Game of Thrones, History, and Details in the Book of Mormon

Game of Thrones ended on what I thought was a funny and thoughtful note. All the survivors serving under the new king gather to discuss how to rebuild the kingdom. It was so charming in fact I wouldn’t mind seeing a spin off series about these meetings as they combine many of the fan favorites. One of the major complaints from this scene though is when the events of the show get put into a book. It turns out that Tyrion, the dwarf who was part of most of the major events was not even listed. One youtube scholar wrote:

That "Song of Ice and Fire" joke was dumb; Tyrion, not mentioned? His arrest caused the War of Five Kings, he served as hand to three (Joffrey, Dany and Bran) monarchs, he lead part of the vanguard at Green Fork and organized and lead the entire defense at Kings Landing. But sure, hack writers needed a cheap laugh.

But with a knowledge of how historians write, it is possible to conceive of a Game of Thrones history that doesn’t include Tyrion Lannister.

Tyrion is arrested by Catlin Stark:

This event was monumental because it caused Tywin Lannister to order his forces to attack Catlin’s ancestral lands. The king was incapacitated from a hunting accident (really an arranged murder from his wife Circe Lannister), and couldn’t keep the peace between his wife’s family (Lannisters), and the family of his biggest supporters (the Starks).  The average historian has a great deal to cover, and the dwarf was merely the catalyst for larger events and thus could have been summarized as, “Tywin Lannister attacked to avenge his wrongly implicated and arrested relative.” Or if the historian is pro Lannister, since the Ned Stark took advantage of the king’s absence from court to order a punitive expedition and was later executed for treason, the historian would write, “Tywin defended himself against the wrongful arrest of his son and malicious attack ordered by the traitor Ned Stark.” 

Tyrion as Hand of the King: 

The Hand is the Game of Thrones equivalent of palace or prime minister. Throughout history, some are inconsequential, while others like Pepin the Short inaugurate new dynasties.  Chinese legal scholars warned that not every conquest resulted from armies scaling the walls and breaking down the gates. Moreover, Tyrion was sent to Kings Landing to act as Hand in the name of his father. His last stint as Hand was largely ineffectual. He governed the city of Mereen quite well, but that is a distant city in the East that Westeros historians wouldn’t know or care about. By the time the Dragon Queen came to Westeros he was often ignored and eventually he quit and was imprisoned by her. His time as Hand of the king or queen could be described as, “Tywin Lannister, governing through proxies…” or simply, “The Dragon Queen ignored her ineffectual advisors.”

Tyrion leading several key attacks:

The show put a lamp shade on this one. After he led a key counterattack at the Mud Gate during the Battle of Blackwater Bay, he was horribly wounded but the counter attacked succeeded and saved the city at a critical moment. One of his visitors was the spymaster, who thanked him for saving the city, but warned that the people thought he was the imp and Tyrion won’t get credit for it.  

Tyrion’s counterattack was simply one of many twists and turns to the battle. The use of a fictional version of Greek Fire, called wildfire, destroyed much of the opposing fleet. During the Muslim siege of Constantinople in 678, the Greek Fire is often mentioned but not the ministers  or even leaders that employed it. Tyrion was only one player in this event out of many. The historian would write something like, “The king, Joffrey Baratheon oversaw the battle from his central position on the parapets. He would likely have seen the counter attack led by his grandfather, Tywin Lannister. The ladder secretly marched his army away from the usurper Rob Stark to defend the capital and attack Stannis from behind. The ghost of Stannis’ brother attacked from the west. This was Loras Tyrell, in a new alliance with the Lannister’s forming yet another flank attack in the king’s great victory.”  

As you can tell, there was so much going on in this battle and so many important players, a minor counter attack from an unpopular person wouldn’t be missed. Tyrion’s attack at the Green Wood was more conspicuous. (In the budget challenged first season though, Tyrion gets conked on the head and both he and the viewer completely miss it.) In the books he does a good job of commanding the left flank.  But that battle was only a diversion for Rob Stark to fight at Whispering Woods, where they captured the very important Jaime Lannister. Thus, the history could be, “Lannister forces defeated a diversionary force from Rob Stark, while the latter counter-marched and captured Jaime Lannister.” 

