice needs affirmative approval in the text. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that the simultaneous anonymity and silence surrounding Helaman’s servant, and the detailed exposition of the secret works, is a subtle but strong editorial comment that shows the secret works of darkness are known to God, and the righteous works of defense against them are not known to man.

[7] Implicitly stated in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d55

Trump, Moroni, and the Teancum Option

        Reading a take this week praising President Trump’s “decapitation” approach to terrorism, I couldn’t help but think of Book of Mormon — specifically the Amalickiah cycle and the campaigns of Captain Moroni.

        Amalickiah twisted and maneuvered his way to the top and instigated war through private assassination. Teancum tried to end the war by killing Amalickiah and then Ammoron. 

        While the tactic might have been the same, their hearts were far different. Targeted assassination is described as "necessarily offensive" by LDS National Security professional Ryan Chavez,[1] but Teancum's was a offensive tactic within a defensive war and it was aimed at ending the war. 

        Amalickiah was trying to gain power and start a war. The difference in intent is key in any discussion and why its the first chapter of my book. 

        Most importantly here, it diffuses the argument that Trump shouldn't have done this because "what if China or Russia did it too?" Based on intent, the US relying on a decapitation strategy against a state sponsor of terror is as great as the difference between Teancum and Amalickiah relying on assassination. 

        Decapitation strategies are not new. They show up in Roman campaigns against insurgent tribes, in early modern wars of succession, and in 20th-century counterinsurgency doctrine. The Spanish figured out that despite the Aztec's numerical superiority and scary visage, if they concentrated on the leader they could quickly scatter enemy forces.  

        We still don’t know exactly what happens next. We've been warned by isolationists, pacifists, and pointy headed pseudo scholars that we couldn't strike Iran. The risk of blowback or escalating into a war was too great. Or they'll call this a "mission accomplished" moment, invoking the specter of Iraq. 

        As a result, we had 50 years of some nice sounding policy papers as Iranian extremists took hostages, provided insurgents with deadly bombs, rained rockets on Israel and pursued nuclear weapons. 

        Yet there’s solid research that decapitation strategies can shorten wars, reduce violence, and increase the likelihood of victory when done successfully. Studies show that removing insurgent or militant leadership tends to reduce the intensity of conflict and increase chances of ending it quickly rather than dragging indefinitely, even if it’s controversial and not always decisive on its own.[2]

        More importantly, we've had Trump, the real estate developer, smash fears of "endless war", "escalation" and "mission accomplished" in a series of 12 day wars, decisive operations to capture Maduro, and decapitation strikes. 

        Those who read the Book of Mormon shouldn't be surprised. Decisive actions by Moroni weren’t just about winning battles — they broke their will to fight. After Moroni’s victories, Alma 47:2 records how many Lamanite were so afraid of facing Moroni that they fled and rebelled rather than take up arms. 

        We are constantly taught that Ammon and the Sons of Mosiah were the peacemakers. But Moroni and King Benjamin show that decisive force can be precisely what ushers in a longer peace. Moroni pacified thousands of bitter enemies and dissenters who moments before were fanatically devoted to killing him and let them leave with a covenant of peace. 

        If Amalickiah had simply been captured before seizing power (Alma 46:30),  the Nephites likely would have enjoyed a period of peace comparable to the golden age under King Benjamin.

        So the irony here, is that after Senator Lee was trolled and ratioed for comparing Trump to Moroni, Trump has acted like Moroni by blending the Teancum Option with Moroni's decisive victory in battle to produce peace.  

        Thanks for reading! If you liked this research please consider buying one of my books linked in the top left. I'm creative too! Please consider buying my creative work! 

1. Ryan Chavez, “The Teancum Option and Modern LDS National Security Thought,” Wielding the Sword While Proclaiming Peace: Views from the LDS Community on Reconciling the Demands of National Security with the Imperatives of Revealed Truth, Kerry Kartchner and Valerie Hudson eds.,(Brigham Young University Press, 2003), 87-100.

2. Byman, Daniel. "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95–111.

David, Steven R. "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Mideast Security and Policy Studies 51 (September 2002): 1–25.

Frankel, Matt. "The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns against Insurgents and Terrorists." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 17–30.

Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies 18, no. 4 (December 2009): 719–755.

Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism," International Security 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 9–46.

