Newest Book on Just War Released, Ten Year Anniversary of my First Book!

 

    I’m excited to announce that my new book, To Stop a Slaughter: Just War in the Book of Mormon is published and available on Amazon! Those of you that read this blog already have a good sense of the material that is in it. You might remember posts about the importance ofthe heart, preemptive war, and the Nephite wars at the end of their nation. Here is the back cover blurb:

    In a world filled with what seems like "one continual round of bloodshed and murder" (Mormon 8:8) the debates in how to stop that slaughter are filled with partisan talking points, competing vociferous voices, unexamined assumptions about the use of force, fearful hot takes, and self-serving politicians and media narratives that only serve to increase the tension.

    In this the war of words and tumult of opinions (JS History 1:10) acclaimed military historian Morgan Deane applies a Hugh Nibley like command of numerous Christian and Chinese philosophers to engage the rich, intellectual debates from history, and apply them to the ethics of war and peace within the Book of Mormon. The result shows that Book of Mormon offers robust comments on such pertinent topics as the paramount importance of the heart, when and how a nation should use force, the limits of the word and the sword, the intent of people making war, preemptive war, insurgency, and a resolution between, instead of cross talk and proof text citations of oft cited pacifist and isolationist verses and those that support the use of force. This book amplifies the clarion call of the Book of Mormon to love your neighbor enough to be like the Nephites, reluctantly compelled to use arms to stop their slaughter (Alma 48:21-23).

    I’ve sent the book out for reviews, and if you’re interested in a review copy feel free to send me a message. 

    My first book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon has reached its ten year anniversary! I just received a message the other day about how it has helped strengthen testimonies. As I wait for new reviews to come in, here are some more over the years:

    Deane’s work is well-written and thought provoking, required reading for those interested in warfare in the Book of Mormon as warfare, rather than just spiritual analogy. David Spencer, author of Captain Moroni’s Command.

    Hugh Nibley’s understudy. …an absolute must for anyone studying the Book of Mormon... [ties] wide ranging examples from the ancient world in remarkable efficiency. Deane's personal experience also gives a strong eye to military aspects so often neglected... This is a book that will be talked about for years to come by any serious student of the Book of Mormon...” David West, award winning author of Heroes of the Fallen

    Deane is an excellent scholar with fresh ideas and is always worth reading. Matthew Roper, Scripture Central.

    [Deane helps provide analysis] equal of any rabbinical quarrel or Jesuitical casuistry…[and] a fitting springboard for robust and lively debates.” Robert Wood, Chester M. Nimitz Chair Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College.

    The book successfully uses the battles as a means to understand the evolution of Chinese military culture, doctrine, and tactics. The battle maps are well drawn and helpful for those who are not familiar with China’s geography and history. The author has designed the book for general readers, including high school seniors and college freshman, so they can quickly grasp the complex security concerns and strategic calculations often underlying China’s decision-making process. Li Xiaobing, Journal of Chinese Military History

    China’s increased presence on the global stage has attracted greater interest in its long military history. With five millennia behind it, East Asia’s dominant power is certainly no stranger to armed conflict. While that immense scope may seem daunting, author Morgan Deane offers a highly accessible survey with Decisive Battles in Chinese History. Army History

    This astute history clearly reveals the development of China’s military and martial spirit. Military Officer

    I look forward to reading more positive reviews of my latest book and I’ll share them as they come in.

Eat This: Logistics in the Book of Mormon

Mormon doesn’t include many details in his narrative of the destruction of the Nephites, his most frequent refrain is that he doesn't want to dwell on the war they are losing; but in a letter to his son we do get an interesting tidbit. Moroni 9:16-

And again, my son, there are many widows and their daughters who remain in Sherrizah; and that part of the provisions which the Lamanites did not carry away, behold, the army of Zenephi has carried away, and left them to wander whithersoever they can for food; and many old women do faint by the way and die.

This verse is intriguing for several reasons. I first thought of it in response to a critic attempting to describe how logistical problems of feeding groups as large as the quarter million mentioned in chapter six would be impossible and lead to starvation. According to his logic therefore the Book of Mormon was obviously a fiction from Smith’s mind.  So while the account was rather brief, in one of the most detailed letters we do see examples of logistical problems that led to combat over limited provisions and starving civilians.[1] Of course, chapter 9 also mentions acts of cannibalism on both sides, so the assumption that they were living on a normal diet, and would need the normal amounts of food listed in such places as Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, Supplying War, and even Aztec Warfare wouldn’t apply in this situation.[2] On top of this, the prisoners taken by the Lamanites were only fed the flesh of their relatives. (Moroni 9:8) So what we have here could be the practical implications of excessive war in addition to spiritual decay.



