Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Victor David Hanson described how the Ottoman Admiral Ali Pasha carried his entire fortune into the battle with him at the Battle of Lepanto (1571). Hanson argues he did that in part because he couldn't trust that the Sultan would not arbitrarily confiscate his fortune. In contrast, the Venetians were part of the city states of northern Italy which safeguarded their money in a relatively democratic republic with free markets and a respect for property rights. This resulted in a striking imbalance of economic and military power between the Venetians and Ottomans. Despite having far vastly smaller amounts of territory and resources compared to the Ottoman Empire, the Venetians and their shipyards and armories that made up the Arsenal of Venice could create a relatively larger fleet of higher quality ships faster than their opponents.
This website seeks to highlight and promote ideas that defend the fundamental principles of American strength, including free market principles, commitment to the rule of law, limited government, and military strength symbolically represented in the Arsenal of Venice. It also serves to highlight my writing projects and I humbly hope to be as productive in producing quality policy and military analysis as the historical Arsenal of Venice.
This is new website I've developed to highlight my broader writings, and provide an online presence for my writing. The end goal is for this website to do with my various political and military writings what this website did for my writing on warfare in the Book of Mormon. I hope you get a chance to look at it and provide any feedback.
Thursday, February 27, 2014
[This is the second part of a guest post by Ryan Tanner. You can find the first part here.]
This brings us to 72 BC, when Amalickiah arrives in the land of Nephi. By this point the elite in the city of Nephi had settled on a new king. His control over the seven cities may have been very tenuous. The elements of power that must have existed in the city of Nephi would have included those who were originally direct competitors of Lamoni's father, the new elite who rose to power after the Anti-Nephi-Lehis left, the Amalekites and the Zoramites, and the interests of the six other cities in the alliance. The elites who were in control in Nephi would have been entrenched there since the days of Lamoni's father, or longer, and were currently in a semi-stable position since the Amalekite and Zoramite backed contender to the throne, Zerahemnah, failed in his bid.
The new king, whose name is never mentioned, would have been the one person holding the new alliance together. It is possible that he was an outsider, meaning he was not from the city of Nephi, but had been accepted by the elites in the city, possibly by his marriage to the queen, who as we will see later had considerable control over the city of Nephi and the elites who lived there. In effect he was acting as the glue between the seven cities, but the connection was most likely tenuous.
Under the influence of Amalickiah, with perhaps the backing of the Amalekites and the Zoramites, the new king proclaimed his intention to invade the Nephite lands. The tenuous alliance was immediately put to the test when some of the allied cities (we have no idea which ones or how many) refused and banded together under the leadership of Lehonti, who they proclaimed as their king (Alma 47:6). The power base of Lehonti must have been the Lamanites who were not under the control of the Amalekites and the Zoramites, and/or those who were not under the direct control of the city of Nephi.
Thus the new king was in danger of having his newly forged alliances come undone, but he could not attack the rebels directly because then he would have lost even more influence in the surrounding area. He was effectively in the same situation Lamoni was in when Ammon arrived in the land of Ishmael. The king could not order an attack on the army of Lehonti without risking civil war. But other influences were pushing him towards war with the Nephites, and he needed the cities and troops under the control of Lehonti. Thus Amalickiah, like Ammon, presented a way out. If Amalickiah succeeded then the king could further consolidate his power, but if Amalickiah failed then the Lamanite king could easily disassociate himself from the attack. Perhaps the army sent with Amalickiah was composed mainly of Amalekites and Zoramites, and those Lamanites that they could muster out. Thus if the expedition was a failure then the Amalekites and the Zoramites, or whoever the king sent with Amalickiah, would have been expendable allies, or at least allies that were not considered essential to the elites in the city of Nephi.
So let us reconsider the sociopolitical situation that Amalickiah was working with in and around the land of Nephi. A previously cohesive alliance of seven, or more, Lamanite cities had recently been broken up by the very public conversion of a significant segment of the ruling class to the religion of the Nephites. Certain groups, such as the Amalekites, had been exerting influence in Lamanite society for a number of years, but were still considered outsiders. Others, such as the Amulonites, had some influence, but lost it recently. The Nephite dissenter axis was recently strengthened by the addition of the powerful Zoramites, but the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition was not enough to gain control of the seven cities, perhaps due to the loss of their main candidate for the position of king, Zerahemnah.