Moral Clarity on the Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings

Reposted yearly as a much needed part of the conversation. 

        August 6th marks the dubious day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark controversy. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. And a record low number of Americans are proud of their country. This is somewhat understandable as societal attitudes change and there is a great deal to critique over the decision. But it might also be what the editors at the National Review recently pointed out is part of the crisis of self-doubt gaining traction in America and what Wilfred McClay called a deeply unserious country that doesn’t believe in itself. Yet a proper study of the history surrounding the decision to drop the bombs and an examination of ethics finds the bombing was both justified and necessary.

        During the war both sides held a great deal of racial animus towards one another, which suggests the bomb might have been more willingly used because of racism.[1] Though, the bomb wasn’t ready in time to end the war against Germany so that is hard to gauge. Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3] After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4] (Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets.) Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese that made this completely unnecessary.

        As I will show below, these are all extremely flawed arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context and seem like excuses to blame American and undermine moral confidence today, instead of understanding the tragic but justified decisions of the past. Most importantly, every moral argument against the bombing fails because every blood soaked alternative was worse! 

        The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. Who doesn’t want the war to end early? This theory argues that the Japanese were ready for peace and only block headed, blood thirsty, and maybe even racist generals kept the war going. These were detailed by a revisionist historian, Gar Alperovitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5] More importantly, this theory cherry picks some information and leave out much more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent and U.S. officials were correct when they disregarded them.

        The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup. Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[6] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

        Let me stress, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. The idea is an ahistorical fantasy used by modern pundits to attack America. Moreover, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions.

        Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but really aren’t because these quotes also ignore historical context. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[7]

        With all due respect to Eisenhower and other leaders cherry picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear weapons since his New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[8] Those that blanche at the use of nuclear weapons and hate the national security state should probably avoid quoting a general that as president, threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crises, and unleashed CIA sponsored coups on democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala that still reverberate today.

        Other military critics were vocal against nuclear weapons not because of moral principles, but because of parochial rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[9] Thus it isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

        The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese) dying from an invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[10] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

        

        The various estimates are disputed, often based on ideological preference, but General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[11] If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. But somehow shallow sermonizers against the bomb would have us believe that was the better choice. 

        The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[12] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

        Even then, any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet they are drafted, out of context, into modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons. 

        The quick end to the war had the felicitous effect of forestalling a Soviet invasion. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. (Stalin was so petty he didn't even let allies use his airspace to drop supplies.) It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

        After looking at the other options and strategic context in late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact, ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why the allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[13] Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[14]

        In short, every other option was worse than using atomic weapons! Taken in a vacuum, of course nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral and it makes a nice bumper sticker to sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But that weapon wasn’t used in a vacuum. It was used against a horribly aggressive regime and it prevented other options that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war doesn't make a convenient bumper sticker, but its correct and morally superior to the alternatives. 

        It is both unfair and shallow to blame America for their barbaric use of atomic weapons while ignoring the context of that fierce war which compelled and justified their use. I bet that many of the pacifists today are descendants of servicemen and women that came home and had babies instead of dying because the atomic bombs prevented so much needless bloodshed. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

        Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II. Every American should strive to have the knowledge and tools to properly judge the morality of the past, which in turn provides the moral confidence to justly proceed in the present.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

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[1] For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.
[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.
[3] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)
[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks
[5] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth
[6] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.
[7] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)
[8] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.
[9] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.
[10] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.
[11] Frank, Downfall, 340.
[12] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.
[13] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.
[14] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197

Newest Book on Just War Released, Ten Year Anniversary of my First Book!

 

    I’m excited to announce that my new book, To Stop a Slaughter: Just War in the Book of Mormon is published and available on Amazon! Those of you that read this blog already have a good sense of the material that is in it. You might remember posts about the importance ofthe heart, preemptive war, and the Nephite wars at the end of their nation. Here is the back cover blurb:

    In a world filled with what seems like "one continual round of bloodshed and murder" (Mormon 8:8) the debates in how to stop that slaughter are filled with partisan talking points, competing vociferous voices, unexamined assumptions about the use of force, fearful hot takes, and self-serving politicians and media narratives that only serve to increase the tension.