Moreover, I’ve often compared the large numbers in the Book of Mormon to the Chinese War of the Eight Princes. Unsurprisingly, their bloody war featuring massive numbers of people and the end of a nation also featured cannibalism. As I wrote in chapter one of my upcoming book (highlights added):

The Princes of the Jin dynasty laid waste to the rival cities. The citizens in and around the capital city of Luoyang were almost continuously looted, raided, starved, eaten, conscripted and attacked by Chinese and barbarian forces until one of the largest cities of the 3rd century world and most prosperous regions was desolate. The city of Luoyang had an estimated 600,000 people, and the army may have had as many as 700,000 people at the start of the war. And even suggested peace plans and the heads of rival generals couldn’t stay the slaughter.



And contemporary and later Chinese historians recorded:



By the [end of the war] trouble and disturbances were very widespread….many suffered from hunger and poverty. People were sold [as slaves]. Vagrants became countless. In the [provinces around the capital] there was a plague of locusts…Virulent disease accompanied the famine. Also the people were murdered by bandits. There rivers were filled with floating corpses; bleached bones covered the fields…There was much cannibalism. Famine and pestilence came hand in hand.

The verse also mentions several armies. The Lamanites are naturally listed. But then he mentions the army of Zenephi. This doesn’t seem like a Lamanite army or Mormon wouldn’t have listed it right after them. So it is either an independent army from another power, or a Gadianite army. Mormon uses the term “my army is weak” in the next verse and laments that he could no longer enforce his commands. So we may infer that he commanded that the widows, and civilians in general be protected and provided with food. But the Nephite army led by Zenephi disobeyed those commands and took the supplies they needed. (17-18)



Notice also, how close this commander’s name is very similar to Nephi. A brief search of the term suggests it is a hybrid Egyptian and Hebrew name meaning, “one of Nephi.” But given this is an apostate general I like the Hebrew term that means “one of lighting.” https://onoma.lib.byu.edu/onoma/index.php/ZENEPHI



Strategically this implies that the Nephites were pressed on several fronts. All the armies were close to the tower of Sherrizah, but Mormon could not reach it. So the Lamanite army occupied what is called the central position. This allowed the Lamanites to shift and mass their forces between the army of Mormon and that of Zenephi as necessary. While the Nephites armies would each have to attack on their own. Since Zenephi is not following the orders of Mormon it is unlikely that would work. Napoleons early campaigns in Italy, and Stonewall Jackson at the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic used this to maneuver to great effect.[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Jackson%27s_Valley_Campaign_May_21_-_June_9,_1862.png



Mormon also mentioned that he lost several choice men in battle. These could be previously loyal commanders of other armies. Or it could be sub commanders in his army. Again using the American Civil War and Napoleonic Wars, as the war dragged on the brilliant commanders like Lee and Napoleon increasingly had to rely on less capable and less trustworthy generals. This trend could only have been worse in an ancient society, and one like the Nephites where I’ve argued before that they were only a dominant city state of a coalition than a large hegemonic power like the Romans.[4]



Finally, we realize more about Mormon as a man. He cares deeply about his people, and the only details of battle he gives are the loss of righteous men, the horrible treatment of prisoners by forces on both sides, and the suffering of widows. While he was a commander capable of earning the respect of his people and was given leadership at a young age. He cared more about the spiritual welfare of his people. Given the horrors he witnessed and constant fighting it is amazing he held to a belief and hope in Christ. While all of my strategizing is good, it is better that we remember the struggle that Mormon and Moroni truly cared about, the salvation of their brethren. Thus a nuanced and detailed analysis of the Book of Mormon helps us understand its many dimensions, but also gives us additional context and a deeper understanding of its primary mission. Thanks for reading.

---

[1] This has important anthropological implications as well, since fighting over limited resources is one of the reasons given for conflict in society. 

