Hill Yeah: Notes on Jaredite Geography

I’ve long been intrigued by Jaredite geography. Unfortunately, even those that accept the historicity of the Book of Mormon and have geographic models they fight over, find the book of Ether bewilderingly sparse. Yet the text is very clear in some instances on what is affecting the story, even if you don’t know where it is. It mentions plains, sea shores, valleys, hills, lands of first inheritance, strategic deposits of ore (steel, which invites another 1,000 words of analysis on its own), a great city, and a capital land. In the years of researching and writing I’ve become a firm believer that geography matters a great deal in a nation’s development and most importantly, in the conduct on the battlefield despite variations in date, culture, and regions. The following is a list of major geographic forms listed in the text and insights from history in how those places might affect battle.

Seashore– supply and protection

The biggest advantage of the seashore comes from those who have a strong navy. I’ve never read about the “embark, circle around via the sea, and then amphibiously invade the opposing army encamped on the seashore” maneuver in history. (But if you’ve heard of an example please let me know.) Because of that fact the sea shore provides a secure flank. This may mean that they are trapped, but since the power on the sea shore usually has a navy protecting the sea, it often becomes a secure exit door and not a trap. The encamped army can then maximize their defenses facing inland.

The British at Yorktown, and again at Dunkirk relied upon the sea for resupply and rescue. It was the temporary French advantage in sea power that allowed the Colonials to capture the British at Yorktown and win the war. The ancient Athenians actually made their entire city a fortified sea colony. Athens on the on the mainland, but they built the long walls that provided a fortified harbor and connection to their city.[1] In contrast to the British examples, this was a more permanent solution and even imperial policy, instead of something done by an army in the field after a defeat. Since Athens had the preeminent fleet for much of the early classical period they could always count on resupply by their navy. In fact, it was only the Spartan defeat of the navy and blockade of their port that finally brought them to their knees.

Alma 51 describes the repulse of Amalickiah’s army, and their camp on the sea shore. While not directly stated in the text this strongly suggests the same principles. They moved back to the ocean to provide additional security and resupply. In fact, the defection of the Zoramites may have been so dangerous in part because it gave the Lamanites an outlet in that region, when the Nephites relied on inland riverine transport. Ether14:13 described a running battle in which Lib retreated to sea shore. Again, the context of a recent battlefield defeat, followed by a retreat to a secure base and possible resupply strikes me as entirely consistent.

A good map showing pivotal valleys near the Wei, Fen, and Yellow rivers

Valleys– power base.

Valleys provide a good base of power. Valleys are usually formed by a river, has good farm land, restricted pass in and out which lead to relatively easy security. Multiple dynasties in China rose to power via secure river valleys as I described in my book on Chinese battles. The Di tribe settled in Wei River valley during the period of disunion. With only one pass to the east they could fortify their position, engage enemies, such as those at Luoyang, at their leisure and they eventually established the Former Qi Dynasty. The eventual founders of the much more impactful Tang Dynasty started as governors of the Fen River Valley, to the North East of both the Wei River valley (and its ancient capital of Chang’an), and the frequent Chinese capital at Louyang. The famous war lord Cao Cao started his career as a soldier in Ye, which was one pivotal pass away from the Fen River Valley. But he could also swing around towards the South East and attack the capital through Hulao pass. When the Tang were consolidating their power, one of the most famous battles in Chinese history happened at Hulao Pass, which was often called the Chinese Thermopylae. And to wrap up the importance of valleys, rebellious members of the Jin Dyansty held commands at each of the above centers (Ye, Chang’an, Taiyuan in the Fen River Valley and more), which explained why they so often swooped upon the hapless capital during the War of the Eight Princes to the point that what was once the rival of Rome in the ancient world became a desolate place of huddled refugees.[2] The carnage was so great in such a short time that contemporary historians described piles of white bones that covered the field and that quote inspired my research into comparing the War of Eight Princes with the Jaredite denouement (Ether 14:22).[3]

Of course the Nephite center of power was in a river valley surrounding Zarahemla and the “most capital parts” of the land (Helaman 1:27.) In the Jaredite fighting the Valley of Gilgal witnessed an “exceedingly sore” (Ether 13:27) that lasted three days. (This is a very similar and thus unsurprising time frame compared to the Battle of Hulao, as much of the time was spent eyeing each other across the narrow pass, feeling each other out, and sending out raids before finally engaging each other. Once the fighting started it was rather fierce, one leader of the Tang forces hacked his way across the battlefield so many times his armor looked like a porcupine with jagged arrows and broken blades.)[4] V. 28 and 29 describe a back and forth between that valley and the Plains of Heshlon. The armies likely fought over a key pass that led to the power center in the Valley of Gilgal. The chaos described in verses 1-3 of Ether 14 describe the loss of a power base very well, as I discussed in my first book.

Plains- battles

As mentioned above, the fight for a power base in the Valley of Gilgal led to more fighting in the plains. This is the best place for shock battle, wherein opposing groups of infantrymen rushed toward each other, seeking to cut their way through to their destination or out of a trap (Alma 52:33–34; Alma 43:39–43). The battle recorded in Alma 52 only occurred after the Lamanites refused to meet and battle on the plains, and had to lured out of their strongholds (Alma 52:20-21) The Greeks were particularly adept at this. Their small cities and farming valleys pitted opposing groups of heavily clad infantry that charged each other. The farmers couldn’t be away campaigning for long so the battles had to be decisive. While they typified what some call the Western Way of War, one of the earliest recorded battles in history between Egyptian and Caananite forces that charged across relatively flat land. Again, a pass proved critical in the course of the Egyptian’s march. This connects with the previous point that flat land near bases of power and likely critical valleys were prime locations for shock battles.

Wilderness– hit and run

The other type of battle consists of more lightly armored soldiers often with lighter or ranged weapons conduct hit and run attacks. These can occur on their own or sometimes as a result of a collapse of the army during shock battle. Cao Cao in battle of Red Cliffs had his army trampled in the swamps. They had won plenty of victories before, and were a good army that got routed but they didn’t maintain discipline in the retreat. The Noche Triste of the Spanish fleeing Aztec capital featured the same result. They tried to sneak away from the palace complex under siege. In the running fighting in the streets and canals leading out of the city, and under fire from Aztec light infantry and archers, many people died, and much like Cao Cao’s force, the mounted cavalry used the foot soldiers to gain footing in the muck.[5]

Helaman 11:25 described the Gadianton robbers redoubts in mountains, wilderness and secret places. The Nephite military attempted to route them out but had a great deal of difficulty. The text says they were “driven back” (v.29) with “great havoc [and] great destruction” (v.28). This mirrors Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhe De’s experience in the Jinggangshang highlands. The mountain villages had few entrances, few roads, and could be blockaded with great difficulty. The few roads and avenues of approach made counter attacks extremely successful. In short, the remoteness makes it nice as another kind of power base (usually from predatory forces or those on the usurping side of the power scale compared to valley bases).

