China's Peace Disease

Rare Nationalist Propaganda, 1938

[This is more of a policy piece I developed as part of a site devoted to experienced driven commentary. It also includes material for a future book I’m writing introducing Modern Chinese Problems and Strategy.]

Hardware is fairly easy to assess. The speed of missiles, the range of sensors, and the amount of Aegis destroyers are all fairly certain quantities. But how they are used is not. Wars are not simply a math contest and generals are not mathematicians. Strategy, training and surprise matter just as much, if not more than the systems themselves. This is where the RAND report and so many analysts falter. They provide a chilling picture of material imbalance and possible scenarios such as China’s invasion of Taiwan in 2020. But they don’t account for the training and professionalism of the US military. For example, American pilots have been flying missions as part of the war on terror for almost 20 years. While the planes may need spare parts, the average fighter pilot has thousands of hours of combat experience.

China fought its last active war in 1979. There are few if any officers and military members that have experience operating in war time conditions. The last joint naval and land operation occurred in 1955. That means the senior leadership in China’s military has little combat experience. And none of their NCOs and junior officers has seen any combat. The Chinese do have an increasing number of sophisticated missiles, ships, and weapons, but there is little indication of how they will perform complex operations in wartime conditions. Training exercises are important, and China has many of them, but there is little that can replace the skills gained from war time experience. Chinese fighter pilots for example, often go through very basic training exercises and have trouble showing initiative. War time conditions include a great deal of stress, confusion, unexpected events and a limited time in which to make decisions. An untested military using untested technology means their missile threat may be one of the many militaries around the world that look and sound good on paper as they promise the “mother of all battles” only to melt away when the conflict starts. Assuming Chinese forces skillfully use their new missiles, these are a high use and rapidly depleted weapon. In this case it means China would have a strong first punch but little staying power once the missiles run out.

This peace disease is exacerbated by personnel problems. China has had a one child policy that affects their modernization of their military and interacts with general trends. The one child policy results in what Chinese analysts often call the “little emperor” syndrome. These are the only children of parents who are often spoiled to the point that the military lifestyle is rather jarring to them. Almost 70% of recruits are only children and this increases to 80% in some front line combat units. On top of that, the general effect of modernization, such as an increasingly urban and sedentary lifestyle means that recruits, on average, are taller, weigh more, and just can’t fit into tight military equipment built for a different average from 20 or 30 years ago. The pollution for which China is known for limits potential recruits even further. Many of potential recruits have severe lung issues that limit their ability to run and leads to an increase in respiratory diseases. The increasingly technical demands from these fancy weapons systems require recruits with more technical ability and aptitude. Average test scores have risen which suggests China is finding better recruits. But due to the above problems with modern and urban living, they often recruit rural candidates as well that have little exposure to complex technical systems and little ability to master them.

The solution to this has been to relax recruitment standards and hope that China can train them up to military standards. But many recruits don’t stay in very long. Many military assignments are in remote inhospitable locations far from home. Mid-career soldiers often have limited professional development opportunities and their skills aren’t as readily transferable to civilian sectors. Soldiers often receive low pay and benefits which makes retention difficult, and incentivizes a recurring problem with corruption.

On top of having trouble retaining recruits and seasoned mid career personnel, the culture of the military often prohibits independent and local decision making. They often refer decision making to higher units. Their training exercises are often a way for unit commanders to look good for higher ups. There is severe pressure for Red Units to win, resulting in exercises that fail to identify weaknesses. As alluded to above, there is legitimate worry that their fighter pilots are “dumb.”

The end result of all this severely undermines the click bait fearmongering that is popular among many academics. A closer look suggests that Chinese recruits are often physically and psychologically unprepared for combat and the advanced Chinese weapon systems. They have limited training opportunities and retention among the most skilled. They have a training system that often limits junior officers and promotes a culture of delayed decision making that could prove catastrophic in combat. Chinese officials are aware of the problem and doing more to rectify the situation. But only success in combat can truly dispel the dangers and drawbacks that come from these trends.

This kind of in depth analysis isn’t nearly as attractive click bait compared to fearful hot takes about supersonic weapons, drone swarms, and obsolete carriers. But it is very important to move beyond headlines and the short attention span of social media. Chinese analysts like Zhao Hui have pushed back on this narrative. After calling the arguments “untenable, unscientific, rustic, inhibit self-confidence, and may lead to misguided policy …” he provided two examples. In the Gulf War in 1991 Iraq had just fought an eight yearlong conflict with Iran, and the United States had not fought a major engagement since their withdraw from Vietnam 16 years earlier. Yet the lack of combat experience didn’t stop the United States from winning in overwhelming fashion.

The other example comes from World War I. The British had been involved in a long string of colonial wars, including the Boer War. Yet in the first (and almost decisive) phase of the war the British conducted a “continuous retreat” against victorious German forces. The United States in particular should be concerned because their experience comes from counter insurgency brush wars in contrast to a likely heavy weight match with China. Just like the British, their experience might be in the wrong area leaving them over stretched and unprepared for conventional combat.

Zhao provides several good points that I don’t think completely prove his case. It is possible for an untested military to beat a more experienced one. Those armies each had particular advantages in strategy, culture, and training that proved more decisive than the length of time since their last conflict. For example, the German army in World War I had an incredibly high standard of training, their General Staff College was the best in the world other nations tried to copy, and they had a venerable history and culture of excellence. As the Chinese philosopher Sunzi might have said, the German military was like the release of a torrent of water flowing down a mountain, the swoop of a deadly falcon catching its prey, or the release bolt from a crossbow. The German’s lack of recent military experience was a far less measure of their competence than their training, strategy, and élan.