[2] Engles, D. W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkely: Univeristy of California Press. Creveld, M. V. (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. London: Cambridge University Press.  Hassig, R. (1988). Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control. Norman, London: University of Oklahoma Press.

[3] I’m glad my Master’s Thesis on Stonewall Jackson is still useful.

[4] This thought is expanded upon in chapter two of my upcoming book. http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2010/12/nephite-politics.html

Military Participation Ratio and Wrong Numbers

[These are some impromptu remarks I made recently on a discussion board. As such it doesn't have a polished introduction and conclusion.]

Do wrong numbers destroy the truthfulness of The Book of Mormon?


The answer is a resounding no. I explained a few reasons why in this post about millions. But there are more. For example, Chinese writers would want to highlight how the previous dynasty lost the Mandate of Heaven, so they would inflate the size of the bad last emperor's army. Ancient historians often wrote not to tell what happened, but with a specific moral purpose. So they didn't have the same scruples about bending facts to fit their story. Brant Gardner even discussed how one set of deaths in The Book of Mormon followed a same double same double pattern. (Alma 2:19) This could be a coincidence, or it had some sort of symbolic power. This is similar to the modern "I've told you a million times" or Jesus using the phrase "seven times seventy." So if The Book of Mormon has the same problem listing exact number for deaths on battle or the size of armies, as other historical documents this puts it in good company.

This gets even more confusing because some ancient words stood for a number and a unit. But the size of that military unit could change. Centurion means one soldier of one hundred. But by the late Roman Empire, Centuries only had 80 people. Myriad is another ancient word that have this problem. So when I see "ten thousand" listed so often in Mormon chapter 6 I start to that is a unit name and not necessarily a number. For example, by the end of the American Civil War some units in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had only a fraction of their normal strength. (They did this out of pride because units didn't want to retire their colors and consolidate.) So if a general is listed as having "his ten thousand" there is a strong chance this refers to a unit name rather than a number. It is discussed in a bit greater detail in the first two posts here: http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/search?q=ten+thousand

Further, I find it odd that Mormon would begin his war of survival with 30,000 soldiers. (Mormon 2:42) But after many years of defeats, defections, and the loss of their capital city and lands, he had 7 times that number in the final battle. (Just from a logistical point of view I have a problem with this increase.) But when you look at the MPR this supposedly sudden increase in size makes more sense. The Military Participation Ratio is a formula historians use to figure out army and population sizes and other items. Basically its how many soldiers a society can muster for war. The high limit is usually 15% of the population can be mobilized for war. (Though ancient Sparta could muster about 25%.) For example, historians estimate that the U.S. MPR for WWII was 12%. So 30,000 would be about 15% of 200,000. This is close to the number listed in the final battle. This being the number of the total population gains strength when we read Mormon 6:7. If you read it carefully it sure seems to suggest that the order of battle included women and children. Towards the end of any war a nation scrapes the bottom of the barrel to fill out their army.


So even if the numbers are exaggerated by Mormon, or translated as numbers instead of units by Smith, or if these were unit names that didn't exist at their full strength, or the total population it doesn't matter. Having a problem with numbers puts it in good historical company, and a 30,000 man army and an ethnic group numbering about a quarter million is believable. There is both internal evidence and historical precedence for each view. Keep in mind that the writers in The Book of Mormon often complained about being "almost surrounded." Alma 22:29 In Mosiah25:2-3 we read that the Nephites were only about a quarter of the population of the Lamanites. (There are other verses that suggest the Nephites were a political minority, as well as significant outside sources from Mesoamericanists that often describe a small political elite ruling a much larger population, but this is getting on another topic.)

Fed With the Flesh of Their Husbands

The following is an abstract for a potential paper. I proposed this for the Mormon Scholars in the Humanities conference. Southern Virgina University, my alma mater, hosted it this year. So I looked forward to presenting there. But my abstract did not make the cut.

Now it goes into a weird limbo stage. I have many projects on which I'm currently working, which is the subject of a future post. Yet I thought my readers might appreciate a peak into this topic. Most likely this will end up being a chapter in a follow up book on warfare in The Book of Mormon.

