Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Moroni's Tactics and the Vandal War

Belisarius led armies from the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) empire in the 6th century AD. He fought the Persians on the eastern front of the empire and eventually fought a long war to reclaim Italy from Gothic tribesmen. The subject of interest here is the Vandal war in North Africa. The Emperor Justinian, taking advantage of a revolt against Vandal rule and a peace with the Persians, sent Belisarius with a small force of ten thousand men to attack the formerly held territories of the Roman Empire in North Africa.

One the invasion landed on the beach; Belisarius marched towards the Vandal’s capital at Carthage. He ordered his soldiers to pay for their supplies and forbade them from pillaging. As a result, they had the support of the people and moved “as if in their own land.”[1] Gelimer, the Vandal king, planned an ambush along their likely route. At Ad Decimum, Gelimer planned a three-pronged attack. His brother, Ammatas, would attack the advance of Belisarius from the front. Another force under Gibamundus would attack Belisarius from the left flank. And Gelimer would use his local knowledge of roads to take an interior route to attack Belisarius from the rear. 

The plan compensated for the division of forces by relying on the surprise of attacking simultaneously form multiple directions. Unfortunately, the plan collapsed quickly. The cavalry of Belisarius defeated the flank attack led by Gibamundus and the latter fell among the fighting. A short time later the frontal attack led by Ammatas smashed into the Byzantine force. He engaged the vanguard of Belisarius’ army, but the former hadn’t prepared to attack Belisarius so far north; as a result, Ammatas had his army spaced out along the road. The forward units were defeated piecemeal as they marched into the Byzantines, and then as those units retreated, they affected the next column and forced them to retreat and so on. His entire force ended up fleeing in a panic back towards Carthage. 

Finally, Gelimer arrived and attacked towards the north at what he thought was the rear, and already engaged, army of Belisarius. If the plan had worked, the two attacks by Gibamundus and Ammatus would mean that Gelimer attacked the rear for a coup de grace like Helamans “furious” attack upon the rear of the Lamanite army in Alma 56:52 with his Stripling Warriors. Gelimer routed the screening cavalry (the force that defeated Ammatas earlier), who then fled to the safety of the main camp of Belisarius. Gelimer regrouped his forces and stood poised to attack the bulk of the army of Belisarius. He hadn’t achieved his goal of attacking in the rear for the finishing blow, but still commanded motivated soldiers flushed with initial victory, while Belisarius, seemingly under attack from every direction, was trying to reorder his forces. Yet upon seeing the dead body of his brother Ammatus, Gelimer paused to assess the situation.[2] The pause by Gelimer allowed Belisarius to rally his fleeing cavalry, and counterattack with his entire force. Gelimer fled south, and Belisarius had an open road to Carthage. He took the city, defeated the resurgent Gelimer and reclaimed North Africa for the Byzantine Empire.


This story provides several insights into the Book of Mormon. The hook that invited the comparison was the use of hilly terrain to set up an ambush along an expected route. In Alma 43 Moroni anticipated the expected Lamanite attack. He hid an army on east side of the river Sidon behind a hill, and two on the other side. When the Lamanites crossed the river heading west, Lehi “encircled the Lamanites about on the east in their rear” (Alma 43:35). Lehi drove them where they met Moroni “on the other side of the river Sidon” (Alma 43:41). The Lamanites then fled towards Manti taking another route and “they were met again by the armies of Moroni” (Alma 43:41). [Insert Nibley Map}

Unlike the defeated Gelimer, the tactics of Moroni were resoundingly successful. Stuck in the trap the Lamanites responded with fury that had never been seen before which approached the power of dragons (Alma 43:44). But their tactical advantage couldn’t offset the superior positioning of Moroni’s forces. The Lamanites could not re-cross the river Sidon with Lehi on that side (though Alma the younger crossed the ford in the face of a hostile enemy- Alma 2:27), nor could they retreat towards Manti and then their own lands, and they could not hack their way through the Nephites to their goal of raiding Zarahemla to the north.

The comparison reminds the reader that an army is not such an easy thing to maneuver. The hapless General Lew Wallace discovered this on the American Civil War battlefield of Shiloh; Wallace had to march and re-march his soldiers through several different routes because of unclear orders that placed him on the wrong roads; and hence it took him an entire day to reinforce a front several miles away. Gelimer and Moroni had a plan that relied on surprise to compensate for numbers that were likely smaller than their enemies. This was compounded by the fact that their smaller armies were then placed into even smaller sub groups.

