Monday, January 13, 2014

A Chance to Vote: Best Historical Post and Best Apologetic Post



This is a quick reminder that they are holding "best of" elections at the group blog Wheat and Tares. I am nominated for Best Historical Post, in discussing the "The Butchers' Apostle: Context for the Anti War Quotes of J. Reuben Clark."  And I've been nominated for Best Apologetic Post, for "Henry V, Hummers, and the Book of Mormon."   I blog because I enjoy sharing my ideas with a wider audience, but it's also nice to get a pat on the back for my efforts.  So please take a couple minutes to vote before this Sunday (Jan 19th).  

Saturday, January 4, 2014

For the Peace of our People: Amalickiah's Arguments in Alma 47



Amalickiah’s flight to the Lamanites and subsequent intrigue that won him the Lamanite throne and war against the Nephites seemed a bit too easy.  Everybody in the account seemed to do exactly what he wanted.  But upon closer examination of the scriptures the reader can see that Amalickiah’s arguments were based in mutual self-interest and often justified his actions using the rhetoric of peace.

One of these arguments is listed in the text. After one of Amlickiah’s servants killed the king in verse 27 it reads: And it came to pass that Amalickiah commanded this his armies should march forth and see what had happened to the king; and when the had come to the spot, and found the king lying in his gore, Amalickiah pretended to be wroth, and said: Whosoever loved the king, let him go forth, and pursue his servants that they may be slain.

By killing the king, letting the army see his fake grief, and placing blame on the king’s servants Amalickiah strengthened his loyalty among the army, and his credentials as a “bold” Lamanite. (Alma 54:24)[1] He also removed the only witnesses that might foil his plan and cast blame on him. So in this case Amalickiah presumably enticed his servants by offering him a better position in the future king’s household.  Amalickiah used the fear and self-preservation of the murdered king’s servants to cast the blame on them and he used the natural loyalty of the soldiers to their king to win their hearts. This example is towards the end of the story, but an analysis of the rest of the account shows similarly manipulated emotions. 

In verse one Amalickiah and a small group of men fled from Moroni to the land of Nephi and the Lamanites.  The small group probably consisted of his personal household and fellow elites but maybe included military specialists as well.  They likely followed Amalickiah because of promises of future wealth and success and when they arrived the text says they “stirred up” the Lamanites. Many of his arguments were most likely different versions of events seen in scriptures that Amalickiah embellished or twisted to promote his interest and make it appear in the interest of the Lamanites to go to war.  His argument might have been that the Nephites expelled them and they fled for their lives because they were a peace faction that had tried to prevent the rise of dangerous men like Moroni, and they tried to prevent some of the policies that Nephite elites wanted to implement.  Alma 51:13 recorded how many king-men refused to take up arms when the Lamanites attacked.  Even modern commenters suggested that Moroni’s execution of the king-men and compelling them to fight was a “war crime.”[2] So anciently Amalickiah could have claimed some sort of objection based on real (or more likely feigned or politically convenient) claims of friendship and brotherhood to the Lamanites.  Alma 61:8 described the coup by the king-men that entered into a treaty of friendship with the Lamanites. So again, the scriptures contain evidence that the king-men and Amalickiah might have promoted themselves as a peace party professing friendship with the Lamanites. 
Amalickiah also could have stirred the Lamanites towards war over news of a pre-emptive invasion.  While he could have made up any number of plans and there was no way for the Lamanite king to verify it, a short time after Amalickiah’s flight Moroni pre-emptively attacked and expelled the Lamanites in the East and West wilderness. (Alma 50:7-9)  Moroni also rallied the people around his Title of Liberty and mustered the army against Amalickiah and his men.  Amalickiah and his followers could have viewed this as mob like and excessively militant action that infringed on their rights.  Certainly Amalickiah would have relayed Moroni’s actions in chapter 46 in the most sinister terms possible to the Lamanite king. Perhaps the king was inflamed enough by this news to declare war.  Or Amlickiah could have convinced him that a quick strike at Ammonihah, their target chosen in chapter 49 because of the easy attack a  generation earlier, (Alma 16:2) could blunt some of Moroni and the government’s militancy. He might have added that the bloodshed from a quick strike would be less than the bloodshed from a later war after the Nephites had gained more power.[3]   