Likewise, the Iraqis fought Iran for almost a decade. But those battles were largely stalemates along a static and somewhat geographically constrained front. The US in contrast had overwhelming air power, faced the Iraqis across a different front, led a large coalition and was fighting a war of liberation in contrast to Iraqi soldiers that were fighting for a dictator. Again, like the Germans, the combat experience was one factor among many that didn’t affect performance in that case.

It’s true the United States is fighting an insurgency and long war on terror. The military faces legitimate dangers of imperial over stretch as their hardware has deteriorated and many soldiers have faced multiple deployments. But the military is upgrading its equipment. The pilots in particular have received advanced and invaluable training that gives them the edge over Chinese pilots despite fighting brush wars for decades. More importantly, while there are examples of inexperienced forces beating ones that have more experience; China has many other problems that raise significant concerns. The Chinese military remains untested, they have trouble recruiting and retaining high caliber soldiers, they have new equipment that hasn’t been integrated into the military in combat conditions, and they don’t have the élan and institutional experience of the United States and German militaries that can compensate for peace disease. America might be overstretched, but unlike China’s peace disease, the institutional experience and quality of the American soldier can compensate while it is doubtful for China.

The major problem with those examples was that victory resulted from a variety of factors more than experience that included military culture, training, and equipment. There are two relevant examples from Chinese history which shows these additional factors.

The first comes from the Song Dynasty. Ruling in the same time frame as the European Middle Ages, the Song fought several wars with the Kitan Liao empire. The Chinese treaty with the Kitan produced long periods of peace interspersed with wars. The Song dynasty performed horrible at the start of these wars. The generals were accustomed to rather pleasant peace time requirements, and the soldiers were untrained. But the baptism of combat quickly produced a trained group of officers and soldiers that rose to the occasion and produced results for the empire. (Or as Mao said, their experience was “paid in blood.”) But they again went through a long period of peace and the same pattern repeated itself when the next war broke out 30 years later. This was a good example of peace disease, as the military performed well in combat with good leaders, culture, and advanced medieval weaponry, including extensive gunpowder weapons hundreds of years before Europeans adopted it. They simply lacked rigorous peace time training.

The next example comes from a military with lots of experience. The Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-Shek unified the country in 1926 and ruled during what is called the Nanjing Decade. This period has the dubious distinction of being before their fight with the Japanese, before World War II eclipsed that struggle, and before the Communists won the Civil War in 1949. As a result, they are often viewed from the lens of defeat in 1949 instead of their victories in the 1920s. New scholarship shows that the Nationalist army had strong espirit de corps and bold aggressive tactics that carried them to victory against the warlords. But they faced defeat, not because of imperial over stretch or because of their lack of peace disease but due to several important factors.

Against the Communists, the Nationalists fought forces that were just as motivated as they were. The extremely rough terrain of Jiangxi province, where Mao based his rebellion, was particularly unsuited to aggressive maneuver. In fact, the aggressive independent maneuver that secured victory against the warlords resulted in devastating ambushes and defeat against the Communists. Against the Japanese, they were simply overwhelmed by a superior military machine with more advanced equipment. The Chinese nationalists fought well, but the Japanese had more and better artillery, which was properly distributed to its front line units. They had support from tactical air forces and naval batteries which pummeled the Chinese units. Chiang Kai-Shek’s units, though experienced, didn’t have the same staying power and offensive punch that the Japanese did and they suffered accordingly.

Peace disease is a very important factor but it is one among many. The current Chinese army has a multitude of problems which suggest they will not be able to perform like the Germans in World War I, Japanese in World War II, and America in the Gulf War. Based on historical precedents they will likely pay for the needed combat experience by the blood their soldiers in the early phase of any conflict despite click bait fear mongering.

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On Mental Gymnastics

I don't think the anger comes out of a desire to see the church disappears. In my case is more the aghast and shocking reaction to the mental gymnastics that that nuanced members have to do to justify the historical problems particularly. In my mind and in the minds of many exmos there is no "perfectly rational and intellectual defense of all historical problems ". I see it as people clinging desperately to Mormonism and for many of us is not something worth clinging to. To many of us the evidence against the church is much more black and white and damning.  I feel like I'm speaking to a truther or a anti vaxers when I hear some of the justifications for belief by the nuanced crowd. (In the comments here) https://www.facebook.com/randall.bowen.315/posts/530303953981179

I see the term “mental gymnastics” a great deal. Gymnasts are well trained athletes that must put thousands of hours into their craft just for entry level competition, and Olympic athletes dedicate vast sums of time and effort to training.  I’m often bemused by the term, as though being a mental couch potato is better. When the critics use that term they aren’t comparing apologists to dedicated athletes, nor are they praising mental laziness, so obviously something else is going on. Based on my research into the use of words as insults, I think critics use the term as shorthand for deceptive and straining arguments while trying to turn the academic debate upside down.

The important connotation with words like mental gymnasts is the contortions that the gymnast must perform. The critics imply that church members must go through all sorts of crazy contortions in order to support the truth. The critic in contrast, can point to their simple narrative as the correct position that doesn’t need explanation. With an increasing discussion of good and bad apologetics, the release of the excellent Greg Kofford volume in the subject, and continuing debate over its methods, the term seems like a particularly egregious, gutter style tactic.