Gelimer had to move three separate forces towards the enemy, and have them attack at the same time. His force was largely horse based, so maneuvers like this were a bit more common and easier to pull off than infantry-based armies (and modern readers) might think.  Moroni, in contrast, kept his infantry-based armies stationary until the Lamanties passed his positions.  This is critical since the movement of multiples armies to catch a moving army increased the difficulty of Gelimer’s maneuver. Napoleon was a master and one of the greatest military geniuses of all time in moving his men in separate columns to engage the enemy on multiple fronts at the same time to achieve decisive victory.[3] Even he found it extremely difficult to keep abreast of locations for half a dozen corps under his command, the need to know their current marching orders and future locations, the need to modify those orders in relation to the often fragmentary and conflicting scouting reports concerning a dozen moving enemy divisions, and the need to move the forces under his command in a way that brought them into battle in favorable position.[4] The military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz claimed that Napoleon compared the mass of life or death decisions based on incomplete information  to “mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of Newton.”[5] It is no surprise, then, that Gelimer did not catch Belisarius in his snare. The group attacking from the front and the flank acted too quickly, and only engaged the leading elements of the army. One attacking group seemed surprised to see the army. That group entered the battle in fragments and turned what should have been a decisive surprise into an ineffectual piecemeal attack. 

Moroni made sure the entire Lamanite army passed the first ambush on the east side of the river, which eased the difficulty level of his maneuver. This also might imply that Moroni adopted a strategy that relatively untrained foot soldiers could perform. Complex battlefield maneuvers were the domain of groups like the professional Roman centurions,[6] intensely drilled Prussians, or elite Spartans. The Mongols and other cavalry-based armies were well trained due to hunting and extensive experience in encircling and attacking their enemies. But most militaries and most members of the military in premodern times were part time soldiers impressed into duty during a crisis.[7] Moroni likely adopted this strategy to compensate for inferior numbers, but also for an untrained force. Moroni placed his soldiers in a place to succeed through superior “stratagem” (Alma 43:30) which speaks highly of Moroni’s skills as a strategist….

Read more in From Sinners to Saints: Reassessing the Book of Mormon

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[1] Procopius, The Wars of Justinian 3.17.2

[2] Ian Hughs, Belisarius: The Last Roman General, (Yardley PA: Westholme Press, 2009) 94. This is different than the traditional interpretation taken from Procopius in 3.19.3, which laid the blame at Gilmer discovering his brother’s dead body. Hugh’s claims, and I agree, that Gilmer discovered the remnants of the battle, and based on its location, and the location of his dead brother, assumed that Belisarius had already moved north towards Carthage. Therefore, he paused to assess the situation and marshal his forces before making the next attack.

[3] See the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt for a vivid example.

[4] Kristopner A. Teters, “Dissecting the Mind of a Genius: An examination of the Tactics and Strategies of Napoleon Bonaparte” Journal of Phi Alpha Theta 9 (2003): 16 (9-21).

[5] Carl Von Clausewtiz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret trans., (Princeton University Press, 1984), 112.

[6] Victor David Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, (New York: Anchor Books, 2001) 118. He quoted Josephus in describing the professionalism and prowess of legions: “One would not be wrong in saying that their training maneuvers are battles without bloodshed, and their battles maneuvers with bloodshed.“ (Jewish War: 3:102-107)

[7] Morgan Deane, “Experiencing Battle in the Book of Mormon,” Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture, 23 (2017), 239 (237-252).


Friday, July 10, 2020

The Word and the Sword



I found a single verse in Alma that comments upon an important debate and important ideas in philosophy. Alma 31:5-

And now, as the preaching of the word had a great tendency to lead the people to do that which was just—yea, it had had more powerful effect upon the minds of the people than the sword, or anything else, which had happened unto them—therefore Alma thought it was expedient that they should try the virtue of the word of God.

The word having a more powerful effect on the mind than the sword comments on the debate between Legalists and Confucians in Chinese history. Legalists took one side of that debate as thinkers like Lord Shang and Han Feizi believed in the power of the state. Some of the basic concepts stated that the state should punish light crimes heavily and use a system of rewards and punishments to control the people, weaken the separatist tendencies of noble families, and harness the entire state for war. As part of that harnessing Legalists like Han Feizi thought religion and other items that could undermine the state were vermin.  