Fed with the Flesh of Their Husbands:
The High Spiritual Costs of Waging Economic War

The Roman politician Cicero once called money the “sinews of war”. Due to the high cost of waging war many entities have attempted to lessen this cost through the use of particular tactics and strategy. One of the most well known cost effective strategies is the “Chevauchee”, performed by medieval English leaders whose armies devastated much of France during the 100 years war.(1337-1453AD) A Chevauchee describes a march through the countryside typified by burning, pillage, rape, and murder. This allows a nation to supply its army at the cost of the opposing nation even as the attacker’s rapacious tactics undermine the legitimacy of the defending ruler and his ability to wage war. While this practice is interesting to study and certainly allows the attacking nation to wage war on a limited budget, it often disregards an important moral dimension to warfare. The Book of Mormon also relates devastating conflicts and details practices that match and sometimes exceed the devastation of a Chevauchee. As both the Nephites and Jaredites resort to these tactics in the denouement of their nations this paper will argue that the decision to wage war “on the cheap” through pillaging is both a cause and reflection of their decaying spiritual condition. And it tentatively applies these principles in a modern context.

Thanks for reading. Stay tuned for more updates on my current projects and ideas.

The Use of Qualifiers in Studying The Book of Mormon

I want to address the criticism concerning qualifying words in our writings. These are words such as "probably", "most likely" and so on that indicate a degree of doubt concerning scholarly research. What follows is a brief response to the charge that scholarship which defends The Book of Mormon is faulty or inadequate because it includes these qualifiers:

I have found that the more I study and the more degrees I get the more I realize how much I DON'T know. In fact, one of the main conclusions of my Master's Thesis was that even deceptively simple topics defy easy conclusions; and the problem only gets worse with ancient topics that have a paucity of written sources, such as pre Nara Period Japan, Shang Dynasty China, Old Kingdom Egypt and Pre Classic Mesoamerica.

In the books I've read even the most simple points are debatable based on how you interpret evidence. So the authors correctly offer qualifiers. I could open to a random page from any academic book and find the same qualifiers that you attack. This process is accelerated the farther back you go in time. These qualifiers acknowledge the limitations of research and represent an honest attempt to allow the possibility that contradictory evidence may be uncovered in the future. Thus is shows that the historian is aware of the limits of his craft and his sources. When there is a rush to judgement, and refusal to allow for additional sources you will probably find somebody begging the question with an ax to grind.

And these "books" that I mentioned earlier are not fluff pieces either, but from the leaders of their fiel such as Bernard Bachrach, David Graff, Peter Lorge, Ralph Sawyer, and John Gallagher. So people who are leaders in their fields with PhDs and years of experience, still qualify many of their arguments; but those at some "Christian" ministry sites, read a few articles from an anti Mormon site and think they can end the debate. So I think a negative reaction to the use of qualifiers says more about your education and scholarly acumen than quality of Mormon researchers.

My spiritual testimony of the book is firm and unbending, but when you enter the academic realm a cautious reading of sources is not only understandable but desirable.

Impact of Naval Warfare

Many members of the Church of Jesus Christ are good at explicating spiritual messages from the text of the Book of Mormon. As recent talk given by Robert D. Hales as a Church Education Fireside used the concept of "high ground" that an army used for defense in Alma 47 as the basis for his over 30 minute keynote address. I was impressed at how easily the speaker and audience seemed to transition between sound military principle and useful spiritual lessons.

On a related note, my wife has recently commented that I have "ruined" her. She was recently reading a verse and thought it was about naval warfare. Of course, I don't believe I "ruined her". Instead of reading the Book of Mormon for spiritual experiences, she has started to read it "backwards". Instead of taking obvious military principles like the high ground and applying it to spiritual matters, she takes narratives that are ostensibly about religious material and finds military lessons or ideas. Thus this post points out two additional scriptures that involve naval warfare. But I also wanted to point out the need for readers of the Book of Mormon to have their minds work both ways. One of my papers mentioned the double helix of spiritual and warfare that is intertwined throughout the book. Thus we need to look at both topics, examine ideas from both directions, and have our scholarly ideas be as strong as the spiritual ideas we find.

