Futile Victory in Jacob 7:26

[This is my application to the Mormon Theology Seminar. Last time there were over 80 applications for seven spots, but I'm still very proud of my ideas regardless of the decision and hope to pursue this line of thought in the future.]

The poignancy contained in Jacob 7:26 serves to highlight Nephite military conflicts. They combine with several key words and phrases, and a judicious comparison to the legendary Chinese general Yue Fei, to suggest that Jacob talked as a martial leader that was victorious in battle, but also sensed the failure represented by those victories.   

Confucianist and Taoist teachings on war highlight the contentions mentioned in verses 24 through 26. Alastair Johnson argued that Chinese thought held what he called a Mencian view, named after a prominent disciple of Confucius, which believed that the righteousness and good governance of a ruler could prevent conflict.[1]  Much like Doc& Cov 121: 121:46, a righteous ruler would have power “flow unto [him] forever and ever.” For example, the martial leader and philosopher Wuzi wrote. “The Sage rests the people in the Way [Tao], orders them with righteousness, moves them with forms of propriety [li], and consoles them with benevolence. Cultivate these four virtues and you will flourish. Neglect them and you will decline.”[2]  Even when military thought didn’t condemn violence, one of Sunzi’s principle beliefs said that a commander must configure his troops in order fight with the military power of a suddenly unleashed torrent of water.[3]  As a result, ancient Chinese historians blamed the defeat of the Northern Song (960-1126 AD) on rulers who forfeited Heaven’s Mandate through unrighteous behavior.[4]

So the need to use military force represented a moral failure and these thoughts amplify the poignancy of the Nephite’s failure to persuade the Lamanites. If we accept Grant Hardy’s strong argument that Nephi’s mission was to keep the brothers from splintering,[5] the “continual” warfare and “eternal hatred” (v.24) of the Lamanites represented a stunning defeat of that mission. Even though the Nephites were successful in their martial defense (v.25), Jacob was perhaps the last living person to hear Father Lehi’s voice and understand how Nephite success on the battlefield couldn’t overcome the moral failing that required fighting in the first place. 

Moreover, Jacob was only a link in the chain of Nephite record keepers and spiritual leaders; after Jacob there is a noticeable decline in the spirituality, length of writing, and marvelous testifying within their writing. A few generations after Jacob, one author confessed he was a “wicked man” (Omni 2), another couldn’t claim any additional revelation (Omni 11), and Jacob’s descendants were inconsequential third person observers of Nephite history that actually turned over the plates to the secular king and historian (Omni 24-25).  On top of his personal link, Jacob presumably knew of Nephi’s prophecy concerning the eventual destruction of his people, suggesting a subtle and parallel pattern within the text.

Yue Fei (1103-1142 AD) only rose to prominence during the collapse of the Northern Sung Dynasty, but despite all of his victories he never did recover Northern China. For various political reasons he was arrested and had his death arranged by the Emperor he faithfully served. He fought to preserve his people, but the need to fight in the first place represented moral failings on the part of rulers. And he died knowing that his fight, despite all of his victories, remained futile.   Jacob’s personal link in the chain seemed futile, his defense of his people represented the failure of Nephi and himself to unite the people, he was the last link before the deteriorating spirituality of descendants, and he feasibly knew that the Nephites were destined for extermination.  It is no wonder at the end of his book he compared his journey to that of a solemn and lonesome wanderer. Conceivably, like Yue Fei or Moroni, he wandered a desolate, war scarred landscape, shell shocked at the failure of his life’s mission, and “mourning” (Jacob 7:26) his days while feeling his contribution was “small” (v. 27) and ultimately futile.

Update 3/21/20: An expanded version of these ideas can be found in my book, Saints to Sinners: Reassessing the Book of Mormon

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[1] Alastair Iain Johnson, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (New York: Princeton University Press, 1998) 155.

[2] Wuzi, Ralph Sawyer trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (New York: Westview Press, 1993), 207.

[3] Sunzi, The Seven Military Classics, 165, 168.

[4] Neo Confucianist historians that dominated the court of the Southern Song Dynasty would have especially believed that. Contemporary historians, though, argue it was stunningly poor military and political choices of the Emperor that turned a devastating Jurchen raid into utter collapse. Peter Lorge, War, Politics, and Society in Early Modern China: 900-1795, (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), chapter 2.   

