Atomic Bombings Justified? Examining the even worse alternatives

 

August 6th marks the controversial day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. Critics of Hiroshima have long debated whether dropping the bomb was moral yet every realistic alternative would have killed far more people.

The Question Is Not Whether the Bombs Were Horrific

            Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[1] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[2]

The Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later.[3] Critics have argued that the bombings were intended not only to force Japanese surrender but also to demonstrate American military capability to the Soviet Union.

Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets. Critics also argue that Japanese peace overtures made the bombing unnecessary.

Critics of the bombings often focus on morality in isolation. The real moral question, however, is whether any realistic alternative would have produced fewer deaths.

Did Japan Actually Offer Peace?

            The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. The Japanese were ready for peace and the argument implied it was only the blood thirsty, American war mongers who kept the war going. Gar Alperovitz later argued that these peace efforts demonstrate the bombing was unnecessary. His interpretation, however, relies on selective evidence.[4] More importantly, this interpretation emphasizes evidence supporting its conclusion while overlooking later events.

            The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup.

Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[5] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

            Again, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting.

Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. It took two atomic bombs to convince them, and even then, just barely. American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions. Any idea of peace before dropping the bomb conflicts with the available evidence from Japanese decision making in 1945 and relies on assumptions about what Japanese leaders would have done under different circumstances. 

The Postwar Critics and the Context of Their Opposition

            Some critics rely heavily on statements from military leaders who opposed the bombing after the war. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

             Eisenhower's later criticism must be considered within its historical context and ultimately discounted. He commanded the war in Europe and wasn't privy to the intelligence or decision-making in the Pacific. Yet today his opinion is often treated as expert testimony on a campaign he didn't direct.

When he became President Eisenhower’s New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7]  He threatened the use of nuclear weapons during the Taiwan Strait Crises and was so interested in their deployment that he developed tactical nukes.

            The main source of opposition was parochial, interservice rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] 

It isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize what they called the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

    The Alternatives Were Not Bloodless

                Japan was unlikely to surrender without either atomic bombing or a catastrophic invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

            Estimates vary significantly depending on assumptions about Japanese resistance and invasion scenarios. But General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[10]

If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. Critics who focus primarily on the immediate destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki often do not account for the enormous human cost of alternative strategies.

Blockade and Starvation as Alternatives

            The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[11] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death.

That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

            Any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet their statements are often used as rhetorical props in modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons.

            Ending the War Before a Soviet Occupation

            The rapid end of the war also prevented a larger Soviet role in Japan. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

            The Least Harmful Choice Available

            Ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why some allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[12]

Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[13]

            Every other option was worse than using atomic weapons. Of course, nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral, and I’ve seen people sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But nuclear weapons were not used in a vacuum. They were used against a horribly aggressive regime, and they prevented alternatives that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war is not as catchy as the sarcastic claim that “Jesus nukes people,” but it reflects the moral reasoning used by Allied leaders who believed it was the least harmful option available.

            Any evaluation of the atomic bombings must account for both the destruction they caused and the alternatives available during the final months of World War II. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

            Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

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[1] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[2] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[3]  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[4] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[5] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.

[10] Frank, Downfall, 340.

[11] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.

[12] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.

[13] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197.

The Restoration Shouldn’t Need Inquisitors

 

        Elder Clark Gilbert was recently appointed as the newest apostle. Around the same time, I was an invited guest of the Interpreter: A Journal of LDS Scripture, to speak at their conference on the small plates. But someone at BYU’s “clearing office,” which is a new creation from Gilbert, decided I was unfit to present. Maybe it was my lack of temple recommend, maybe it was my exit from BYU-Idaho, maybe they didn’t like my reliance on Confucian thought to engage the Book of Mormon, or maybe I dumped his daughter. I don’t know, and that black box is part of the problem.

         But I do know that my research supports the divine Book of Mormon and enhances readers appreciation of it. And some bureaucracy blocked me. (Don’t worry, it’s a modified version of chapter two from my latest book, so you can still read it.)