                But the Lamanite soldiers were reluctant to obey the king’s command.  In verse three Amalickiah gained control of the part of the army which remained loyal to the king. As we later see, those who disobeyed the king’s command were not simply rebellious soldiers, but a full-fledged rebel faction with an anointed king. (v.5-6) But why did the king appoint Amalickiah?  Amalickiah and his men obviously had more knowledge of Nephite territory so they would be natural leaders while attacking the Nephites. (Alma 48:5) But that advantage became a disadvantage in unfamiliar Lamanite territory.  The “place of arms” (Alma 47:5) to which the rebel Lamanites fled was roughly ten miles from the capital city,[4] so terrain wasn’t likely an issue.  The real advantage lay in the added social capital and elites that Amalickiah brought.  He had the above knowledge of (maybe exaggerated) Nephite militancy.  He had military skills evidenced by he and his brother’s later leadership of the entire Lamanite army and war effort, and they escaped Moroni’s pursuit. (Alma 46:32-33)

Brant Gardner argued that an earlier king sent Ammon to the waters of Seebus because he was an outsider and a wild card that could affect the balance of power between rival houses.[5]  The king couldn’t punish those who pillaged his flocks because they were protected by rival elites and maybe even the king’s relatives. But he had to maintain his power so he killed his servants for failing to protect his flocks. Ammon on the other hand, did not have those restraints, so the king placed him in a difficult situation to see what he could do and maybe solve the king’s problems.  Amalickiah could have fulfilled the same role for the current king. In a budding civil war he was an outside force. He could have succeeded in his mission and earned the king a united and more powerful army.  If Amalickiah suppressed the revolt heavy handedly, killed the wrong people such as those with powerful connections, or made the wrong enemies (remember that one man tried to kill Ammon in revenge at the king’s house [Alma 19:22]), he could act as the king’s scape goat. The king might have even used one of his servants to slay Amalickiah.  So we see how Amalickiah used the king to gain command of an army, but the king likely used Amalickiah as well.  

In verse 13 Amalickiah presented the rebel general king, Lehonti, the rebel general king, with a rather attractive offer.  Amalickiah desired him to come down [from the mountain] with his army in the night-time, and surround those men in their camps over whom the king had given him command, and that he [Amalickiah] would deliver them up into Lehonti’s hands, if he would make him (Amalickiah) a second leader over the whole army.

Mormon summarized this offer in a way that made it sound too good to be true. But Amalickiah’s argument probably sounded different.  Amalickiah could argue that the king placed him between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the king forcing him to lead Lamanites into battle against other Lamanites.  But Lehonti had the high ground, possibly controlled the source of their obsidian weapons at the place of arms, and possessed greater numbers. So Amalickiah had to obey the orders of the king to attack, but was likely to fail. His attack would result in Lamanites killed on each side, with the result that whomever won the civil war would be in a weaker position to resist Nephite aggression.  Amalickiah’s offer instead made it so nobody would have to fight. Lehonti would win after a brilliant attacking move. Amalickiah would save his army, and like Ceasar’s pardon of Brutus, Lehonti would appear to have king like magnanimity and appoint Amalickiah as the second in command.   Lehonti likely had a practical need for Amalickiah’s martial skills, and the knowledge of Nephite plans would give him additional leverage to win the people; as Lehonti could use Amalickiah’s knowledge of supposed (or real) Nephite attacks to presnt himself as a defender of his people against Nephite aggression. This agreement saved Lamanite lives by uniting the armies without bloodshed and both commanders benefitted.  Amalickiah, knowing that he was perhaps expendable to the king, extricated himself from the need for a costly and likely fatal frontal assault.  Lehonti appeared as a strong conteder for the throne by uniting the army without bloodshed and appearing conciliatory between the two factions.