Chapter 14 in Ether described how Coriantumr was defeated and retreated to the wilderness of Akish (v.3). His enemy Shared tried to invade, but then “laid siege” to it but was subjected to counter attacks (v.5). Coriantumr stayed there two years while his enemies occupied the center of power (see below.) After a see saw battle against Lib that went all the way to the seashore, Coriantumr was again defeated and again retreated there (Ether 14:12-14). Again, see that the losing side took cover in the wilderness, gained strength, and could launch successful counter attacks against forces trying to root them out.

Capital City- Political and cultural nexus

From the debate about taking Moscow or Ukrainian farms in World War II,[6] the burning of Washington in the War of 1812, or the bombing of Chongqing, the capital is always extremely important for political, cultural, and logistical reasons. They organize the armies that defend the nation and losing the capital is often represents the defeat of the nation.

Ether records how leaders held court (Ether 9:5), dispensed justice (Ether 7:24), oversaw religion (though sometimes it was the other way around, “murdered in a secret pass by High priest” Ether 14:10), and represented others at “outcasts” (Ether 10:9). The Land of Moron was a nexus of important cultural and political power. Though holding it wasn’t a guarantee of victory. As mentioned above, Luoyang was the capital but powerful frontier commanders could force their way into the capital at will. Coriantumr remained in the wilderness regaining his strength enough to still contend with for the throne.

Conclusion

Based upon my experience researching military history for years I found this a useful thought exercise in how fundamental geographic realities affect war fighting. Each region has a particular strength and often provides the economic growth, farming land, key passes, or inspirational center that determines where battles are fought, and often what tactics are used. In fact, my latest book goes further and suggests that geography largely determines what kind of armies are created as well. Each geographic feature mentioned in the brief narrative helps us better understand the bitter struggle for survival and power and the way terrain affected their decisions.

[Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance writer. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the pay pal button below.] 

********

[1] David Berkey, “Why Fortifications Endure: A Case Study of the Walls of Athens During the Classical Period,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy Victor David Hanson ed., (Princeton University Press, 2009), 58-92.

[2] Arthur Waley, “The Fall of Loyang,” History Today Volume 1 Issue 4 April 1951. https://www.historytoday.com/arthur-waley/fall-lo-yang

[3] “By the [end of the war,] trouble and disturbances were very widespread….many suffered from hunger and poverty. People were sold [as slaves]. Vagrants became countless. In the [provinces around the capital,] there was a plague of locusts…Virulent disease accompanied the famine. Also the people were murdered by bandits. Their rivers were filled with floating corpses; bleached bones covered the fields…There was much cannibalism. Famine and pestilence came hand in hand [emphasis added].” Lien-sheng Yang, “Notes on the Economic History of the Chin Dynasty,” Studies in Chinese Institutional History(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961), 181.

[4] Old Book of Tang, chapter 60. https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=941042 New Book of Tang, chapter 78.

[5] Victor Davis Hanson, “Technolgoy and the Wages of Reason,” in Carnage and Culture: 9 Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Culture (New York, Anchor Books: 2002.)

[6] R. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpretered, (Norman OK, Oklahoma University Press, 1991.)

Decisive Battles in Chinese History

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my book, Decisive Battles in Chinese history. The study of Chinese military history faces steep hurdles where English academics have to afford trips to far away archives, from Chinese cultural values and the way events were transmitted to the West. The first Westerners who had significant academic engagement in China were Jesuit missionaries, beginning in the sixteenth century. They interacted with Chinese elites who also disdained war and emphasized cultural values over military ones. The Jesuits sent back to the West the stories of Chinese civil virtue and martial impotence. (Ironically, Jesuit cannon making skills were among the most sought after technologies the Chinese wished to obtain.) Chinese scholars emphasized the strongly held cultural values that helped create the great dynasties and almost completely ignored the equally important role of warfare. From the first dynasty of China in 221 BC, civilian leaders exercised political dominance over the military. Though outranked by their civilian counterparts, the military men held great power, and it was the use or lack of military power that brought about the rise and fall of dynasties. It’s true that many Chinese leaders adopted passive or nonviolent ways to subdue their enemies, such as marriage proposals or generous trade agreements. But these were often done as a way to compensate for military weakness. During times of martial strength, Chinese leaders preferred pacification campaigns because they had the means to carry them out; during times of weakness, in contrast, they often adopted other methods. But it was the relative martial strength of the dynasty, its ability to project power, and other practical considerations that often determined strategy, not an overwhelming cultural preference for pacifism.[1]

Song Dynasty warship, 13th century. Notice the trebuchet on the roof. (All pictures used with permission.)

There are many books about major or decisive battles, but few have more than a handful of non-Western battles, nor do they examine the battles with the expertise of a Chinese military historian. If they do include non-Western battles, it is usually because of their association with (and defeat by) the West. In A History of War in 100 Battles, for example, only four battles do not have a European or American opponent, and only six are from the Southern Hemisphere.[2] Another book presented itself as the authoritative guide to battles in world history but didn’t include a single section devoted to Chinese history, the index did not include an entry on China, and the book contains only scant references to Japanese history.[3]

It is true that China entered a long period of military weakness at the same time the West was expanding its influence globally, and there are significant questions about its capabilities even today. But the picture is far more complicated than the West dominating and China trying to keep up. China has one of the oldest civilizations and has a claim to some of the longest continuous cultural traditions. It fielded armies as big as half a million soldiers during the Warring States period, or roughly the same time that Rome was little more than a collection of huts on a few hillsides. (See more about numbers and army sizes below.) China invented key technologies such as the crossbow and gunpowder. During a time when America was a small nation clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, China extended its rule over hundreds of thousands of square miles with hundreds of millions of people. It also has a history that seems almost cyclical at points, where a strong dynasty would eventually collapse, followed by a period of weakness and then consolidation and expansion under a new emperor. It had the singularly unfortunate timing to enter a period of weakness and fail to industrialize during a period of rapid change in the West. For example, at the start of the Opium War in 1839 (see chapter 10 of my book), the Chinese armies possessed fairly modern weapons and defensive fortifications but could not keep pace. The British fielded their first ironclad the very year the war started and had several other advantages that unfairly cast the Chinese as backward and hopelessly inferior.

Japanese soldiers entering the port of Ningbo during the Battle of Shanghai, 1937.