Those who have dealt with critics have probably heard this narrative. The critics enjoy telling stories of vast million people Jewish American tribes that rode Tapirs into battle and came over on submarines while not leaving a trace of evidence. Joseph smith made it up as he went along, and so on. (As you can tell, I tend to focus on the Book of Mormon so I hear way more of those lousy narratives than the Joseph Smith/ church history ones.)

What the critics are doing is somewhat sophisticated. I say somewhat because I doubt that it is deliberate in most cases. As we might see in statements like "Bush lied and people died," its quite common in political arguments to shape the conversation (or figurative battlefield more often), using loaded terms.  (The phrase is loaded, because it assumes that Bush deliberately lied and simply wasn't mistaken.)

I first noticed this trend in the Book of Mormon. In my first book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents, I wrote how “robber” was one of these terms. Throughout history the term was used by various historians to describe what called objectively be called the private armies of individuals. But in situation where the government power was deteriorating the distinction between legitimate agents of the government collecting taxes and ruffians robbing the people became blurry. Hence the term robber could be used against agents of the government, rebels could be called terrorists, terrorists could call themselves freedom fighters, and so on.

The term genocide, terrorist, war monger, and even liberal and conservative on occasion are used more often for their pejorative and emotional value than clinical accuracy. These terms shift the debate and put the other party on defense, and even clouds the debate with the FOG of war. (Fear obligation guilt.) Politicians that oppose war feel obligated to reaffirm their patriotism. Those that want to use western land have to wade through guilt inducing narratives from Native Americans and so on. And in the game of politics, the simpler argument usually wins.

In the case of the Book of Mormon or other apologetic endeavors, the rhetorical maneuvers actually make an intense study of a topic into something negative. Apologetics seems to be the only field where random memes and face value impressions seem to count more than diligent and thoughtful research.  If you disagree with my assessment, try to make an argument about chariots or horses in the Book of Mormon, or a nuanced historical assessment of Smith's marriages to a critic and let the ridicule flow. They preemptively dismiss the idea that translations might be loose, loan words used, history is complicated with incomplete sources, and that the etymology of words allows for alternative interpretations of chariot. (In my study of Chinese, the two character word for palanquin chair uses the primitive for chariot.)   Using this technique a mocking comment about submarines counts more than sophisticated insights gleaned ancient seafaring practices.  A meme of an Indian being pulled by on a sled by chariots, and other mocking items counts more than a thoughtful study of translations and cross cultural contact.

I'm particularly annoyed by the mocking based on numbers. One of the first tasks undertaken by professional historians such as Hans Delbruck included a reassessment of numbers. Unscientific methods of counting, unreliable reports, mistakes in translation, and deliberate exaggeration to prove a moral point are all perfectly acceptable ways to understand and amend our understanding of battle numbers. Doubting large numbers is also a favorite historical past time, from the Battle of Fei River to the size of Hangzhou, the histories of China have often been disputed as fantasy.  (I especially like to point out Marco Polo's description of unicorns. Its plain to modern readers that he simply got it wrong and they are rhinos, but seeing critics explain away the obvious application regarding the naming of animals is too fun. That is some gymnastics worth watching.)

In short then, a discussion of wrong numbers is not only appropriate, its almost one of the first tools developed by modern historians. (I have a chapter in my next book about numbers, and you can previews here and here.) The contrast between the diligent study put into the text, and the seeming ease with which critics dismiss it with a way of their hand makes me feel a good deal like Dr. Evil,  and that I didn't go to six years of school just to be called Mr., thank you very much.

The face value reading of something matters. Strong impressions are vital, and it's possible to connect those impressions to Moroni's promise. But face also has the same Latin root as the word superficial. Assuming that a chariot has to mean whatever was seen in Ben Hur is not a proper way to read and understand a text.  I'm often bemused at how cavalier members and critics can be with something that is supposed to be a sacred text. Without getting into a long discussion of the various deficiencies of the church's scripture study program, and the critics have their own issues as well, if a member believes that something is scripture they should be willing to dive deeply into the text's possible literary styles, allusions, patterns, historical antecedents, possible cultural comparisons, moral messages, and doctrinal exposition. In short, while critics use the term mockingly, I think we should be mental gymnasts instead of couch potatoes when it comes to our scriptures.  The current use and acceptance of “mental gymnastics” is a way to delegitimize substantive Mormon arguments, solidify their own (often shallow or deliberately obtuse) interpretations of the text, and they do so often unwittingly using a cliché term.

• Upon reflection, are there any terms that you might use which that are emotionally charged and used to shape the conversation?
• This post doesn’t mean to imply that every apologetic argument is good simply based on its complexity or number of footnotes. What are some legitimately bad apologetic arguments that stretch to reach a conclusion?
• What was the most annoying conversation you had with a critic (or apologist)?
• What is the difference between a nuanced and valid argument, and mental gymnastics that reconciles at any cost? Can you provide examples?

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Book Review: Mormon's Codex

Mormon’s Codex: An Ancient American Book by John Sorenson is the culmination of his lifetime of research into the Book of Mormon. Sorenson uses the correspondence methodology, used by Biblical scholars like William Dever, to place the Book of Mormon into Mesoamerican history. (7) Using extensive, and some would say, exhaustive, research Sorenson has admirably succeeded in his goal.