        That experience made a recent categorization Gilbert reportedly used at BYU feel less theoretical and more dogmatic than free. As summarized by the Salt Lake Tribune, when assessing professors at BYU he described a group just short of “secular foes,” worse than the “faithful core” and “supportive center,” called “secular first” — individuals who put “truth” from any source on equal footing with the LDS gospel. 

        That category is astonishing because Brigham Young explicitly taught that we should seek truth from any source, even from the “infidel”:

“Mormonism,” so-called, embraces every principle pertaining to life and salvation, for time and eternity. No matter who has it. If the infidel has got truth it belongs to ‘Mormonism.’ The truth and sound doctrine possessed by the sectarian world, and they have a great deal, all belong to this Church.

        The Church’s own statement, Treasuring All Truth, affirms that Mohammed, Confucius, the Reformers, Socrates, Plato, and others received a portion of God’s light. If that is our doctrine, then placing truth from any source on “equal footing” with the gospel is confidence in the restoration, not secularism.

        As I studied for my PhD in Chinese history, I’ve come to appreciate Confucianism deeply and have found real wisdom there. In researching my recent book on just war thought and the Book of Mormon, I was struck by how much more developed the broader Christian tradition’s discourse on war and peace has been.

        My book was a small attempt to strengthen LDS discourse on war and peace using both of those traditions. In fact, it’s my study of the Book of Mormon, delighting in its complexities and engagements it has with critical questions, that has kept me in the Church. This pursuit of understanding is not an attack on the church or a danger for faithful members, but my attempt to magnify my God given talents and let my light shine (Matthew 25:14-30; 5:16).

        Leaders who block or discourage my academic study risk stifling the very faith they claim to protect. If serious engagement with non-LDS thinkers places someone one step below a “secular foe,” that signals a disturbing shift into orthodoxy policing.

        Perhaps the Tribune mischaracterized his remarks.  If he meant those who subordinate revealed doctrine to fashionable ideology, that is a legitimate concern. But if the category includes those who refuse to dismiss or minimize truth simply because it originates outside our institutional boundaries, it restricts the pursuit of light and truth.

        I’m reminded of Galileo because the broad arguments he made in his defense against heresy are often repeated by modern scholars. And his expulsion is an easy cultural touchstone that everyone knows: institutional anxiety about and reactive defense against external truth have never aged well. The restored gospel should not reflexively align itself with inquisitors against inquiry. It should be the most confident intellectual tradition in the room.

        Only time will tell if these fears are unfounded. But my personal experience — and the cancellation of things like the Mormon Theology Seminar — already represents a disturbing shift. The restored gospel claims continuing revelation and the fullness of truth. As a scholar on a fearless quest to study the Book of Mormon and the truths it contains, I shouldn’t have to wonder if I’m “cleared” to share it. If the gospel is confident in light, it should be confident in all who seek it — no matter where that truth shines.

Update: Cheryl Bruno, along with a wide range of scholars researching polygamy—many of them faithful and trained at BYU—were recently denied access to tour BYU’s Special Collections library. These are precisely the kinds of scholars institutions should want to engage: people committed enough to attend conferences, seek out specialized training, and work directly with primary sources.

Of course, we can’t know every detail behind the decision. But taken alongside similar incidents, it begins to look less like an isolated case and more like a troubling pattern—one where dogma crowds out genuine inquiry. It’s one thing when that happens to me. It’s another when an entire community of serious scholars finds the door closed.

Thanks for reading. If you liked this post please consider buying one of my books linked in the top left. I'm also creative! Please consider buying my cyber punk thriller. 

Reviews of My New Book!