This book uses battles as a hook, and each chapter highlights an engaging battle that selectively focusing on unique Chinese characteristics including their major belief systems, ruling ideology, connection between technology and warfare, Chinese military theory, major political events and key rulers, their foreign policy with their neighbors, cultural developments, and their interaction with the West. The text pushes back on a variety of ideas and stereotypes ranging from the Chinese use of gunpowder, their supposedly weak reaction to the West, the viability of the Dynastic Cycle in studying history, the context of their military theory, the exclusivity of martial and cultural spheres,  and the uniqueness of Western imperialism.  It offers a groundbreaking reassessment of Mao Zedong’s leadership and his impact on the development of guerilla warfare. In world filled with disturbing reports of conflict and potential warfare, Decisive Battles in Chinese History offers a unique addition to students, historians, and anybody wishing to better understand Chinese history.

This is great but you might ask, what does this have to do with Mormonism? Truthfully, not a great deal. Like the Pirates of the Caribbean, when I get involved in Mormon discussions I feel a bit like Captain Barbosa.   I’m just a humble pirate or military historian. The intersection of my studies with Mormonism remains somewhat small. I mostly like to discuss military history, Mormon stances on warfare, and specialize in warfare in the Book of Mormon. But I’m also branching out as a thoughtful member of the church who is struggling with the standard Orthodox positions and I appreciate Wheat and Tares bringing me aboard.

That being said, there are still several intersections between Decisive Battles and Mormonism. The most ironic one comes from the charges of antagonistic Mormon critics. I have a book coming out that looks to be, if I can say so, quite good and successful. One of the chapters I presented in Kings College London, in front of Richard Overy (see footnote 2), to enthusiastic applause. But when I take the same skills, research, methodology, and apply them to the Book of Mormon suddenly I’m some Mopologist hack. In fact, I know that the critics tend to obsess over details and try to delegitimize scholars that sustain the Book of Mormon as an ancient text, so I tend to work even harder on my Mormon studies than my already successful writing career.

More substantively, I have an entire chapter that discusses numbers in Chinese history. The Battle of Fei River was, naturally, one of the most decisive battles in Chinese history. Fought in the late 4^th century AD, a rising dynasty based in the north marched south to conquer the dynasty who fled there a century earlier. (I’m being somewhat brief here, but you can get the fun details in the book.) The battle was a loss for the north, and their empire quickly disintegrated, and resulted in the longest period of disunion in Chinese history. Not surprisingly, this is called the Period of Disunion and it’s roughly contemporaneous with the fall of the Roman Empire and early medieval history.

Northern Qi heavy cavalry from the 4th century AD. They were particularly unsuited to warfare in Southern China.

Reportedly, Fu Rong lost over 800,000 men in the Battle of Fei River, and this is the big intersection with the Book of Mormon. The numbers could either be correct or wrong, but either solution doesn’t present a problem for the text. Exaggerating the size of armies and numbers of the dead was often done for several reasons. Scribal error, the unreliability of eyewitness estimates, and the use of the wrong numbers to make a deliberate moral or political point were the primary factors. Ancient historians often wrote not to tell what happened but with a specific moral purpose. Hence, they didn’t have the same scruples about bending facts to fit their story.

In this case, one of two sources for the battle was written during a period in which the contemporary ruler planned a massive, large scale invasion of Korea, so Confucian historians likely massaged the numbers in order to dissuade the current emperor from his endeavors. The other source that records this battle was written by the southern dynasty that survived, and hence they also probably massaged the record to enhance the legitimacy of their rule.

Even though they were likely inflated or exaggerated, the numbers were still within the realm of possibility. While modern readers should have a healthy skepticism of numbers, the ancient Chinese could field and kill large armies. The War of the Eight Princes (also a chapter in my book), decimated the western Jin dynasty in ancient China; scholars argue that the Jin army had seven hundred thousand soldiers at the start of the war. The battles from this civil war raged across northern China for only about six years, and one ancient historian suggested that capital province had only 1 percent of its population survive the conflict. Modern historians posit that the powers in the Warring States period from almost a thousand years earlier could possibly field up to half a million men for one campaign. Historians will likely never know what the true numbers were. There is good evidence that the numbers in the Battle of Fei River were wildly inflated (but just as strong evidence to say that those numbers were still possible) and that they were overstated because of political and cultural factors. Whatever the size of the army, the effect is not in question as the northern dynasty quickly collapsed after their battlefield defeat.

12th century ink painting of the 3rd century Battle of Red Cliffs.

Careful readers will of course be reminded of supposedly ludicrous accounts of million man battles in the Book of Mormon. I’m giving you the short version because this post is already getting long, but as you can tell from the above discussion, this is a bread and butter topic for military historians. The first modern historian, Hans Delbruck, reassessed battle numbers in classic and medieval sources. When I say I take the same methods and techniques and apply it to the Book of Mormon this is exactly to what I’m referring. I have several chapters and blog posts that deal with this subject in great depth and I will probably detail them in future posts as they are predictably brought up by critics.

My answer to the question of wrong numbers in the Book of Mormon is the same as those for Fei River, the numbers could be right or wrong but the text is in good company either way. Suggesting they might be plausible, the Aztecs raised up to 400,000 men for routine campaigns, and the Toltecs reportedly lost millions in the course of a campaign. The Nephite and Jaredite numbers are well within historical norms, for the region. And the evidence of those battles remains as hard to find as other historical norms.  The archaeological evidence of battles is notoriously difficult to find because battles rarely produce permanent structures that remain to be studied hundreds or thousands of years later. And the most prominent and permanent features of warfare like walls are often mistaken for slight rises in the ground and often missed.  Yet critics of the Book of Mormon expect the evidence to look like Triceratops poop from Jurassic Park.

But let’s say the numbers are wrong. Brant Gardner has research that some battlefield numbers could be symbolic, and Mormon would have the same proclivities and tendencies as other ancient historians that had trouble counting large numbers or deliberately exaggerated to make a moral point.

More interestingly, there are additional avenues of approach in Book of Mormon that takes numbers as unit names and combines that with something called the military participation ratio to come up with a much smaller number. A century, centurion and myriad are two examples from Roman and Greek history that show how 100, one hundreth, or 10,000 might not refer to a number of people. The Roman century actually had 80 people by the late Roman Empire and that’s not including any sick, wounded, or desertions that likely would have made a number of soldiers in a century far lower than what the recorded that recorded the number of legions and centuries would have the reader believe. (As I discussed in my first book, the Theodosian Code allowed soldiers up to four years of leave without significant punishment, so this was not a random concern.)   Again, ancient historians did not have a golf clicker as an army walked by, but relied upon supposed eye witness accounts based on things like the number of banners, but not the exact troop strength of each unit marching under the banner.