Lord Shang for example continually emphasized that the government should control the people and that a weak people will make the army doubly strong.[1] and “a fearful people, stimulated by penalties, will become brave, and a brave people, encouraged by rewards, will fight to the death.”[2]

Han Feizi rather stridently opposed calls for mercy, compassion, love and anything that might undermine the state’s ability to use the sword:

To reward those who cut off the heads of the enemy and yet to admire acts of mercy and compassion; to hand out titles and stipends to those who capture the enemy’s cities and yet to give ear to the doctrines of universal love [Mohism]; to strengthen one’s armor and sharpen one’s weapons in preparation for the time of trouble, and yet to praise the elegant attire of the civil gentry; to hope to enrich the nation through agriculture and ward off the enemy with trained soldiers, and yet to pay honor to men of literary accomplishment…to indulge in contradictory acts like these is to insure that the state will never be well ordered. The nation at peace may patronize Confucian scholars and cavaliers; but the nation in danger must call upon its frightening men.[3]

Religious writers, especially Confucians disagreed with this view. They argued a strong state might command men, but they are inherently fragile because they don’t win the love of and service of their people. The most widely cited belief comes from Mencius, a leading disciple of Confucius. He summarized the principle very well when he said that “when force is used to make men submit, they do not submit in their hearts…But when virtue is used to make men submit, they are happy in their hearts and sincerely submitted themselves.[4]

The Pheasant Cap Master, a Daoist text that looked towards a hopeful future, described a people that might obey threats of the sword, but secretly seethed at Legalist governments and waited for a chance to rebel. 

“Worthy men hide in a disordered generation. Above they have to follow the ruler, below, there is no straight speaking, When the ruler is arrogant in behavior, the people have many taboo words. So men distort their honest sincerity, capable knights disguise their true substance. Though their real mind is unhappy, they dare not but praise...they dare not but labor...they dare not but follow.[5] 

(Until they revolt. The Huainanzi attributed the swift and destined fall of the first Chinese dynasty to accumulated grievances.[6])

In a statement that seems somewhat simple Xunzi, a leading Confucian scholar specifically mentioned the tattoos and branding irons, (implements of punishments of Legalist states), as leading the people to view the opposing ruler as more like a father than their own:

If the [people in a Legalist army] favor the benevolent ruler [of the opposing state], look up to him as to a father or mother, and rejoice in him as in the fragrance of iris or orchid, and on the contrary regard their own superiors as so many wielders of branding irons and tattoo knives, as their foes and enemies, then human nature being what it is…how could they be willing to fight for the sake of men they hate and do harm to one they love?[7]

The first and last quote include details about the efficacy of soldiers forced into war by an authoritarian state compared to choosing to fight because their hearts are devoted to their leader. But the most important point of all the writings is that the state, or as Mormon wrote, the sword, can only change or compel men so much. The Confucian and Daoist writers argued very well that force fails to capture the hearts of the people and produces changes that are more superficial. The Book of Mormon includes an example of this. The people of Alma were subjugated by the Amulonites who then institutde the death penalty for those caught praying. But the power was temporary because “Alma and his people did not raise their voices to the Lord their God, but did pour out their hearts to him (Mosiah 24:12.)” Eventually God helped them escape and the Amulonite’s use of the sword proved ineffectual to the hearts of the people devoted to God.

What is interesting though is that the sword still has a prominent place in this part of the text. Alma’s mission to the Zoramites was designed to avoid their defection to the Lamanites and a war (Alma 31:4), yet it ended up happening (Alma 35:9-11). Even the converts among the Zoramites had to take up arms to defend the country (Alma 35:14). Even though the text says the word had more power than the sword, the word didn’t produce the change they wanted while the sword did protect the Lamanite and Zoramite converts.