    In this the war of words and tumult of opinions (JS History 1:10) acclaimed military historian Morgan Deane applies a Hugh Nibley like command of numerous Christian and Chinese philosophers to engage the rich, intellectual debates from history, and apply them to the ethics of war and peace within the Book of Mormon. The result shows that Book of Mormon offers robust comments on such pertinent topics as the paramount importance of the heart, when and how a nation should use force, the limits of the word and the sword, the intent of people making war, preemptive war, insurgency, and a resolution between, instead of cross talk and proof text citations of oft cited pacifist and isolationist verses and those that support the use of force. This book amplifies the clarion call of the Book of Mormon to love your neighbor enough to be like the Nephites, reluctantly compelled to use arms to stop their slaughter (Alma 48:21-23).

    I’ve sent the book out for reviews, and if you’re interested in a review copy feel free to send me a message. 

    My first book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon has reached its ten year anniversary! I just received a message the other day about how it has helped strengthen testimonies. As I wait for new reviews to come in, here are some more over the years:

    Deane’s work is well-written and thought provoking, required reading for those interested in warfare in the Book of Mormon as warfare, rather than just spiritual analogy. David Spencer, author of Captain Moroni’s Command.

    Hugh Nibley’s understudy. …an absolute must for anyone studying the Book of Mormon... [ties] wide ranging examples from the ancient world in remarkable efficiency. Deane's personal experience also gives a strong eye to military aspects so often neglected... This is a book that will be talked about for years to come by any serious student of the Book of Mormon...” David West, award winning author of Heroes of the Fallen

    Deane is an excellent scholar with fresh ideas and is always worth reading. Matthew Roper, Scripture Central.

    [Deane helps provide analysis] equal of any rabbinical quarrel or Jesuitical casuistry…[and] a fitting springboard for robust and lively debates.” Robert Wood, Chester M. Nimitz Chair Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College.

    The book successfully uses the battles as a means to understand the evolution of Chinese military culture, doctrine, and tactics. The battle maps are well drawn and helpful for those who are not familiar with China’s geography and history. The author has designed the book for general readers, including high school seniors and college freshman, so they can quickly grasp the complex security concerns and strategic calculations often underlying China’s decision-making process. Li Xiaobing, Journal of Chinese Military History

    China’s increased presence on the global stage has attracted greater interest in its long military history. With five millennia behind it, East Asia’s dominant power is certainly no stranger to armed conflict. While that immense scope may seem daunting, author Morgan Deane offers a highly accessible survey with Decisive Battles in Chinese History. Army History

    This astute history clearly reveals the development of China’s military and martial spirit. Military Officer

    I look forward to reading more positive reviews of my latest book and I’ll share them as they come in.

The Silver Bullet: Afghanistan and Blowback

    

        When discussing American intervention inevitably someone will cry Afghanistan as a warning. In the 1980s the United States supplied arms to various militant groups. The goal was to resist the Soviet invasion in the hopes that it would weaken a US rival at  a relatively minimal cost. Some of these groups then became the ruling Taliban that won their post-Soviet civil war. The ruling Taliban allowed Al Qaeda to train and then launch the 9/11 attacks. Thus creating “Afghanistan” as a single, silver bullet to any American intervention.[1] In fact, “blowback” is such a lazy catch phrase that even in commenting on the Israel Hamas war Connor Boyack,  a supposedly serious libertarian, conflated cycle of violence and blowback into cycle of blowback. (He also added some antisemitism as well.) But this argument fails as a simplistic retelling of history, offers a presentist argument that discounts the contemporary threat of the Soviet Union, and continues to offer a reactive and weak vision of foreign policy.

        History doesn’t move in a straight line. It’s true that some militant groups received arms. At the same time though that action doesn’t lead in a straight line to the 9/11. The various militant groups fought against each other almost as much as they fought the Soviet Union. In fact, the fragmentary leadership and society led to a civil war in Afghanistan for much of the 90s. Only half a decade after that civil war Al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks. There were all sorts of moments that could have changed that outcome, and the US wasn’t closely involved in them for a decade.

        The Soviets could have continued their occupation. Another power like the Northern alliance and the Lion of Panjshir, could have won the civil war. Ironically enough, after the withdraw of Soviet forces that lion complained the US wasn’t more involved. From the linked interview he said: “[The US] forgot Afghanistan and they left Afghanistan alone.” This reminds me of a poor book where the author argued the US was imperialistic for “meddling” in foreign countries, while he also blamed the US for “losing” China to the Communists. In other words, he blamed the US for not meddling. But when your isolationist agenda comes first, and you rely on a simplistic understanding of history, intellectual rigor and honesty take a back seat.