The military participation ratio is the number of soldiers compared to the population that a society could field. 25% was the upper limits for any society and the normal about 15%. The final number at Cumorah was listed as 230,000 and 15% of that ratio is 35,000. That number is right in between the only two specific numbers listed earlier in the text: Mormon 2:9 (42,000) and 2:25 (30,000). (See Mormon 6:7 as well, which suggests women and children were in the order of battle and strengthens the idea that the final number is the total population.)  Just from a logistical point of view I have trouble believing Mormon started the war with 30,000 but at the end of that desperate war of survival 20 years later he had seven times that number. (Though Hugh Nibley suggested that’s because we are only getting one minor thread of their defeat personally witnessed by Mormon until the final gathering of the entire realm.) That being said, 23 unit names of 10,000 filled with only about 30,000 military aged males (calculated using the mpr) and civilians makes much more sense to this historian. This might open me up to charges of being a mental gymnast, yet I’ve seen the same arguments modifying the size of armies listed in ancient sources, done by first rate scholars in excellent journals, and they are published with a golf clap from the academic community.[4]

Thanks for reading this post. I hope you found it informative and have better insights into my background and what I bring to the study of scriptures.

• What kind of discussions of Chinese topics would you like to see here?
• What kind of subjects would you like to see concerning the Book of Mormon?
• Why haven’t you pre ordered my book already? (Just kidding…mostly.)
• Why is there a different perception between Mormon and non-Mormon research despite the same skills and methods being used? It can’t just the supposed begging the question of apologists, but I believe it’s a rather skilled campaign to delegitimize so called “faithful” research.

[Thank you for reading. I work as a free lance author and I'm struggling with medical bills. If you found value in this work please consider donating using one of the pay pal buttons at the bottom of the page.] 
********
For more pictures that didn't make it into the book please see my personal blog.
[1] A good book that shows how Chinese officials were far more practical and realistic in their war making than the stereotypical portraits painted of biased Confucian historians can be found in Peter Lorge ed., Debating War in Chinese History (London: Brill, 2013).
[2] Richard Overy, A History of War in 100 Battles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[3] Richard Holmes and Martin Evans, eds., A Guide to Battles: Decisive Conflicts in History (London: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[4] N. Whatley. "On the Possibility of Reconstructing the Battle of Marathon" N. Whatley, Journal of Hellenistic Studies 84.1 (1964):119-139.  Kelly DeVries. "The Use of Chronicles in Recreating Medieval Military History,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 2.1 (2004): 1-30.

Real Clear Defense: The Imperative of Chinese History and Geography

[I suppose its a good sign that I do so much writing that I didn't see this piece. It was originally published on Strategy Bridge, which I noted earlier in the year. But it was also picked up by Real Clear Defense. I check out their collection of links almost every day and its an honor to be included among them. The cool thing about this article is that it is largely based on a chapter of my book. I noticed that the regions included in a Stratfor article on being critical to China, are the same ones I discussed in the chapter. ] 

  

Chinese behavior in the South China Sea is viewed by many as implacably aggressive. China contends it is consistently defensive and even pacifistic. To cut through the rhetoric we can look at the combination of geography and history in the past 150 years to explain Chinese behavior. As Stratfor has noted, China has core geographic imperatives. Western powers (and Japan after adopting Western weapons and attitudes) penetrated these core territories during a long period of weakness that lasted from about 1840 to 1950. As a result, since 1950 Chinese leaders have fought offensive and often preemptive wars with each one of their neighbors, but they’ve been able to claim these are defensive measures. A careful look at the history suggests there is some merit to Chinese positions, but most often they are used as rhetoric to justify aggression.

The geographic regions of most concern to China consist of its core Han territories between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers, its tributary states such as the Muslim Republics in the West, and the littorals and oceanic avenues of approach to Chinese territory. Hereafter they will simply be referred to as key territories. For much of Chinese history these territories have been the route of invaders ranging from Mongolian invaders from the North West in the 13th century to the wokou (literally translated as dwarf pirates) along the South Eastern coast in the 16th. Chinese diplomacy was also predicated on their being the center of diplomacy, after all, they are the Middle Kingdom, with many tributaries and neighboring nations acting as figurative sons or brothers to their Chinese father.[1] For example, Hideyoshi’s 1592 invasion of Korea was explicitly announced as a prelude to assaulting China and changing the East Asian world order. My forthcoming book, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, describes what happened to China when those key regions were penetrated starting with the Opium War (1839-1842). British warships with shallow drafts often bypassed key positions and easily out fought the apathetic ethnic Han troops who did not wish to fight on the behalf of the foreign rulers of the Manchu Dynasty. The resulting treaty overturned the nature of Chinese diplomacy, forcibly opened many Chinese cities and penetrated on of their key geographic areas.Chinese victories for the next half century after the Opium War showed evidence of their adaptability, inherent strength, and desire to defend their territories.[2] Chinese armies armed with Western-style rifles and diplomatic tactics recovered and even expanded further into central Asia. They fought a brief war and resolved the conflict with Russia over the pivotal Ili valley and province. They subdued the Taiping rebellion that engulfed most of China during roughly the same period as the American Civil War, and defeated Muslim-led revolts in the remote Southwest of Chinese territory. This period proved that an active and capable leader could still secure and recover territory, as well as make modest improvements in adopting Western arms in the face of resistance from traditionalists and cultural elites. Compared to the collapse of the Song and Ming dynasties (in the 12th and 17th centuries respectively), the Qing government performed well against stronger threats in creating peace and prosperity.

With the exception of trade cities opened by the British in key Chinese territory, the Chinese were able to respond to land-based threats and internal rebellions in their core territories and their tributary states, but the European naval threats to areas that were nominally under their control were a different story. The Chinese fought and lost two wars against the British, which prompted military reforms and they lost two more pivotal wars in the latter decades of the century that showed their efforts at modernizing were stumbling and inadequate. The first of these was against the French in 1883-1885 for control of territory we now know as Vietnam, and which was a frequent tributary in China’s long history and hence one of their key territories. The failures of this war were stark, but not complete. They mostly revealed that the efforts at military reform were led by various local leaders in an inconsistent fashion hampered by factional politics. The uneven reform resulted in modern ships and armies that lacked standardized equipment, spare parts, common training, and adequate leadership. This was a common theme until the end of World War II, as China at various points in this period obtained Soviet, German, Japanese, American, German, British, and French advisers and equipment.[3]

Assuming they did have working equipment, good doctrine and rigorous training they faced factional infighting between various governors and regional leaders. Once the conflict with France began for example, the key reform leader Li Hongzhang, a skilled veteran of the Taiping and Muslim rebellions, would not allow his Northern Chinese fleet to move south. He jealously procured and guarded the very best ships (ironically French built), not wanting to risk them. Unlike the Opium War though, the Chinese performance was not such a clear cut failure. China scored several clear victories over French infantry in Northern Vietnam, and only lost control of a small amount of territory on the periphery that became the French colony of Vietnam.

