Book Review: Even Unto Bloodshed

The Interpreter posted my review of Even Unto Bloodshed. I thought the book was an excellent discussion of LDS scriptures and thought on war, and a vital resource for understanding the need and legitimacy of just war, but you should read the whole review of course.  There is already a comment there and several on Dan Peterson's blog where people want to re litigate the war in Iraq or continue to promote their anti war views.  Three cheers for doing a gospel topic search of the word peace! That should settle the matter haha.  These tendencies only underscore how vital it is that Latter Day Saints have serious and substantive discussion of the topic, without needlessly charging the issue.  (Like calling people war mongering propagandists or saying they have a "hatred and unquenchable thirst for revenge" if they disagree with you.)  Anyways, I can highly recommend the book.

Mesoamerican Anthology- The Gadianton Chapter

Neal Rappleye has a fantastic suggestion about a Mesoamerican anthology. There are many volumes written about the Book of Mormon, but no volume collects all the research into one place. He suggested a section on warfare and I replied with my thoughts below:

This would be a great volume that I would buy. Though I think instead of basically having a collection of reprints, there could be a great deal of new material added. (To which I'd love to contribute.) Some of my research that seems to be inexhaustible concerns the use of "robbers" and their place in history throughout the world. In chapter two of my book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents, I show that both late Roman historians and Chinese sources during the period of division use the term robber to delegitimize competing centers of power. It also illustrated the declining power of the central government, the role of predatory and protective bands of robbers, and the significant overlap between secular banditry and political military insurgency.

In my second book I look at the akuto, or "evil gangs" of Samurai from Japanese history and found supporting conclusions. They definitely represented competing between officials appointed by the rising shogunate and those from the declining central government. These officials often fought for the right to tax lands, and for exclusive economic rights. The term was rather flexible and used by both sides much the same way modern writers throw around "freedom fighter" and "terrorist." In fact, I found court records that show competing law suits where they both labelled each other as member of an evil gang. I found other instances where large landowners and their retainers were variously accused of being an akuto, and then appointed as a local manager by the same official. This is because they knew the area so well they were often both the cause of and solution to the problems. I use several specific case studies which show the intense competition among land owners and officials, economic collusion among some of them (compare to the various comparisons between the Gadianton Robbers and the mafia), and various paramilitary actions that represented gang warfare between large landowners that even rose to insurgent like tactics.

Finally, I just did some research into Mao Zedong's early insurgency in Jiangxi province (and just presented it in London) and I found so much more supportive evidence. Again, there is a great deal of overlap between remote terrain (think of G robbers in the mountains), ethnic tension (I argue the G robbers were others), lack of government control (they always appear in the BoM during times of government weakness), and the overlap between banditry, local economic interests of leading figures (the "get gain" that is labelled as the chief sin of G robbers) and political military rebellion (3rd Nephi 3). I even found sources from Communist leaders to the brethren of secret societies. Many bandit groups found the oaths of loyalty a good way to replace the familial connections of larger more well established families (and the resulting political and economic cartels they formed that controlled the provinces.) Many of these elite families had their own private militias that would fight the bandits. At various times both the private forces and bandits would be legitimized by the provincial government. (Just like the akuto in Japanese history.) The Communists in turn found than an alliance with local bandit groups offered additional muscle and intimate knowledge of local areas and successful tactics. This in turn led to intra party concerning how much weight they should give to banditry. And the Nationalists labelled called their efforts "bandit encirclement and suppression campaigns." Of course, these campaigns can be analyzed and compared to specific verses in the BoM that described the Nephites attempts to combat the Gadianton Robbers.

Well I think I've gone on enough lol. (Like I said. I've been surprised at how the more I research the more I see that applies to the BoM.) But needless to say I think there is space for at least a chapter on historical instances of robbers and secret societies. As you said, Brant Gardner has some good material on it. Though as you see, I think there is enough for a book that focuses on robbers in history. Using specific details from half a dozen time periods and locations we can tease additional information from the BoM about what this combination looked like. I have several historians that specifically cite how difficult it is to strictly define them as they seem to cross so many boundaries. Not to mention they are sometimes an existential threat to the Nephites but we have almost nothing about them.

Thanks for the great post! As you can tell I love to think, read, and write about this so I appreciate the suggestion and chance to offer my thoughts. (I love it so much, I had to post this in two parts!)

What do you think readers?  I know I have at least a few authors that regularly read my blog.  And I know I have many readers were going to be part of the proposed anthology I discussed a long time ago.  I also have at least one expert on insurgency that reads as well.  What would you include?

Another Footnote: Even Unto Bloodshed.

I had the pleasure of receiving a review copy Even unto Bloodshed: An LDS Perspective on War.  That review coming out soon in the Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Studies. The book was an excellent discussion of scriptures regarding warfare and provides a firm foundation for an LDS theory of just war.  I particular enjoyed his thorough and powerful dismantling of pacifist arguments. I've run into annoying proponents of those theories before and its always nice to have articulate arguments support what you've been arguing for a long time.