The elites of the city of Nephi, which we suppose had had control of the surrounding area and cities for some time (i.e. a few generations), were unwilling to relinquish their positions of influence to the Amalekite-Zoramite axis, but had to balance that against the machinations and intrigue from the other six cities in the alliance. Despite the fact that the elites may not have wanted a close relationship with the Amalekites and Zoramites, they were constrained somewhat by the fact that the Amalekites and Zoramites represented the mortal enemies of the Nephites. Specifically they were the enemies of Moroni and his armies, which had entered into an alliance with the people of Ammon, that is, the one group of people that had someone who could legitimately lay claim to the title of King of the Lamanites. Thus the elites in Nephi may have been relying on their alliance with the Amalekites and Zoramites to help prevent the return of the legitimate king, backed by a Nephite army.
After the death of Lehonti, and the treacherous assassination of the king, Amalickiah was in command of an army that was most likely made up of troops from the Amalekites and Zoramites, and from the surrounding six Lamanite cities. There was apparently significant loyalty in this odd assortment of an army to the king since Amalickiah could use the death of the king to motivate his troops. Also it is an indication of the rather tenuous position of the king since Amalickiah could blame the king's murder on the king's own servants and people would believe it. Perhaps his reasoning was somewhat along the lines of, "The servants must have been agents of Anti-Nephi-Lehi who remained in the land to kill the king." Thus giving the Lamanites another reason to go along with the war against the Nephites and their new allies, the Anti-Nephi-Lehis.
At this point the city of Nephi is surrounded by a Lamanite army that most likely was not made up of men from the capital city, that is, the city was not their home and they would have no objection to sacking the city. The army may also have been looking for some sort of payment and the capital city may have been a tempting target. Also the army may have contained troops from the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition which were not Lamanites and would have no problem with inserting themselves into the Lamanite power structure.
So in this rather explosive situation the queen of the Lamanites asks Amalickiah to "spare the people of the city", invites him to come into the city, accepts the evidence of the king's murder, and in a move that allows her to maintain the independence of the city and its elites, while preventing the sack of the city, and the potential takeover by the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition, while at the same time not giving preference to any one of the many Lamanite groups that were vying for power, she agrees to marry Amalickiah and bring about a quick end of the recent difficulties. Her ability to maintain her position is evident by the fact that after Amalickiah dies in the subsequent war his brother must return to the city of Nephi to report on his death and consolidate his power before returning to the battlefield.
For the other competing groups Amalickiah represented an acceptable candidate for king. The Amalekite-Zoramite coalition would have accepted him as a fellow Nephite dissenter who was opposed to the expansionist policies of Moroni. The Lamanites from the other six cities would accept him because he was not from the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition, or from any of the seven cities. Thus he would not upset the new balance of internal power among the Lamanites who had to reorganize their power structures after the flight of the Anti-Nephi-Lehis. He was also opposed to Moroni, and Moroni's new allies the Anti-Nephi-Lehis.
If we look at Amalickiah's rise to power in this context we see that there were many competing and complex interests at work. For all these competing and complex interests Amalickiah represented the ideal compromise. Even though he was not their man, more importantly he was no one else's man. In a society that had just four years before gone through a major upheaval, Amalickiah was the one man who could be everything to everyone and not disturb the new and still unsteady power structures. Sometimes we forget or do not account for the impact that Ammon and his brothers had on Lamanite society and power structure. It was only four short years between the flight of the people of Ammon and the arrival of Amalickiah in the land of Nephi. Lamanite politics and society were still in a flux and Amalickiah, rather than being a conniving fiend who duped the easily deceived Lamanites, was actually a significant stabilizing force in an otherwise unsteady time for the Lamanites. It is unfortunate that Amalickiah used, and squandered, his opportunity by perpetuating a war on the Nephites rather than building a more stable and just society.