Paradigms don’t change in a day, but I find it hard to believe that many of the academic articles of faith concerning Mesoamerica remain after this.  For example, Sorenson summarizes and then caps previous research concerning pre Columbian contact with plants, diseases, and oceanic travel that make it hard for anybody to question the occurrence of diffusionist events.

His book is divided into three sections.  The first details his methodologically paradigms. These include such things as where to look for correspondences.  This was one hundred pages that went by surprisingly fast; and a preliminary review of that section is found here: http://www.studioetquoquefide.com/2013/09/welcome-to-orientation-mormons-codex.html

The second section examines correspondences by topic.  And the third part examines correspondences from archaeology and history.  While this reviewer has read the entire book, with a specialty in military history I will focus on chapter 18 and the warfare correspondences listed therein. I will highlight the material that caught my eye, the way it interacts with my research, and humbly, a few points he may have missed.     

Finding Evidence of Battles

As I said here, evidence for battles is notoriously hard to find.  I even mentioned the Battle of Hasting in previous discussions.  So I nodded vigorously when Sorenson quoted Dr. William Rathje’s description of archaeologists digging at Hastings, one of the most studied battles in history, and finding a few teeth instead of the trove of weapon and armor. (383, fn 9) Of course this won’t stop critics from leveling the same charge to dig at Cumorah for an easily findable cache of weapons and armor, but it reinforces the idea that this book is a must read for those that wish to study the Book of Mormon.

War Chiefs

 Sorenson described how the Yuctan Maya called their local chiefs batabs, which the Spanish translated as Capitan, or Captain in English. (395)  The term nacom is translated as war chief. (395-396) There were many words that Smith could have used for leadership positions, but captain and chief captain seemed particularly poignant based on these Mayan terms. 

Sons

Sorenson described how the Quiche rulers of highland Guatamela conceptualized their soldiers as “sons.” (396) This is very interesting and something I noted in preliminary research in two other places. The Chinese also used familial conceptualization.  In their case it was designed to instill discipline in raw troops. In Confucian society each member of society had a duty to abide by the proper forms of conduct (li). So a ruler had to be a good ruler, a father a good father, a son a good son, and so on. So calling recruits sons would instill the same sense of obedience they likely learned growing up, and would enhance the authority of a new commander.  Abiding by the proper forms of conduct also induced greater power in the soldiers.

Finally, the military theorists that advocated these policies lived during the Warring States period. Armies increased in size, so this was an additional attempt to instill discipline in armies that were growing bigger.  Since this is the first period in Nephite history that recorded multiple armies in multiple theatres, it would make since that new soldiers, and a new commander, would adopt a father son relationship. So I think Sorenson touched upon something that is far stronger than he realized.

Numbers

I’ve discussed numbers in several places. Sorenson repeated a few of the points I made concerning the unreliable and often inflated numbers.  But he added important evidence from several Mesoamerian groups that could form large armies.  The Quiche force that fought the Spanish numbered about 232,000. (397) Almost exactly the amount listed by Mormon.  The Aztecs raised 400,000 for a routine campaign.  Another Aztec army reprorted 700,000 men.  The one I enjoyed the most was a Tultec war that witnessed 5,600,000 deaths. (398) I enjoyed reading this numbers a great deal, as I’ve often argued that ancient realms could field and kill large numbers and even millions of people, and I plan on incorporating this evidence into my discussion of numbers in the future.

Prearranged Battle

The Mayans often scheduled their battles according to anticipated astronomical phenomena. The final battle would have been 1000 years after a significant date like the arrival of Lehi in the New World.  Sorenon also cited the prearranged battle with the Amlicites. I touched upon the Amlicite example; though I added a thought that perhaps it was prearranged only because the rival cities were close to one another similar to Richmond and Washington during the U.S. Civil War, and there was little other strategy besides attacking the opposing capital that made guessing about this battle rather easy. 

Camp Followers

Sorenson discussed the camp followers that normally accompany an army using Alma 56:28 among other verses.  (420) Alma 56:28 talked about supplied being delivered for soldiers and their families, which inspired a paper and now book chapter.  So I agree, but there are more implications than Sorenson listed. Since they didn’t carry armor and weapons they could carry more food and provide much needed logistical support.  Bringing along their women and families increased the moral of soldiers.  Moroni also invoked a support of their wives and families in the title of liberty, so this could have been a psychological prop for the soldiers. If the Nephites were defeated their families in the nearby city would be the first to die so it would inspire them to fight harder.

I also suggested that this could have been a military colony.  Some critics have argued that the war chapters represent an anachronistic standing army, but this could be an attempt to move soldiers into the area on a long term basis without keeping them active. As a military colony they would have gone back to farming with their families around the city when the war ended, but would be available for additional duty pending renewed conflict. So the presence of wives and children could mean a great deal more than simply telling us about the organization of the army. 