Tyrion kills Tywin Lannister:

Tyrion is blamed for the poisoning of King Joffrey and is sentenced to death. The spymaster frees him and before he goes, he killed his father and eventually makes his way to the Dragon Queen. Given that Tywin was shot while he was in the privy with his pants down, and there was a dead prostitute in his bed (also murdered by Tyrion), this could have been glossed over by historians. (Though not forgotten by the bawdy Game of Thrones version of a theater troupe.) 

Historians had several easy scapegoats in contrast to tawdry family drama.  Sansa Stark was the daughter of the traitor and disappeared on the day that Joffrey was killed. The Sand Snakes killed or disfigured (tv or book respectively) the queen’s daughter and could also be blamed for the Tywin’s death around the same time. Religious fanatics quickly overran the city after Tywin’s death. They installed a reign of terror and they eventually arrested Circe and King Tommen’s wife. With plentiful rumors at their disposal, and a dead body on the privy, historians could say it was various traitors fulfilling the wrath of the gods while leaving out the details or focusing on the post Tywin mistakes and subsequent downfall of the kingdom. 

The Book of Mormon:

This clearly shows the limits of being a historian. Ancient historians often had a lack of primary sources to create their narrative. Thucydides, for example relied on a combination of personal knowledge, and contemporary events to craft his narrative. He plainly said that in his speeches he wrote what he “thought the situation demanded.” They had to sift through mountains of rumors. They often had their own biases. Many religious writers such as Gregory of Tours wrote to show God’s hand impacted history. They could change the narrative slightly to enhance that effect.  

The Book of Mormon itself reveals several of these interesting glosses that could be covering up important people or events like Tyrion was left out of Westeros history books. The war chapters describe “some intrigue, which caused dissensions amongst the [the Nephites], [so the Lamanites] gained some ground over the Nephites. (Alma 53:8).” We don’t know if these were factions of cities rebelling against Nephites and installing Lamanite friendly governors. (Which happened in Zarahemla Alma 61:8) We don’t know if it was a dispute between cities as described in Alma 50. We just don’t know much except it happened. We know how Amalickiah gained the throne through treachery and deceit but not Tubaloth or Lachoneous for that matter.

For example, I find it suspicious we have a long line of no name but generally wicked leaders, many of them kill each other to gain power, and we are even told at one point the Gadianton Robbers have “sole management” of the government (Helaman 6:39), but then here comes Lachoneus and tells them to repent (3 Nephi 3:12).  What was his backstory and how did he keep power when so many other rulers were being assassinated?  Perhaps like Helaman (Helaman 2:6), Lachoneus had servants willing to infiltrate factions and kill potential assassins and enemy’s before they carried out their quest. This would be very inconvenient for a story about God saving the Nephites because they prayed.

This is not some radical retelling of the story but simply a careful reading of the text based on what other documents, and the text itself tells us. For example, Mormon selectively edited his narrative in many places. In the most notable instance he wrote that the Lamanites captured some of the people of Noah (Alma 16:3), but when portraying the event as the wrath of God and desolation of Ammonihah, he left it out (Alma 49:3). Presumably the people of Noah were not wicked and didn’t deserve God’s punishment. So Mormon the historian included those details, but Mormon the prophet, pronouncing God’s judgment, did not. This particular detail was first noted by Grant Hardy in a FARMS volume almost 30 years ago.

The Book of Mormon is an excellent spiritual text that has historical value. Mormon as the historian had the same habits of other historians with limited sources and space to advance his objective for the book. We can see some of those methods but using a fictional example from pop culture. I hope we can dive deeper into some of the little noticed details that hint at much larger events or people.

The Churning for Power

My recent methodology focuses less on parallels and how they prove the Book of Mormon. We don’t necessarily have to point to a direct connection between Rome, China and the people of the Book of Mormon because the underlying behavior, motivations and feelings are so similar.

