Now Available! Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft

    I'm proud to announce my newest book, Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft is now available for order. Here is the book blurb and I'm still looking for reviewers if you're interested: 

    Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) is one of the most popular and widely known military writers in all of history. His ideas have influenced statesmen, generals, and businessmen for hundreds of years in the West and thousands of years in China. But Sun-Tzu was only one of many competing voices in Warring States China, and many Chinese philosophers and leaders, as well as a few modern Western military historians have questioned the privileged status of his theories. Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft, is the first book to systematically examine the chaotic debates among philosophers in the pivotal Warring States Period.

    Military historian Morgan Deane examines scores of texts from the philosophers of Legalism, Confucianism, Daoism, the Seven Military Classics, and many others to find the truly dominant ideas of Chinese thinkers, areas of disagreement, surprising points of agreement, and a sophisticated synthesis. The result forces us to fundamentally reexamine Chinese military theory and gives us the tools to understand contemporary matters. This "broad knowledge" of Chinese military theory becomes an invaluable tool to help readers better assess the strength of Communist China, the relative unimportance of super weapons, the primacy of winning the allegiance of the people to your government, the importance of timeless counter insurgency methods, and so much more.

The Word and the Sword

I found a single verse in Alma that comments upon an important debate and important ideas in philosophy. Alma 31:5-

And now, as the preaching of the word had a great tendency to lead the people to do that which was just—yea, it had had more powerful effect upon the minds of the people than the sword, or anything else, which had happened unto them—therefore Alma thought it was expedient that they should try the virtue of the word of God.

The word having a more powerful effect on the mind than the sword comments on the debate between Legalists and Confucians in Chinese history. Legalists took one side of that debate as thinkers like Lord Shang and Han Feizi believed in the power of the state. Some of the basic concepts stated that the state should punish light crimes heavily and use a system of rewards and punishments to control the people, weaken the separatist tendencies of noble families, and harness the entire state for war. As part of that harnessing Legalists like Han Feizi thought religion and other items that could undermine the state were vermin.  

Lord Shang for example continually emphasized that the government should control the people and that a weak people will make the army doubly strong.^[1] and “a fearful people, stimulated by penalties, will become brave, and a brave people, encouraged by rewards, will fight to the death.”^[2]

Han Feizi rather stridently opposed calls for mercy, compassion, love and anything that might undermine the state’s ability to use the sword:

To reward those who cut off the heads of the enemy and yet to admire acts of mercy and compassion; to hand out titles and stipends to those who capture the enemy’s cities and yet to give ear to the doctrines of universal love [Mohism]; to strengthen one’s armor and sharpen one’s weapons in preparation for the time of trouble, and yet to praise the elegant attire of the civil gentry; to hope to enrich the nation through agriculture and ward off the enemy with trained soldiers, and yet to pay honor to men of literary accomplishment…to indulge in contradictory acts like these is to insure that the state will never be well ordered. The nation at peace may patronize Confucian scholars and cavaliers; but the nation in danger must call upon its frightening men.^[3]

Religious writers, especially Confucians disagreed with this view. They argued a strong state might command men, but they are inherently fragile because they don’t win the love of and service of their people. The most widely cited belief comes from Mencius, a leading disciple of Confucius. He summarized the principle very well when he said that “when force is used to make men submit, they do not submit in their hearts…But when virtue is used to make men submit, they are happy in their hearts and sincerely submitted themselves.^[4]

The Pheasant Cap Master, a Daoist text that looked towards a hopeful future, described a people that might obey threats of the sword, but secretly seethed at Legalist governments and waited for a chance to rebel. 