Battle Standard

Sorenson discussed a battle standard attached to an army’s leader.  But surprisingly he only spends a short paragraph on this. (421)  David Freidel described how Mayan armies also used a battle standard.[1] Friedel described it as a standard that represented and was infused with the power of deity. So in addition to an army losing because of the death of their war chief, the perceived loss of divine favor would also compel their retreat. On top of that, some monuments in Mesoamerica were ritually destroyed upon defeat, with some figures actually having holes in the back where standards could be placed when they were thrown down.[2] (Compare to Alma 51:20)

Conclusion

Sorenson’s research displayed impressive depth and scope, and I couldn’t help but remember the quote about critics losing the battle without knowing it. Sorenson also called this a “benchmark for future researchers.” (xvii)  So in many cases his benchmarks validated the research I had already done, and left the door open for me to dig deeper using my specialized knowledge of military history.  I’m grateful to have additional research and sources which enhance my study and I highly recommend his book for those that wish to study the Book of Mormon. 

 

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[1] David Friedel,  "May Warfare: Myth and Reality." California State East Bay University Resources. http://maya.csuhayward.edu/yaxuna/papershome.html (accessed January 2008,). This link no longer works.  

[2] Golden, Charles, “The Politics of Warfare in the Usumacinata Basin: La Pasadita and the Realm of the Bird Jaguar.” In Ancient Mesoamerican Warfare, edited by Travis Stanton Kathryn Brown, 293-301. Balitmore: Little Field Publishing, 2003.(43) My research notes are a bit unclear, I will continue to look at this one.

Eat This: Logistics in the Book of Mormon

Mormon doesn’t include many details in his narrative of the destruction of the Nephites, his most frequent refrain is that he doesn't want to dwell on the war they are losing; but in a letter to his son we do get an interesting tidbit. Moroni 9:16-

And again, my son, there are many widows and their daughters who remain in Sherrizah; and that part of the provisions which the Lamanites did not carry away, behold, the army of Zenephi has carried away, and left them to wander whithersoever they can for food; and many old women do faint by the way and die.

This verse is intriguing for several reasons. I first thought of it in response to a critic attempting to describe how logistical problems of feeding groups as large as the quarter million mentioned in chapter six would be impossible and lead to starvation. According to his logic therefore the Book of Mormon was obviously a fiction from Smith’s mind.  So while the account was rather brief, in one of the most detailed letters we do see examples of logistical problems that led to combat over limited provisions and starving civilians.[1] Of course, chapter 9 also mentions acts of cannibalism on both sides, so the assumption that they were living on a normal diet, and would need the normal amounts of food listed in such places as Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, Supplying War, and even Aztec Warfare wouldn’t apply in this situation.[2] On top of this, the prisoners taken by the Lamanites were only fed the flesh of their relatives. (Moroni 9:8) So what we have here could be the practical implications of excessive war in addition to spiritual decay.



Moreover, I’ve often compared the large numbers in the Book of Mormon to the Chinese War of the Eight Princes. Unsurprisingly, their bloody war featuring massive numbers of people and the end of a nation also featured cannibalism. As I wrote in chapter one of my upcoming book (highlights added):

The Princes of the Jin dynasty laid waste to the rival cities. The citizens in and around the capital city of Luoyang were almost continuously looted, raided, starved, eaten, conscripted and attacked by Chinese and barbarian forces until one of the largest cities of the 3rd century world and most prosperous regions was desolate. The city of Luoyang had an estimated 600,000 people, and the army may have had as many as 700,000 people at the start of the war. And even suggested peace plans and the heads of rival generals couldn’t stay the slaughter.



And contemporary and later Chinese historians recorded:



By the [end of the war] trouble and disturbances were very widespread….many suffered from hunger and poverty. People were sold [as slaves]. Vagrants became countless. In the [provinces around the capital] there was a plague of locusts…Virulent disease accompanied the famine. Also the people were murdered by bandits. There rivers were filled with floating corpses; bleached bones covered the fields…There was much cannibalism. Famine and pestilence came hand in hand.

The verse also mentions several armies. The Lamanites are naturally listed. But then he mentions the army of Zenephi. This doesn’t seem like a Lamanite army or Mormon wouldn’t have listed it right after them. So it is either an independent army from another power, or a Gadianite army. Mormon uses the term “my army is weak” in the next verse and laments that he could no longer enforce his commands. So we may infer that he commanded that the widows, and civilians in general be protected and provided with food. But the Nephite army led by Zenephi disobeyed those commands and took the supplies they needed. (17-18)



Notice also, how close this commander’s name is very similar to Nephi. A brief search of the term suggests it is a hybrid Egyptian and Hebrew name meaning, “one of Nephi.” But given this is an apostate general I like the Hebrew term that means “one of lighting.” https://onoma.lib.byu.edu/onoma/index.php/ZENEPHI



Strategically this implies that the Nephites were pressed on several fronts. All the armies were close to the tower of Sherrizah, but Mormon could not reach it. So the Lamanite army occupied what is called the central position. This allowed the Lamanites to shift and mass their forces between the army of Mormon and that of Zenephi as necessary. While the Nephites armies would each have to attack on their own. Since Zenephi is not following the orders of Mormon it is unlikely that would work. Napoleons early campaigns in Italy, and Stonewall Jackson at the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic used this to maneuver to great effect.[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Jackson%27s_Valley_Campaign_May_21_-_June_9,_1862.png



Mormon also mentioned that he lost several choice men in battle. These could be previously loyal commanders of other armies. Or it could be sub commanders in his army. Again using the American Civil War and Napoleonic Wars, as the war dragged on the brilliant commanders like Lee and Napoleon increasingly had to rely on less capable and less trustworthy generals. This trend could only have been worse in an ancient society, and one like the Nephites where I’ve argued before that they were only a dominant city state of a coalition than a large hegemonic power like the Romans.[4]



Finally, we realize more about Mormon as a man. He cares deeply about his people, and the only details of battle he gives are the loss of righteous men, the horrible treatment of prisoners by forces on both sides, and the suffering of widows. While he was a commander capable of earning the respect of his people and was given leadership at a young age. He cared more about the spiritual welfare of his people. Given the horrors he witnessed and constant fighting it is amazing he held to a belief and hope in Christ. While all of my strategizing is good, it is better that we remember the struggle that Mormon and Moroni truly cared about, the salvation of their brethren. Thus a nuanced and detailed analysis of the Book of Mormon helps us understand its many dimensions, but also gives us additional context and a deeper understanding of its primary mission. Thanks for reading.