I’ve talked about many principles between the Jaredite and Chinese Civil War in my first book. In this case, I was particularly impressed with the jealousy of the Roman empress regent against powerful generals and how those generals held key commands around Roman territory. The power struggle between generals, politicians, and priests using the levers of the state or their personal commands to protect their own power against rivals aided by assassination. Aetius also had to recover from defeat which recalled the similar effort by Coriantumr. These scrums for power place the Book of Mormon firmly in ancient settings.

We might consider how chaos in both China and Rome allowed associated barbarian groups to enter and seize control. One Chinese source said they “picked the bone of the dynasty.” Aetius used his time as a hostage to the Huns to use them as allies against his enemies. This presents an intriguingly possibility concerning others in the Book of the Mormon. The Jaredite fight for power among themselves and crush for manpower could have led to unconventional alliances or allowed nonaffiliated groups to expand their power. In fact, the Mulekites could be some of those outsiders. They were too late to affect the twilight wars of the Jaredites (though the account says Coriantumr lived with the people of Zarahemla for 9 months.)  But they entered the Jaredite (possibly San Lorenzo) culture zone and soon created their own mix aristocracy and control of nearby regions.

The more I read ancient accounts and documents the more firmly I’m convinced of its ancient setting. Without further ado here are the three summaries of the churning for power in ancient society. If you get lost trying to keep track of all the power players, don't worry, that is kind of the point.

China: 

After a period of disunion, romantically called the “Three Kingdoms Period,”¹ Sima Yan united China and proclaimed the beginning of the Jin Dynasty in the mid-3^rd century A.D. Sima Yan placed his relatives in strong military commands surrounding the capital of Luoyang on the Yellow river.²  As is typically the case in Chinese history, however, commanders capable enough to protect the frontier were also powerful enough to assert their will against the Emperor.  It took a strong Emperor at the center to hold these ambitious commanders in check. 

Upon the death of Sima Yan in 290 A.D, his mentally feeble son Sima Zhong assumed the throne.  His wife, the Empress Jia, suppressed, executed or ran off members of the Sima clan, and effectively ruled until 300 A.D.  After the murder of the Sima Yu, the various Princes stationed along the periphery asserted their will in favor of the Imperial (Sima) clan.  Two Princes, Sima Yong and Sima Lun, violently seized power in the capital and forced the Empress to commit suicide.

Up until this point, the various political machinations had been done under the façade of Imperial authority.  The Empress signed an edict in the name of her feeble husband, and then executed or exiled the various “traitors” to the Empire.  The naked use of power without a justifying edict by the Sima brothers led to what historian David Graff calls a “plunge into the abyss.”³  Members of the Sima clan justified their actions based on assertions of military power, and not Imperial authority. 

Less than a year after the two Simas coup, a third, Sima Yun, attempted a coup but was killed.  In response, Sima Lun abandoned all pretenses of ruling through his feeble cousin and declared himself Emperor.⁴  Yet this caused the former Emperor’s younger brothers (Sima Ying, Sima Yih, and an area commander Sima Jiong) to attack from the West. They defeated the new Emperor and restored their mentally challenged brother to the throne. 

With the unremitting carnage among the princes in their struggles for power, by May of 302 A.D., no clear heirs remained to the (recently restored) Jin Emperor. Sima Ying hoped for the nomination, and he resented the dominant position taken by the more distant relative Sima Jiong, while Sima Yung from the west also sought a role. In complex intrigue during the last days of the Chinese year [heading into 303 A.D.], Sima Ying and Sima Yung involved Sima Yih in their rivalry with Sima Jiong, but when Sima Jiong sought to destroy Sima Yih, Sima Yih turned the tables on him and took his place at the head of government...⁵

After heavy fighting, Sima Yih defeated Sima Ying’s forces and held off another army from Sima Yung, commanded by the vigorous general Zhang Fang.  However, Sima Yih was betrayed by his own soldiers, under the influence of Sima Yue.  In 304 A.D., the latter had the former burned at the stake, and he continued his efforts to gain control over the Emperor.  Sima Yue’s enemy, Sima Yung, tried to appease him by offering the head of his general Zhang Fang.  Sima Yue accepted the head but continued the fight to gain control of the government. He accomplished his design in 306 A.D.  