 

        Reviews for my new book, To Stop a Slaughter: Just War in the Book of Mormon have arrived. I’m proud to announce they are universally positive, and I appreciate the time the reviewers spent reading and thinking about my ideas. I still have a few more outstanding so hopefully I can add to this list. I know Scripture Central is working on a review, and Public Square, where I published a version of chapter 4, might have one. Without further ado, hare are some things that people are saying about the book:

Square Two, reviewed by Kerry Kartchner. “sophisticated, enriching, well-written, and worthy of study.” “Refreshing…authenticity and subtly of a soldier’s perspective.”  “A significant contribution to the discourse.” A great final paragraph that I repeat in full: 

[Deane's] volume offers a substantial, detailed, and nuanced explanation of military and strategic issues in the text of the Book of Mormon, and a vigorous defense of the imperative to sometimes wield the sword to defend oneself and one’s neighbors. Deane brings a formidable knowledge of warfare, the development of Christian just war theory, and the military history of ancient China to bear on this material. He is also attuned to contemporary American defense and foreign policy issues, with frequent references to how the principles he expounds in this book apply at the policy level in today’s world. This book is an important contribution to the discourse among LDS national security scholars and practitioners. Its message of how a righteous people may sometimes be reluctantly compelled to take up arms to stop the slaughter of their innocent neighbors deserves careful consideration in our day as we confront “wars and rumors of war.”

Times and Seasons, reviewed by Ivan Wolfe. Morgan Deane is “probably our #1 expert on Ancient war and the Book of Mormon.” You may not agree, but his book demands “you should at least fully understand what it is you aren’t agreeing with.”

Interpreter, reviewed by Craig Foster. “interesting and informative”…the book “demonstrates an excellent knowledge of the literature pertaining to war, the philosophical and theological reasons for war, and the conduct of war.” “provocative topics that encourage fascinating and meaningful discussion.”

Substack, reviewed by Michael Towns. “Offers substantive answers and insights into these moral questions [about war and peace.]”…“Morgan Deane is steeped in all the philosophical and academic foundations needed to understand Just War Theory.”

        I encourage you to read the reviews for yourself and of course, buy the book. If you’re a regular reader you probably already have a copy but maybe buy one for a friend or family member. If you’re tight on money just send me an email and I’ll give you a free copy. For those in the Las Vegas area I’d be happy to sign it for you. Feel free to peruse my author page and consider purchasing some of my other books. This is Christmas time, and my books are well priced stocking stuffers and enhancements for your library. Thanks for reading!

I work as a free lance author. If you find value in my work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page, or again, please consider buying one of my books linked in the top left. 

Newest Book on Just War Released, Ten Year Anniversary of my First Book!

 

    I’m excited to announce that my new book, To Stop a Slaughter: Just War in the Book of Mormon is published and available on Amazon! Those of you that read this blog already have a good sense of the material that is in it. You might remember posts about the importance ofthe heart, preemptive war, and the Nephite wars at the end of their nation. Here is the back cover blurb:

    In a world filled with what seems like "one continual round of bloodshed and murder" (Mormon 8:8) the debates in how to stop that slaughter are filled with partisan talking points, competing vociferous voices, unexamined assumptions about the use of force, fearful hot takes, and self-serving politicians and media narratives that only serve to increase the tension.

    In this the war of words and tumult of opinions (JS History 1:10) acclaimed military historian Morgan Deane applies a Hugh Nibley like command of numerous Christian and Chinese philosophers to engage the rich, intellectual debates from history, and apply them to the ethics of war and peace within the Book of Mormon. The result shows that Book of Mormon offers robust comments on such pertinent topics as the paramount importance of the heart, when and how a nation should use force, the limits of the word and the sword, the intent of people making war, preemptive war, insurgency, and a resolution between, instead of cross talk and proof text citations of oft cited pacifist and isolationist verses and those that support the use of force. This book amplifies the clarion call of the Book of Mormon to love your neighbor enough to be like the Nephites, reluctantly compelled to use arms to stop their slaughter (Alma 48:21-23).

    I’ve sent the book out for reviews, and if you’re interested in a review copy feel free to send me a message. 

    My first book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon has reached its ten year anniversary! I just received a message the other day about how it has helped strengthen testimonies. As I wait for new reviews to come in, here are some more over the years:

    Deane’s work is well-written and thought provoking, required reading for those interested in warfare in the Book of Mormon as warfare, rather than just spiritual analogy. David Spencer, author of Captain Moroni’s Command.