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[1] This has important anthropological implications as well, since fighting over limited resources is one of the reasons given for conflict in society. 

[2] Engles, D. W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkely: Univeristy of California Press. Creveld, M. V. (1977). Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. London: Cambridge University Press.  Hassig, R. (1988). Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control. Norman, London: University of Oklahoma Press.

[3] I’m glad my Master’s Thesis on Stonewall Jackson is still useful.

[4] This thought is expanded upon in chapter two of my upcoming book. http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2010/12/nephite-politics.html

Military Participation Ratio and Wrong Numbers

[These are some impromptu remarks I made recently on a discussion board. As such it doesn't have a polished introduction and conclusion.]

Do wrong numbers destroy the truthfulness of The Book of Mormon?


The answer is a resounding no. I explained a few reasons why in this post about millions. But there are more. For example, Chinese writers would want to highlight how the previous dynasty lost the Mandate of Heaven, so they would inflate the size of the bad last emperor's army. Ancient historians often wrote not to tell what happened, but with a specific moral purpose. So they didn't have the same scruples about bending facts to fit their story. Brant Gardner even discussed how one set of deaths in The Book of Mormon followed a same double same double pattern. (Alma 2:19) This could be a coincidence, or it had some sort of symbolic power. This is similar to the modern "I've told you a million times" or Jesus using the phrase "seven times seventy." So if The Book of Mormon has the same problem listing exact number for deaths on battle or the size of armies, as other historical documents this puts it in good company.

This gets even more confusing because some ancient words stood for a number and a unit. But the size of that military unit could change. Centurion means one soldier of one hundred. But by the late Roman Empire, Centuries only had 80 people. Myriad is another ancient word that have this problem. So when I see "ten thousand" listed so often in Mormon chapter 6 I start to that is a unit name and not necessarily a number. For example, by the end of the American Civil War some units in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had only a fraction of their normal strength. (They did this out of pride because units didn't want to retire their colors and consolidate.) So if a general is listed as having "his ten thousand" there is a strong chance this refers to a unit name rather than a number. It is discussed in a bit greater detail in the first two posts here: http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/search?q=ten+thousand

Further, I find it odd that Mormon would begin his war of survival with 30,000 soldiers. (Mormon 2:42) But after many years of defeats, defections, and the loss of their capital city and lands, he had 7 times that number in the final battle. (Just from a logistical point of view I have a problem with this increase.) But when you look at the MPR this supposedly sudden increase in size makes more sense. The Military Participation Ratio is a formula historians use to figure out army and population sizes and other items. Basically its how many soldiers a society can muster for war. The high limit is usually 15% of the population can be mobilized for war. (Though ancient Sparta could muster about 25%.) For example, historians estimate that the U.S. MPR for WWII was 12%. So 30,000 would be about 15% of 200,000. This is close to the number listed in the final battle. This being the number of the total population gains strength when we read Mormon 6:7. If you read it carefully it sure seems to suggest that the order of battle included women and children. Towards the end of any war a nation scrapes the bottom of the barrel to fill out their army.


So even if the numbers are exaggerated by Mormon, or translated as numbers instead of units by Smith, or if these were unit names that didn't exist at their full strength, or the total population it doesn't matter. Having a problem with numbers puts it in good historical company, and a 30,000 man army and an ethnic group numbering about a quarter million is believable. There is both internal evidence and historical precedence for each view. Keep in mind that the writers in The Book of Mormon often complained about being "almost surrounded." Alma 22:29 In Mosiah25:2-3 we read that the Nephites were only about a quarter of the population of the Lamanites. (There are other verses that suggest the Nephites were a political minority, as well as significant outside sources from Mesoamericanists that often describe a small political elite ruling a much larger population, but this is getting on another topic.)

"Millions" in The Book of Mormon

Many critiques of The Book of Mormon often result from several common errors. The attack against the "millions" number from the book of Ether is a perfect example of arguments that result from shallow reading of the text and a lack of historical context.

1. Shallow Reading: The "millions" that some site is actually "nearly" that number. This equivocation is not something that I made up, it’s in the text. So critics take a figure explicitly inexact and turn it into a precise number. There is internal evidence for doubting BoM numbers elsewhere as well. At one point Mormon says that the Nephites “numbered as it were, the sands of the sea”. Yet this innumerable nation only mustered 30,000 soldiers for their war of survival against the Lamanites. (Mormon 1:7; 2:25)

But back to the chapter at hand, this number (of millions) is assumed to be from one battle in one area. This is demonstrably false. First, Ether 15:2 states that these casualties are in the past tense. So you have to look at chapter 14:
v 1-2 social order breaks down
v 3 civil war faction "gave battle" unto Coriantumur
v 4 more battles, travel
v 5 a long siege more deaths
v 6-10 more civil war and intrigue
v 11 two factions "give battle" across the land
v 13 another battle
v 14 army "smited"
v 16 a series of battles across the land
v 17 "many" cities overthrown and inhabitants killed
v 18-26 "swift" and "speedy" destruction across the land
v 27 more battle

So Chapter 15:2 is the result of the previous sanguine conflicts that ranged across the land. Not one “skirmish” in front of Ramah.