In verse 15, Amalickiah schemed to gain strengthen the loyalty of his soldiers.  The latter awoke and found themselves surrounded by Lehonti, and begged Amalickiah to save them.  According to the above agreement he did so.  Armies were largely based on personal bonds of loyalty, so it was important for a leader to gain that trust. As an outsider, and maybe even seen as expendable by his rank and file soldiers, the increased loyalty helped Amalickiah, even as Amalickiah fulfilled his part of the agreement to help Lehonti and save the lives of soldiers in both armies. He continued to build loyalty with the theatre surrounding the murder of the king discussed above in verse 27.  In each case Amalickiah further convinced the soldiers that Amalickiah had their best interests at heart. As with any ancient army commander, he had the trust of their soldiers that he would lead them to victory and plunder.  Amalickiah in turn gained by having an army more closely bound to him.  

Verse 33 presented one of the most intriguing items after Amalickiah gained complete control of the army: Therefore, when the queen had received [word of the King’s death] she sent unto Amalickiah, desiring him that he would spare the people of the city; and she also desired him that he should come in unto her; and she also desired him that he should bring witnesses with him to testify concerning the death of the king.

If the queen requested that he spare the people of the city it suggests that the Lamanite army could have sacked the city. Anciently, plunder acted as one of the few reliable ways for an army to get paid, and often acted as a bonus for the success of a campaign.  Like the faceoff between Amalickiah and Lehonti’s army, perhaps the queen still had military force and the inclination to oppose Amalickiah.  But then the queen requested, or possibly ordered, that Amalickiah bring witnesses of the king’s murder. And the next verse says that the witnesses “satisfied” the queen. Hearing testimony suggests some sort of legal procedure. So it’s possible that this served as part of the ritual surrounding a coronation, or more theatre to cover the naked ambition of two joint rulers. The unexpected death of a sovereign often resulted in a mad scramble for power. The queen could easily use her position, and networks of elites to control the capital and remain in power. Amalickiah, in contrast, could use the army as a platform to control the countryside and seize the capital by force. With rival bases of political power, a desire to “spare the people of the city” likely represented a coded political message to end the still simmering power struggle.[6] The queen remained in power; and with Amalickiah she had a partner just as powerful, if not more so, than her late husband. Amalickiah gained by keeping control of the army and possessing a stronger claim to the throne. Not to mention he shared bed with what appears to be the Cleopatra of the Book of Mormon.   

Amalickiah probably assumed the throne claiming he was from the peace faction of the Nephites.  The king-men associated with him often opposed the Nephite conflict with the Lamanites, and they could claim to oppose Moroni’s aggressive promotion of the Title of Liberty and pre-emptive war. Amalickiah could claim that he prevented bloodshed in a nascent civil war as a servant of the king fighting Lehonti, and as a leader of the united army opposing the widowed queen.  He spread the city upon his ascension, and likely promised to protect his new subjects from Nephite encroachment. Of course, modern readers get a version of the story from Mormon.  But every story has more than one side and a careful reading and analysis of Amalickiah’s story suggests he achieved so much because spoke in terms of mutual self-interest, and he often justified his actions using the rhetoric of peace.