        Returning to other historical paths not taken, Bill Clinton could have seized Osama Bin Laden when he had the chances. (BillClinton actually had nine chances according to the 9/11 commission.) Any of these variables alone, and definitely all of them together cut the thread of American aid to the mujahadeen leading to 9/11 implied in the blowback arguments. There were so many variables that meandered throughout the decade plus interval between the two that the blowback argument becomes simplistically ahistorical.

        More importantly, this is a presentist argument. Presentism is normally a fallacy from those that complain individuals in the past are racist, sexist, and otherwise fail to conform to current standards. In this case presentism takes the terror attack from a decade later to ignore the threats at the time that made America arm the mujahadeen. It would be much like looking at Soviet strength early in the Cold War and complaining that it was blowback for America’s defeat of Hitler.[2] That thinking ignores the threat the Nazis posed and the need to intervene against that threat.

        In that Cold War America faced an evil empire that repressed its own citizens, ruthlessly crushed dissidents abroad, aggressively expanded along its borders and threatened nuclear war. Arming Afghani fighters was a relatively low-cost way to sap the strength of an existential threat. Those using their only bullet ignore the historical context of that threat. They might argue that the US had no moral right or national interest to resist the Soviet Union, but I’m assuming that my readers don’t lack moral confidence in America or show downright hatred for their country that many show today. Because ignoring the Soviet Union of the 1980s for fear of the Taliban assisted terror attack of 9/11, is like saying America shouldn’t fight Hitler because the Soviet Union will be stronger.

        The US should balance the consequences with their goals but can’t be paralyzed by fear which leads to my final point that our foreign policy can’t be paralyzed by fear of what could happen. Its true that actions have consequences, but so does inaction.

        The best example of blowback from inaction that ends up being worse than any blowback from action is in Syria. Back in 2011 the typical crowd wanted to avoid any military action to remove the Syrian dictator and protect civilians. They did so using a false dichotomy between a massive invasion and nothing, when America could have achieved good results with limited invested and danger through a no fly zone. But afraid of a small potential of war through a no-fly zone or missile strikes, we did nothing.

        The result was that America looked weak because our leaders declared red lines that they didn’t enforce, and made bellicose statements that the dictator’s days were “numbered” that became irrelevant. Almost 300,000 civilians have died, 12 million internally displaced, and 5 million people became refugees. Russia made Syria their proxy and tested their combat tactics that were used in Crimea and Ukraine a short time later. The terrorist group ISIS went from jayvee to pro and stormed across much of the region. European nations still grapple with that refugee crisis, including Sweden that had to mobilize the army to fight gangs of immigrant youth. In the US we had rabid debates about what to do with all of those migrants. (Though I think we should have loved them enough to make sure their homes weren’t destroyed in the first place.) 

        Looking at all that, do the isolationist libertarians that use this silver bullet consider all the consequences of inaction? Nope, they scream blowback about the current shiny thing in the news. Ironically enough, it was blowback that started the war in Ukraine, and probably Israel. Putin started marshaling his forces for invasion mere weeks after the botched Afghanistan withdraw. 

        Clearly the United States should carefully consider its actions which include blowback to military intervention and nonintervention. But using the aid to Afghanistan in the 1980s as a direct cause of 9/11 is over simplistic reasoning in support of consistent, knee jerk isolationism. (Or as I discovered researching my next book, their beliefs are called contingent pacifism because they recognize a theoretical right to just war in scripture but don’t find any examples in the world that meet those conditions.) The Afghani silver bullet ignores the historical context of the decisions in the 1980s to argue for isolationism today. Most importantly, that silver bullet shows an inherently weak foreign policy by ignoring the expensive cost of inaction for often vague and exaggerated costs of action.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider getting more of it by donating using the paypal button below or by purchasing one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] This is more rhetorical flourish than clinically accurate. Isolationists libertarians sometimes refer to the CIA coups against Guatemalan and Iranian governments in the 1950s.

[2] Personally, that’s why I preferred Winston Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy where Western allies invaded Eastern Europe from Italy. Despite its higher difficulty level that strategy would have spared millions from Soviet domination. 