2. Historical Context: The possibly exaggerated numbers within The Book of Mormon fits many other historical accounts. Many scholars have already done a great job of pointing out the flaws in the Exodus numbers.[1] But I'm reminded of Edward Dryer's account of the "War of the Eight Princes" that decimated the Western Jin Dynasty in Ancient China. Some scholars argue the Jin army had 700,000 soldiers, and their capital at Luoyang boasted a population in the hundreds of thousands but was deserted by the end of the civil war. The battles from this civil war ranged across Northern China for only about 7 years, one contemporary observer said that the “bones had been picked” from the dynasty and one ancient historian suggests that one province had only 1% of its population survive the conflict.[2] Even earlier in Chinese history, Ralph Sawyer has pointed out that Warring States Period Kingdoms could possibly field up to half a million men for one campaign.[3] In every case these numbers are taken with a grain of salt, but that doesn’t condemn the texts that state them as a fraud.

Despite the evidence that pre modern societies could create and kill incredibly large armies over a short space of time, lets assume that the people here are right, and that other scholars who cite demographic impossibility of “millions” are right: does that destroy the historicity of the Book of Mormon?

The answer is a resounding no. In fact, having number problems would put The Book of Mormon in good company. Herodotus said the Persian army numbered in the millions. According to one scholar an army that big would have the beginning of the column in Greece before the end of the column even started![4] Kelly DeVries has discussed the imprecise nature of Medieval European military chronicles and cites the same problems.[5] As stated above, Edward Dryer doubts the numbers contained in the Imperial history of the “War of the Eight Princes” but still studies the primary sources for the conflict.

Scribal error, deliberate exaggeration, and a use of numbers as a colloquium (I told you a million times) explain the "wrong" numbers in the Book of Mormon far better than other theories and places it on a firm foundation with other ancient texts. Critics will cry foul, and argue that I just said that mistakes in the Book of Mormon prove its true, that's exactly what I did because historians  know the limitations of their sources and often accept their historicity even with those limits. To cite another example Greek historians, much like Mormon, had an ethnocentric view of their world. If all you read was Herodotus and Thucydides you would conclude that Westerners were the center of the world. But when study the Greeks with their proper historical context, you would know that there was a much bigger and arguably more influential power in Persia.[6]

So in short, there is a great deal of precedent for large numbers of soldiers being killed in battle. A careful reading of the text within The Book of Mormon suggests that an inexact number of people were killed over the course of numerous battles and locations. But The Book of Mormon is not false for possibly presenting exaggerated numbers, instead those wild numbers suggest that Mormon had the same editorial proclivities as other ancient historians. Thanks for reading, I look forward to your comments.

***Sources***
1. See The Church of Jesus Christ's Old Testament manual for one example.
2. Edward Dreyer, “The War of the Eight Princes”, Nicola Cosmo Ed. Military Culture in Imperial China Harvard University Press, 2009.
3. Ralph Sawyer Trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China West View Press, 1993.
4. N. Whatley. "On the Possibility of Reconstructing the Battle of Marathon" N. Whatley, Journal of Hellenistic Studies 84.1 (1964):119-139.
5. Kelly DeVries. "The Use of Chronicles in Recreating Medieval Military History, Journal of Medieval Military History, 2.1 (2004): 1-30.
6. Victor David Hanson Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western PowerAnchor Books, 2001, Chapter 1.

Revisiting the Military Problems in the Book of Helaman

A little while ago I discussed the social and political problems that resulted in the Books of Helaman and Third Nephi due to an influx of military veterans. I elaborated on this concept further in describing war bands in the Book of Mormon. Without going into excessive detail, the main thrust of my posts was to explore the reason for a social breakdown among the Nephites described in the years immediately before the coming of Christ. I postulated this was due to an increase in lengthy and distant wars which led to what Roman historians call The Agrarian Crisis. The length of wars caused many small farmers to lose their farms. This led to the rise of large landowners, while the de mobilized soldiers moved to the cities and increasingly became full time soldiers of fortune. Large private landlords could offer the rewards of full time military service that the state could not, and thus central power broke down and warlordism started to rise.

I applied this model to the events recorded in Helaman and Third Nephi with mixed results and largely abandoned it to explore other areas. But a recent video posted on youtube brought this topic back to me. Starting at about 1:45 in the video the narrator describes the social consequences of the elite's building program.



As the elites sought extravagant building projects many farmers lost their livelihood and became the poor masses. These poor and landless masses became exploitable as household soldiers, since many of the small farmers would not have the resources to cope with the changes. Second, many of these affected farmers would flee, either to large households or into the mountains to pursue banditry. It is not surprising that the Book of Helaman would show the effects of these actions. Many large households in ancient China could act as a tax and physical shelter to peasants. This would decrease the revenue and power of the state and increase the ability of large land holders to act with greater autonomy. This causes a self repeating cycle where the peasants continue to feel unsafe and either join the robbers, or seek protection of those with local and real power, (as opposed to an increasingly distant and impotent central power). The above analysis in conjunction with my previous posts goes a long way in explaining the causes detailed within the books of Helaman and Third Nephi.