Without further ado here is verse #1 in Alma 2:
15.And it came to pass that the Amlicites came upon the hill Amnihu, which was east of the river Sidon, which ran by the land of Zarahemla, and there they began to make war with the Nephites

My wife mentioned this verse as a possible naval invasion of Zarahemla. (I discussed the conflict and campaign here) This is completely possible. I have discussed how ancient armies would have used rivers over land due to their ease of transport and supply compared to land roots. The advancing army could have been river borne and used the hill as a convenient staging area before they attacked the city. They could have come up and over the hill by land to start the battle as well, so there is some ambiguity in the verse. If this was a river borne assault then that suggests that the Capital did not have adequate naval defenses or possibly even a navy. If the Sidon area was a wealthier city with secessionist tendencies this could have been a private army and navy against a still weak central government (This was the second year of the reign of the judges immediately after the humble reign of King Mosiah). Thus this verse does point to some possible insights into Nephite War, society, and government based upon their manner of naval warfare.

Verse #2 Alma 51:
32 And it came to pass that they did harass them, insomuch that they did slay them even until it was dark. And it came to pass that Teancum and his men did pitch their tents in the borders of the land Bountiful; and Amalickiah did pitch his tents in the borders on the beach by the seashore, and after this manner were they driven.

Upon reading this verse it dawned on me that maybe Amalickiah's army retreated to the sea shore for resupply! The British did this at Yorktown. And if we assume that the Nephite government had a smaller and part time army than their war like neighbors (see above)this would apply to their navy as well. So we can deduce that the Lamanites would have at lest local naval superiority.

It should be remembered that Alma 51 described a revolt similar to that in Alma 2. Only Moroni had to travel to their cities and "pull down their pride and nobility". So there is a possibility that the naval capacity of the Nephites were being used just downstream of Zarahemla, and not by the seashore of Bountiful through Moroni. This reinforces verse 22 that shows the Lamanites taking advantage of the Nephite contention. It also gives us tantalizing insight into Chapter 60:

16 Yea, had it not been for the war which broke out among ourselves; yea, were it not for these king-men, who caused so much bloodshed among ourselves; yea, at the time we were contending among ourselves, if we had united our strength as we hitherto have done...had they..united with us, and gone forth against our enemies...if we had gone forth against them in the strength of the Lord, we should have dispersed our enemies...

I am thinking this wish for "uniting" includes the naval forces available to many of the capital cities north of Zarahemla. But instead of uniting with the central government the government had to use their own forces to subdue them. Thus most of the naval forces (since the capital was fighting the capital parts) were engaged elsewhere and Amalickiah could safely camp on the sea shore and receive resupply from his naval forces.

Conclusion:
This explores several scriptures that imply naval warfare, trasport, and supply. These verses are also surprisingly consistent in describing the impact of that Naval warfare had on Nephite government (private navies used to overthrow government), society (increased wealth allowed private armies/navies of "king men"), and war strategy (lack of navy at the capital and eastern sea shore hurt Nephites but helped the King Men and Lamanites, a navy was also needed to subdue the King men). These are just a few ideas I have concerning the needed explication of military ideas from the Book of Mormon.

In the future I plan to examine the defection of critical navies with Chinese history, and connect this to the Malay Model for Book of Mormon geography. Thank you for reading, and a special thank you to Mormon Heretic at mormonmatters.org for his help with links. As always I look forward to your comments.

Naval Warfare in the Book of Mormon

This may seem an odd post since there is no explicit mention of warfare upon the waterways in the Book of Mormon. But there are ships, rivers, oceans, and armies fighting, which means warfare extended to that arena.

The logical place to start is with the few mentions of sea going vessels in the Book of Mormon. The original settlers arrived across the ocean in a boat. Although that ship's construction was on par with other miracles like Moses crossing the Red Sea, (1 Nephi 17) so it is unlikely the Nephites built more once they arrived. According to Sorenson they probably moved into the highlands away from the coast.(Ancient American Setting, 138-140) A small tribal confederation in the highlands would have little need, or means for a navy, or even much maritime trade. (If I was an expert in 6th Century Mesoamerican economics I could insert some cool figures here, but I am basing my views on general knowledge I have on Nephite society, and in knowledge I have of other ancient civilizations)

The next mention of ships is in Alma 63 where the "exceedingly curious" person named Hagoth uses his skill in shipbuilding to expand Nephite trade and settling. This represents a new period of expansion in Nephite trade and society. There are other examples from ancient societies that mix trade, colonization, and warfare. William Hamblin in Warfare in the Ancient Near East describes how Egyptian rulers often combined trade and military missions. In fact, a receipt of goods was often a sign of superior military strength, and after receiving goods the stronger power would leave a garrison to establish political control and ensure favorable terms with their "trading" partner. I have also talked about the likely hood of the colonizers being former army veterans, thus the overseas expansion of the Nephites, enabled by Hagoth's shipbuilding, was at least under protection of the Nephite soldiers (part of the "Corporate Sponsorship" that Sorenson described in Nephite trading missions, 211) and could have been more overt military ventures- like using military force to ensure favorable trading status and/or to exert military control.