“Worthy men hide in a disordered generation. Above they have to follow the ruler, below, there is no straight speaking, When the ruler is arrogant in behavior, the people have many taboo words. So men distort their honest sincerity, capable knights disguise their true substance. Though their real mind is unhappy, they dare not but praise...they dare not but labor...they dare not but follow.^[5] 

(Until they revolt. The Huainanzi attributed the swift and destined fall of the first Chinese dynasty to accumulated grievances.[6])

In a statement that seems somewhat simple Xunzi, a leading Confucian scholar specifically mentioned the tattoos and branding irons, (implements of punishments of Legalist states), as leading the people to view the opposing ruler as more like a father than their own:

If the [people in a Legalist army] favor the benevolent ruler [of the opposing state], look up to him as to a father or mother, and rejoice in him as in the fragrance of iris or orchid, and on the contrary regard their own superiors as so many wielders of branding irons and tattoo knives, as their foes and enemies, then human nature being what it is…how could they be willing to fight for the sake of men they hate and do harm to one they love?^[7]

The first and last quote include details about the efficacy of soldiers forced into war by an authoritarian state compared to choosing to fight because their hearts are devoted to their leader. But the most important point of all the writings is that the state, or as Mormon wrote, the sword, can only change or compel men so much. The Confucian and Daoist writers argued very well that force fails to capture the hearts of the people and produces changes that are more superficial. The Book of Mormon includes an example of this. The people of Alma were subjugated by the Amulonites who then institutde the death penalty for those caught praying. But the power was temporary because “Alma and his people did not raise their voices to the Lord their God, but did pour out their hearts to him (Mosiah 24:12.)” Eventually God helped them escape and the Amulonite’s use of the sword proved ineffectual to the hearts of the people devoted to God.

What is interesting though is that the sword still has a prominent place in this part of the text. Alma’s mission to the Zoramites was designed to avoid their defection to the Lamanites and a war (Alma 31:4), yet it ended up happening (Alma 35:9-11). Even the converts among the Zoramites had to take up arms to defend the country (Alma 35:14). Even though the text says the word had more power than the sword, the word didn’t produce the change they wanted while the sword did protect the Lamanite and Zoramite converts.

The supremacy of the word over the sword might be a subtle critique against Moroni. His Title of Liberty included prophecy, but also men running with their armor (and presumably weapons) to hear and covenant with those words (Alma 46:21).  Moroni later received permission from the people and the government to suppress dissenters with the sword and force them to fight for the cause of liberty (Alma 51:15; 17-20). This was a time of great danger for the nation as they faced a significant invasion, but I always find it odd to make people fight for freedom. As Xunzi pointed out, the people should love the ruler and their nation so much that they “[buckle] on their armor and enthusiastically [attack the enemy] without waiting for any orders from their superiors.”[8] While Moroni’s free men enthusiastically flocked to his Moroni’s banner; applying the commentary of Chinese philosophers, we might conclude that the King Men submitted with their lips and supported the Nephite cause but they secretly seethed at the government, perhaps fueling the insurgency later in Helaman.

Clearly a nuanced look at the history of the text would suggest the Nephites may have relied on the sword too much, despite Mormon’s statement in Alma 31:5. The word was stronger as it penetrated the heart and made for more lasting change than those compelled by the power and swords of the state. Yet military action remained a tragic necessity as seen by the results of the Zoramite mission. Its possible that the Nephite’s compelled the bodies with the sword but didn’t win hearts like they should. This underscores how truly important it is to led the word lead people to do what was just. And it impresses me that the Book of Mormon can have such robust conversations with the ideas debated by impressive Chinese thinkers.   

Thanks for reading. I work as a freelance scholar so if you found value in this work please consider donating using the pay pal button below or buy one of the my books linked in the top left. Thanks again! 

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[1] The Book of Lord Shang, JJL Duyvendak trans., (Chicago University Press, 1928,) 198.

[2] The Book of Lord Shang, 201.

[3] Han Feizi, Basic Writings, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 2003,) 108.

[4] As quoted in Rickett, Guanzi: Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans., (Princeton University Press, 1985,) 12.

[5] The Pheasant Cap Master, Marnix Wells trans., (Three Pines Press, 2013,) 195.