What do you think? Is the Agrarian Crisis an appropriate comparison? Am I fitting the narrative to fit a preconceived conclusion? Am I right on? Did this help you understand the perils of seeking riches? Did this help you look at the scriptures in a different way? Thanks for reading.

Myriads of Soldiers

Over at mormonheretic someone made a comment suggesting that numbers in the Book of Mormon could mean specific units instead of an exact count. I was somewhat surprised and skeptical of that notion....Until I was studying some Xenophon today.

Xenophon's book, The Anabasis, recounts the story of Ten Thousand Greek soldiers that were trapped deep in Persian territory and had to fight their way out. In that book, the Greek root of the word myriad actually refers to a Greek unit of ten thousand men. I only mention it because today we use myriad in an adverbial sense, such as "the myriad fish in the ocean". And it can also be used as a noun, as in the "myriads of soldiers". In both instances the original usage of myriad, meaning ten thousand is lost and replaced with an approximate use of the word.

Now I can see a case where the Book of Mormon uses a reformed Egyptian word that has colloquial meaning, but Joseph Smith translates the term literally into a number. It would be as though a modern translator took the opposite of what happened to myriad, they took a phrase that now means "many people" and literally translated it to ten thousand.

Thus there is one more nuance added to our understanding of numbers in the Book of Mormon. There is evidence from classical western sources that a specific term for a military unit can change meaning through time. I appreciate Firetag for raising the original question and I hope to see some of his research soon.

The Problem with Numbers

I ran across an interesting site the other day: CARM. This "christian" apologetic group has a very active message board that largely consists of "yea those Mormons are dumb." In fact they have a current thread about Mormon "Scholars". The quotes around scholars are theirs and not mine. Their tactics consist of thumping their chests, demanding answers from Mormons, and then obfuscating and disqualifying the answers of anybody that actually responds, or even dare question the presumption that Mormonism is so obviously false, and maybe the Book of Mormon IS an ancient book.

That is where I come in. I have no stomach for intense polemic debates, I got my fill in Texas as a missionary. What I did want to comment on is the problem with numbers that is posted on CARM. I spent a great deal of time searching for the quote, more time than I wanted to on a site like that(I found it, but still have trouble posting links). But the two questions they present remain valid: Are the numbers accurate in the Book of Mormon? And if the casualty numbers detailed in several of the battles are false, is the historicity of the book still valid?

My answer is yes, no, and yes. Brant Gardner has done research on the possible symbolic nature of Book of Mormon numbers. One account contains a double/same/double pattern that could be a figurative device. (Alma 2:19: 12,532 and 6,562)Other numbers could be the mesoamerica equivalent of "if I told you a million times...". Now lets assume that the people at CARM are right, and that other scholars who cite demographic impossibility are right: does that destroy the historicity of the Book of Mormon? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, having number problems would put the Book of Mormon in good company. Herodotus said the Persian army numbered in the millions. According to one scholar an army that big would have the beginning of the column in Greece before the end of the column even started! (See "On the Possibility of Reconstructing the Battle of Marathon" by N. Whatley Journal of Hellenistic Studies) Kelly DeVries has discussed the imprecise nature of Medieval military Chronicles and cites the same problems. (Journal of Medieval Military History, vol. 2) Scribal error, deliberate exaggeration, and a use of numbers as a colloquium (I told you a million times)explain the "wrong" numbers in the Book of Mormon better than the other theory (Jo Smith making it up) and places it on a firm foundation with other ancient texts. Critics will cry foul, and argue that I just said that mistakes in the Book of Mormon prove its true, that's exactly what I did because real historians ("scholars" if you will) know the limitations of their sources and accept their historicity even with those limits. I.E. I read Herodotus in spite and sometimes because of its mistakes as well as for historical knowledge.

This argument is actually a second line of defense, since the first line of defense shows that either the original number for the demographic models is wrong. (A model starting with 50 will proceed differently than a model staring with 35, and over 1000 years will make a big statistical difference) Or that the qualifying statistics used are wrong (see Steven Danderson at FAIR) Or that the original group found "others" upon their arrival and absorbed them into their community. (See Sorenson: "Did Lehi Find others" Journal of BoM studies 1/1)

This shows the need for more careful scholarship in finding out the subtle things the Book of Mormon has to say. Using straw men based on shallow reading of the text to suit a "christian" goal of tearing down a religion is sad. More so when there are a great number of studies that have been done by scholars honestly examining what the Book of Mormon has to say concerning demographics and causality figures.

And there are more issues that historians can look at. A. Brent Merrill presented a case for a decimal organization of Nephite armies. (see the book, Warfare in the Book of Mormon) Future studies can examine the qualifying descriptions and the few express numbers to suggest army size. Scholars can then take the tentative demographic studies already completed and compare it to army size (decimal armies) and casualty reports, to examine orders of battle. So the real problem with numbers is not the wild statistics that pseudo scholars use to beat Mormons with, but the lack of in depth research concerning Nephite army size, casualty rates, and its comparison to demographic trends already presented.
Update: Thanks to meeting Mormon Heretic I can now post links
Update two: But in updating the link I deleted something that makes the link useless. Sorry.