It was the second of these two conflicts, the Japanese war in 1894-1895, however, that clearly revealed Chinese weakness and signaled an era of Western (and Japanese) predations. The conduct of China’s army and sea forces were a complete embarrassment for the Qing Dynasty and their Manchu rulers. The Chinese army was sent retreating , core Chinese territory was penetrated, and Beijing was close to falling. Despite having superior numbers, the navy was completely destroyed. Once again, the Northern and Southern Chinese navies failed to assist each other, but even if they had acted in a concerted effort it likely would not have helped. The Japanese fleet completely out maneuvered, outperformed, and annihilated the much larger Chinese fleet. The resulting treaty removed Korea and Taiwan from Chinese orbit and a key tributary and part of traditional China respectively, and subjected China to years of Japanese aggression. Many local Japanese leaders regularly seized territory long considered by Chinese rulers as vital to the defense of the capital and cultural cradle of their civilization. The last of the puppet states in Manchuria would eventually lead to the start of World War II.After the Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, Germany, Russia, and Great Britain demanded additional trade concessions in ports, the rights to use railroads, and special protections for missionaries. American concessions were smaller, but still consisted of the Open Door policy that allowed American goods to flood China. In short, the Sino Japanese War revealed the impotence of the Manchus in the face of aggression from Japan. Western nations soon competed to see who could take the most advantage of China’s vulnerable state. Geographically, these defeats centered on the three geographic territories listed above: core Chinese territory, traditional tributary states like Vietnam and Korea, and approaches from the sea near the ports seized.

It wasn’t until 1949 that China was unified, and it is no surprise that their primary concern since that time has been to secure their core territories, protect bordering states that were historically tributary clients, readjust their borders in favor of Chinese interest, and to aggressively protect its seaward approaches. In 1950, when many analysts believed China needed years of recovery, Mao launched an attack on American forces in Korea nearing the Chinese border. A few years later they seized several islands controlled by Taiwan and Mao signaled his intention to take the rest of their territory. Only the timely intervention of American forces prevented that action. Chinese wanted to address the unequal treaties regarding Indian territory in 1962 and Outer Mongolian territory in the Ussuri River Skirmish with Soviet Union (1969). After a war with Vietnam in 1979, China had settled its control over core territories (except Taiwan) and states that were former tributes.[4] The final key remains the approaches to China which leads to today’s flashpoints in the South and East China Sea where China is placing military facilities, landing strips, and various missile batteries on contested islands,or building islands on which to place these capabilities.

When placed in this historical context Chinese behavior is and goals are easier to understand. The seizure of territory in all three of the traditional areas, adjusting borders and the removal of foreign troops from those territories, such as the Americans in Korea or Soviets in Vietnam, all can be seen as action which sought to protect China’s core. Yet the Chinese were not forced into preemptive wars with almost every one of their neighbors. The traditional narrative of a China that is set upon by greedy Westerners leaves out important details that suggest China’s offensives were optional. It is true that MacArthur was approaching the Yalu River bordering Chinese territory, but the Chinese had strong defensive positions against a potential enemy that was at the end of its logistical limits and an avowed goal to stop at the Yalu river when China launched their attack in the Korean war. There was no immediate threat to Chinese territory and China was still recovering from its long internal civil war. The territory they seized from India was a rather small, and the Indians already had their own share of South Asian problems. The Chinese could have used diplomacy with both India and Pakistan to leverage what they wanted without a preemptive strike. At the time of Ussuri River Skirmish, China was nominally an ally of the Soviet Union, and had a 1950 treaty of friendship that recognized the pivotal nature of Mongolian territory to Chinese security.

After many years of heavy investment in their military, and especially their naval forces, China currently possesses significant coastal defenses, increasingly advanced missiles, ships, and bombers; there is a good argument that there is no need to militarize the South China Sea. In short, even though there is strong historical precedent for China to be wary of the West and want to aggressively defend its territory, the one hundred years of Chinese defeats from the Opium War to the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war is more often used as a shield to excuse or explain away overt aggression.

Understanding this behavior will allow the United States to properly adopt foreign policy positions that will perhaps convince China there is no need to aggressively defend those traditionally key territories because the current measures are sufficient. For example, freedom of the seas operations reaffirm the import of international law and make it less likely that matters will be settled by force.

If a conflict occurs United States has and can take even more appropriate measures to prevent conflict. China’s much vaunted Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy is frequently discussed but not as formidable as many think. Carrier-killing and hyper sonic missiles do have impressive speeds and capabilities but they are also simply the newest version of technology that have been around for 70 years. Over that time the United States developed robust defenses against this threat. To begin with for example they can use the combat air patrol and repurposed Ohio class submarines to knock out launch sites. The latter is particularly deadly as they can carry and launch more land attack missiles than an entire carrier group combined, launch them from a stealth platform, and fire all of those missiles within six minutes.[5] The navy is using the new F-35 to network with older fighters to extend their range beyond the horizon. The next layer of defense are Aegis destroyers, and they are being networked with the F-35 and their radar is receiving improvements that make them 35 times stronger. The rapid capabilities office wants to re-purpose howitzers to target and destroy incoming missiles. (Though placing offensive weapons near contested islands will hardly relax tensions.)

Given the current climate in the region it's tough to believe a simple knowledge of history will ease all of the tension but the United States can understand how to react and respond in the region without aggravating historic concerns and be more likely to see through Chinese masking rhetoric. They have a reason to be cautious about Chinese capabilities and objectives, but they have the tactics and weapons systems to counter the Chinese threat.

[Thanks for reading. I work as a freelance author. If you found value in this work please consider donating using one of the paypal buttons at the bottom of the page.] 

***************************
[1] This also related to the Chinese concept of Imperial Confucianism, which ordered society based on the duties that one had to take based on their relationship. A ruler had to be a good representative of Heaven, a father a good father, a son a good son and so forth. Chinese rulers and court officials incorporated their foreign relations into the same ideas.

[2] Richard Horowitz, “Beyond the Marble Boat: The transformation of the Chinese military from 1850-1911,” in A Military History of China, David Graf, Robin Higham ed. (New York: Westview Press, 2002)153-174. Also see chapters 5 and 6 of Bruce Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare- 1795-1989. New York: Routledge Press, 2001.

[3] For a representative example you might examine the equipment and performance of the Chinese army during the Battle of Shanghai. Harmsen, Peter. Shanghai: 1937 Stalingrad on the Yangtze. (New York: Casemate, 2015).

[4] See this for Chinese motivations in their war with Vietnam. Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping's Long War The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991 ( New York: UNC Press, 2016).

[5] The Ohio class submarine can carry as many as 154 land attack missiles. The other ships in a carrier group have multiple functions, and hence carry a smaller amount of different kinds of missiles.

Pictures from Decisive Battles in Chinese History

My book, Decisive Battles in Chinese History from Westholme Press is scheduled to come out in October. I've been going through edits and checking the maps for the book.  Here are a few of the pictures I hope to use. My guiding principle was to take pictures associated with the text that are evocative on their own, but also show something that you don't expect from Chinese history.  I do have one picture of a Terra Cotta Warrior (that restored the original color), but I generally tried to stay away from stereotypical Chinese images.