    Hugh Nibley’s understudy. …an absolute must for anyone studying the Book of Mormon... [ties] wide ranging examples from the ancient world in remarkable efficiency. Deane's personal experience also gives a strong eye to military aspects so often neglected... This is a book that will be talked about for years to come by any serious student of the Book of Mormon...” David West, award winning author of Heroes of the Fallen

    Deane is an excellent scholar with fresh ideas and is always worth reading. Matthew Roper, Scripture Central.

    [Deane helps provide analysis] equal of any rabbinical quarrel or Jesuitical casuistry…[and] a fitting springboard for robust and lively debates.” Robert Wood, Chester M. Nimitz Chair Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College.

    The book successfully uses the battles as a means to understand the evolution of Chinese military culture, doctrine, and tactics. The battle maps are well drawn and helpful for those who are not familiar with China’s geography and history. The author has designed the book for general readers, including high school seniors and college freshman, so they can quickly grasp the complex security concerns and strategic calculations often underlying China’s decision-making process. Li Xiaobing, Journal of Chinese Military History

    China’s increased presence on the global stage has attracted greater interest in its long military history. With five millennia behind it, East Asia’s dominant power is certainly no stranger to armed conflict. While that immense scope may seem daunting, author Morgan Deane offers a highly accessible survey with Decisive Battles in Chinese History. Army History

    This astute history clearly reveals the development of China’s military and martial spirit. Military Officer

    I look forward to reading more positive reviews of my latest book and I’ll share them as they come in.

New Journal Article in the Interpreter: The Unwritten Debates in Moroni's Letter

 

Hello everyone. I'm proud to present my newest article in Interpreter: A Journal of Latter Day Saint Scripture. Moroni in his letter is assumed by most readers to be angry. But he actually showed rather sophisticated rhetorical strategies as he responded to debates among the Nephites. It was a pleasure to write and I hope you find value in reading it. 

This is part of an amazing string of success. One of my critics dismissively asked, "how many works [about LDS scriptures and just war] could have been published in the 'last few decades'?" Well, I still have a couple pieces in the pipeline, but if those are published that will mean I've published or presented nine chapters of my future book. (Not including the book itself.) To be honest, I don't feel like I'm particularly gifted or smart. So if I could publish or present nine pieces in two years based on one manuscript written, I can only imagine how many more could be published if LDS thinkers seriously engaged just war theorists. Perhaps like Brigham Young encouraged, we could seek and embrace truth wherever we find it, even among the professed infidel instead of staying within the intellectual confines of the Mountain West. 

Speaking of publishing, I'll have some exciting news to share about that in a couple months. Stay tuned and thanks for reading! 

If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of the books linked in the top left. 

The Silver Bullet: Afghanistan and Blowback

    

        When discussing American intervention inevitably someone will cry Afghanistan as a warning. In the 1980s the United States supplied arms to various militant groups. The goal was to resist the Soviet invasion in the hopes that it would weaken a US rival at  a relatively minimal cost. Some of these groups then became the ruling Taliban that won their post-Soviet civil war. The ruling Taliban allowed Al Qaeda to train and then launch the 9/11 attacks. Thus creating “Afghanistan” as a single, silver bullet to any American intervention.[1] In fact, “blowback” is such a lazy catch phrase that even in commenting on the Israel Hamas war Connor Boyack,  a supposedly serious libertarian, conflated cycle of violence and blowback into cycle of blowback. (He also added some antisemitism as well.) But this argument fails as a simplistic retelling of history, offers a presentist argument that discounts the contemporary threat of the Soviet Union, and continues to offer a reactive and weak vision of foreign policy.

        History doesn’t move in a straight line. It’s true that some militant groups received arms. At the same time though that action doesn’t lead in a straight line to the 9/11. The various militant groups fought against each other almost as much as they fought the Soviet Union. In fact, the fragmentary leadership and society led to a civil war in Afghanistan for much of the 90s. Only half a decade after that civil war Al Qaeda launched the 9/11 attacks. There were all sorts of moments that could have changed that outcome, and the US wasn’t closely involved in them for a decade.

