Friday, January 30, 2009

Mormon Mesoamerica Part II

Without further ado...

Standing armies: The writer uses Alma 53:2-6 and Alma 52:5-11 to show that "Both of these sections clearly describe a standing army, that is, an army that remains organized and structured while waiting for active battle. Again, this does not strike a modern reader as unreasonable, yet there is no evidence of such a practice in ancient Mesoamerica during the Book of Mormon time [quotes Payson Sheets "Warfare in Ancient Mesoamerica: A Summary View" 295]The existence of a standing army as described in the book of Alma would have been highly unusual in ancient Mesoamerica, and would have required a highly urbanized and centralized polity, which did not exist in ancient Mesoamerica during the specified time period.

Again, this is a superficial reading of the text. The verses mentioned are part of a seven years war, where the Nephites kept "standing" armies. Alma 62:44-47 mentions how the exceedingly great length of the war required new and extensive re-regulating of Nephite affairs. In verse 43 it mentions how Moroni yielded command of his armies to his son. In my opinion this is a small repsonse force, and the Nephite armies were largely made up of a reserve. See: Alma 16:3, Alma 60:2 which suggest that armies were largely drawn from people that were normaly farmers. Sorenson's seasonality of Warfare, and Merill's army composotioin (both from Warfare in the Book of Mormon) suggest that Nephite armies were largely part time. This does not take into account possible military colonies (at the city of Judea, and Moroni) and possible small garrisons manned by the left over forces, and a possible military caste, or small number of elite. (see "Military Castes" in Warfare in the Book of Mormon). And my paper being published for the BCC Papers suggests that there were significant breaks in the war (I call them three phases, Zoramite War, First and Second Amalickiahite War) because of the time it took to "reload". Suggesting that the Book of Mormon is consistent with the Mesoamerican difficulty of keeping standing armies.

Thus the blogger assumes that the Nephites had large standing armies similar to the Aztecs (and thus being anachronistic and impossible) when there is still much more study to be done concerning the size and composition (full time vs. part time, military castes, military garrisons etc.) of Nephite armies.

Logistics: This is the most egregious case of misreading the Book of Mormon. The blogger cites the distance and travel time from Jershon to Judea as 210 miles and impossible, and pointless since they would consume all their food just arriving there (thus the fathers sending "provisions" is impossible, Alma 56:27). But Alma 35:13 states that the people of Ammon moved from Jershon to Mulek, to make space (and presumably consume less food) for the Nephite armies there. Mulek is significantly closer to Judea. And using Sorensons geography, is less than 100 miles from Judea.

My research paper currently under consideration for the Journal of Book of Mormon studies has dealt with Nephite logistics (based on Alma 56:28 ironically). The women and children that accompnied the army would extend its operating range, and provide necessary labor once upon arrival. Thus the 100 miles is within acceptable range of an travelling army, representing a one way travel of 8-10 days. If a soldier carries 50 pounds worth of weapons and armor (a very high estimate considering most of the soldiers were probably commoners and had less armor and fewer weapons) the soldier could carry 3 days of food. They also travelled through the capital, and probably resupplied for another 3 days. (The capital being rougly halfway between Melek and Judea). Then you assume that the army had one porter for every 3 soldiers which could carry three days of food for themselves, and another 3 days of food and you have will finish your journey with food to spare. Plus, I suggest that Judea was a military colony, thus the remaining porters would farm the available land and provide more food upon arrival. (This is already a long post, I can do the boring details and excact calculations in another post)

The scenario suposedly gets worse with 3 Nephi 3:21-25, where the Nephites gather in one land, and have food left over, despite the supposedly high population density and limited farming space. Again this is a misreading of the text. I read it, as the Nephites abadoning their less defensible outpost cities in favor of their stronger cities and "lands". The most defensible cities were in the valley and flat lands around Bountiful and Zarahemla. Since the robbers would be more vulnerable after leaving their mountain hideouts and defensible terrain to battle on the plains. And, as noted by Sorenson, the term "land" is sometimes used for wide geographic spaces. Thus when the robbers could not longer plunder the less defensible Nephite outposts, they had to either farm themselves (thus exchanging position with the previously exposed Nephites) or try to attack the best defesnive locations of the Nephites. In short, the internal consistency of the Book of Mormon suggests a looser reading of the term "land" and how fortified they were, compared to the bloggers analysis. "If this event occurred in ancient Mesoamerica, then it required the existence of a highly urbanized, centralized polity with a far more efficient transportation system than actually existed in ancient Mesoamerica, and that same polity and transportation system disappeared without a trace." According to what the Book of Mormon actually says, it does not require a city with the size, power,and logistic capacity of the Aztec capital, but simply a more detailed understanding of what the Book of Mormon actually says.