[5] Grant Hardy, Understanding the Book of Mormon: A Readers Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 

Maintaining and Manipulating the Appearance of Your Camp in The Book of Mormon and Chinese Theory

I had the pleasure of reviewing an advanced copy of David Spencer’s new book: Moroni’s Command. I offered some thoughts and brief endorsement for the back cover. But there was one particular passage that really stuck out to me based upon my knowledge of Chinese military theory:

When scouts were sent out from Manti to determine the strength of the Nephite force, they discovered that the Nephite force was not too large, so the Lamanite force began to make preparations to attack. Helaman’s own scouts reported the Lamanite activity, and he began to make demonstrations carefully designed to give the impression that his force did not suspect the actions of the Lamanite force. Along the main approach to his camp he dispatched two small forces, one under Gid and the other under Teomnor and ordered them to take up hidden positions to the left and right of the main path (Alma 58:16-17). Meanwhile he made an effort to maintain appearances that everything was business as usual in the Nephite camp, seeking to allay any Lamanite suspicions, so they would approach without caution. Helaman’s maturity as a commander since the Antiparah maneuver is evident in this account, as his forces in the main camp coolly waited until the last possible moment before fleeing from the advancing Lamanite force dispatched to destroy them.  This was an essential component of the plan because, by keeping up these appearances Gid and Teomner remained completely undetected.[1]  

The appearances of an armies camp is an important tool that China theorists prescribed for finding out the strength of the enemy. Since those theorists also described warfare as the “way of deception”.[2] It is no surprise then, that military commanders often manipulated their appearance to fool the enemy. 

Tai Kong wrote:[3]

If [your plans] are heard about, the enemy will make counter plans. If you are perceived they will plot against you. If you are known, they will put you in difficulty. If you are fathomed, they will endanger you.

Thus one excels at eliminating the misfortunes of the people manages them before they appear. Conquering the enemy means being victorious over the formless.[i.e., good at denying the enemy a chance to know your plans…]

To be the first to gain victory, initially display some weakness to the enemy and only afterward do battle. Then your effort will be half, but the achievement will be doubled.

And Wuzi wrote:[4]

In employing the army you must ascertain the enemy’s voids and strengths and then race [to take advantage of] his endangered points. When the enemy has just arrived from afar and their battle formations are not yet properly deployed, they can be attacked. If they have eaten but not yet established their encampment, they can be attacked. If they are running about wildly, they can be attacked. If they have labored hard, they can be attacked. If they have not yet taken advantage of the terrain, they can be attacked. When they have lost their critical moment and not followed up on opportunities, they can be attacked. When they have traversed a great distance and the rear guard has not yet had time to rest, they can be attacked. When fording rivers and only half of them have crossed, they can be attacked….In general circumstances such as these, select crack troops to rush on them, divide your remaining troops, and continue the assault- pressing the attack swiftly and decisively.

And the most famous Chinese theorist, Sunzi, touched upon each of these matters as well. “Thus if I determine the enemy’s disposition of forces [hsing] while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented.”[5]

And he offered a warning to those that judge based on enemy camps:

Thus the strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high mountains; do not confront those who have hills behind them.[6]  Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait…[7]

There is a clear congruence between Spencer’s narrative of how this battle developed, and the way that theorists described the need to study, and sometimes manipulate or avoid being manipulated by the enemies’ organization in their camp.  As I described in my book, this doesn’t mean that Helaman opened up his copy of the Seven Military Classics. But if we assume that military theory categorizes and measures military operations the same way a thermometer can measure heat, then using this theory to analyze the Book of Mormon is no different than checking the temperature on your food.  Moreover, if we assume the events described in the text are historical, then we should notice its relation to historical military texts.  Finally, I should not that I’m not completely convinced this is how the battle happened. I think Spencer fills in some blanks that aren’t readily apparent to this reader. But given that my second books is entirely about filling in blanks and making sometimes large (though well founded) assumptions based on small amounts of text;[8] and I find his description of the events matches up surprisingly well with military theory, so I’m willing to give him the benefit of the doubt in making those assumptions. I rather enjoyed describing connection and I hope you enjoyed reading about it. Thanks.  