Jaredite:

The Jaredite Civil War is no less sanguine, complicated, or less known by the public at large. Ending in roughly 300 B.C.,⁶ the historian Moroni summarized Ether’s account.⁷ The final war begins with the latter’s eviction from the rulers’ court. At this point, many “mighty men” fight Coriantumr.  Knowing “all the arts of war” (Ether 13:16), Coriantumr fights back for three years before being put into captivity by Shared.  His sons promptly rescue him and restore him to the throne. This naked aggression seems to throw the kingdom into continual bloodshed, as there was “none to restrain them” (Ether 13:31).  A “curse” upon the land corresponds to this bloodshed. It is manifested by a complete lack of trade and a shredding of the Jaredite economy.

Shared and Coriantumr continue their back and forth fight and exchange victories across the land until the latter kills the former.  Shared’s brother, Gilead, beats Coriantumr in a series of battles and assumes the throne.  Then Gilead’s high priest murdered him as he sits upon the throne.  The text is a bit unclear, but this high priest is either Lib, or killed by Lib so that he can take the throne (Ether 14:10).⁸  Renewed from his defeat and succored by what appears to be a regional power base, Coriantumr regains the throne and kills Lib (or the man who killed Lib).  By this point, the armies are forcibly conscripting soldiers and destroying large populations and cities in their path. Lib’s brother, Shiz, continues the fight, despite peace overtures from Coriantumr, until the nation ceases to exist in any organized form.⁹ 

Roman:10

A six year old boy cannot rule an empire, even in the hands of so capable and experience a mother as Galla Placidia….The fragmentary records indicate that she aimed to sustain a balance of power in which no one figure among the military or bureaucratic elite should become too dominant. The main contenders for power and influence in the years after 425 were the leaders of the three main western army groups: Felix [Italy], Aetius [Gaul], and Boniface [North Africa]…

For awhile, Placidia’s strategy just about worked. The threatened dominance of first one figure, then another, was kept in check, if not entirely smoothly. Slowly, however, the situation fell out of the Augusta’s control. Felix made the first move. Accusing Boniface of disloyalty, in 427 he ordered him to return to Italy. When he refused, Felix sent forces to North Africa, but they were defeated. Then Aetius stepped in. On the strength of some military successes in Gaul against Visigoths (426) and Franks (428)…he felt confident enough to move against Felix. Perhaps his successes had won him new favor with Placidia, or perhaps personal extinction was the price of Felix’s failure against Bonficace, but in 429 Aetius was transferred to Italy and to the post of junior central field army general…In May 430 Aeitus had Felix and his wife arrested for plotting against him. They were executed at Ravenna. Three had become two, and high noon was fast approaching for Boniface.

Aetius seems to have lost little ground at court after he got rid of Felix. Perhaps, one again, Placidia was fearful of the dominance of one unchallenged generalissimo. Boniface was therefore recalled to the Italy, seemingly while Aetius was absent in Gaul again; and Boniface too was promoted to the post of central field army general. Aetius immediately marched to Italy with an army, and met Boniface in battle near Rimini. Boniface was victorious but also mortally wounded; he died soon afterwards. His political position, and the struggle with Aetius, were immediately taken up by his son in law Sebastianus. After the defeat, Aetius first retreated to his country estates, but after an attempt was made on his life, he turned to the Huns, as he had in 425. In 433 he returned to Italy with enough Hunnic reinforcements to make Sebastianus’ position untenable…Aetius had emerged by the end of 433 as the de facto ruler of the western Empire.

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance author and providing high quality ad free research takes time and effort. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buying one of my books using the link in the top left. Thanks again. 

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1 This period is similar in legend and romance to that of Arthurian Britain. 

2  See Appendix B in my book a map of Jin Provinces.

3  David Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare: 300-900 (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 62.

4  Edward Dreyer, "Military Aspects of the War of the Eight Princes, 301-307," in Military Culture in Imperial China,  ed. Nicola di Cosmo, 112-142 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

5  Rafe de Crespigny, “The Three Kingdoms and Western Jin: A history of China in the Third Century AD,” Internet Edition, 2003. 