Now a good portion of what I presented here is speculation and my own thoughts and interpretation of the parts of history that we have in the Book of Alma, but it does provide a different way of viewing the beginning of the Nephite-Lamanite war found in the war chapters of Alma. I would be delighted if others can give additional insights and commentary on this situation because I know that there are several things that I did not cover or consider in writing this. For example, some of these conflicts may have been more to do with control of trade routes, or rich mining grounds, or farmland, than simple political intrigue. So there are definitely more things to consider, but some of those we may be unable to know until we can pinpoint the location of these events and consider the archaeological evidence to give us more insight into what was happening at the time. Until then we must rely on the text to give us the clues.
Saturday, February 22, 2014
[Ryan Tanner is a student at UNC Chapel Hill pursuing a graduate degree in Physics. This is the first part of a guest post partially inspired by my previous post about Amalickiah's Coup]
I have great respect for Mormon and for his great life's work, even if at times I wish he had included just a little more detail here and there, but I must recognize the already difficult task he had of compiling 1000 years of history into a coherent story with a central religious message. For the rest we must fill in the gaps with the best of our understanding. In that vein I offer these ideas as a way of understanding the Nephite-Lamanite wars in a different light so that we might consider the historical complexity that underlies the history of Mormon's Book.
Previously Morgan Deane has addressed the arguments that Amalickiah might have used to work his way into a position to become king of the Lamanites. It is in that context that we must consider the conditions among the Lamanites that made his rise to power, and the subsequent wars, not only a possibility but also something that must have seemed rational to all those involved. One general rule that I always try to apply when considering the motivations of others is that people, at least in the moment of their decisions, try to act in a way that seems rational to them. Thus while we may look at Mormon's account of Amalickiah's rise to power and wonder why the Lamanites were so easily taken in, if we were to know the full social, political and economic conditions at the time we may not be so quick to think the Lamanites were easily duped by a scheming Amalickiah.
It is easy for us to slip into an opinion that the Lamanites were a monolithic group who acted mindlessly, violently and vengefully to attack the peace loving Nephites without cause. But to do that would ignore the complexity that we find everywhere throughout history. Rarely (as in never) are large groups of people perfectly unified in a thought and common cause without a large measure of complexity behind their apparent unity. This is to say that political maneuverings do not stop just because a nation is at war, and in many cases the wars are a direct result of the political maneuverings.
To understand the complex landscape of the Lamanite people that Amalickiah entered into when he fled the
we must go back several years
and consider the mission of the sons of Mosiah to the Lamanites. Interestingly
enough, their mission provides our best glimpse into the Lamanite political
structure in addition to being the impetus that most likely prompted the
Nephite-Lamanite wars recorded in the Book of Alma. Even though I am using the
mission to the Lamanites as the starting point, in reality we are arriving in
the middle of the story in the complex interaction of the Nephites, the
Lamanites, and everyone else that Mormon refers to as Lamanites, despite not
being descended from Lehi, Ishmael, Mulek or anyone else that came from
Jerusalem. land of Zarahemla
The key date to remember is the year 72 BC, which is the year Amalickiah arrived in the
It is very important to pay attention to the dates since sometimes it is easy
to lose sight of how interconnected certain events are when they are separated
by several chapters in the Book of Alma. For example, Amalickiah arrives in the
land of Nephi in chapter 47 while the
destruction of the people of Ammonihah happens in chapter 16, but that only
happened in 81 BC, nine years before Amalickiah arrived in Nephi. So sometimes
we forget that events that are separated textually are very interconnected and
directly related to each other. land of Nephi
So let us consider how the mission to the Lamanites, the destruction of the people of Ammonihah, and the flight of the Anti-Nephi-Lehis made it possible for Amalickiah to become king of the Lamanites.