[1] His brother Ammoron used that phrase, but he is treated as an extension of Amalickiah.
[2]John C. Captain Moroni the War Criminal, September 1st 2008.  http://bycommonconsent.com/2008/09/01/captain-moroni-war-criminal/  (Accessed January 2nd, 2014.)
[3] Keep in mind that Sorenson proposes the new city of Moroni in those territories as a military garrison right on the border with the Lamanites.  And he cited Helaman where they lose half their territory (Helaman 4:16), when Nephi tried to retrench Nephite society he started at Bountiful (Helaman 5:14-16), and later when Christ appeared at Bountiful,  that the Nephite center of gravity seems to have shifted north and to the east, in many of the new lands they conquered in Alma 50. John Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013,) 49-53. So the Lamanite concern seemed justified.   
[4] John Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013) 330.
[5] Brant Gardner, The Case for Historicity: Determining the Book of Mormon’s Production Culture (2004 Fair Conference. http://www.fairmormon.org/perspectives/fair-conferences/2004-fair-conference/2004-the-case-for-historicity-discerning-the-book-of-mormons-production-culture (Assessed January 1st 2014).
[6] I first discussed this verse here: http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/search?q=spare+the+people  (Accessed January 2nd 2014.)

Monday, December 9, 2013

Young Generals

[This is cross posted from the new and excellent blog, Ether's Cave.]
 
Modern readers of the Book of Mormon might wonder a bit at the precociousness of some of the military leaders. Moroni "was only twenty and five years old when he was appointed chief captain over the armies of the Nephites." (Alma 43:17). Mormon says that when he was "fifteen years of age" (Mormon 1:15), "the people of Nephi appointed me that I should be their leader, or the leader of their armies. Therefore it came to pass that in my sixteenth year I did go forth at the head of an army of the Nephites" (Mormon 2:1–2).


 Other leaders were also young. The text reports that "Moroni yielded up the command of his armies into the hands of his son, whose name was Moronihah" (Alma 62:43) in the thirty-second year of the reign of the judges (see Alma 62:39). Moroni was twenty-five in the eighteenth year (Alma 43:3-4, 17) just fourteen years earlier. Even if we assume that Moronihah was born when Moroni was fifteen, Moronihah could not have been more than twenty-four when he took over command of all the armies.


 On the one hand, mortality rates in the ancient world were significantly higher than they are now. So individuals simply had to take over responsibilities at an earlier age. On the other hand, there may have been a cultural factor at play as well.


 Bernardino de Sahagun reports the custom among the Aztecs of sending young men to live in a "young men's house" (tepuchcali):


And when [he was] yet an untried youth, then they took him into the forest. They had him bear upon his back what they called logs of wood--perchance now only one, or, then, two. Thus they tested whether perhaps he might do well in war when, still an untried youth, they took him into battle. He only went to carry a shield upon his back.


 And when [he was] already a youth, if mature and prudent, if he was discreet in his talking, and especially if [he was] of good heart, then he was made a master of youths; he was named tiachcauh. And if he became valiant, if he reached manhood, then he was named ruler of youths (telpochtlato). He governed them all; he spoke for all the youths. If one [of them] sinned, this one judged him; he sentenced [the youths] and corrected them. He dealt justice.
 

 And if he was brave, if he took four [captives] then he attained [the office of] commanding general, [or] chief. (Fray Bernardino de Sahagun, Florentine Codex 3, appendix 5, in Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, Florentine Codex [Santa Fe, NM: The School of American Research, 1952], 4:53.)

While Sahagun is writing about Aztecs, not Nephites, and about customs of a much later time, we do not know how far back the customs stretch. The custom, however, provides a plausible parallel for how a man could rise to be a commanding officer at an early age.

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Imperial Patriots: The Book of Mormon War Chapters as a Catalyst for Imperialism



[This is an abstract for a paper I proposed to the Society for Military History and their theme of transformative warfare.]
 
The Book of Mormon primarily serves as a spiritual witness in the religious realm. But almost one third of the book is devoted to warfare.  Some sociologists have also described Mormonism as a new world religion.[1]  Yet the book, particularly its military passages, remains woefully understudied.[2]  At least in part this is due to the enormous spiritual baggage and bitter polemic debates that accompany the book.  But new research, such as that by Grant Hardy, has tried to bracket the claims of its truthfulness to better understand the complexity, beauty, and message of the text.[3] 