[6] Liu An’s Art of War: Huainanzi chapter 15, Anderew Seth Meyer trans., (Columbia University Press, 2012, )107-108. Chen Sheng, a conscript soldier, arose…He bared his right arm and raised it, proclaiming himself Great chuh, and the empire responded like an echo. At that time, he did not have strong armor or sharp weapons, powerful bows or hard spears. They cut date trees to make spears; they ground awls and chisels to make swords, they sharpened bamboo and shouldered hoes to meet keen halberds and strong crossbows, yet not city they attacked or land they invaded did not surrender to them. They roiled and shook, overran and rolled up an area of several thousand square li…Chen’s force and station were supremely lowly, and his weapons and equipment were of no advantage, yet one man sang out and the empire harmonized with him. This was because resentment had accumulated among the people.

[7] Xunzi, Basic Writings, 58-59.

[8] Wei Liaozi, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Westview Press, 1993,) 260.

Help!

I seemed to have reached a plateau in my writing. I come up with good ideas, I'm good at research, can write good term papers, but can't seem to break through into publishing. So I'm asking for any and all interested reviewers! You not only get to see topics previewed on this site more in depth, but you will also have the satisfaction of helping an up and coming scholar. The following is a list of papers I need reviewed.

The Narrow Strip of Wilderness in the Modern Age:
This is a for a conference on Mormon perspectives on war. While it is just a presentation and has lower standards than a publication this is still important. It is my academic "debut" for many Mormon circles. That may sound ironic since I've been blogging and writing for two years now, but its presentations and publications that really help you make a mark in the field. Plus, its possible that editors from Mormon publications will be there so, naturally, I want to make a good impression.

This paper examines military theory from Clausewitz and then looks at its practice in the American Civil War. I then examine the theory that underlined Nephite actions and then tried to examine Nephite military practice. Finally I applied this to the modern age and offered tentative lessons concerning American foreign policy and particularly the Bush Doctrine.

Bleached Bones Covered the Field:
This is a special paper for me. I started this the day before my personal life fell apart. So just completing it was badge of honor for me. But aside from its' personal importance the paper has a great deal to offer the field of Book of Mormon studies.

This is the only paper of which I know that approaches a study of the book from the East. Hugh Nibley has discussed this topic mostly in passing. John Sorenson has produced a bibliography which included pages of contact between Asia and the New World. And DNA often points to an Asiatic connection. So this paper examines the Jaredite civil war in Ether chapters 13-15 with the Chinese "War of the Eight Princes".

In addition to the unique avenue of approach this is one of the few English language studies of the Chinese civil war. Plus, Chinese military history is also relatively neglected. So this paper offers a truly unique approach to understanding The Book of Mormon. I simply need some help tightening the prose and arguments to get this published.

Notes on a Curious Verse:
This is a paper I wrote while on break from graduate school. As I've said before, I must be the only person that gets more work done during the holidays. This examines Alma 56:28 and its implications for Nephite military strategy, culture, and logistics. Again, this is one of the few papers that takes a "war and society" approach to military history in The Book of Mormon, but also only the second piece to examine military theory in it. (Hugh Nibley's Clausewitzean analysis is the other one).

No Sin By Strategem:
This was the first paper I wrote during graduate school and probably needs the most work. It examines the military career of Captain Moroni using the "principles of war".

So there you have it. I have many fun and important papers with which I would love to receive help. Let me know and thanks in advance!

Strategy in the Book of Mormon

This is a rough draft of a Wikipedia article that I am writing for F.A.I.R. Feel free to provide any feedback that you have.

Strategy in the Book of Mormon:
Merriam Webster’s dictionary defines strategy as “the science and art of military command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions".[1]

The Nephites adopted a strategy that most closely resembles what military historian Russell F. Weigley labeled the “offensive defensive”.[2] They were commanded to avoid offensive wars, (Mormon 3: 9-15)and multiple leaders such as Mormon and Limhi specifically refused to lead the Nephites in their offensive operations outside of Nephite lands (Mosiah: 21:6-12). They believed that their temporal safety and strength in war making were ensured through righteous living and pre battle ritual (Alma 61:13, Alma 46: 9-28, Alma 48: 7, Helaman 4: 24-26). However, once Nephite lands were attacked they were commanded by the Lord to “resist evil…with [their] swords” (Alma 61:10-13), and they felt it was “no sin” to use stratagems and offensive operations to defeat enemy armies (Alma 43: 30).

