This is part three of a series. See part one, part two, part four, part five, part six, part seven, part eight.
The next mention of preemptive war comes from Ammon’s speech. He doesn’t include many details, but he did contrast he and his companions’ successful missionary service with the desire of the Nephites for preemptive war. At the time of the missionaries departure the Nephites reportedly said of the Lamanites, “Let us take up arms against them, that we destroy them and their iniquity out of the land, lest they overrun us and destroy us” (Alma 26:25.) Aaron, one of the individuals that was at that speech, as the son of Mosiah (II) was only two generations removed from the serious wars faced by King Benjamin and the attack led by Zeniff. This timeline is little longer than World War II is from current policy makers and suggests that preemptive strikes were still common in the discussions held by Nephite leaders, and this was viewed by many, as a legitimate Nephite strategy. The highly successful missionary effort and its explicit contrast with the peaceful conversion of many Lamanites seems to be the first indication that the Nephites wanted a better and more spiritual strategy. Ammon at least saw his successful conversion of the Lamanites as a repudiation of the strategy and current 21st century peace advocates see this as a strong rebuke of all warfare, not just the strategy of preemptive warfare. Joshua Madsen wrote, for example, that the service of missionaries “defied cultural stereotypes” and showed that “love and service can break through false cultural narratives, unite kingdoms, and converts thousand to Christianity where violence could not…In the end, Nephite just wars did not bring peace, whereas those like Ammon who rejected their culture’s political narratives and hatred did.”
Yet, Ammon’s success as a missionary benefited greatly from his martial prowess. According to William Hamblin and Brent Merrill, it was not impossible, but took a great deal of skill and application of military training to disarm a foe in a single stroke. The servants that Ammon protected with his disarming prowess seemed to practice the post battle Mesoamerican custom of the presenting of arms, which suitably impressed the Lamanite king and made him receptive to Ammon’s preaching. The other missionaries gained access to the king’s father by Ammon’s success in one on one combat against that head king (Alma 20:20). In short, his missionary efforts benefited from his rigorous military training, and from the martial customs of the day. At the very least it seems fool hardy to dismiss the need for military strategy, when it was the efficacy of his military training and their martial culture that helped him have so much success.
Moreover, that removal of the Lamanite kings the missionaries converted set in motion a chain of events that helps to validate the offensive minded Nephite strategists. It says in Alma 24:1 that the Lamanites who hadn’t been converted were “stirred to anger” against those that were converted. In Alma 25:1 it then says the remaining Lamanites “swore vengeance” upon the Nephites. These are very simple explanations of Lamanite domestic and foreign politics. Mormon likely translated the political and historical foundations for the conflict into spiritual terms. Those can remain valid and useful in spiritual terms, and we might also examine the text for political interpretations that can add nuance and depth. The spiritual success of Ammon and others removed both the head king and his son from their positions of power in Lamanite society. The resulting vacuum created the political conditions for warfare. Scholars note that it was part of the Mesoamerican cult of war that a new king had to consolidate his legitimacy by winning in battle and sacrificing captives.
The scramble for the kingship and the need for that new king to win a quick victory led directly to the city of Ammonihah. Mormon presented this as a just spiritual punishment for their wickedness against Alma and the members of the church. Yet, the account also includes “some from the borders of Noah” and “others” taken captive into the wilderness (Alma 16:3). Presumably, these were righteous members of Nephite society that didn’t deserve the same punishments as those in Ammonihah. Yet they were swept up in the Lamanite attack anyway. The account in Alma 16:8 said that the Nephites managed to retrieve the captives after a battle.
Alma 25 also recorded multiple battles (Alma 25:3) and the death of many Amulonites after their defeat in battle was presented by Mormon as the fulfillment as prophecy. But again, these battles weren’t bloodless, and meant that many Nephite soldiers died who presumably didn’t invite God’s wrath like the people of Ammonihah. Like the captives from the Land of Noah, these deaths could reasonably be considered innocent and needless because of the missionaries’ pacifistic refusal to fight preemptive war. Moreover, because they Nephites reacted to Lamanite aggression they likely out of position and without the element of surprise which made these battles tougher, and more bloody than they would be if the Nephites were prepared. For example, compared the desperate rush in Alma 2 to Moroni’s prepared ambush in Alma 43. The battles were in the same location, but Nephite preparation and surprise made the result far different. Just as the people of Zeniff likely learned, it was better and less bloody to fight a battle at a time and place of their choosing, then having to hastily form their own army (Alma 16:3), and then chase down or trap the Lamanites and recover innocent Nephite captives.
There is no promise that a preemptive strike to prevent later bloodshed would have been any better than attack on Ammonihah and the battles that resulted from missionary conversions. Yet Alma 47:2 says the Lamanites were afraid to mobilize against the Nephites because of their past defeats. The above consequences of missionary service that disrupted the Lamanite political realm combined with their trepidation in Alma 47:2 suggest Nephite strategists that argued for preemptive war could point to legitimate benefits like deterrence and credibly argue that lives would be saved.
It remains tough to justify preemption based on what could happen, yet destruction of Ammonihah, the captives of Noah, and resulting reactive battles and death of blameless Nephite soldiers make a convincing case study which shows the disasters that await a nation when preemptive warfare is automatically disqualified. The spiritual benefits of Ammon’s missionary work are undeniable, yet even the most benign results benefitted from martial methods, and they contained bloody consequences which suggests that preemptive war cannot be dismissed out of hand.
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 Patrick Mason, David Pulsipher, “Teaching about War in the Book of Mormon,” Mormon Matters Podcast, August 11th, 2016. (Accessed October 21st, 2106. http://www.mormonmatters.org/2016/08/11/341-teachings-about-war-in-the-book-of-mormon/ )
  Joshua Madsen, “A Non Violent Reading of the Book of Mormon,” in War and Peace in Our Times: Mormon Perspectives, Patrick Mason, David Pulsipher, Richard Bushman eds, (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2015.) 24.
 William Hamblin, Brent Merrill, “Swords in the Book of Mormon,” in Warfare in the Book of Mormon William Hamblin, Stephen Ricks eds, (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS Press, 1991). http://publications.mi.byu.edu/fullscreen/?pub=1108&index=15
 Bruce Yerman, “Ammon and the Mesoamerican Custom of Smiting off Arms,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies, 8/1 (1999): 44-77, 78-79. http://publications.mi.byu.edu/publications/jbms/8/1/S00009-50cb975e67df08Yerman.pdf
 Grant Hardy, “Mormon as Editor,” in Rediscovering the Book of Mormon, Melvin Thorne and John Sorenson eds, Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1991,) 15-28.
 Jon Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book, (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013), 363-365.
 Brant Gardner, “The Power of Context: Why Geography Matters,” Book of Mormon Archeological Forum, 2004.
 Morgan Deane, Offensive Warfare in the Book of Mormon and a Defense of the Bush Doctrine,” in War and Peace in Our Times: Mormon Perspectives, (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), 38.