The sons of Mosiah left the
in about 91 BC, which is only
19 years before Amalickiah arrives in Nephi. When Ammon arrived at the land of Zarahemla , which was ruled by king Lamoni,
he unwittingly entered into a rather sticky political situation. As pointed out
by Brant Gardner in a paper presented in 2004,
the situation that Ammon and Lamoni found themselves in was more complex than
we typically think of it. land of Ishmael
"The king decides to place Ammon in a position where this condition of being outside the city’s political intrigues might be advantageous: He sends him to water the flocks at Sebus. The dumb thieves who don’t get much from their raids are actually getting everything they want. Key to understanding the story is that whatever ruse was employed to allow the fiction that they were robbers, the reality was that they were well-known to the servants and to the king. They were members of the rival lineage who were attempting to alter the balance of power. By scattering the king’s flocks they were embarrassing the king and therefore diminishing his appearance of total control. Because the rival lineage was sufficiently powerful, the king could not move against them directly without creating civil war. Therefore, the king could not send armed guards. If he killed the members of the competing lineage it would break whatever illusion of cooperation there was and instigate civil disorder. The guards cannot defend themselves for the same reason that the king could not send troops."
This story gives us an insight into the positions of power in Lamanite royalty. What we see here is that king Lamoni was in a situation where he might lose his kingship. His position was not necessarily secure and depended on how well he was able to drive away threats and defend his own land. There were also rival systems of power, or families, that were constantly vying for influence and power. For the king to fail to maintain his influence and power would most likely result in civil war. This insight will be important when we consider Amalickiah.
Later, we don't know how much later (months or maybe even a year), Ammon and Lamoni meet up with Lamoni's father. There are three things in this exchange that come up that give us insight into the power structures among the Lamanites. In the first place Lamoni offers to go with Ammon to Middoni, which was ruled by king Antiomno, because he thinks that he can help get Ammon's brethren out of prison due to the fact that Antiomno is a "friend" (Alma 20:4). This indicates that the king of Middoni is not a brother or even family member of Lamoni. When Ammon and Lamoni meet and confront Lamoni's father, Lamoni's father grants that Lamoni may rule the land of Ishmael without interference and that Ammon's brethren "may be cast out of prison" (Alma 20:26-27). This indicates that both Lamoni and Antiomno were only semi-autonomous kings in their kingdoms and that both of them owed fealty to Lamoni's father. It also indicates that while Lamoni's father could maintain his hold on some cities by appointing his son(s) as kings of those cities, in other cities he relied on non-family members, or family members by marriage, to maintain control.
Upon his conversion Lamoni's father proclaims that Ammon and his brethren are to be given free access "throughout all the land" (
23:1-3). The phrase "all the land" apparently applied to at least seven cities that we assume
were directly under the control of Lamoni's father (the cities are listed in Alma 23:9-12). Mormon also
states that Lamoni's father "and all his household" were converted,
which would indicate that the conversions happened along familial and social
lines. Based on our prior insights we can assume that the conversions spread to
the other cities under the control of the king through family lines, and other
lines of influence and power. Just as Lamoni was a king over one of the seven
cities, Lamoni's brother, whose post conversion name is Anti-Nephi-Lehi, may
have also been the king in one of the seven cities and helped the conversion of
people in positions of influence and power. Alma
We cannot assume that everyone in the seven cities listed were converted since there would be those who for political or economic reasons would not wish to associate with the political structure controlled by Lamoni's father. Plus we must consider the presence of the Amalekites (possibly the Amlicites from Alma chapters 2 and 3?) and Amulonites who by this time were exerting considerable force in Lamanite society. These two groups were the ones who led the attacks on the newly named Anti-Nephi-Lehis, and as we read in chapter 24 the Amalekites waited until the king, Lamoni's father, had died before they began their attacks (v. 4). Thus these attacks would have been the first major challenge to the power and influence of the new king, Anti-Nephi-Lehi.
Even if the new king had not converted he may have had to face these challenges anyway. The seven allied cities, and possibly more, were under the direct control of Lamoni's father and the new king, Anti-Nephi-Lehi, would have had to exert his influence over these cities to maintain control. There were most certainly some of the subject kings who were willing to try to toss off the yoke that had been imposed on them by Lamoni's father. This challenge would have been expedited by the fact that the king's recent conversion would have signaled an alliance with the Nephites (as noted in Alma 23:18), an alliance which some of the kings in the seven cities would not have been too keen on making for political, cultural, historical, linguistic, or economic reasons.