        The Soviets could have continued their occupation. Another power like the Northern alliance and the Lion of Panjshir, could have won the civil war. Ironically enough, after the withdraw of Soviet forces that lion complained the US wasn’t more involved. From the linked interview he said: “[The US] forgot Afghanistan and they left Afghanistan alone.” This reminds me of a poor book where the author argued the US was imperialistic for “meddling” in foreign countries, while he also blamed the US for “losing” China to the Communists. In other words, he blamed the US for not meddling. But when your isolationist agenda comes first, and you rely on a simplistic understanding of history, intellectual rigor and honesty take a back seat.

        Returning to other historical paths not taken, Bill Clinton could have seized Osama Bin Laden when he had the chances. (BillClinton actually had nine chances according to the 9/11 commission.) Any of these variables alone, and definitely all of them together cut the thread of American aid to the mujahadeen leading to 9/11 implied in the blowback arguments. There were so many variables that meandered throughout the decade plus interval between the two that the blowback argument becomes simplistically ahistorical.

        More importantly, this is a presentist argument. Presentism is normally a fallacy from those that complain individuals in the past are racist, sexist, and otherwise fail to conform to current standards. In this case presentism takes the terror attack from a decade later to ignore the threats at the time that made America arm the mujahadeen. It would be much like looking at Soviet strength early in the Cold War and complaining that it was blowback for America’s defeat of Hitler.[2] That thinking ignores the threat the Nazis posed and the need to intervene against that threat.

        In that Cold War America faced an evil empire that repressed its own citizens, ruthlessly crushed dissidents abroad, aggressively expanded along its borders and threatened nuclear war. Arming Afghani fighters was a relatively low-cost way to sap the strength of an existential threat. Those using their only bullet ignore the historical context of that threat. They might argue that the US had no moral right or national interest to resist the Soviet Union, but I’m assuming that my readers don’t lack moral confidence in America or show downright hatred for their country that many show today. Because ignoring the Soviet Union of the 1980s for fear of the Taliban assisted terror attack of 9/11, is like saying America shouldn’t fight Hitler because the Soviet Union will be stronger.

        The US should balance the consequences with their goals but can’t be paralyzed by fear which leads to my final point that our foreign policy can’t be paralyzed by fear of what could happen. Its true that actions have consequences, but so does inaction.

        The best example of blowback from inaction that ends up being worse than any blowback from action is in Syria. Back in 2011 the typical crowd wanted to avoid any military action to remove the Syrian dictator and protect civilians. They did so using a false dichotomy between a massive invasion and nothing, when America could have achieved good results with limited invested and danger through a no fly zone. But afraid of a small potential of war through a no-fly zone or missile strikes, we did nothing.

        The result was that America looked weak because our leaders declared red lines that they didn’t enforce, and made bellicose statements that the dictator’s days were “numbered” that became irrelevant. Almost 300,000 civilians have died, 12 million internally displaced, and 5 million people became refugees. Russia made Syria their proxy and tested their combat tactics that were used in Crimea and Ukraine a short time later. The terrorist group ISIS went from jayvee to pro and stormed across much of the region. European nations still grapple with that refugee crisis, including Sweden that had to mobilize the army to fight gangs of immigrant youth. In the US we had rabid debates about what to do with all of those migrants. (Though I think we should have loved them enough to make sure their homes weren’t destroyed in the first place.) 

        Looking at all that, do the isolationist libertarians that use this silver bullet consider all the consequences of inaction? Nope, they scream blowback about the current shiny thing in the news. Ironically enough, it was blowback that started the war in Ukraine, and probably Israel. Putin started marshaling his forces for invasion mere weeks after the botched Afghanistan withdraw. 