Conclusion: This blogger presents some good points. His arguments would be stronger if he knew the Book of Mormon better, and was willing to adjust his understanding of it to meet his research. One of the best interactions between scholarhsip and faithful reading, is the adjustment of the latter to the former. In other words, we should be willing to allow scholarship to adjust our understanding of the Book, not from true to false, but from shallow reading to nuanced undestanding. Just as believers of the Book of Mormon used to think that it was account of the whole hemisphere; But changed in response to language and population problems presented which forced readers to re-examine verses that got missed due to past assumptions. Likewise, our study of war can benefit from dropping past assumptions under the light of sometimes critical scholarship. It would help if bloggers did not assume the Book of Mormon is false due to their shallow reading concerning warfare and eager desire to contrast it with Mesoamerican research.

Rebuttal to Mormon Mesoamerica Part I

http://www.mormonmesoamerica.com/politiesandpower.htm#Lamanite%20Warfare

Summary: The writer of this blog criticizes Book of Mormon warfare based on an incredibly narrow and superficial reading that seemed designed to fit the secondary sources the writer had available. I intend to show that his criticisms are simply straw men based on a shallow reading of the text. And, while much more study remains to be done, comparisons of the Book of Mormon to Mesoamerican scholarship must at least start with what the Book actually says, not what is seems to say.


Territorial Conquest Warfare: The writer starts with a discussion of the debate between a destructive war and simply tributary wars. The latter would simply change the political leader, and would effect the population far less than the destruction chronicled in the BoM. Conquest warfare arguably started in 378 (AD) according to the Rice in Maya Political Science (p102). Assuming this is true, I agree with Brant Gardner that this type of destructive warfare is consistent with the Book of Mormon time frame that has the latter fourth century featuring the final bloody finale to the Nephite nation. The blogger actually twists the quoted portion Gardner's words. Gardner's "suspicion" simply suggests plausible connections to events in the Book of Mormon to Mesoamerican trends, while the blogger treats his words as statement of hard fact and then smashes the straw man.

What I find interesting, is that the detailed war chapters taking place around 75 B.C., and receiving the most criticism from the blogger for its early date of territorial conquest, actually seems to be resemble all the facets of that final war in limited form. In other words: the elements of the final Book of Mormon war features all the essential elements much earlier. Editorially this would make sense, because Mormon had a strong connection to this period (he even named his son Moroni, like the figure that is highlighted in the 75 B.C. chapters,and he may be named after the waters where Alma started the church) There is limited evidence of ritual sacrifice (Alma 58:31-32), blood drinking and human sacrifice (Alma 49), territorial conquest (Alma 59:5-10) and an "eternal war" with language very similar to the Nephites 4th century destruction. (Alma 54)Thus, Nephite society moved towards war violent absolute, and Moroni is treated as a hero for successfully defending the Nephite nation and arresting that trend. (see my blog post: Moroni the War criminal part two for more)

On a final note the blogger cites David Friedal as to the impossibility of marches halfway across mesoamerica for territorial conquest, and that it likely happened instead through local factions attaching themselves to powerful foreigners. This is another example of the lack Book of Mormon study by the blogger. The war chapters are replete with local factions that ally themselves with foreign powers, possibly for greater trade (see my BCC paper publication for more). The numerous king men references are one, and the allusion to "gaining advantage through intrigue" (Alma 53:8) seems a spot on description of opportunistic session politics.

Coming soon: standing armies, Homeric warfare, and logistics.

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

An eeeevil Plan? The terminology of War

Mormons have been in the news alot lately. Much of has to do with our supposed "war" on gays. I don't plan on interacting with the temper tantrums of the gay community. I instead want to focus on the place that war has in our moral reasoning.

Often our children want to play war because it is a basic morality tale. You learn who is good and bad, as well as the benefits of certain virtures such as sacrfice and courage. Henry Kissinger in his book Diplomacy, also outlines how America wants to fight its wars with the rhetoric of a moral crusade. (war to end all wars, war to make the world safe for democracy etc)

The political borrowing of wars moral terminology tries to impart that same sense of moral focus. Ironically, it is mostly used by liberals who eschew regular war in favor of social causes: the war on poverty, war on drugs, etc. This tries to gain a sense of moral high ground for the progressive advocates. The prosecutors of this war can feel justified by their intrusion into others lives or increased government control because of they are "fighting" for their noble cause.

In this case, the gay community is trying claim the opposite of the usual moral terminology. They are trying to portray the prop 8 campaign as an evil war. (Think Dr. Evil from Austin Powers when you say it). So instead of liberals wrapping themselves in a flag with their "war" against various social evils, they are trying to cast their opponents as evil aggressors (probably wrapping themselves in a Nazi flag).

This reveals a language of victomology, where any loser in a vote suddenly becomes a victim similar to those in Darfour or the refugees in Palestine. These are blatant appeals to emotion that skip any logical and rational case for gay marriage in favor of simply guilting their opponents into giving in. In my experience defending prop 8, I always start with a few logical reasons why I want to preserve marriage; in return, the first card my opponents always play is to call me hateful.