We do not know when the attacks began, but it must have been shortly before the Lamanite armies, led by the Amalekites and Amulonites, attacked and destroyed the city of Ammonihah, a Nephite allied city, in 81 BC. The result of the attack on Ammonihah destroyed the influence of the Amulonites (see Alma 25:7-9), but the influence of the Amalekites continued unabated. We also learn that the Lamanites who were converted by their experience in that brief war "came over to dwell in the land of Ishmael and the land of Nephi" (Alma 25:13). What we see here is an indication that the Anti-Nephi-Lehis were consolidating into those two cities and lands, most likely for safety. This may also indicate that the sphere of influence of the new king was greatly diminished from that maintained by his father. That is, he may have lost the allegiance of five (and possibly more) cities.
After four years, Ammon, Lamoni and Anti-Nephi-Lehi realized that their situation was very precarious and organized their people and left the land of Nephi and Ishmael. When the people of Ammon left there must have been a general power vacuum in Lamanite society since the old king (Lamoni's father) and new king (Lamoni's brother) and all their relatives/allies left. The new power base that took over when they left must have been concerned about Lamoni and his brother returning since they sent an army to follow them and try to kill them (Alma 28:1-2), but were defeated by the Nephites. All this happened or finished up in 77 or 76 BC, just a few years before Amalickiah arrived.
The power vacuum that remained must have been tremendous. The alliance of seven, or more, cities that had been maintained by Lamoni's father, which had been breaking down since before his death, was thrown into disarray. The traditional power base, or those that remained, in the city of Nephi must have been threatened on all sides. The new power base would have been moving in, but due to recent defeats the Amalekites would still be powerful, but not enough to seize control. Those who wished to ensure that the Anti-Nephi-Lehis would never return had lost significant influence and power due to their military defeats. So who was in control in the land of Nephi, and in the six other cities, may have been an open question.
This brings us to four years before Amalickiah arrives in Nephi. The Lamanite alliance is weak and ready to break. There is no clear king, the Amulonites, and all their influence, had just been driven from the land, and the Amalekites were weakened but not defeated and still influential.
It is in this context that in 74 BC the Zoramites entered into an alliance with the Lamanites and a new Lamanite leader named Zerahemnah. If Zerahemnah was king then he would have been still consolidating his power since he had only been king for a maximum of three years. But if we reread Alma chapters 43 and 44 carefully we see that it never actually says that Zerahemnah was the king of the Lamanites. He did rely on the Amalekites and the Zoramites to form his power base so we can infer that he may not have been king over all the Lamanites. That is, the question of who was king over all the Lamanites (the seven cities) may not have been a settled question three years after the people of Ammon left.
So Zerahemnah may have been one of the contenders to be king of the Lamanites, with the backing of the Amalekites and the Zoramites. There is no word on how many Lamanite cities supported him so we cannot know how many of the seven cities he controlled, if any. I think we can assume that he did not control the city of Nephi because if he did then he most likely would have been referred to as king of the Lamanites, but Mormon does not refer to him as the king. Zerahemnah was never heard of again after being defeated spectacularly by Moroni so I don't think he lasted very long as king, if he was a king. At any rate his defeat ended his chance at controlling the seven allied Lamanite cities.
Monday, January 13, 2014
This is a quick reminder that they are holding "best of" elections at the group blog Wheat and Tares. I am nominated for Best Historical Post, in discussing the "The Butchers' Apostle: Context for the Anti War Quotes of J. Reuben Clark." And I've been nominated for Best Apologetic Post, for "Henry V, Hummers, and the Book of Mormon." I blog because I enjoy sharing my ideas with a wider audience, but it's also nice to get a pat on the back for my efforts. So please take a couple minutes to vote before this Sunday (Jan 19th).