As part of this defensive mindset the Nephites built towers (Helaman 7:11), walls and small forts (Alma 48:8).[3] Under the reign of Pahoran, Moroni evicted Lamanites settlers along both the east and west seas so he could establish what anthropologist John Sorenson called “military outposts”.[4] These settlements strengthened the Nephite position (Alma 50:10-13). One researcher suggests this strength derived from the placement of the city Moroni upon a pivotal river crossing.[5] Further research postulates the existence of military colonies established closer to the west sea to bolster the defense of that area.[6]

Upon the invasion of Nephite lands military leaders relied upon defensive fortifications in many cases (Alma 49). However in later Nephite history this often proved ineffective (Helaman 1). Historians A. Brent Merrill and Morgan T. Deane suggest that Moroni used what is now called the principles of war in seeking to attack and defeat enemy armies.[7] Additionally the Nephites used “complex pre battle maneuvering”,[8] pre battle divination (Alma 43:23), ambushes (Alma 43:31-33), spies (Alma 50:31), and feigned retreats (Alma 52:23, 56:36), that culminated in shock battle (Alma 43:37, Alma 52: 32-34). (see TACTICS for more) And sometimes the various parties requested battle at a specific time and place ( Mormon 6: 2, Alma 52:20).[9] Although several pre battle ruses such as raids upon enemy supply,[10] aiding internal dissension (Alma 61: 8), and obstructing marching armies[11] suggest that some strategic options were designed to weaken armies through means other than battle.

For sub national actors such as the Gadianton Robbers, the Nephites adopted a military strategy of “search and destroy” (Helaman 11:28). This policy often failed miserably due to difficult terrain that these robbers occupied. When operating outside of that difficult terrain the Nephites consolidated their position to their central cities. They tried to defend those cities and engage the enemy army in climatic shock battles that took advantage of additional ruses, such sending an army to cut off their retreat (3 Nephi: 2:11, chapters 3-4).

Footnotes:
1. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy (Accessed August 19, 2009).
2. Russell Weigley The American Way of War Indianapolis IN: Indiana University Press, 1973, 96-97.
3. See FORTIFICATIONS.
4. John Sorenson. Mormons Map.(still need to complete this footnote)
5. Preliminary research posted on http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2009/04/naval-warfare-in-book-of-mormon.html (Accessed August 19th 2009).
6. Unpublished research: “Notes on a Curious Verse: Alma 56:28” by Morgan T. Deane.
7. A Brent Merrill “Nephite Captains and Chief Captains in the Book of Mormon” in Stephen Ricks and William Hamblin Ed. Warfare in the Book of Mormon Provo, Salt Lake City: Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon Studies and Deseret Book, 1991. Morgan Deane “No Sin by Stratagem” BCC E Journal 4:1 (2009), 1-32. (Forthcoming) “Principles of War” should have a hyper link to its Wikipedia article.
8. William Hamblin “The Importance of Warfare in Book of Mormon Studies” in Noel B. Reynolds Ed. Book of Mormon Authorship Revisited Provo, F.A.R.M.S. Publication 1997.
9. John Welch also argues that the Almicite War recorded in Alma 1-2 was prearranged: John Welch “Why Study War in the Book of Mormon” in Stephen Ricks and William Hamblin Ed. Warfare in the Book of Mormon Provo: F.A.R.M.S. Publication, 1991.
10. Brant Garnder’s Multi Dimensional Commentary of the Book of Mormon for Alma 52:22.
11. Morgan Deane Preliminary Research posted on http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2009/02/army-composition-and-tactics-part-ii.html (Accessed August 19, 2009).

Naval Warfare in the Book of Mormon

This may seem an odd post since there is no explicit mention of warfare upon the waterways in the Book of Mormon. But there are ships, rivers, oceans, and armies fighting, which means warfare extended to that arena.