        Clearly the United States should carefully consider its actions which include blowback to military intervention and nonintervention. But using the aid to Afghanistan in the 1980s as a direct cause of 9/11 is over simplistic reasoning in support of consistent, knee jerk isolationism. (Or as I discovered researching my next book, their beliefs are called contingent pacifism because they recognize a theoretical right to just war in scripture but don’t find any examples in the world that meet those conditions.) The Afghani silver bullet ignores the historical context of the decisions in the 1980s to argue for isolationism today. Most importantly, that silver bullet shows an inherently weak foreign policy by ignoring the expensive cost of inaction for often vague and exaggerated costs of action.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider getting more of it by donating using the paypal button below or by purchasing one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] This is more rhetorical flourish than clinically accurate. Isolationists libertarians sometimes refer to the CIA coups against Guatemalan and Iranian governments in the 1950s.

[2] Personally, that’s why I preferred Winston Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy where Western allies invaded Eastern Europe from Italy. Despite its higher difficulty level that strategy would have spared millions from Soviet domination. 

Sidelining Jesus: Appraising Mason's Thoughts on Peace and Ukraine

 

        Patrick Mason didn’t attend the LDS National Security Professionals earlier this year but his planned remarks have been published in Public Square. As with his very poorly argued book, he thanks a prodigious amount of people for providing feedback and guidance, but still produced an extremely flawed argument. Mason sidelines Jesus in favor of his own deeply flawed interpretations and misquotes while showing a shallow knowledge (and rejection of) just war.

Sidelining Jesus

        You might think that “side lining Jesus” is a rather harsh thing to say to a fellow Latter Day Saint but that line is used by Mason to denigrate the theories and people who disagree with him. Other people might have different theories than him, but they don’t follow Jesus any less.

        For example, Mason quotes President Nelson as saying, “Any war is a horrifying violation of everything the Lord Jesus Christ stands for and teaches.” But it was actually President Hinckley who gave the most comprehensive discussion of warfare to date. Unlike Presidents Nelson and McKay he recognized and respected other points of view. Moreover, President Hinckley quoted Alma 43:46-46 before saying, “there are times and circumstances when nations are justified, in fact have an obligation, to fight for family, for liberty, and against tyranny, threat, and oppression.” According to Mason, we have to believe that President Hinckley “sidelined” Jesus by quoting the war chapters and recognizing the just causes to use force.

Misquotes

Mason thinks that Jesus should be the center of nonviolent theology, yet Mason shows himself to be a mercenary by using (and often misusing) a variety of quotes. For example, he quoted Tertullian when he said, “In disarming Peter, Jesus unbelted every soldier.” But the problem is that Mason has never read Tertullian![1]

         Tertullian isn’t that hard to read. I found a translation online in a matter of seconds and spontaneously read it in a single sitting. If Mason had bothered to read Tertullian, or any other Christian fathers instead of out of context proof texts in pacifist volumes he would have been more cautious in quoting him. Tertullian rejected the danger of idolatrous military ceremonies and clothing. But many Christians still fought as Roman soldiers and many other Christian fathers like Clement supported the state’s right to use force and Clement prayed for the success of the emperor’s army. The summary of the dominant positions was to that a “vengeful spirit is denounced” not force itself.[2]

In summary, Mason admits he hasn’t read his source, applies it in isolation from Christian fathers, and then uses it to provide a veneer of classical education and the respectability of church fathers to his theories. But he shows the same slipshod style with all of his quotes. For example, in some places he quotes Martin Luther King and the liberal, Catholic Pope in a more privileged position than most of scripture. But in other places, when their words are no longer useful to him, Mason implies that non-LDS thinkers are less than restoration texts. At one point he quotes a Catholic and then says: “On the other hand…most authoritative scripture.”

Mason not only fails to read many seminal thinkers and selectively use others, but he also demotes restoration scriptures! He sidelines most prophets in the Book of Mormon by focusing on the anti-Nephi Lehi’s and Ammon. He redefines words to ignore explicit scripture like DC 134:11.” We believe that all men are justified in defending themselves.” He reinterprets Doctrine and Covenants 98, particularly verse 32 that says this law was given to Nephi and Abraham as a way to ignore the example of the Nephites and Abraham. The latter of whom, didn’t follow the Lords law of war but was blessed as a prince of peace and as the father of the faithful!