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[1] David Spencer, Moroni’s Command: Dynamics of Command in the Book of Mormon,  (Salt Lake City: Cedar Fort Books, 2015), 137-139.

[2] Ralph Sawyer, trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New York: West View Press, 1993)158.

[3]Ibid., 68-69.

[4] Ibid., 213.

[5] Ibid., 167.

[6] An army with hills behind them would be in fatal terrain, making them especially dangerous. See chapter 4 of my book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents.

[7] Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 170-171.

[8] And several anonymous reviewers, one in particular, seemed especially nit-picky and ridiculous in offering criticism of that approach. 

My Comparison Is Better Than Yours

In What Are the Odds Brian H. argues that Smith copied the terms Cumorah and Moroni come from the Comoros Islands and its capital of Moroni.  Other posters made sure to remind Brian that the terms were not on any maps known during the time, nor are there any extant dime novels or sources that contain the terms. But I wanted to take a step back and discuss methodology and comparisons.  Outside of the military kind, I’m not very strong with theory, but I think this is a good description of why ancient comparisons are stronger than modern ones. 

I wanted to comment on methodological consistency. In order for critics to support a naturalistic origin of the BoM they must find all sorts of sources and documents that Smith was supposed to have read, memorized, and then recalled in bits and pieces. For example, I read a critical website which claimed Smith had enough knowledge to plagiarize from: Caesar, Frontinus, Procopius, multiple Irish Legends, The Venerable Bede, Jonathon Swift, Vegetius, Sunzi, Wu Chi, Emperor Maurice, Moorish Legend, the Irish Book of Invasions, The Aeneid by Virgil, Roman legends, Plutarch, Polybius, Livy, Cincinnatus, Josephus, Pliny the Elder, Augustine, Eusebius, Tacitus, The Iliad by Homer, Sallust, Thucydides, and Herodotus.

            So now we can add Captain Kidd to that.

            Though when a world renowned non Mormon Egyptologist sees a distinct connection between Pahor and Paanch in historical sources and Pahoran and Paanchi in the BoM, it is immediately discounted without a second thought. Or its discounted with some lame attempts to show its just a common Italian name, but I guess we can just add that right next to the Irish legends and accounts of Sullust. http://forums.carm.org/vbb/showthrea...=brian+pahoran  

             As my graduate adviser used to say, any monkey can make comparisons, so many of these, even the ones which support Mormonism aren't very strong. DJB and others have certainly shown that is the case with the Captain Kid comparison. They might be weak on their own, but when you end up having hundreds of comparisons, and dozens of names attested in ancient sources from the warrior Tecum in the Popul Vuh, to Egyptian names like Pahor and Paanch (noted by an eminent non Mormon Egyptologist), to the Olmec Kish, to the city of Lamani, who then happen to exist in the same time and place as the BoM suggests; it becomes much stronger than doing a google book search for some nouns or phrases that Smith supposedly learned within his vast underground library, that he secretly committed to memory during his nights off as a day laborer, so he could quote them, one line at a time, at random moments while dictating an intricately complicated text without notes. The absurdity of this theory is shown in this excellent satire by Jeff Lindsey, called One Day in the Life. Modern day scholars with access to the best research libraries, ample amounts of free time, and access to even more information on the internet would have trouble doing that.

             So that is the problem with comparisons and why this theory is rather weak. A stronger theory, and what ancient comparisons have going for them, is that it is consistent with Smith translating an ancient text. So he didn't have to know a few dozen sources- a couple from Kidd, a couple from a Greek source, a couple from a Roman source, and so on- and then plagiarize them, he could simply translate using the power of God, and the ancient comparisons (person names, place names, cultural clues, societal information [see the Mesoamerican Custom of Smiting Off Arms on murals for example], geographical tidbits, and so on) are there because its an ancient text. So ancient comparisons end up making that theory sound more plausible, while modern comparisons or plagiarisms combined with what we know about the production of the BoM make it the theory seem even more absurd.

             And to answer your question about percentages, there are only so many sounds in the human language. So there is a fairly good chance that any two sounds from two different languages can sound familiar. Thanks.

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