6  The timeline for this section of The Book of Mormon is incredibly tenuous. I give a tentative timeline of the battle below (see fn. 53). 

7  This following is a summary of the major events starting in Ether 13:15 to the end of chapter 15. 

8   Ether 14:10 could be explicating verse 9 or could be introducing a new actor. 

9   At this point in The Book of Mormon’s timeline, the Jaredites fade from history and the Nephites assume a central role.  While the common assumption is that the Jaredite nation is destroyed, Hugh Nibley concludes that the political leadership is destroyed, but Jaredite individuals continue to participate in Nephite society, usually as bad actors.  See Hugh Nibley, The World of the Jaredites.

10  Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, (Oxford University Press, 2006), 260-262. 

Preemptive War and the Book of Mormon: Part VII Conclusion

This is the conclusion to a multi part series. See part one, part two, part two(a), part three, part four, part five, part six, and part eight.

The use of preemptive war was fairly common in various cultures throughout history and the Nephites are no exception. Writers mentioned or alluded to the practice in many of the major periods of Nephite history, on the small plates of Nephi, the included record of Zeniff, the speech of Ammon and the Sons of Mosiah, the summary of Captain Moroni’s tactics, the period immediately after that in Helaman 1, the fight against the Gadianton Robbers, and the final fight for survival. There are other strategies mentioned. Zeniff for example presented an alternative to invading and destroying the Lamanites (that he later called overzealous.) The Sons of Mosiah employed missionary service, and Moroni mostly focused on defensive actions, or offensive maneuvers within a generally defensive posture. The Nephites at the end of the nation also assumed a mostly defensive posture as they held various choke points and fortifications for years. The Nephites faced an extended period of peace after the ministry of Christ. Though anthropologists point out that the severe destruction, smaller populations, and more basic political units made an egalitarian society much easier to maintain and almost completely erased the competition for resources and land (i.e., the underlying causes of war).[1] Mormon himself said that the only true method to peace was to lay down their arms and repent (Mormon 7:4). But Pahoran also said that the people would subject themselves to bondage if they had to, but the Lord doesn’t command that (Alma 61:12). Those other strategies have been discussed fairly often, and combined with the several verses that seem to forbid offensive war, and has been the generally accepted position on warfare in the Book of Mormon.

Yet given the number of instances and justifications behind them, Nephite leaders considered preemptive warfare a valid option. Nephite leaders preemptively attacked their opponents or discussed it without editorial comment. In some cases, such as the actions by Moroni, the actors were specifically praised for their righteousness. In other examples, such as those by Zeniff’s group and the seizure of Paanchi, it was such a non-issue that the preemptive nature of the attacks remained in the background. The futile attacks of Limhi, and the desperate last minute counter strokes of Alma the Elder show that attacks at the time and location of the Nephites choosing could have been far more effective than desperate defenses in reaction to seemingly inevitable attacks, or later counter attacks from an inferior position. The refusal of the Lamanites to take up arms against the Nephites in Alma 47 suggest that preemptive war had a deterring effect and could reduce conflict. The controversy over the preemption in Helaman chapter one underscores the debate over the perceived imminence of attacks.

Regarding Mormon and Gidgiddoni’s supposedly explicit verses condemning the practice, their condemnations were just as likely strategic directions and attacks on blood thirsty, arrogant behavior, more than prophetic denial of preemptive war. And the comparison between Ammon’s peaceful mission and the war mongers fall flat. The martial prowess of Ammon, military culture of the Lamanites, political instability they caused, innocent Nephite captives and soldiers that died because of that instability, and later Lamanite fear of mobilizing for war suggest that the Nephite leaders had legitimate reasons to believe a preemptive attack could save lives.