Song Heavy Cavalry (960-1279). Because heavy cavalry is focused on the plains of Northern China, I estimate this is sometimes between 960 and 1126. 

Japanese soldiers in Shanghai fighting under the Coke billboard. 1937.

The Human Bridge, 20th century painter Gu Fuan. 

Artist representation of a tower ship opposing a much smaller ship from the Ming Dynasty, Battle of Lake Poyang 1363. 

View of an American Marine facing south on the lower Yangtze. (If you look very closely you can see the American flag on the mast on the front of the boat.) American soldiers protected US civilians and trade in the region throughout much of the first half of the 20th century. 

12th century ink drawing of the 3rd century Battle of Red Cliffs. 

Peach Blossom Study water color painting by a 15th century Ming painter. My book includes an amazing story about the Peace Blossoms in Spring. 

What picture do you like the most, and what pictures would you like to see in a book on Chinese military history?

Thanks for reading and I'll get you a link and information about a launch party as they become available.

[I work as a freelance author. If you found value in this work please consider donating using one of the paypal buttons at the bottom of the page.] 

Guest Blogger: Consistency in the Location of Nephihah

What follows is a post from one of my frequent commentators. This was originally going to be a comment on one of my earlier posts. Due to its length, and the merits of its argument I thought I should promote it to a guest blog post. I also included a map to help guide you through the analysis. What follows does not necessarily endorse a particular geographic model, and is presented as it was sent to me outside of a couple spelling errors and formatting:

Although I am aware of your later post using the Baja California model of A Choice Land, and I do agree with your tactical analysis of the geographical clues in the Battle of Nephihah, I think there are some additional clues from the overall campaign leading to this battle that need to be considered, too.

Since this post involves clues from Sorenson’s analysis that assumes the Jaredites are the Olmec and the Nephites/Mulekites the Highland Maya during the early Zarahemla period, I’ll go with that model to see how the campaign can tell us some more about the geography of Nephihah.

The campaign tells us about the relationship between Nephihah and four other important Nephite cities besides Zarahemla: Moroni, Lehi, Morianton, and Aaron. And another campaign tells us about the geographic relationship between Lehi and Morianton.


Moroni is built to form the eastern anchor of the Nephite defenses, and is near the East Sea and thus as far south as the mountains that form the natural defense line between the Nephites and Lamanites. However, since it “drowns” later, it probably plugs the gap between the mountains and the sea on the coastal plain and is not in the mountains itself. In the Sorenson approach, this could be near where the Gulf of Honduras reaches southern Belize.

Nephihah is founded at the same time as Moroni and links a natural transportation corridor between Moroni and the direction of Zarahemla. Its relationship with Aaron is not entirely clear; Aaron could be between Nephihah and Zarahemla, or could flank Nephihah on the Moroni-Zarahemla route (guarding an alternative approach). As you point out, it is at the edge of a plain and approachable from above from a more interior Zarahemla defensive perimeter.

Nephihah is inland from Moroni (because the Lamanite thrust stays along the coast) but close enough to be the natural refuge for those fleeing from Moroni. However, Lehi begins to fortify when Moroni falls, indicating that there is a natural approach to Lehi from Moroni. Lehi is NOT a coastal city because Lehi is not among the INITIAL cities to fall during the coastal thrust (as I’ll show below). However, there is something “particular” about the way Lehi is built, which is never explained in the Book of Mormon.

You can think of a couple of things that might qualify in the Mesoamerican model. One would be a natural defensive position that while still primitive, can be fortified easily, such as the site where Yaxchilan will later grow up to prominence and dominate the Usumacinta River Valley. If the Highland Mayan mind regarded anything that was low and swampy in the East as in the borders by the seashore, then the cities built up above the swamps and connected by causeways in the Mirador Basin might also qualify as “particular”. That’s a lot of potential area and doesn’t tightly constrain the location of either Lehi or Nephihah – except that it indicates that Nephihah was not attacked as much because it was well to the west or south of the main Lamanite axis of advance as because of its inherent strength.

Now consider the earlier land dispute between Lehi and Morianton. Morianton wants Lehi, but when the latter city appeals to (Captain) Moroni, the people of Morianton flee to the north into a land of many waters. Again, this would be consistent with fleeing further into the lowlands of Yucatan from within the Mirador Basin, or toward the mouth of the Usumacinto. However, Captain Moroni would hardly regard the former as the kind of strategic threat to the Nephites that the latter would be – and Captain Moroni responds like it’s a mortal threat.

Sorenson regarded the Sidon as the Grijalva River, and the location of Zarahemla in the upland Grijalva River Valley (suggesting the now inundated site of Santa Rosa). From the mouth of the Usumacinta, the mouth of the Grivalja can be threatened, and if occupied, Morianton can control access to the Olmec heartland. Zarahemla would face hostile Lamanites to the south, and, at best, an unreliable power to its north sitting on its most important interior trade route, the Sidon. (Note that if Zarahemla were on the Usumacinta, and Morianton was somewhere to the East, it’s hard to see why Captain Moroni would care if Morianton went north, or how Teancum could be sent to “head” Morianton’s flight if he did.

Now consider one more part of the campaign leading up to the Battle for Nephihah. Nephihah doesn’t just hold the refugees from the City of Moroni; it holds refugees from the fall of Lehi AND Morianton as well. But Lehi must lie somewhere between Morianton and Moroni, and Morianton must then fall before Lehi, or refugees from Morianton would not then be able to flee through the land of Lehi to get to Nephihah.

So there is a self-consistent strategic picture emerging here of the Lamanite advance in the Sorenson approach. I suggest that the Lamanites unhinge Nephite defenses by taking the City of Moroni and occupy the coastal cities against little opposition (quite possibly moving very rapidly – as you’ve suggested in a previous post – by taking advantage of intra-coastal shipping routes for naval supply and movement that Zarahemla, an inland power, cannot then counter. The Lamanites then sweep UP the Usumacinta River Valley and clear Morianton and Lehi, with the inhabitants of those cities fleeing further up the river to Nephihah. Nephihah is then the obstacle that prevents the Lamanites from linking up their advance with their homeland and shortening their supply line by a lot, securing their conquest of all of the Nephite eastern lands and advancing on Zarahemla either along a direct route from Nephihah, or almost anywhere from the south and east. (Moving against Bountiful would allow them to also replicate Morianton’s original strategy of seizing the mouth of the Sidon).

Indeed, when Nephihah falls, it is due to reinforcements of Lamanites moving around the perimeter of the Nephite lands to the south. So this would place a possible location for Nephihah nearer the headwaters of the Usumacinta, guarding a passage between the Lamanite lands and the Usumacinta River Valley and/or between the Usumacinta and Grijalva watersheds.