The logical place to start is with the few mentions of sea going vessels in the Book of Mormon. The original settlers arrived across the ocean in a boat. Although that ship's construction was on par with other miracles like Moses crossing the Red Sea, (1 Nephi 17) so it is unlikely the Nephites built more once they arrived. According to Sorenson they probably moved into the highlands away from the coast.(Ancient American Setting, 138-140) A small tribal confederation in the highlands would have little need, or means for a navy, or even much maritime trade. (If I was an expert in 6th Century Mesoamerican economics I could insert some cool figures here, but I am basing my views on general knowledge I have on Nephite society, and in knowledge I have of other ancient civilizations)

The next mention of ships is in Alma 63 where the "exceedingly curious" person named Hagoth uses his skill in shipbuilding to expand Nephite trade and settling. This represents a new period of expansion in Nephite trade and society. There are other examples from ancient societies that mix trade, colonization, and warfare. William Hamblin in Warfare in the Ancient Near East describes how Egyptian rulers often combined trade and military missions. In fact, a receipt of goods was often a sign of superior military strength, and after receiving goods the stronger power would leave a garrison to establish political control and ensure favorable terms with their "trading" partner. I have also talked about the likely hood of the colonizers being former army veterans, thus the overseas expansion of the Nephites, enabled by Hagoth's shipbuilding, was at least under protection of the Nephite soldiers (part of the "Corporate Sponsorship" that Sorenson described in Nephite trading missions, 211) and could have been more overt military ventures- like using military force to ensure favorable trading status and/or to exert military control.

In discussing these tenuously supported ideas, we should keep in mind that "a hundreth part" of what happened in Nephite society is included in the record. (Helaman 3:14) Thus there should be a a little understanding in trying to figure out the other 99 parts.

Part of those unstated factors are the logistical and strategic concerns from the river Sidon. The river could be crossed (on foot it seems-Alma 43:35) above Zarahemla, but was deep enough to float bodies out to sea beneath Zarahemla. This suggests an ebb and flow to the river, and that the river is deeper down stream from Zarahemla. Rivers were almost always logistic highways due to the ease of transporting large amounts of supplies compared to using land routes. Both ancient Egypt (in Ancient Warfare in the Near East) and ancient China ("Dou Jiande's Dilema..." by David Graff in Chinese Ways of Warfare) used rivers for troop and supply transport, as well as many other societies. (See John Lynn Ed. "Feeding Mars") The Egyptian example was from the early Bronze age and the Nile had many areas with impassible rapids, so even societies with primitive technology and with unfriendly terrain could see and use the advantage offered by waterways.

In strategic matters, if we accept Sorenson's map 12 on page 240 then the important city of Sidon and maybe even the military city of Moroni were on the river, and the river marked a boundary with the Lamanite center of influence. The Southern Song and Chen Dynasty in China can testify to the importance of using a river for defense since they were both conquered by Northern Empires using the Yangtze as a highway for conquest.(General Grant did the same thing in Tennesse during the American Civil War as well) Plus, the famous Battle of Red Cliffs and Fei River represented the ability of a weak opponent to turn back a strong one by defending pivotal river crossings.(The Battle of Shiloh during the American Civil War is another example of defending against river crossing by a stronger power, amazing how good military principles transcend time and place huh?) This is another piece of evidence that bolsters the case for Moroni placing a military garrison on the river: he sought to deny the enemy a chance to cross the river. It could also answer the charge of some critics who contend that Mesoamerican (and hence Nephite) societies were not advanced enough to equip, transport, and supply armies across large distances in the first century B.C.. Using the river Sidon as a highway for transport and supply would ease logistical burdens for much of their possessions on the "East Sea". It would make an ability to project power in that direction far easier. And explain why on the west sea the Nephites had to establish military colonies (that I argue for in a paper based on Alma 56:28). And further explains the fatalistic thoughts that occurred when Nephihah was captured: in Alma 59:11 Moroni wonders if the war could be won if his government so easily abandons a pivotal city.

Thus it is impossible to think that the Nephites did not use the river to transport soldiers (perhaps the reason Moroni had time to redeploy from Jershon to Zarahemla faster than the Lamanite force). The Nephites already used it to depose of dead bodies (Alma 44:22). And I have an unpublished paper that discusses logistical concerns, with the river Sidon being important to that.

