Atomic Bombings Justified? Examining the even worse alternatives

 

August 6th marks the controversial day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. Critics of Hiroshima have long debated whether dropping the bomb was moral yet every realistic alternative would have killed far more people.

The Question Is Not Whether the Bombs Were Horrific

            Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[1] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[2]

The Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later.[3] Critics have argued that the bombings were intended not only to force Japanese surrender but also to demonstrate American military capability to the Soviet Union.

Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets. Critics also argue that Japanese peace overtures made the bombing unnecessary.

Critics of the bombings often focus on morality in isolation. The real moral question, however, is whether any realistic alternative would have produced fewer deaths.

Did Japan Actually Offer Peace?

            The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. The Japanese were ready for peace and the argument implied it was only the blood thirsty, American war mongers who kept the war going. Gar Alperovitz later argued that these peace efforts demonstrate the bombing was unnecessary. His interpretation, however, relies on selective evidence.[4] More importantly, this interpretation emphasizes evidence supporting its conclusion while overlooking later events.

            The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup.

Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[5] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

            Again, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting.

Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. It took two atomic bombs to convince them, and even then, just barely. American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions. Any idea of peace before dropping the bomb conflicts with the available evidence from Japanese decision making in 1945 and relies on assumptions about what Japanese leaders would have done under different circumstances. 

The Postwar Critics and the Context of Their Opposition

            Some critics rely heavily on statements from military leaders who opposed the bombing after the war. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

             Eisenhower's later criticism must be considered within its historical context and ultimately discounted. He commanded the war in Europe and wasn't privy to the intelligence or decision-making in the Pacific. Yet today his opinion is often treated as expert testimony on a campaign he didn't direct.

When he became President Eisenhower’s New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7]  He threatened the use of nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Strait Crises and was so interested in their deployment that he developed tactical nukes.

            The main source of opposition was parochial, interservice rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] 

It isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize what they called the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

The Alternatives Were Not Bloodless

                Japan was unlikely to surrender without either atomic bombing or a catastrophic invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

            Estimates vary significantly depending on assumptions about Japanese resistance and invasion scenarios. But General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[10]

If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. Critics who focus primarily on the immediate destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki often do not account for the enormous human cost of alternative strategies.

Blockade and Starvation as Alternatives

            The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[11] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death.

That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

            Any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet their statements are often used as rhetorical props in modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons.

Ending the War Before a Soviet Occupation

            The rapid end of the war also prevented a larger Soviet role in Japan. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

The Least Harmful Choice Available

            Ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why some allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[12]

Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[13]

            Every other option was worse than using atomic weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral, and I’ve seen people sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But nuclear weapons were not used in a vacuum. They were used against a horribly aggressive regime, and they prevented alternatives that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war is not as catchy as the sarcastic claim that “Jesus nukes people,” but it reflects the moral reasoning used by Allied leaders who believed it was the least harmful option available.

            Any evaluation of the atomic bombings must account for both the destruction they caused and the alternatives available during the final months of World War II. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

            Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

*********

---

[1] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[2] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[3]  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[4] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[5] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.

[10] Frank, Downfall, 340.

[11] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.

[12] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.

[13] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197.