Notes from the National Security Conference

   

 

    I just returned from the 2023 LDS National Security Professionals Conference last weekend. I came down with a non covid illness the week before which made it all the more impressive that I could drive to Provo and interact with everyone like it was fine.  

    My presentation went well. I discussed two applications of section 98 in scripture. Abraham largely ignored our understanding section 98, but was blessed. The Nephites more fully followed it, but because of their extreme wickedness they were cursed. The truth is that we must have the spirit of section 98, a peaceful heart, but also be willing to wield the sword when necessary. A rote invocation of the scripture against force is not what it was intended for.  

    What follows are some of my brief notes on the presentations mostly covering their interaction with my research, as well as an update on that research. 

Mark Henshaw: An LDS Jus Post Bellum Framework  

    This is an important topic that has not been developed all that much. Henshaw offered some ideas that I found extremely flawed. He started by saying we are not beholden to ideas from the past. This is severely misguided and borderline chauvinistic. We have authoritative scriptures that can weigh in on things, but the competing invocations of section 98 and Alma 48 among Latter Day Saints are the same debates between turn the other cheek and Jesus' numerous uses of force. Latter Day Saints could benefit from great thinkers of the past wrestling with the great questions of today but they completely ignore those answers because, as Mark Henshaw implied, they are just small minded medieval Catholics. That is the entire reason I wrote my book trying to show the numerous interactions between restoration texts and those seminal thinkers and they can bring further light and knowledge. 

    Substantively I had two major problems with Henshaw's just peace. He claimed that it was required of the winning power offer honorable terms of surrender similar to the terms found Lee received at Appomattox. But a nation doesn't always know it is defeated. Moreover, a winning power offering terms could be seen as a sign of weakness by the losing power, and encourage them to continue the war. If they can't win, offering terms would encourage the losing power to fight on and seek better conditions. This was the case with the militant officers in the Japanese army during World War II. This would result in attempts at peace leading to longer war. I would remind Henshaw that the greatest kindest is ending the war. And if the attempts at just peace lengthen the war, they aren't just. 

    The second problem was again, his reliance on Moroni's actions in Alma 44. While his actions seemed to end the battle in a just manner, it didn't end the war. This hardly makes Moroni's actions an example of a just and lasting peace. Keeping the big picture in mind, this battle was only the beginning of the war chapters. Plus, as I've discussed before, the battle pause is unnatural and could be a literary creation. At the very least, pausing a victorious battle seems like a rare luxury that wasn't followed anywhere else in the Book of Mormon including other battles that Moroni fought like that in Alma 51. (Moroni did offer generous terms in other places but not in the middle of the battle.)  

    Finally, Moroni defended or even bragged about the strategems he used to win (Alma 43:30). But Thomas Aquinas argued that stratagems prevented a just peace because it convinced the opponent that the one using the ambush was dishonorable. Unsurprisingly, Zerahemnah attributed the Nephite victory to their "cunning" and refused a peace (Alma 44:9). (Aquinas and Christians got around that injunction by pointing to Jesus' use of concealment and the overall just purpose of the war.) But Henshaw dismissed pivotal concepts from just war theorists that directly applied to his argument. If he read Aquinas then Henshaw could have seen a Nephite barrier to just peace in Moroni's tactics and perhaps been less reliant on Alma 43 and 44 for his concepts.

Megan Alder: LDS Responsibilities in a Shifting Balance of Power 

    Megan talked about the church's responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine and its application elsewhere. Her talk was very appreciated as she directly rebutted the many people that thought the church provided a weak, milquetoast statement. It was fairly generic, but she argued convincingly that church leaders do this because they value providing ordinances and materials to its members in the aggressing country, than scoring points with an in your face activist statement. She pointed out that they still provide massive materials to Ukraine and help the suffering people there, while also being good shepherds to their members in Russia.  

    I'm probably not supposed to say this, in addition to being really smart and articulate, she was also totally freaking gorgeous. She seemed single so I thought for a bit that I could end up having a good professional and personal day. But being sick I felt like total garbage by the end of the day and went back to the hotel and collapsed, (and had to start my drive home the next day.) Maybe I'll get lucky and bump into her again somewhere. Regardless of her looks and my crushing on her, her ideas were excellent and very needed. There is much more to helping people than making a strident political statement. 