Even if the Nephites commonly held justified reasons to use preemptive war, that doesn’t always mean the attacks were successful. Zeniff’s attack was launched, but a good number of people had second thoughts about the attack which led to civil war. Moroni’s preemptive behavior likely enhanced Amalickiah’s arguments about Nephite perfidy in front of the Lamanite king and strengthened his position there. The Nephite’s preemptive execution of Paanchi was the catalyst for the Gadianton Robber threat, and likely fueled their social bandit ideology that proved so potent. The Nephites utterly failed to root out the Gadianton Robbers, though they did have some success with the offensive defensive strategies once they lured the robbers out of their mountain strongholds. The Nephites at the end of the nation had some military success and if we take an honest look at Mormon’s praise of the soldiers, not just his spiritual condemnation, and we look at the strategic context in which these attacks were launched, we see enough in the text to merit their offensive attacks. In other words, wicked people tend to use the same tactics as righteous people, they just liked it more.

Ultimately the efficacy of preemptive war was mixed and fraught with unintended consequences. Although inaction and a purely defensive posture has consequences as well; the innocent captives of Noah after Ammon’s rebuff of preemptive war, and the bondage of the people of Limhi after Zeniff deferred against a preemptive attack suggest that not attacking could have been just as dangerous. At the end of the day, the proactive nature and potential benefits of the policy likely tipped the scales in favor of the policy.

The Book of Mormon exhibits the historical features that make preemptive war desirable even if it’s dangerous and opened them up to condemnation. The chief historical reason for a preemptive attack is the attacker’s belief that preemption now is better than facing worse consequences later. The Japanese war machine in World War II only had a few months of oil left because of American embargoes. They felt that a surprise attack on America would stun them long enough for Japan to seize their prosperity sphere, especially the oil fields in Java. A preemptive attack immediately for them was better than waiting. The Germans in World War I faced enemies on every side, but they believed they could quickly defeat France and then be ready for Russia by the time their slower, Eastern foe had fully mobilized. They needed a quick strike through a neutral country to do so.[2] Epaminondas and the 3rd century Thebans faced yearly invasions from Sparta. He thought they should launch a surprise attack to permanently remove the devastating attacks on their homeland, weaken Sparta, and alter the balance of power.[3]

The Nephites were always talked as though they were vastly outnumbered by the Lamanites (Mosiah 25:2-3; Alma 51:11; Mormon 2:3). A surprise attack could throw their enemy off balance, capture territory that would make the Nephite realm stronger, prevent an imbalance of power arising from defecting dissenters, preemptively stop a gathering attack, root out endemic banditry before the government fell, or simply fight at a place of their time and choosing instead of unpropitious battle being forced upon them. The Book of Mormon shows us that preemptive war was a justly held strategy, commonly employed, with as much effectiveness as other strategies but with potential pitfalls. In a world where a surprise nuclear attack is likely and the numbers of dead in a preemptive strike by terrorists could number millions, the attractiveness of preemptive war is even more enticing. But there is a strong stigma associated with it based on a narrow interpretation of a couple of verses, and an almost demonic dislike for it bred from a dogmatic devotion to political planks more than a substantive and thorough interpretation of the scriptures. Given the lives at stake it’s important the Latter Day Saints have all the tools for judging a preemptive strike and have an understanding that these strikes are just another tactic used by both ancient and modern powers, the Book of Mormon does not condemn it, but actually justifies it.

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance writer and providing high quality, ad free research over the last decade takes time and effort. If you found value in the work please consider donating using the pay pal button below or buy one of the my books linked in the top left. 


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[1]Jon Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book, (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013,) 653-655.
[2]See Matt Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive Wars in Modern History (New York: Routledge Press, 2008), for more.
[3] Victor David Hanson, “Epaminondas the Theban and the Doctrine of Preemptive War,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy Victor David Hanson ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 93-118.

Preemptive War in the Book of Mormon: Part VI Third Nephi and Mormon

This is part of a series. See part one, part two, part two (a), part three, part four, part five, part seven, part eight.

There seems to be several verses that forbid preemptive war.[1] In Third Nephi, Gidgiddoni claims that the Lord forbids them from preemptively going into their opponents lands ( 3rd Nephi 3:21). But considering the disastrous offensives against the robbers on their territory (Helaman 11:25-28) this was more likely strategic advice than a commandment from the Lord. In that same campaign, Gidgiddoni maneuvered offensively to cut off the robbers. His tactically offensive operations in a strategically defensive stance suggest, at least, a more flexible approach than an overly simplistic notion that offensive war is inherently immoral.