He also made some good arguments in defense of preemptive war, including a moral obligation to wage that kind of warfare on occasion.  (Some people suddenly dropped their nachos during their apoplectic rage.) While defending preemptive war he said in footnote 4 on page 298: Morgan Deane covers the topic of offensive tactics in warfare more fully than I do here, and with a focus on different examples.

I appreciate the comment, and I do focus a bit more on military history and historical practice. That is one of the things I didn't notice as much in his book.  I'm glad I'm able to contribute to the conversation.  Its a bit frustrating to realize that I have so many good ideas that don't seem to get noticed, but my words are getting out there. I do have a highly praised book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon. I have a journal article under consideration at Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought describing the unexamined consequences of the great war; and I'll shortly submit another to the Journal of Book of Mormon Studies about the arguments Amalickiah used to gain power. (Frequent readers will notice how those sound familiar. I figured if my second book is finally published these will make great advertisements for it. Not to mention that each publication will include a byline mentioning my current book.)

I'm also trying to get into contact with somebody at FairMormon for a presentation next year on insurgency. I already have a good title for it taken from my current research: Climbing a Tree to Find a Fish: Insurgency in the Book of Mormon.  Of course, I just presented the results of that new research in London.  I have great things happening and I'm happy to participate in a wider academic discussion. Thanks for reading.

To the Brethren of the Big Sword Society

I’ve been hard at work researching for my paper and I came across a very interesting document. It was written by the Communists in Jiangxi province in 1933. This was written in the midst of the final encirclement campaign that expelled the Communists from the province.  The document urges members of this secret society to leave their “bad landlords” (or the tu hao lie shen, “evil gentry”, as compared to the upright gentry). If they joined the Communists the party was willing to forgive their past mistakes.[1] 

There is a ton of meaning associated with this short document.  I’ve argued elsewhere that the Gadianton Robbers represented contested power centers.  In Nephite history the central government increasingly lost control, as represented by a rise in ethnic others and competing power centers. We see that here with the definitions of “bad” and “upright” landlords represented local power holders. Every society has bandits, but then some of these power holders had private groups of soldiers to protect themselves from bandits. They also used those personal soldiers to extort locals through tolls and taxes or even counter raids. The Book of Helaman is replete with condemnations against “getting gain” and examples of political fragmentation.[2]  At some point it seems every leader in Chinese society relied upon local bandit leaders to provide muscle, yet those in power had relatives or friends in positions of higher power that could legitimize these groups as militia. Stephen Averill even said that line between bandit gangs and official militias, brigand chiefs and local power holders was so often indistinct as to be nonexistent.[3]  In the Book of Mormon you might consider how fully half of Nephite lands were returned to their possession upon the conversion of a few elites.  That makes sense well connected local elites suddenly shift their allegiance.  (Compare Helaman 4 with 5:32) Huang Li Rui for example had extensive land that produced a large yearly income, 20 armed retainers that protected and promoted economic activity on that land (including bandit like activity), a son that was a militia leader, a grandson that was a government official in the main town, another son in the provincial assembly, he controlled numerous companies that traded across provinces, and he had numerous other familial connections.  In the shifting alliances of power forced by the Communist insurgency and Nationalist counterinsurgency,  a personal conversion or statement of loyalty to one side or the other could shift a great deal of power.

The brotherhoods then actually acted as a way to replace familial connections among the poor youth (those most likely to become bandits) provide protection, and enhanced their ability to coordinate strategies in their fight for economic and political power against people like Huang.  Thus the line between bandits, militia of a hated rival, private bodyguards, deputized law enforcement officers, or insurgents, became incredibly blurred. Moreover, I wrote in my second book, that the letter from the leader of the Gadianton Robbers, was pre-invasion propaganda designed to enhance his strength.  So it doesn’t surprise me that Communists who need strength to resist nationalist invasion send a letter to their “brothers’” that promises to forgive them if they joined forces.  The Communists were engaged in a multifaceted battle with the Nationalists that included military force and political persuasion.  On the local level that meant there were competing groups vying for power. Labels are very powerful, and labels like bandit were used to stigmatize. Yet early Communist forces had large components of bandits, including the entire forces of the two largest bandit groups nearest the Jinggangshan mountain base.  So when Chiang Kai-Shek labelled his campaign as bandit suppression and encirclement, it reflected an overt political attack on Communists, but it also reflected the way a political military fight can blur the boundaries with and reflect lawless banditry.  And its why a letter written by the Communists in 1933, can use almost the same words as a letter in 3^rd Nephi chapter 3.

As you can see, I have many great ideas that I’d like to discuss further. I hope to be able to organize all of my fascinating research into a compelling article or presentation soon. Thanks for reading.

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[1] CCP Kwang-Chang Central Committee, A Few Words to the Brethren of the Big Sword Society, December 22^nd, 1933. Chen Cheng Collection, Reel III, no. 16, Hoover Library, Stanford California.

[2] This post focuses more on my research into Chinese insurgency, but interested parties can click the links and find scriptures that support my assertions.

[3] Stephen Averill, Revolution in the Highlands: The Jinggangshan Base Area 1927-1929. (New York, Rowan and Littlefield, 2007), 57.