Fred Axelgard: In Praise of 4th Nephi

    He was particularly nice to meet. He is one of the few from the pacifist crowd I've met that actually acted like he had love in his heart. I've lost track of the number of pacifists that say all the right words, and then seem so phony, fake, and even angry when you disagree with them. He said some nice words about my research and after looking at my blog he said he can tell I have a deep passion for the Book of Mormon. Those were very kind words that will be nice fuel when it feels like I'm wasting my time on all this stuff. 

    His presentation was extremely thoughtful as he talked about the importance of morally hard and even contradictory passages. He suggested that Mormon summarized the war chapters, refused to fight, then changed his mind to fight even though the Nephites hadn't repented, and wrote about the Anti Nephi Lehis, so his life and contradictions are particularly important to consider. He mentioned the ninth article of faith to argue there are many important things yet to reveal about matters of war and peace. 

David Palkki: On Love and Hate in Section 98

    I was worried this would overlap with mine but our presentations were complementary. We agree that this is more about principles than military doctrine. I particularly enjoyed his quotes about quotes. He had one from President Nelson that divine doctrine is confirmed by more than one witness. Boyd Packer said that often or obscure doctrines must be measured against other scriptures. And Dallin Oaks said that it is dangerous to rest a firm conclusion on one verse. I liked these because they underscore with what I've tried to do in applying multiple, interlocking scriptures and contrasts with so many that rely on one verse to rest far reaching arguments (that just happen to damn everyone else.)

    Palkki was particularly good at showing the inconsistencies of policy based on this verse. The Book of Mormon in Alma 48:14 gives a different number. There are metaphorical numbers in the same section, such as 98:40 that says the saints should forgive 70 times 7. He made the good point that it is ridiculous to start counting 490 times, but we think forbearing three trespasses is literal. Finally, it hasn't been mentioned by any leader since 1948. (And I would add, that reference was from the isolationist J Reuben Clark.

Medlir Mena: LDS Perspectives on Standing Firm in an Era of Domestic Upheaval 

    From a mechanical standpoint this was, unfortunately, one of the worst. He rambled a good deal and his slides didn't follow his presentation. I don't like to be a robot reading from my script, but I know how nervous I can get so I type my presentation word for word, and practice it hard. I think my presentation is much better as a result. (I was super sick so I'm probably nasally on the tape.) 

    Substantively he seemed really focused on intra state conflict (gang violence, cartel killings against their own people, low level insurgencies etc.) instead of interstate competition. He tried to cast Laman and Lemuel as the same family, but they seemed like two distinct polities fighting inter state warfare. The Nephites did fight an insurgency, which is a chapter in my next book but he hasn't. He seemed to dislike "grand theories" derived from verses like section 98. I would need to see some examples so I could judge for myself. Ironically, he seemed to literally hand wave and make lots of "grand" assumptions.  

Conclusion

    This conference was good. I follow the same pattern every time. I apply, get accepted, become way too nervous to the point I can't eat or sleep, I do really well, feel great, and wonder what I worried about in the first place. I have some good material to add to my book, and have a great deal to think about. 

    This presentation was based on a chapter of my upcoming book on just warfare. I have another chapter, based on Helaman 2, that is coming out in Square Two. My views on the Ukrainian war are based on chapter four of the book. And I have a journal article about Moroni's letter that is still working its way through the Interpreter. In short, I have 4 publications or presentations based on my book (and there are only about 10 substantive chapters in it). Its a bit frustrating publishers don't seem to like all those ideas in one place, but it is good validation that I have ideas worth sharing. I will continue to pursue publication of the book, and modified, stand alone chapters from it. Thanks for reading. 

I work as a freelance writer. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below. Or buy one of my books linked in the top left.  

The Nazi's Veto

 

    Murray Rothbard was the father of modern libertarianism and in turn inspires many Latter Day Saint views of war, including this horrendous reading of the Book of Mormon. But the libertarian’s elevation of the individual at the expense of the state ends up creating what I call the “Nazi’s veto” that disallows any state war, and as a result, leaves the state and individuals with no real power to stop abuses.