The supremacy of the word over the sword might be a subtle critique against Moroni. His Title of Liberty included prophecy, but also men running with their armor (and presumably weapons) to hear and covenant with those words (Alma 46:21).  Moroni later received permission from the people and the government to suppress dissenters with the sword and force them to fight for the cause of liberty (Alma 51:15; 17-20). This was a time of great danger for the nation as they faced a significant invasion, but I always find it odd to make people fight for freedom. As Xunzi pointed out, the people should love the ruler and their nation so much that they “[buckle] on their armor and enthusiastically [attack the enemy] without waiting for any orders from their superiors.”[8] While Moroni’s free men enthusiastically flocked to his Moroni’s banner; applying the commentary of Chinese philosophers, we might conclude that the King Men submitted with their lips and supported the Nephite cause but they secretly seethed at the government, perhaps fueling the insurgency later in Helaman.

Clearly a nuanced look at the history of the text would suggest the Nephites may have relied on the sword too much, despite Mormon’s statement in Alma 31:5. The word was stronger as it penetrated the heart and made for more lasting change than those compelled by the power and swords of the state. Yet military action remained a tragic necessity as seen by the results of the Zoramite mission. Its possible that the Nephite’s compelled the bodies with the sword but didn’t win hearts like they should. This underscores how truly important it is to led the word lead people to do what was just. And it impresses me that the Book of Mormon can have such robust conversations with the ideas debated by impressive Chinese thinkers.   

Thanks for reading. I work as a freelance scholar so if you found value in this work please consider donating using the pay pal button below or buy one of the my books linked in the top left. Thanks again! 

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[1] The Book of Lord Shang, JJL Duyvendak trans., (Chicago University Press, 1928,) 198.
[2] The Book of Lord Shang, 201.
[3] Han Feizi, Basic Writings, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 2003,) 108.
[4] As quoted in Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans., (Princeton University Press, 1985,) 12.
[5] The Pheasant Cap Master, Marnix Wells trans., (Three Pines Press, 2013,) 195.
[6] Liu An’s Art of War: Huainanzi chapter 15, Anderew Seth Meyer trans., (Columbia University Press, 2012, )107-108. Chen Sheng, a conscript soldier, arose…He bared his right arm and raised it, proclaiming himself Great chuh, and the empire responded like an echo. At that time, he did not have strong armor or sharp weapons, powerful bows or hard spears. They cut date trees to make spears; they ground awls and chisels to make swords, they sharpened bamboo and shouldered hoes to meet keen halberds and strong crossbows, yet not city they attacked or land they invaded did not surrender to them. They roiled and shook, overran and rolled up an area of several thousand square li…Chen’s force and station were supremely lowly, and his weapons and equipment were of no advantage, yet one man sang out and the empire harmonized with him. This was because resentment had accumulated among the people.
[8] Wei Liaozi, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Westview Press, 1993,) 260.

Friday, June 26, 2020

Approaching Nephite Thought on Warfare




Military history is more than battles. The extensive war campaigns and drama surrounding those battles tend to promote a great deal of writing them. But warfare is also how societies conceptualize warfare, and leaders justify it. I was doing the Come Follow Me readings and found very interesting verses at the end of Jacob. I have already discussed Jacob’s futile victory before, but I think these two short verses in Jacob set a template for how later Nephite leaders justified warfare.

Jacob 7:24-25-

And it came to pass that many means were devised to reclaim and restore the Lamanites to the knowledge of the truth; but it all was vain, for they delighted in wars and bloodshed, and they had an eternal hatred against us, their brethren. And they sought by the power of their arms to destroy us continually. 
Wherefore, the people of Nephi did fortify against them with their arms, and with all their might, trusting in the God and rock of their salvation; wherefore they became as yet, conquerors of their enemies.
Verse 24 starts with a discussion of Nephite “means” to “reclaim and restore” the Lamanites. These are interesting verb choices that most likely reflect the difference between Aaron and Ammon’s missionary service. Compare Alma 17 where Ammon becomes a servant of the king, sets a good example, and then preaches; with Aaron’s attempt to preach in the synagogues of Jerusalem in chapter 21. It might also refer to activities like the prayer of Enos for the sake of his brethren. 

But those are futile because of the “eternal” hatred of the Lamanites. They rejected the preaching of the Nephites in favor of exercising their hatred through warfare. The “power of arms” at the end of the verse contrasts with the “knowledge of the truth” that the Nephites missionaries believed would reclaim and restore the Lamanites. (The apostle Paul also compared the spirit and word of God to a sword. Ephesians 6:17.)  The Lamanites then rejected the gospel, turned to hatred, and took literal swords instead of the figurative sword of truth.