In discussing these tenuously supported ideas, we should keep in mind that "a hundreth part" of what happened in Nephite society is included in the record. (Helaman 3:14) Thus there should be a a little understanding in trying to figure out the other 99 parts.

Part of those unstated factors are the logistical and strategic concerns from the river Sidon. The river could be crossed (on foot it seems-Alma 43:35) above Zarahemla, but was deep enough to float bodies out to sea beneath Zarahemla. This suggests an ebb and flow to the river, and that the river is deeper down stream from Zarahemla. Rivers were almost always logistic highways due to the ease of transporting large amounts of supplies compared to using land routes. Both ancient Egypt (in Ancient Warfare in the Near East) and ancient China ("Dou Jiande's Dilema..." by David Graff in Chinese Ways of Warfare) used rivers for troop and supply transport, as well as many other societies. (See John Lynn Ed. "Feeding Mars") The Egyptian example was from the early Bronze age and the Nile had many areas with impassible rapids, so even societies with primitive technology and with unfriendly terrain could see and use the advantage offered by waterways.

In strategic matters, if we accept Sorenson's map 12 on page 240 then the important city of Sidon and maybe even the military city of Moroni were on the river, and the river marked a boundary with the Lamanite center of influence. The Southern Song and Chen Dynasty in China can testify to the importance of using a river for defense since they were both conquered by Northern Empires using the Yangtze as a highway for conquest.(General Grant did the same thing in Tennesse during the American Civil War as well) Plus, the famous Battle of Red Cliffs and Fei River represented the ability of a weak opponent to turn back a strong one by defending pivotal river crossings.(The Battle of Shiloh during the American Civil War is another example of defending against river crossing by a stronger power, amazing how good military principles transcend time and place huh?) This is another piece of evidence that bolsters the case for Moroni placing a military garrison on the river: he sought to deny the enemy a chance to cross the river. It could also answer the charge of some critics who contend that Mesoamerican (and hence Nephite) societies were not advanced enough to equip, transport, and supply armies across large distances in the first century B.C.. Using the river Sidon as a highway for transport and supply would ease logistical burdens for much of their possessions on the "East Sea". It would make an ability to project power in that direction far easier. And explain why on the west sea the Nephites had to establish military colonies (that I argue for in a paper based on Alma 56:28). And further explains the fatalistic thoughts that occurred when Nephihah was captured: in Alma 59:11 Moroni wonders if the war could be won if his government so easily abandons a pivotal city.

Thus it is impossible to think that the Nephites did not use the river to transport soldiers (perhaps the reason Moroni had time to redeploy from Jershon to Zarahemla faster than the Lamanite force). The Nephites already used it to depose of dead bodies (Alma 44:22). And I have an unpublished paper that discusses logistical concerns, with the river Sidon being important to that.

Conclusion: I have discussed external evidence from ancient societies that could help shed light on naval warfare in the Book of Mormon. And I have shown that the Book of Mormon contains sufficient evidence to discuss overseas trading missions, and possible military ventures. The direction of Nephite political power could at least partially result from the benefits of the river Sidon. And many strategic decisions make more sense as well if we accept the benefits that the river Sidon offered. Like many other topics I discuss here, these are preliminary comments and research that demand comment, discussion and further research. Thanks for reading and I hope you can contribute to those stated goals.

Mormon Mesoamerica Part II

Without further ado...

Standing armies: The writer uses Alma 53:2-6 and Alma 52:5-11 to show that "Both of these sections clearly describe a standing army, that is, an army that remains organized and structured while waiting for active battle. Again, this does not strike a modern reader as unreasonable, yet there is no evidence of such a practice in ancient Mesoamerica during the Book of Mormon time [quotes Payson Sheets "Warfare in Ancient Mesoamerica: A Summary View" 295]The existence of a standing army as described in the book of Alma would have been highly unusual in ancient Mesoamerica, and would have required a highly urbanized and centralized polity, which did not exist in ancient Mesoamerica during the specified time period.