    Rothbard’s fundamental axiom of libertarian theory “is that no one may threaten or commit violence (‘aggress’) against another man’s person or property.”[1] He explains this by using a private example that person A has no right to aggress against B because C is threatening. Rothbard claims that “give me liberty or give them death is a far less noble battle cry” and that simplistic theory sounds convincing.

    Those are nice ideas that falls apart upon even a cursory examination. Let’s go back to the fictional examples of people A, B, and C. There are moral differences that immediately make this far more complicated, and unworkable in practice. For example, lets say that person A is a police officer or sheriff, and he is responding to a bank robbery. The robber is doing what libertarians complain about the state, robbing the people of their money. But in stopping the robber, person C, maybe the police officer, person A, causes the robber to crash into another car, killing an innocent lady, person B. In this case, A was stopping C from violating rights, but did so at the expense of person B. That proves the libertarian case, right?

    The libertarian fear of an innocent third person having their rights aggressed would mean that almost no force could be used ever. But the bank robber, rapist, murder (or genocidal dictator below) must be stopped. Sometimes force is required and yet innocent people, (hypothetical person B) could still be hurt, or “aggressed” against. Instead of disallowing force, most people would still consider the actions of the police in this case just, if extremely tragic and regrettable. They might carefully monitor the use of force and ask if other tactics might have been more appropriate, but their use of force would still be just. (Before we continue, notice how this is the distinction between just cause and just conduct regarding warfare. The police can have every right to stop a robber, but not by any means necessary.)

    Now think of the same example, a bank robbery, but maybe the robber intentionally puts someone else in danger. They take a hostage. This would largely shift the immorality of the third person being hurt to the robber (though we would always hope that the robbery can be stopped without the loss of innocent life.) That still requires force, with even more risk to innocents, but if the innocents are hurt, that means the criminal and not the police are at fault.

    There are many different permutations we could do in this situation to assess morality and rights in stopping the criminal. But the point is clear, while the ideal is that no innocent third party should die in defense of your rights. If practiced to the libertarian extreme, it restricts the use of force to such a point that no force can be used. In this fictional example, the police would be so restricted by the danger of aggressing against other’s rights (and since he is government funded official, according to libertarians he is already aggressing against the citizen by living off of taxpayer money),[2] he couldn’t stop the robber.

    The difficulties in morality only get more complicated in war. The state, like the police, is empowered by the people it represents to protect the rights of its citizens under its care by using force. This is the basic contract in the constitution that promises to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, and in return they have the power to tax, print money, make laws, jail citizens, and conscript and fight wars.

    Once that right is recognized, it becomes necessary to determine which strategies are employed so that they don’t create new victims. That is the fundamental reason because justice in war. Because even if the cause of the war is just, it can’t be fought in a way that creates more victims of injustice. Libertarians would deny the state’s power and morality to send soldiers into war. But their ideas would leave much of the world impotent in the face, as the Book of Mormon would say, the “barbarous cruelty” of terrorists (Alma 48:24).

    Libertarians would argue for a limited right to self-defense, and if living under a tyrannical government that they should encourage rebellion in those unjust states. But the oppressed minorities often don’t have the means to resist. Forgot about possessing firearms or having the freedom to organize a rebellion, simply existing as a Bosnian Muslim, Volga German, or a Tutsi in Rwanda would be enough to warrant arrest and execution for many regimes. Much like the actual Warsaw uprising in 1944, Rothbard’s fictional example of Waldavia (225) would say good luck, and then like the Soviets, but because libertarians dislike the state, would stand by and watch them get slaughtered. That isn’t a good moral position to take.

    The idea of rebellion from citizens denied their rights also contradicts the Book of Mormon which taught that if people are oppressed it is because of their wickedness and the Lord will deliver them in his own time. Mosiah 21:15 explains:

15 And now the Lord was slow to hear their cry because of their iniquities; nevertheless the Lord did hear their cries, and began to soften the hearts of the Lamanites that they began to ease their burdens; yet the Lord did not see fit to deliver them out of bondage.