Thus his argument boils down to his thesis statement with my edits in italics: “Both incredibly selective and cherry-picked scripture and history, therefore, attest that self-defense can effectively take nonviolent forms.”

Just Read It

Most annoyingly, when he does discuss just war Mason uses “the list” or “the menu.” Its use here is ironic because I remember sitting at the 2011 conference on war and peace, and listening to presenters complain about the use of the “list.” This is what I call a rote listing of the just war criteria and its use here seems more like a straw man than engagement. My gut feeling is reinforced because he already listed a secondhand veneer of church fathers.

If he did have a good understanding of Just War he would realize the foundation is the heart. The heart of the Israeli baby about to be beheaded. The breaking heart of the parent that cries for justice as their soul is ripped in two. The heart of the soldier that wishes he could have been there to stop it, and the heart of the Good Samaritan in Jesus’ story, who would have intervened if he had the chance. And Mason ignores that heart filled with love and pain and denies it’s just expression in the form of wielding the sword to stop those abuses.

Failing to understand this is what allows him to ignore just war so easily. But he tries to conflate nonviolent resistance in Ukraine while piggy packing on those who wielded the sword to defend their country. Just like he tries in his piece to piggyback off millions of allied soldiers during Second World War to give Danish nonresistance credit. (He also uses a false cause fallacy; Denmark was likely least damaged because it was the less strategically important for the allies to target. The narrow peninsula made it incredibly unsuited to military operations and the Germans would not relocate key industries CLOSER to allied airbases.) Nor does Mason recognize how many Ukrainians disappeared in the night only for their broken and raped bodies to be found in basement torture chambers. And he doesn’t understand how impotent his theories are in stopping those atrocities in the first place or rescuing them.

As I wrote here, the list or menu given in perfunctory fashion represents how just war theories have been watered down for the masses, to the point that many of their positive aspects of the theory, such as the protections for women and children are assumed, without giving credit to just war theorists. But the abuses of the theory by tyrants like Putin are attributed to just war theorists and the entire theory is dismissed as too basic or unhelpful. So just war theory gets blamed for the bad and given little credit for the good, and blithely dismissed by people like Mason.

Moreover, what’s left out of the discussion of just war theory are very specific prohibitions and guardrails designed to stop abuses of espoused principles. For example, while the principle of just war is recognized, every discussion of it in theory is followed by a lengthy series of warnings about the chaos, bloodshed, and factionalism that can happen when it is applied and a suggestion to pursue alternatives. The interaction of just war theories with the Book of Mormon provides the very kind of discussion and insights that are often lost in rote proof-texting and goes deeper than “partisan allegiances and the urgency of battle” that still permeate the discourse among Americans and Latter-day Saints 20 years after the start of the most infamous preemptive war in American history.[3] Mason doesn’t recognize any of the above nuances of theory. How could he when the closest he got to actually reading the theory was a second hand quote of Tertullian and straw men “list” of just war?

Bring Me a Higher Love

        Duane Boyce once talked about the need to clear away weeds so the seeds can grow. It serves an important function to dispatch Mason’s bad arguments. But there is an argument in favor of force that accounts for all scriptures and not one series of (pacifist or just war) scriptures.

        There are two significant impulses, I would call natural rights, and both are correct. The first is that war is wrong. No man should be killed. Laozi said that even victorious warfare should be treated like a funeral.[4] If Adam and Even hadn’t fallen, or Nephi and Laman kept the family together, there would be no evil and no war. But we don’t live in a perfect world and because people are in danger of losing their fight right, they have an obligation to fight for the second right.

        Good-hearted people everywhere have the impulse to wield the sword to stop injustice. And while Mason gives lip service to the second impulse, he prioritizes the first. In his tortured word games of “justified” he splits the two. But they are connected. Moreover, he denigrates the second by calling it a “sin.”

