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My book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents, argued that the Book of Mormon
is a text that should be taken seriously by policy makers and even generals. The
current events in Iraq and pending fall of Ramadi recall the capture of
Nephihah in Alma 59, and provide additional insight into Nephite society and
courses of action we might take.
As I write this ISIS is driving
towards the pivotal city of Ramadi. They
have captured nearby cities and threaten its supply route to Baghdad. This is the capital of Anbar province, and
the home of the Sunni Awakening that turned against Al Qaeda, allied with the
U.S. during the surge, and essentially won the war in Iraq. The Institute for
the Study of War says that “the fall of Ramadi would deal a major strategic and
psychological blow to the Anbaris and to the government of PM Abadi. It would
also undermine the relationships between Anbaris and Baghdad, as Iraqi Sunni
leaders in Anbar have been calling for an increase in aid to the province as a
whole and to Ramadi in particular.”[1] The known brutality of ISIS, their genocide,
sexual slavery, and destruction of monuments is tragic enough. Many Americans
have the sense that we allowed this to happen by leaving and failing to view
ISIS as more than a jayvee team. Moreover, the provincial government has been
begging for more troops and help.
How does this relate
to the Book of Mormon?
Nephihah was a pivotal city that
was close to the borders town of Moroni, along the route to Bountiful, and
protecting the route to Zarahemla. After if we read starting in Alma 59:9-
And now as Moroni had supposed that
there should be men sent to the city of Nephihah, to the assistance of the
people to maintain that city, and knowing that it was easier to keep the city
from falling into the hands of the Lamanites than to retake it from them, he
supposed that they would easily maintain that city….And now, when Moroni saw
that the city of Nephihah was lost he was exceedingly sorrowful, and began to
doubt, because of the wickedness of the people, whether they should not fall into
the hands of their brethren…[His leaders] doubted and marveled also because of
the wickedness of the people, and this because of the success of the Lamanites
over them.
Ethnic Tension
The obvious comparison is that Moroni
pleaded for reinforcements, didn’t receive them, and the fall of the city dealt a
powerful blow to their spirits. There are more comparisons and possible
insights. U.S. forces that remained would have acted as honest broker between
the various factions in Iraq. As strange
as this sounds considering the pontificating about the hated Western
imperialists, Sunni leaders in Anbar province had more trust in American
soldiers than the government. With
soldiers in the country, and with future arms contracts for advanced weapons
like fighter jets (now cancelled), which required a long relationship filled
with shipments of spare parts, the military would have leverage to force the
Shia government to be more inclusive of Sunnis and Kurds. Most importantly, our
training advisers would have prevented the government from politicizing
leadership posts within the army. Removing capable Sunni leaders (many of whom
cut their teeth in Saddam’s army) crippled their effectiveness and led to their
disgraceful retreat last summer.
The Book of Mormon doesn’t explicit mention
others or describes domestic ethnic tension. In my book I describe how ancient
historians often used loaded terms to describe ethnic others. The late Roman historian Gildas called
robbers a “hive of bees” and their influence an “infestation.”[2]
Another Roman historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, called them “serpents that come
out of their holes in spring” to attack with “wicked” and “most cruel” fury.[3]
While Giddianhi described the robbers’ war as one for their rights, Ammianus
described robbers as “swarthy and dark complexioned” who are “bitter exactors
of their rights.”[4]
This is compared to Mormon, who calls the Lamanites “lazy” (Mosiah 9:12), and
Nephi, who describes those that do not believe as “dark” and “loathsome” (1
Nephi 12:23). The governor of the Nephites dismissed Giddianhi’s quest for his
rights as the threatening of a “mere” robber (3 Nephi 3:12). This suggests that
perhaps the people of Nephihah had the same smooth relationships with Zarahemla
as Baghdad does with Ramadi.
Partition
Critics and even many members tend
to view the Nephites as a Roman like empire that lasted a thousand years. During most of Nephite history a better
comparison would have been the rump states left over in Europe after Rome fell,
or the city states of ancient Greece. As
late as the time of Alma the Elder he personally led the Nephites in battle just
outside of the city of Zarahemla. Those
in Ammonihah rejected Nephite political authority, “the most capital parts of
the land” rebelled in the Amlicite war, Morianton tried to seize land, and the
unspecified strong holds and cities forced to raise the Title of Liberty (Alma
51:20) rejected Nephite authority and eventually allied with the Lamanites. The
Nephites seemed ascendant after the war chapters, but as quickly as Helaman 1
they lost their capital. In Helaman 4
Moronihah could only recover half the land.