As you do, I’d place all sorts of disclaimers on the particular model. But what I want to note is the rich detail and self-consistency that exists in the military aspect of the story at tactical, operational, and strategic levels in the MesoAmerican model, because whatever geography Joseph Smith and early church leaders imagined about the location of the Book of Mormon before 1830, it wasn’t this one.

FireTag

The Geographic Strategy Behind the Location of Nephihah

Using the terrain to strengthen your defense is not a new idea. Richard Smail described the early crusader habit of building forts using existing terrain.[1] Such a fortress would be built upon a spur near a pivotal river crossing, and thus be only accessible by one side. This would reduce the need to four high walls, hence both men and material could be better concentrated. Benjamin Wallacker discussed how many Chinese cities could be self sustaining fortresses.[2] This allows the defender a greater degree of sustainability in the face of assault. Finally, David Graff's analysis of the Battle of Huo-I examined how that city was placed to guard the open plains extending away from a narrow river gorge.[3]

This final point has direct application to the city of Nephihah, its importance to the Nephite government, and the actions of Moroni. The Book of Mormon describes plains being near the city and bearing the same name(Alma 62:18). When this city fell Moroni doubted if the Nephite government would survive (Alma 59:11). John Sorenson places the city in a position between the capital of Zarhahemla and the Nephite possessions on the East Sea.[4] So we can assume that the capture of Nephihah opened up another avenue of approach to the capital (the other being on the West sea where Helaman was fighting) and almost fulfilled the Nephite nightmare of being harassed on every side (Alma 52:13-14).

I submit that the strategic importance of this city, evidenced by the internal evidence and geographer cited above, is due to the tactical importance gained from its location. Micheala Stephens has discussed the unique tactical insight from the description of Moroni's night time scouting recorded in Alma 62.[5] Since Moroni needed no ladders to get on the walls, but did need cords to get down OFF of the wall she argues that the city was backed by cliffs on at least one (and presumably the west) side. I support this assertion for several reasons. First, the macro geography of the Nephite nation supports Nephihah as a pivotal city in their defenses. And based on the readings I outlined in the first paragraph, few places are more solid than a self sustaining fortresses that takes advantage of micro terrain and protects a river valley leading to the capital.

Furthermore, the account mentions how Moroni came upon the West side of the city and was able to see the army camped by the East side of the city. While Moroni could see this while standing on the city wall, it makes more sense if he were significantly higher by standing upon the cliff side in the west and able to see the army campfires in the east. An article by William Hamblin described how Saladin used the ruse of climbing upon an unexpected place to surprise an army; so this has verifiable historical correlations as well.[6] Finally, the account mentions the Lamanites attempted to flee out "by the pass"(Alma 62:24). This pass could mean a number of things including the East gate where they were camped or another gate. But it could refer to a mountain pass that would be near Nephihah, especially if it was built into a cliff. And it could refer to whatever terrain is opposite the "plains of Nephihah". This includes the example of Huo-I, which described a city located at the opening of a narrow river valley into a plain.

The brevity of the text and the preliminary nature of Book of Mormon geography preclude a definite conclusion.[7] But the above was a consistent reading of both internal and external evidence that point towards Nephihah being strategically located withing Nephite lands with the benefit of natural terrain such as cliffs and or "passes". And I suggest that Nephihah was located near a strategic choke point along the river Sidon with rocky terrain to one side, and upon plains to the other. The next step would be to correlate the theory presented here with real world geographic models and see what we find!

Thank you for reading. I invite your comments.

***Sources***
1. Richard Smail. Crusading Warfare: 1097-1193 London: Cambridge University Press 1995.
2. Benjamin Wallacker "The Siege of Feng Tian", Peter Lorge Ed. Warfare in China to 1600,London: Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
3. David Graff, "The Battle of Huo-I", Ibid.
4. John Sorenson, An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon. Provo: F.A.R.M.S. Press, 1985, 241.
5. Private Email Correspondence October 24th, 2009.
6. William Hamblin. "Saladin and Muslim Military Theory", The Horns of Hattin, 228-238.
7. But please see this post for why you haters can go screw yourself.

Impact of Naval Warfare

Many members of the Church of Jesus Christ are good at explicating spiritual messages from the text of the Book of Mormon. As recent talk given by Robert D. Hales as a Church Education Fireside used the concept of "high ground" that an army used for defense in Alma 47 as the basis for his over 30 minute keynote address. I was impressed at how easily the speaker and audience seemed to transition between sound military principle and useful spiritual lessons.

On a related note, my wife has recently commented that I have "ruined" her. She was recently reading a verse and thought it was about naval warfare. Of course, I don't believe I "ruined her". Instead of reading the Book of Mormon for spiritual experiences, she has started to read it "backwards". Instead of taking obvious military principles like the high ground and applying it to spiritual matters, she takes narratives that are ostensibly about religious material and finds military lessons or ideas. Thus this post points out two additional scriptures that involve naval warfare. But I also wanted to point out the need for readers of the Book of Mormon to have their minds work both ways. One of my papers mentioned the double helix of spiritual and warfare that is intertwined throughout the book. Thus we need to look at both topics, examine ideas from both directions, and have our scholarly ideas be as strong as the spiritual ideas we find.

Without further ado here is verse #1 in Alma 2:
15.And it came to pass that the Amlicites came upon the hill Amnihu, which was east of the river Sidon, which ran by the land of Zarahemla, and there they began to make war with the Nephites

My wife mentioned this verse as a possible naval invasion of Zarahemla. (I discussed the conflict and campaign here) This is completely possible. I have discussed how ancient armies would have used rivers over land due to their ease of transport and supply compared to land roots. The advancing army could have been river borne and used the hill as a convenient staging area before they attacked the city. They could have come up and over the hill by land to start the battle as well, so there is some ambiguity in the verse. If this was a river borne assault then that suggests that the Capital did not have adequate naval defenses or possibly even a navy. If the Sidon area was a wealthier city with secessionist tendencies this could have been a private army and navy against a still weak central government (This was the second year of the reign of the judges immediately after the humble reign of King Mosiah). Thus this verse does point to some possible insights into Nephite War, society, and government based upon their manner of naval warfare.

Verse #2 Alma 51:
32 And it came to pass that they did harass them, insomuch that they did slay them even until it was dark. And it came to pass that Teancum and his men did pitch their tents in the borders of the land Bountiful; and Amalickiah did pitch his tents in the borders on the beach by the seashore, and after this manner were they driven.

Upon reading this verse it dawned on me that maybe Amalickiah's army retreated to the sea shore for resupply! The British did this at Yorktown. And if we assume that the Nephite government had a smaller and part time army than their war like neighbors (see above)this would apply to their navy as well. So we can deduce that the Lamanites would have at lest local naval superiority.