Again, this is a superficial reading of the text. The verses mentioned are part of a seven years war, where the Nephites kept "standing" armies. Alma 62:44-47 mentions how the exceedingly great length of the war required new and extensive re-regulating of Nephite affairs. In verse 43 it mentions how Moroni yielded command of his armies to his son. In my opinion this is a small repsonse force, and the Nephite armies were largely made up of a reserve. See: Alma 16:3, Alma 60:2 which suggest that armies were largely drawn from people that were normaly farmers. Sorenson's seasonality of Warfare, and Merill's army composotioin (both from Warfare in the Book of Mormon) suggest that Nephite armies were largely part time. This does not take into account possible military colonies (at the city of Judea, and Moroni) and possible small garrisons manned by the left over forces, and a possible military caste, or small number of elite. (see "Military Castes" in Warfare in the Book of Mormon). And my paper being published for the BCC Papers suggests that there were significant breaks in the war (I call them three phases, Zoramite War, First and Second Amalickiahite War) because of the time it took to "reload". Suggesting that the Book of Mormon is consistent with the Mesoamerican difficulty of keeping standing armies.

Thus the blogger assumes that the Nephites had large standing armies similar to the Aztecs (and thus being anachronistic and impossible) when there is still much more study to be done concerning the size and composition (full time vs. part time, military castes, military garrisons etc.) of Nephite armies.

Logistics: This is the most egregious case of misreading the Book of Mormon. The blogger cites the distance and travel time from Jershon to Judea as 210 miles and impossible, and pointless since they would consume all their food just arriving there (thus the fathers sending "provisions" is impossible, Alma 56:27). But Alma 35:13 states that the people of Ammon moved from Jershon to Mulek, to make space (and presumably consume less food) for the Nephite armies there. Mulek is significantly closer to Judea. And using Sorensons geography, is less than 100 miles from Judea.

My research paper currently under consideration for the Journal of Book of Mormon studies has dealt with Nephite logistics (based on Alma 56:28 ironically). The women and children that accompnied the army would extend its operating range, and provide necessary labor once upon arrival. Thus the 100 miles is within acceptable range of an travelling army, representing a one way travel of 8-10 days. If a soldier carries 50 pounds worth of weapons and armor (a very high estimate considering most of the soldiers were probably commoners and had less armor and fewer weapons) the soldier could carry 3 days of food. They also travelled through the capital, and probably resupplied for another 3 days. (The capital being rougly halfway between Melek and Judea). Then you assume that the army had one porter for every 3 soldiers which could carry three days of food for themselves, and another 3 days of food and you have will finish your journey with food to spare. Plus, I suggest that Judea was a military colony, thus the remaining porters would farm the available land and provide more food upon arrival. (This is already a long post, I can do the boring details and excact calculations in another post)

The scenario suposedly gets worse with 3 Nephi 3:21-25, where the Nephites gather in one land, and have food left over, despite the supposedly high population density and limited farming space. Again this is a misreading of the text. I read it, as the Nephites abadoning their less defensible outpost cities in favor of their stronger cities and "lands". The most defensible cities were in the valley and flat lands around Bountiful and Zarahemla. Since the robbers would be more vulnerable after leaving their mountain hideouts and defensible terrain to battle on the plains. And, as noted by Sorenson, the term "land" is sometimes used for wide geographic spaces. Thus when the robbers could not longer plunder the less defensible Nephite outposts, they had to either farm themselves (thus exchanging position with the previously exposed Nephites) or try to attack the best defesnive locations of the Nephites. In short, the internal consistency of the Book of Mormon suggests a looser reading of the term "land" and how fortified they were, compared to the bloggers analysis. "If this event occurred in ancient Mesoamerica, then it required the existence of a highly urbanized, centralized polity with a far more efficient transportation system than actually existed in ancient Mesoamerica, and that same polity and transportation system disappeared without a trace." According to what the Book of Mormon actually says, it does not require a city with the size, power,and logistic capacity of the Aztec capital, but simply a more detailed understanding of what the Book of Mormon actually says.