The prophet Nephi left the land (and the record) for six years (compare
Helaman 6:6 to 7:1)! When he came back the people had to plead to him through
intermediaries (Helaman 11:8, suggesting he was still partially removed from
the people.) The Nephites retreated to
their central territories to defeat the Gadianton in Robbers (3 Nephi
3-4). In their final battle against the
Lamanites Mormon says they number “as the sands of the sea” but only muster
30,000 soldiers for their war of survival (Mormon 2:42).[5]
The point is outside of a short
period of time during and after the great war, they were rather weak and didn’t
not command large territories and huge populations. The Nephites were not a large monolithic
empire and faced various ethnic rivalries and political tension, perhaps
similar to Iraq and seen in the failure to support Nephihah, which made cooperation
difficult and fracturing into smaller entities more likely.
What to do about it?
Looking at some similarities is
nice, but what course of action might the Book
of Mormon suggest? After the fall of
Nephihah, Moroni wrote a rather intense letter where he correctly diagnosed the
treasonous reasons for the lethargic supply and mobilization by Zarahemla
judges. His threatened coup turned out to be a counter revolution in
conjunction with Pahoran.
This is seemingly where the
comparisons break down. Many Iraqis are sick of the government and tolerate the
rule of ISIS. The Kurds continue to rule
autonomously and seek independence. The current attacks in Ramadi are close urban
operations that limit air strikes. The PM said that if unchecked ISIS could
become unstoppable.[6]
But not too many are flocking to his defense, and the Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs basically shrugged at its loss. Pahoran blamed the coup on “great flattery
[that] led away the hearts of many” (Alma 61:4).
Judging from the lack of support
for action in Iraq, the reader might appropriately examine if the government
under Pahoran and Moroni squandered public support for the war through
misrule. Moroni held men in prison for
years without trial in Alma 51:19; 62:9. There is evidence that he killed
dissenters (Alma 51:19), he threatened a coup and a genocide in separate
letters (Alma 60:25-27; Alma 54:12-13), along with calling his opponent a child
of Hell (Alma 60:18; 54:11), and he possibly militarized a vote against the King
Men (after all, he and his supporters put on armor and gathered in a loud
shouting body before the vote, Alma 46:21).
The war had to be funded from somewhere, and the 4,000 dissidents hewed
down (Alma 51:19), and others imprisoned or executed provided plenty of revenue
for the state, but likely left many kin seething with resentment.
The Nephite example suggests that
military force won on the battlefield for Moroni and inspires many, (including
me as a young recruit in Marine Corps Boot Camp) but it remains a short term
solution because their underlying ethnic tension, political fragmentation, and
heavy handed policies didn’t change. As I focused in my second book, in many
cases forceful action created more enemies.
The situation in Iraq is complex
and difficult. The American public doesn’t want to send ground troops. ISIS spans both Iraq and Syria and any action
against them might assist Iranian agents in Iraq or help Basher Al Assad keep
power. Military operations cost money
and degrade the military’s readiness for future conflicts. But many argue
America has an interest in fighting genocidal barbarians forcing many into
sexual slavery, who steadily advance and export terrorism. Much like the
Nephites that cut bait and consolidated their central territories during the
Gadianton threat, and Mormon’s strong defense of the narrow neck of land suggest
that the least worst American option is to consolidate their position by
supporting the Kurds as a bulwark against ISIS expansion, continue bombing, and
work to train the Iraqi army so they can roll back ISIS. This limits American commitment but provides a
low risk high reward way to protect American interests in a vital region,
without a burdensome American commitment.
This was rather heavy on analysis, what do you think of the situation?
[2]
Marcellinus, Res Gestae, 1.25-26. Of course, swarms could also refer to the
difficulty and pain in prosecuting a successful counter-insurgency
campaign.
[3] Ibid.,
19.8.1-2; 28.2.10.
[4] Ibid., 22.16.23.
[5]
Interestingly, if you look at the military participation ratio a society that
was about 200,000 people, or about the total of dead at Cumorah, could produce
an army of 30,000. See “A Nephite Ten
Thouand” in my upcoming book for more.
[6] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/16/iraqi-city-ramadi-verge-falling-isis-prime-minister
(Accessed Apr 17th 2015).
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