[This is my application to the Mormon Theology Seminar. Last time there were over 80 applications for seven spots, but I'm still very proud of my ideas regardless of the decision and hope to pursue this line of thought in the future.]
The poignancy contained in Jacob 7:26
serves to highlight Nephite military conflicts. They combine with several key
words and phrases, and a judicious comparison to the legendary Chinese general
Yue Fei, to suggest that Jacob talked as a martial leader that was victorious
in battle, but also sensed the failure represented by those victories.
Confucianist and Taoist teachings
on war highlight the contentions mentioned in verses 24 through 26. Alastair
Johnson argued that Chinese thought held what he called a Mencian view, named
after a prominent disciple of Confucius, which believed that the righteousness
and good governance of a ruler could prevent conflict.[1] Much like Doc& Cov 121: 121:46, a
righteous ruler would have power “flow unto [him] forever and ever.” For
example, the martial leader and philosopher Wuzi wrote. “The Sage rests the
people in the Way [Tao], orders them with righteousness, moves them with forms
of propriety [li], and consoles them with benevolence. Cultivate these four
virtues and you will flourish. Neglect them and you will decline.”[2] Even when military thought didn’t condemn
violence, one of Sunzi’s principle beliefs said that a commander must configure
his troops in order fight with the military power of a suddenly unleashed torrent
of water.[3]
As a result, ancient Chinese historians
blamed the defeat of the Northern Song (960-1126 AD) on rulers who forfeited
Heaven’s Mandate through unrighteous behavior.[4]
So the need to use military force
represented a moral failure and these thoughts amplify the poignancy of the
Nephite’s failure to persuade the Lamanites. If we accept Grant Hardy’s strong
argument that Nephi’s mission was to keep the brothers from splintering,[5]
the “continual” warfare and “eternal hatred” (v.24) of the Lamanites
represented a stunning defeat of that mission. Even though the Nephites were
successful in their martial defense (v.25), Jacob was perhaps the last living
person to hear Father Lehi’s voice and understand how Nephite success on the
battlefield couldn’t overcome the moral failing that required fighting in the
first place.
Moreover, Jacob was only a link in
the chain of Nephite record keepers and spiritual leaders; after Jacob there is
a noticeable decline in the spirituality, length of writing, and marvelous
testifying within their writing. A few generations after Jacob, one author
confessed he was a “wicked man” (Omni 2), another couldn’t claim any additional
revelation (Omni 11), and Jacob’s descendants were inconsequential third person
observers of Nephite history that actually turned over the plates to the
secular king and historian (Omni 24-25).
On top of his personal link, Jacob presumably knew of Nephi’s prophecy
concerning the eventual destruction of his people, suggesting a subtle and parallel
pattern within the text.
Yue Fei (1103-1142 AD) only rose to
prominence during the collapse of the Northern Sung Dynasty, but despite all of
his victories he never did recover Northern China. For various political
reasons he was arrested and had his death arranged by the Emperor he faithfully
served. He fought to preserve his people, but the need to fight in the first
place represented moral failings on the part of rulers. And he died knowing
that his fight, despite all of his victories, remained futile. Jacob’s
personal link in the chain seemed futile, his defense of his people represented
the failure of Nephi and himself to unite the people, he was the last link
before the deteriorating spirituality of descendants, and he feasibly knew that
the Nephites were destined for extermination.
It is no wonder at the end of his book he compared his journey to that
of a solemn and lonesome wanderer. Conceivably, like Yue Fei or Moroni, he
wandered a desolate, war scarred landscape, shell shocked at the failure of his
life’s mission, and “mourning” (Jacob 7:26) his days while feeling his
contribution was “small” (v. 27) and ultimately futile.
Update 3/21/20: An expanded version of these ideas can be found in my book, Saints to Sinners: Reassessing the Book of Mormon
Update 3/21/20: An expanded version of these ideas can be found in my book, Saints to Sinners: Reassessing the Book of Mormon
*****
[1]
Alastair Iain Johnson, Cultural Realism:
Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (New York:
Princeton University Press, 1998) 155.
[2] Wuzi, Ralph Sawyer trans., The Seven
Military Classics of Ancient China, (New York: Westview Press, 1993), 207.
[3]
Sunzi, The Seven Military Classics, 165,
168.
[4]
Neo Confucianist historians that dominated the court of the Southern Song
Dynasty would have especially believed that. Contemporary historians, though,
argue it was stunningly poor military and political choices of the Emperor that
turned a devastating Jurchen raid into utter collapse. Peter Lorge, War, Politics, and Society in Early Modern
China: 900-1795, (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), chapter 2.
[5] Grant
Hardy, Understanding the Book of Mormon:
A Readers Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3 comments:
How very interesting. I hope you get to expound on it at the conference!
Happily, he was not as much a failure as he may have thought - the book of Jacob is a wonderful part of the Book of Mormon.
I agree Grant. There was a great deal more I could have added but didn't have the space. If I do get the chance to attend this seminar I'm sure I'll study that and so much more. Thanks for all of your comments.
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