Mormon 3:15 also seems to prohibit preemptive war. However, the real sin recorded by Mormon was not the offensive tactics but rather the bloodlust and vengeance that dictated Nephite strategy (v. 14). One might also say it was their false oath (to a false god?) in Mormon 3:10 that finally forced Mormon into his utter refusal. Again, that doesn’t have much to do with their strategy. The seemingly unequivocal anti-war sentiment expressed in Mormon 4:4 does not record any saying of the Lord, but can just as easily represent a strategic description (that isn’t completely accurate, see below). If this is a command against offensive action it is also contradicted by other writings by Mormon. This is most clearly seen in a reevaluation of Alma 48:14. The traditional understanding of this verse is a prohibition against offensive warfare. But a slightly different reading suggests the Nephites are rather commanded to never “give an offense” except “against an enemy” and “to preserve their lives” (Alma 61:3).

Finally, there is Mormon’s statement that the wicked punish the wicked (Mormon 4:5). This seems to describe the inverse of the ideal to trust in the Lord and implies, unsurprisingly, that making strategic decisions while not “under the influence” of the Spirit results in lousy choices with equally horrible results. Here the German military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz can lend us assistance with his description of an essential element of leadership called Coup De’ Oeil.[2] This term is complex but it basically describes both a commander’s ability to “see the light” and his strength to follow it. Clausewitz did not have any spiritual implications in mind, but it certainly applies here. When the Nephites were spiritually darkened, their ability to make correct military decisions were severely impaired (though not completely destroyed, see below). Thus the military prohibition described in the Book of Mormon is not against offensive or even preemptive action, but it is rather a condemnation against passive stupor, lacking trust in the Lord, and lusting for vengeance—in short, a darkened mind.

In fact, leaving aside Mormon’s denunciation of his soldiers, he recorded their admirable qualities many times. The people were “arouse[d]…somewhat to vigor” and they did meet and beat their enemies (Mormon 2:24, 26). They “went forth” and won against the robbers and recovered their lands (Mormon 2:27). They “beat” the Lamanites in Mormon 3:8. Again, they “repulsed” the Lamanites, and again, the only sin is what Elder Neal A. Maxwell called a pronoun problem in taking credit for themselves instead of giving it to God (Mormon 4:8).[3] A short time later the Nephites stood with “boldness” which gained them another impressive victory (Mormon 4:15-20). If somebody was told that a somewhat vigorous army with bold soldiers repulsed and beat a much larger enemy multiple times to defend their territory, wives, children, and houses (Mormon 2:23) that person would think that army was incredibly skilled and maybe even praise worthy. But the descriptions of their sins were so pervasive that readers have failed to adequately assess their military strategy itself separately from faithfulness of those doing it.

Some might argue they shouldn’t be separated, but one of the difficulties in applying the Book of Mormon to a modern American context is the difference in political systems. The modern notion of separation of church and state precludes a prophet leading the United States and thus begs the question of what constitutes “righteous” leadership. Likewise, the concept of a civilian audit over the military excludes a prophet-general leading the country or even determining military policy in any significant degree. That leaves Latter Day Saints to assess strategies like preemptive war, at least somewhat independently from sin and righteousness.

While Mormon makes it seem as though the Nephites were hopeless (and in a spiritual sense they certainly were), their martial conduct and even the result of their offensive attack was not as disastrous as Mormon makes it seem. They had already repulsed the several Lamanites attacks. In the Nephite preemptive attack they debouched out of Desolation and had some initial success though they were ultimately pushed back. The arrival of a new army caused a further retreat to the city of Teancum. The Nephites (again) “repulsed” the Lamanites and then retook the city of Desolation. In the 8 verses of Mormon 4 that describe their supposedly horrible offensive, they ended up right back where they started.