The Nephites, after failing to convert the Lamanites, and being the subjects of eternal hatred then fortified against them.  This sounds purely defensive, but the fortifications refer to arms and not walls, and it led them to be conquerors so I wouldn’t read that quite so literally.  What is interesting, is that even though they resorted to arms, the proper place of warfare was to remind them to trust in God. 

Finally, the couple ends with, “wherefore, they became as yet, conquerors.”  The tentative declaration of that sentence is very poignant to me. Its not a final victory. After all, fighting only occurs because the preaching of the truth failed. The Nephites only succeeded in defending themselves by trusting in God. The victories thus hardly seem like it because a true victory would mean they never had to fight in the first place.  

These verses seem to have influenced later Nephite writers. Alma gave up political power to devote his full time and energy to preaching. His reasoning corresponds to the first part of Jacob’s couplet and the primacy of spiritual power over political power. 

Alma 4:19-

These verses from Jacob seem to have influenced later Nephite writers. Alma gave up political power to devote his full time and energy to preaching. His reasoning corresponds to the first part of Jacob’s couplet and the primacy of spiritual power over political power. 

This he did that he himself might go forth among his people, or among the people of Nephi, that he might preach the word of God unto them, to stir them up in remembrance of their duty, and that he might pull down, by the word of God, all the pride and craftiness and all the contentions which were among his people, seeing no way that he might reclaim them save it were in bearing down in pure testimony against them.
Its interesting to note that those who rejected his spiritual teachings at Ammonihah nominally recognized Alma’s former political power, but it was the rejection of his spiritual teachings and the great wickedness of the city that got them killed (Alma 8:12; 16:2). Pahoran clearly echoes this thinking in response to Moroni. 

Alma 61:14:

Let us resist evil, and whatsoever evil we cannot resist with our words, yeah, such as rebellions and dissensions, let us resist them with our swords, that we may retain our freedom, that we may rejoice in the great privilege of our church, and in the cause of our Redeemer and our God. 
Again, spiritual teachings come first, and the resort to weapons comes second. In this case it’s interesting to note that he is referring to subduing internal rebellions while Jacob was referring to external invasion. Still though, the use of those weapons only occurs after the failure of preaching and must be connected back to God.

In Jacob’s time it simply refers to God and his salvation. But here the use of weapons here points towards their freedom to worship God and protect their church. Not every Nephite belonged to the church of God, so this could have been a more divisive point than modern readers understand. Those that didn’t belong to the church of God were subject to Nephite rulers, again, think of the people of Ammonihah.  In the case of the chief judge Nephihah, he was chosen from only among the elders of the church (Alma 4:19), but they still had to fight for that church’s right to worship at the threat of Moroni’s sword (Alma 51:17).  

Helaman 6:3, 37-

The final case is the most revealing as it shows how the Lamanites either incorporated Nephite thought, or Mormon crafted his narrative in such a way that the Lamanites conformed to it. After the Lamanites were converted in Helaman chapter 5 in chapter 6 they are recorded as being more righteous than the Nephites (Helaman 6:2-3). These righteous Lamanites used “every means” to destroy the Gadianton Robbers. These sounds like an aberration because preaching is supposed to come first according to Jacob. But verse 37 says that the Lamanites “did hunt the band of robbers; and they did preach the word of God among the more wicked part of them.” The printer’s manuscript may have meant the “less wicked” parts of the robbers, or more wicked parts of the Lamanites who, as Ammon and Aaron found out, would still be more receptive to the gospel than apostate Nephites. But the important part is that the Lamanites preached to those that would listen, and fought those that didn’t.  

Conclusion-

Jacob’s short verses were an incredibly powerful statement about the importance of spiritual teachings, it’s relation to warfare, and warfare’s ideal purpose leading to trust in God. Adhering to spiritual teaching was supposed to lead to peace, but the rejection of it often led to war. Warfare required warfare to combat it. Not pacifism as many modern readers mistakenly believe. But that warfare was supposed to be done with a trust in God, and it was supposed to lead to greater reliance on God as the ultimate guarantee of victory, and not the strength of arms as a temporary victory.  

It was so important I believe it influenced Nephite leaders and was possibly transmitted to Lamanite coverts or through the entirety of Nephite history down to its great (second to) last record keeper, Mormon.