Its also rather passive aggresive. They try to obfuscate their hateful and rude attempts at fighting back by dramatically painting their oppoenents as the aggresors. Hugh Nibley described this type of langauge in the Book of Mormon. Laman and Lemuel both complained that their brother was tyring to usurp power from them even as they repeatedly tied down, beat, and fought their brother. In Alma 54, Ammoron complained that his war was to avenge the wrongs done to him, when he was the one that fled after his failed revolution. The robber Giddianhi complained in the same fashion (3 Nephi 3:4-11). Giddianhi was a robber that lived in the mountains, and he complained of the wrongs done to him as he was threatening to rob and plunder Nephite lands.

In short: we should not be surprised that the aggresors, those who want to dramtically redefine marriage to suit their indulgences, should then try to wrap themselves in the language of the victim. As we examine the moral rhetoric that comes with war we see one more way Warfare in the Book of Mormon can help us today.

Monday, January 26, 2009

Clausewitz on Captain Moroni's Genius

The influential military theoretician Karl Von Clausewitz outlined several criteria for what makes a military leader a genius.

-Courage is the first requirement. Moroni had physical courage. In the Battle of Mulek (Alma 52) Moroni was wounded in battle, presumably fighting the enemy commander, Jacob, in one on one combat. (Alma 52:35, compare with Alma 2:29-33) Unlike Napoleon but more like Alexander the Great, Moroni fought at the head of his troops. Clausewitz also referred to the courage to face civilian audit. Moroni powerfully displayed his courage in the face of civilian audit by heavily criticizing the government. It is doubtful the government could have removed Moroni from his command: He had the loyal veterans, and like Caesar was not afraid to cross the Rubicon. Although when Moroni complained to the government he did cite their power to muster, equip, and feed men; and he cited that many men were dying from the lack of government care, so the government had significant power as well.

-Strength is next. Physical strength is important, but Clausewitz refers more to the mental stamina and physical power to perceive what is right and then follow it. The army is described as a "machine". And the machine is only as responsive and efficient as the general in charge of it. Thus the will of the general pushes the machine to greatness. I can think of Stonewall Jackson and his ability to move his army with such speed that he mentally disabled the enemy. Moroni was able to achieve decisive results by rapidly moving and motivating his "machine". Inherent in any military operation is the concept of "friction". A talented general can overcome friction and achieve his goals. He did this with able lieutenants like Lehi and Teancum; he also did this with ideological motivation like the Title of Liberty, and presumably the example of his physical courage.

-Coup De Oeil This is a french term that refers to the leaders ability to "see the light" and follow the light. Again, this is a mental continuation of physical strength, where a leader must have the strength to weigh the massive amounts of information and quickly discern what is right. It also has a religious overtone. Moroni had both the mental ability and the spiritual ability to see what was right (the light) and he had the physical and character strength to follow it in the face of opposition. He could animate the machine to follow and obtain the light of victory. (See my paper published by BCC Papers for Moroni's skill at seeing and following his strategic vision)

-determination vs. obstinacy. Clausewitz describes a fine line between a general courageously overcoming odds (in following the light) and a general that is obstinately refusing to accept reality. The line is a refusal to change based on a clear conviction. There are a couple instances of Moroni changing course based on clear conviction. The first is his execution of the king men. In being invaded Moroni saw the enemy within and without his realm. He sought and obtained power from the people to end the internal threat to better meet the external threat. After the important city of Nephihah fell, Moroni quickly ascertained the cause of the government neglect and "marched speedily" to restore the government. (Alma 61:15,17)

-imagination/terrain. This quality refers to the mental ability to envision (imagine) and use both micro and macro terrain. His use of tactical ruses in Alma 43 and 52 show his ability at mastering micro terrain. His desire to hold certain cities, and to build military garrisons represents his ability to master strategic terrain. His rallying the people in Alma 46 against Amalickiah represents his ability to judge human terrain as well.

-changing the rules. A commander must be revolutionary in his application of military principle. Moroni armed his soldiers to such a degree that the Zoramites retreated into the wilderness. He also fortified "after the manner of Moroni" (Alma 51) so that he "astonished" his opponents. (Alma 49) This also brings up an item: If the Book of Mormon prominently displays a story, is that because it is a text book example of the normal, or because it is incredibly unique. If its the latter, than Moroni's use of the Title of Liberty changed the rules of the game. But there is significant evidence (In a paper currently submitted to the Journal of BoM studies) that it is textbook.

In short, Moroni meets the criteria established by Clausewitz in determining a military genius. Studying the leadership of Moroni from a theoretical standpoint allows us to better understand the interaction betweenthe demands of military leadership and the demands of discipleship.