    This is in part because the people would only be slaughtered. (Think of the three failed attacks from the people of Limhi [Mosiah 21:6-12], or the Melian Dialogue.) Philosophers were also wary of rebellion because the chaos and slaughter from a rebellion had a good chance of being worse than the injustice that caused the rebellion!! (It is no surprise that the person who witnessed these blood drenched revolts, Martin Luther, didn’t give any right for the people to revolt. See his text, The Murderous Thieving Hordes of Peasants.) The Salamanca school scholar Francisco Suarez wrote, revolt is just “if essential for liberty…always provided that there is no danger of the same or worse evils falling on community as result of the tyrants death.”[3]  Hugo Grotius, often called the founder of international law, wrote about the same right to revolt if the king alienates his people, but also placed limits on potential usurpers because it would lead to fighting among various factions.[4] From a libertarian standpoint then, the advice for citizens to revolt, not only caused their own deaths in futile revolts, but could result in even more bloodshed, and aggressing against rights, than the always condemned “state war.” 

    Even saying that, America rains death from above which is still horrible right? Let us go back to the A, B, Cs from earlier. Killing a civilian by accident is different than deliberately targeting him or her. If they happen in the course of legitimate acts of war (similar to legitimate police functions designed to save people from our earlier example) and the direct intention is a morally acceptable military target, then unintentionally killing civilians is within the realm of just war. That probably sounds like lame justifications to many libertarians. Those deaths are still tragic and a horrible loss of life and unless you’re okay with genocide and mass murder it doesn’t forbid war.[5] Like the police stopping the robber, the public should reasonably ask if the military should have been more cautious and use better judgement (not to mention aim) during the situation. But disallowing any state use of force is a poor strategy against groups that have far more power than individuals and is often state sponsored themselves.

    To conclude, let us get even more specific about the damning consequences of the fundamental libertarian axion. The ideas that “it is impermissible to violate the rights of other innocent people and war “only proper…when the exercise of violence is rigorously limited to the individual criminals,” lead to the conclusion, “State wars are always to be condemned (220, 222).” (Notice how libertarian ideology elevates personal rights but excludes the collective rights of people represented and expressed by their government.)  Libertarian theory then would have the rights of the most ardent Nazi sympathizer staffing the German war machine veto any moral, humane, just, and even righteous impulse to stop massive slaughter and genocide of innocents. 

    J. Reuben Clark, often quoted by libertarians because of his staunch isolationism displayed the Nazi's veto during World War II. He was so isolationist that he repeatedly advocated for a negotiated peace with Germany that would have left them in control of much of Europe.[6] He did so after multiple reports from death camps such as Auschwitz. According to libertarian philosophy, the United States could not wage war because it might aggress against the rights of innocent third parties, and those third parties should sponsor their own revolt. But it is ridiculous to think that German libertarians would have any collective power against the Gestapo, let alone European Jews already in concentration camps.  It was only state power that could stop the genocide of a totalitarian government. Libertarians, so concerned about being violated by taxes, would ensure that so many others get slaughtered by disallowing any intervention by another state.

    That isn’t a moral or workable philosophy for the evil in the world. In fact, their philosophy only marginal works for individuals in relatively isolated areas like the American mountain west, long ago tamed by agents of the state, such as sheriffs, and protected actions of the state such as defeating Nazi Germany. I kind of wish libertarians would take the same passion they have for hating the government and taxes and spare at least some dislike for the massive slaughter of Ukrainians. If they did, then maybe they would have some Christlike compassion for their brothers and try to stop their slaughter, instead of an ideological zealotry against the state that gives Nazis a veto against that impulse.  

I work as a free lance author. Producing ad free research takes time and effort. If you found value in this work, please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] Murray Rothbard, “War, Peace and the State,” We Who Dared Say No To War: American Anti War Writing from 1812 to Now, Murray Polner, Thomas Woods Eds., (Basic Books, 2009,) 217-226.

[2] 222 “Any war against another State, therefore, involves the increase and extension of taxation-aggression over its own people.”

[3] Andre Azevedo Alves, Jose Moreira, John Meadowcroft, The Salamanca School, (Bloomsbury Academic Pro, 2013), 53. Suarez.

[4] Grotius said on page, 73 “if king alienates the people, he invites retributions.” But places limits on usurpers, 76. Stephen Neff trans., Grotius on the Laws of War and Peace, (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[5] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Examples, (Basic Books, 2015,) 153-155.

[6]  D. Michael Quinn, “Pacifist Counselor in the First Presidency: J Reuben Clark Jr., 1933-196” in War and Peace in Our Times: Mormon Perspectives, Patrick Mason, J. David Pulsipher, Richard Bushman eds. (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), 153-154.