        His argument is constructed by boiling the frog. The urban myth says the frog will jump out of boiling water, but if you put him in water and gradually raise the temperature he’ll stay in the pot and get boiled. He starts with something broadly agreeable, just war in Ukraine, stopping murderous bad guys and praising the World War II allies as partners of nonviolent Dutch resisters. He then does some word games about the term justified to make just war something sinful that God needs to justify. He builds upon those ideas to then suppress all sorts of clear scripture that justifies warfare. All the time he is including tons of caveats and exceptions to try and appear sensible, he then concludes by calling war a corruption and sin that should be avoided. At one point he even said we need to “[invite soldiers] into a space of repentance and reconciliation.” In other words, he calls them unjustified sinners. He seals it with a proof text from a single modern, non-doctrinal source in President Nelson’s Ukraine war talk.

        In the real world his theories indicate his sympathy and praise for Tank Man, (the Tiananmen Square protestor that stood in front of the tank) but offers impotent solutions to an authoritarian state that sends him to a concentration camp before killing him. He even contends that if Tank Man picked up a rifle in revolt against his authoritarian regime he would need to repent. Or to use a more recent example, he condemns the defenders of Israeli women and children. Those defenders tried to stop the beheading of their children and similarly depraved acts of terror. And for their troubles, Mason calls them to repentance.

        He does this in such conciliatory language that you don’t notice it. But his rhetoric spits on the military service of every good-hearted soldier that fought for freedom. I don’t need to repent for defending my family nor do Israeli soldiers for defending theirs. Natural rights are those that are not dependent on the laws, customs, or beliefs of any particular culture or government, and are therefore universal and inalienable, despite Mason’s wrangling of scriptures.

        So Mason complains that just war feels right but isn’t right. But I’d counter that it feels right because the defense of liberty comes from an innate or natural sense of right of wrong. And Jesus agrees. Assuming the Good Samaritan came upon the beaten traveler in the middle of the attack, no reasonable person would turn the other cheek of the beaten traveler, renounce war, proclaim peace and stand idly by, wait until the traveler was attacked three times, or question the legitimacy of action by citing long-standing ethnic tension in the region or perhaps the culpability of the traveler. The love of the Good Samaritan for his neighbor, and the love that we should have, would compel violent intervention! That is why I agree with all the scriptures that Mason cites. You should love your enemies (Matthew 5:44), but can defend, or love, even unto bloodshed (Alma 43:14). We overcome evil through righteousness (Romans 12:14-21), but also by resisting it with the sword (Alma 61:14.) As the many church fathers that Mason ignored would argue, wielding the sword is an expression of love not a corruption of it.

        At the end of his piece he calls for us to love our neighbor. I agree, the problem is he spent thousands of words ignoring dozens of scriptures and people explaining the fundamental role of love in taking up arms. If he wants to be seen as less, in his words, “smug, self-assured, arrogant, and judgmental in the supposed righteousness of my near-absolute nonviolent position,” he should start by not accusing his opponents of “sidelining Jesus.” He might also stop laughing and snickering at his opponents while among fellow peace proponents. Take it from someone who was bombed with a gotcha question from Mason at a war and peace conference in 2011, and believes the loving heart is the foundation of just war, recognizing his smugness is a good step, but he has a long way to go.

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[1]His footnote reads: Idolatry 19, p. 73, quoted in Lisa Sowle Cahill, Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Pacifism, Just War, and Peacebuilding (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2019), 77. Updated: See also: fns. 6-10 in Patrick Mason, "Zionic Non Violence as Christian Worship and Practice," in How and What you Worship: Christology and Praxis in the Revelations of Joseph Smith, Rachel Cope, Carter Charles, Jordan T. Watkins eds., (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book), 2020. In fact, every footnote in that piece referencing Christian fathers refers to a secondary source. 

[2] David Corey, J. Daryl Charles, Just War Tradition: An Introduction (ISI Institute, 2012), 47.

[3] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York, Basic Books, 2015,) xxix.

[4] Gia Fu Feng et al., Tao Te Ching by Laozi, (Vintage Press, 1989), 31.