In particular, the Book of Mormon contains a dense series of chapters that follow a great war between the two principle groups, the Nephites and Lamanites. Both groups descended from two brothers, Nephi and Laman, who left Jerusalem around 600 B.C. [4] After journeying to the new world they split into two groups that frequently warred with each other until the Nephites were destroyed in the 4th century A.D. Living in the first century B.C., Moroni is described as leading the Nephites during a 14 year long period of intense conflict covered in a dense narrative section called the “war chapters.” His actions included creating a standard of liberty to rally his people, giving powerful political religious speeches that increased support for the war, merciful treatment of surrounded and surrendered soldiers, many outstanding battlefield victories, brilliant strategy and pre battle tactical maneuvers, and a respect for the rule of law. But his actions also included things that are not as sterling or had unintended consequences.   This included the use of preemptive warfare, increased use of (expensive) armor for his soldiers, increased use of fortifications, an expansion of the size of armies, execution of defectors, aggressive pursuit of decisive battle, a completely counterproductive negotiating strategy, using rhetoric that threatened a war of extermination against his enemies, and a threatened coup against the government. 

A careful reading of the war chapters suggests that Moroni initiated a series of actions that inaugurated an imperial period within the book, led to their eventual destruction as a political entity, and can be used by modern readers to justify an aggressive and interventionist American foreign policy. Examining the unintended consequences suggests a need for added caution in considering the merits of military action. A relatively short time before Moroni assumed military command, King Benjamin served as a “yeoman” ruler who boasted that he farmed with his own hand.[5] The Nephites ruled a relatively small area around their capital and had a single army. Yet a generation later, the Nephite people led by Moroni preemptively seized land during a time of peace, and preemptively sought to attack an enemy leader.  Moroni changed their armor and fortifications that made their military more effective in the short term, but more expensive to maintain in the long run. The Nephites also fielded multiple armies capable of operating in different theatres with Moroni as the chief captain. The necessary tax base to fund the armor and fortifications required more extensive territory, protection of trade routes and a larger military; these actions led to deeper debts and an overextension of their military. Even though the Nephite armies explicitly fought under a banner of liberty, they faced continued political unrest, increasing social stratification, oppression of the poor, and a growing insurgency they had trouble subduing.

Battlefield losses often inspire great soul searching and political, military, and cultural reform, while winning a war brings a whole new set of problems.  From Rome to Britain, to American policy after World War II, the burden of hegemonic leadership is often assumed vigorously after outstanding military victory, but often unravels from within due to the demands of money and men and a slow decay of society’s ability, and desire, to furnish them.  The Book of Mormon is a uniquely American text,[6] from a uniquely American religion that informs the voting habits of millions of Americans.  Thus a study of the war chapters suggests that Moroni initiated a series of actions that inaugurated an imperial period within the book, and can be used to justify an aggressive and interventionist American foreign policy, while at the same time shows a transformation that has been missed by military historians.




[1] Rodney Stark, The Rise of Mormonism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
[2] Stephen D. Ricks, William Hamblin Eds. Warfare in the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS Press 2001), is the only academically substantive book dedicated to warfare in the Book of Mormon.  Patrick Mason, David Pulispher, Richard Bushman, ed. War and Peace in Our Time: Mormon Perspectives (Draper UT: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), is a more recent addition but it has very few chapters on the Book of Mormon and only one from a military historian. 
[3] Grant Hardy, Understanding The Book of Mormon: A Reader’s Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[4] Bracketing truth claims I can either report the dates and actions of the characters with the Book of Mormon faithfully, or add a “supposedly” or “reportedly” in front of every fact in the book.  For the sake of brevity I will simply report what the book said. Serious skeptics and non believers of the book can feel free to add those qualifiers and keep in mind that the entire volume is a fantasy fiction of Joseph Smith.  
[5] Scott, G. St. John. “King Benjamin and the Yeoman Farmer” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 39 (1988), 1-26.
[6] This is due to its focus on at least some part of North or South America being type of “promised land” similar to the land of Israel described in the Bible.