Mormon blamed their offensive attack, saying that if it wasn’t for that the Lamanites would have no power over them (Mormon 4:4), yet the course of the fight and resulting status quo ante make this offensive essentially a draw and no worse than the annihilation they faced.[4] The skill of the soldiers that produced at least a draw makes it clear that the real sin was their, anger, vengeance, blood lust, and boasting which withdrew the divine strength of the Lord, and not their tactics or strategy. (Sensitive readers might also notice the weary matter of fact after action report in Mormon 4:9: And many thousands were killed on both sides.) In fact, one might say that no strategy except repentance could have save the Nephites, which is a great spiritual message but hardly a condemnation of preemptive war.

If the readers see this period of the war as a back and forth see saw, then a spoiling attack launched from a narrow point against a much larger enemy actually has a good deal of merit. In tactical combat, a narrow point that people must pass through is called a kill zone. If the Nephites knew the point of Lamanites attack, and knew that attack was imminent, they could see a good deal of value in launching an attack against a massed foe in a killing zone. Again, just like Zeniff, and the leaders in Ammon’s day, they could reasonably argue that fighting at a time and place of their choosing, with the advantage of surprise, was better than waiting to receive an imminent and inevitable attack from a much larger enemy (Mormon 5:6).

Returning to the beginning of the paper and the difference between a moral preemptive war and morally suspect preventive war, the justification or lack thereof is based on the relative imminence of the threat. The more imminent (or even ongoing) a threat, the more justified it becomes. Mormon says in the 362nd year they defeated the Lamanites and began to boast (Mormon 3:8). Their supposedly wicked and forbidden attack occurred in the 363rd year (Mormon 4:1). Arguably this event was less like the devastating catalyst for their destruction that Mormon makes it seem, and more like an attempt to recreate Moroni’s expulsion of Lamanites from the wilderness in Alma 50. They both occurred during a period of nominal peace but what really seemed like a simple lull in between phases of fighting. Arguably, the only difference in strategy seemed the relative enthusiasm for the conflict based on their spiritual condition (compare, Alma 48:23 and Mormon 3:9). The Nephites were only 14 years removed from ceding their land of inheritance by treaty and were only a year removed from the previous attack (Mormon 2:28-29 lists the 349th year which would be more recent to the Nephites than the 2000 election is to us at the time of this writing). With an existential threat gathering across a narrow pass, and a generation of warfare to suggest an attack was being launched from a land violently conquered within recent memory, even allowing for an irredentist faction that wanted to recover their homeland at any cost, this strategy had more justification than Moroni’s in Alma 50, and it becomes one of their most justified attacks.

There are several verses that make it seem as though the Lord clearly forbids preemptive war. Those scriptures are more likely strategic advice based on specific context, which are also contradicted without editorial dissent elsewhere in the text by its leading figures like Moroni. At other times it was contradicted by the unnoticed background of a story like in Zeniff’s case, or in the unexamined consequences such as those in Ammon’s case. Other verses clearly condemn blood lust, boasting, the pronoun problem, false swearing, and overall a darkened mind, and not the specific strategy of preemptive war. In fact, when the strategy used to defend the Nephites in their last days is assessed on its own merits, and compared to earlier actions by righteous figures, they actually have what is arguably the most justification for preemptive war in the scriptures. A careful reading of the text suggests the high operational tempo with almost nonstop fighting and loss of territory from year to year, with lulls in the fighting without true peace, leading to their final extinction, makes this a long series of attacks and counter attacks which erase the supposed dichotomy between righteous defensive action and horrible, demonic, and evil preemptive war.

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[1] Jeffrey Johanson, “Wars of Preemption Wars of Revenge,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, vol.35, no.3 (Fall 202), 244-247. https://www.dialoguejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/sbi/articles/Dialogue_V35N03_244.pdf
[2] Clausewitz, On War, 101-102.
[3]Neal Maxwell, “Consecrate thy Performance,” April 2002, Ensign, 2002. https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2002/04/consecrate-thy-performance?lang=eng
[4] Of course, if the Nephites had a smaller population than the Lamanites the loss of Nephite soldiers would be harder to replace than their enemy, and thus fatally weaken their armies despite their retention of territory and battlefield victories. This is a major criticism of Confederate Robert E. Lee. His spectacular battlefield victories drained the South of manpower and lost a war of attrition.