Conclusion: This blogger presents some good points. His arguments would be stronger if he knew the Book of Mormon better, and was willing to adjust his understanding of it to meet his research. One of the best interactions between scholarhsip and faithful reading, is the adjustment of the latter to the former. In other words, we should be willing to allow scholarship to adjust our understanding of the Book, not from true to false, but from shallow reading to nuanced undestanding. Just as believers of the Book of Mormon used to think that it was account of the whole hemisphere; But changed in response to language and population problems presented which forced readers to re-examine verses that got missed due to past assumptions. Likewise, our study of war can benefit from dropping past assumptions under the light of sometimes critical scholarship. It would help if bloggers did not assume the Book of Mormon is false due to their shallow reading concerning warfare and eager desire to contrast it with Mesoamerican research.

The Past and the Future

This post deals with what has already been studied concerning Book of Mormon warfare and what can or needs to be done.

The famous LDS scholar Hugh Nibley started the trend in several of his books. He compared one of the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Title of Liberty episode in the Book of Mormon. He also produced a brief battle history for the war chapters of the Book of Mormon. From an anthropological standpoint, John Sorenson has produced a geography and short battle history of the Book of Mormon as well. His study is interesting because he tries to see how the Nephites actually lived-their fears and hopes- in studying the cultural clues the Book of Mormon has given us. Brant Gardner's multi-dimensional commentary to the bom (link forthcoming) also focused on anthropological detail, and included several tactical or cultural examples from Mesoamerican warfare. The best book is adroitly title "Warfare in the Book of Mormon". This features the laws of war, the tools of war, army organization, and even a little military theory from Clausewitz. Unfortunately, the book is out of print and somewhat hard to find.

Largely, Book of Mormon warfare is a subset of the intense polemical debates between believers and non believers in the Book of Mormon. Thus, warfare studies focus on the supposed anachronisms in the Book of Mormon, such as steel weapons, bows and arrows, demographic implausibilities and extant evidence. Critics try to focus on the lack of physical evidence for many of the large battles in the bom. Supporters focus on the many similarities between fortifications in the bom and trends in Mesoamerican fortifications. Outside of the debate surrounding the supposed anachronisms there is little directly involving warfare. The remaining study focuses on the impact of the book on LDS theology, and not the study of the text.

I feel this is a mistake. A short list of study that can help in historicity debate of the Book of Mormon include the following:

1. A study that included not just Clausewitz, but Frontinus, the Strategikon by Maurice ,De Re Militari, and Sunzi or Tai Kung can help provide context for the warfare described in the bom. Unlike the "two edged sword" that surrounds the polemic debates- where one side sees nothing but ancient and authenticating parallels, and the other sees nothing but 19th century and fradulating parallels- a study of a wide range of cultures and military theory allows the proper context to judge what kind of warfare the Book of Mormon contains from a theoretical standpoint.

2. We can then take the theory of war, and apply it practically to the Book of Mormon by examining other narrative books, such as the Book of Maccabees, Chinese Literary tales, the Popul Vuh and the bible. This will again provide context in order to see what the Book of Mormon says concerning warfare compared and contrasted to other ancient books. Again these are studies that have not been done, but I feel are crucial for understanding what the Book of Mormon truly says concerning war, and not simply seeing parallels based on our limited knowledge.

3. Additional studies can include a study of contrasting leaders to determine the desired qualification of a ruler and strategic culture of the people within the Book of Mormon. The military thinker Karl Von Clausewitz said that "war is a continuation of policy by other means". And Dr. Antulio Echevarria from the Strategic Studies Institute said that the political discourse before war is just as important as the leadership decisions during war and they are flip sides of the same coin.

4. We can examine the traditional drum and trumpet history of the strategic campaigns, with a broader theoretical concept than Nibley's post World War II study, and Sorenson' geographic focus.

5. We can build on Gardner's tactical commentary by including the wide range of options implied within the text, that are skipped over by devotional commentators and largely skipped by cultural commentators like Gardner. This approach has the added benefit of examining the duties and functions of the average solider; this face of battle approach will help us reach the goal that Sorenson and many latter day saints seek: to understand how the living breathing people of the bom behaved and felt.

6. A final study will include the logistics of the Nephite nation. Modern scholarship points to logistics as the root of strategy and not its branches, thus studying logistics will help us understand how non combatants were affected, but also allows us to reexamine the political leadership, and strategic decisions of the military leaders.

In short: historians wishing to study the Book of Mormon have a field that is white and ready to harvest.