It should be remembered that Alma 51 described a revolt similar to that in Alma 2. Only Moroni had to travel to their cities and "pull down their pride and nobility". So there is a possibility that the naval capacity of the Nephites were being used just downstream of Zarahemla, and not by the seashore of Bountiful through Moroni. This reinforces verse 22 that shows the Lamanites taking advantage of the Nephite contention. It also gives us tantalizing insight into Chapter 60:

16 Yea, had it not been for the war which broke out among ourselves; yea, were it not for these king-men, who caused so much bloodshed among ourselves; yea, at the time we were contending among ourselves, if we had united our strength as we hitherto have done...had they..united with us, and gone forth against our enemies...if we had gone forth against them in the strength of the Lord, we should have dispersed our enemies...

I am thinking this wish for "uniting" includes the naval forces available to many of the capital cities north of Zarahemla. But instead of uniting with the central government the government had to use their own forces to subdue them. Thus most of the naval forces (since the capital was fighting the capital parts) were engaged elsewhere and Amalickiah could safely camp on the sea shore and receive resupply from his naval forces.

Conclusion:
This explores several scriptures that imply naval warfare, trasport, and supply. These verses are also surprisingly consistent in describing the impact of that Naval warfare had on Nephite government (private navies used to overthrow government), society (increased wealth allowed private armies/navies of "king men"), and war strategy (lack of navy at the capital and eastern sea shore hurt Nephites but helped the King Men and Lamanites, a navy was also needed to subdue the King men). These are just a few ideas I have concerning the needed explication of military ideas from the Book of Mormon.

In the future I plan to examine the defection of critical navies with Chinese history, and connect this to the Malay Model for Book of Mormon geography. Thank you for reading, and a special thank you to Mormon Heretic at mormonmatters.org for his help with links. As always I look forward to your comments.

Naval Warfare in the Book of Mormon

This may seem an odd post since there is no explicit mention of warfare upon the waterways in the Book of Mormon. But there are ships, rivers, oceans, and armies fighting, which means warfare extended to that arena.

The logical place to start is with the few mentions of sea going vessels in the Book of Mormon. The original settlers arrived across the ocean in a boat. Although that ship's construction was on par with other miracles like Moses crossing the Red Sea, (1 Nephi 17) so it is unlikely the Nephites built more once they arrived. According to Sorenson they probably moved into the highlands away from the coast.(Ancient American Setting, 138-140) A small tribal confederation in the highlands would have little need, or means for a navy, or even much maritime trade. (If I was an expert in 6th Century Mesoamerican economics I could insert some cool figures here, but I am basing my views on general knowledge I have on Nephite society, and in knowledge I have of other ancient civilizations)

The next mention of ships is in Alma 63 where the "exceedingly curious" person named Hagoth uses his skill in shipbuilding to expand Nephite trade and settling. This represents a new period of expansion in Nephite trade and society. There are other examples from ancient societies that mix trade, colonization, and warfare. William Hamblin in Warfare in the Ancient Near East describes how Egyptian rulers often combined trade and military missions. In fact, a receipt of goods was often a sign of superior military strength, and after receiving goods the stronger power would leave a garrison to establish political control and ensure favorable terms with their "trading" partner. I have also talked about the likely hood of the colonizers being former army veterans, thus the overseas expansion of the Nephites, enabled by Hagoth's shipbuilding, was at least under protection of the Nephite soldiers (part of the "Corporate Sponsorship" that Sorenson described in Nephite trading missions, 211) and could have been more overt military ventures- like using military force to ensure favorable trading status and/or to exert military control.

In discussing these tenuously supported ideas, we should keep in mind that "a hundreth part" of what happened in Nephite society is included in the record. (Helaman 3:14) Thus there should be a a little understanding in trying to figure out the other 99 parts.

Part of those unstated factors are the logistical and strategic concerns from the river Sidon. The river could be crossed (on foot it seems-Alma 43:35) above Zarahemla, but was deep enough to float bodies out to sea beneath Zarahemla. This suggests an ebb and flow to the river, and that the river is deeper down stream from Zarahemla. Rivers were almost always logistic highways due to the ease of transporting large amounts of supplies compared to using land routes. Both ancient Egypt (in Ancient Warfare in the Near East) and ancient China ("Dou Jiande's Dilema..." by David Graff in Chinese Ways of Warfare) used rivers for troop and supply transport, as well as many other societies. (See John Lynn Ed. "Feeding Mars") The Egyptian example was from the early Bronze age and the Nile had many areas with impassible rapids, so even societies with primitive technology and with unfriendly terrain could see and use the advantage offered by waterways.

In strategic matters, if we accept Sorenson's map 12 on page 240 then the important city of Sidon and maybe even the military city of Moroni were on the river, and the river marked a boundary with the Lamanite center of influence. The Southern Song and Chen Dynasty in China can testify to the importance of using a river for defense since they were both conquered by Northern Empires using the Yangtze as a highway for conquest.(General Grant did the same thing in Tennesse during the American Civil War as well) Plus, the famous Battle of Red Cliffs and Fei River represented the ability of a weak opponent to turn back a strong one by defending pivotal river crossings.(The Battle of Shiloh during the American Civil War is another example of defending against river crossing by a stronger power, amazing how good military principles transcend time and place huh?) This is another piece of evidence that bolsters the case for Moroni placing a military garrison on the river: he sought to deny the enemy a chance to cross the river. It could also answer the charge of some critics who contend that Mesoamerican (and hence Nephite) societies were not advanced enough to equip, transport, and supply armies across large distances in the first century B.C.. Using the river Sidon as a highway for transport and supply would ease logistical burdens for much of their possessions on the "East Sea". It would make an ability to project power in that direction far easier. And explain why on the west sea the Nephites had to establish military colonies (that I argue for in a paper based on Alma 56:28). And further explains the fatalistic thoughts that occurred when Nephihah was captured: in Alma 59:11 Moroni wonders if the war could be won if his government so easily abandons a pivotal city.

Thus it is impossible to think that the Nephites did not use the river to transport soldiers (perhaps the reason Moroni had time to redeploy from Jershon to Zarahemla faster than the Lamanite force). The Nephites already used it to depose of dead bodies (Alma 44:22). And I have an unpublished paper that discusses logistical concerns, with the river Sidon being important to that.

Conclusion: I have discussed external evidence from ancient societies that could help shed light on naval warfare in the Book of Mormon. And I have shown that the Book of Mormon contains sufficient evidence to discuss overseas trading missions, and possible military ventures. The direction of Nephite political power could at least partially result from the benefits of the river Sidon. And many strategic decisions make more sense as well if we accept the benefits that the river Sidon offered. Like many other topics I discuss here, these are preliminary comments and research that demand comment, discussion and further research. Thanks for reading and I hope you can contribute to those stated goals.