Conclusion: I have discussed external evidence from ancient societies that could help shed light on naval warfare in the Book of Mormon. And I have shown that the Book of Mormon contains sufficient evidence to discuss overseas trading missions, and possible military ventures. The direction of Nephite political power could at least partially result from the benefits of the river Sidon. And many strategic decisions make more sense as well if we accept the benefits that the river Sidon offered. Like many other topics I discuss here, these are preliminary comments and research that demand comment, discussion and further research. Thanks for reading and I hope you can contribute to those stated goals.

Ancient Models for Modern War

Lindsey asked a good question. Good enough, that she will get an entire post as a response. The question is: How can ancient war help us understand modern conflict? In particular, how can the Book of Mormon help us understand modern war?

There are several responses I have to this. Here are some general impressions:

1. Every historian has the same general answer; when you study the past, different cultures, and periods hundreds or even thousands of years removed from ours you are really trying to learn about yourself. You can do this by seeing similarities or explaining why there are differences. Thus the study of the past is really a study of yourself, and a study of the future. (Insert the overused George Santayana quote here). So the study of the past has intrinsic merit in understanding ourselves today. For example, I mentioned how we can study the tactical operations of Nephite armies. This will allow us to examine how the "average" soldier acted. By understanding the hopes and fears of ancient soldiers, it can inform us pertaining to the universality of mans condition, and help us understand ourselves. That as people we tend to react a certain way to fear and death no matter what time and culture we live in.

2. There are some specific military historians (See Martin Van Creveld's "The Transformation of War", and Hammes' "The Sling and the Stone" for two of them) who say that we have entered a post Clausewitzean phase where the famous German military theorist's ideas on the nature of war no longer applies, because wars basic nature has changed. Others, such as my former teacher Dr. Echevarria, argue that Clausewitz is still very much in force and that war can change colors (i.e.: technology) but its nature (the trinity of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy) remain the same. See "4th generation warfare and other myths" at the Strategic Studies Institute. Examining the nature of war with a book that seems to have come out of nowhere can better inform us concerning the underlying nature of war; even for an ancient society, or what the 19th century imagination of an ancient society.

3. In a similar vein, other military theorists point to almost scientific principles that explain how war is conducted. British Inter World War Theorist J.F.C. Fuller articulated the principles of war that our modern U.S. Army Officers study even today. Thus ancient warfare should conform to these principles just as much as modern warfare does. And studying an ancient book (like the Book of Mormon) should exhibit these principles of war and could add to our understanding of them. In the LDS Church we often talk about the definition of principle: Principles are concentrated truth, packaged for application to a wide variety of circumstances. (Richard G. Scott, November 1993 Ensign,86) Thus the Book of Mormon, if true, should contain not only vast amounts of spiritual truth, but also other truth as well. I have already done research that shows the Book of Mormon conforms to these principles and adds several twists to our understanding of them. (The paper is currently under review by BCC E Journal)

4. Today's military historians are obsessed with the "Western Way of War". The short short version of the theory says that Ancient Greeks fought a certain way, and Western culture has generally produced armies that fight the same way. By introducing the Book of Mormon to this argument we can examine one of several things. First, does the Book of Mormon present similarities to this Way? If so, what does that say about the uniqueness of a supposed Way of War. Does it mean there is a universal condition to war? Or is it more like John Lynn's counter argument that says each culture has a specific dialogue and "way" of war? Thus the Book of Mormon can help add to a modern debate about the prosecution of modern war.

5. There are examples of modern technology mirroring in many ways ancient tactics and technology. The first chariots were missile platforms from which archers could fire with greater security. Kenneth Chase in "The World History of Firearms", showed how early gunpowder forces would use mobile wagons linked together to provide firing platforms and greater security. Thus, an ancient technology like the War chariot was loosely reproduced thousands of years later due to both societies having similar demands. Thus, studying the ancient tactics in the Book of Mormon will allow us to see general principles that can apply even today.

6. The Book of Mormon's spiritual message should not be separated from warfare. Every cultural must face war, and many Christian cultures find trouble reconciling their faith with their martial duties. And in ancient cultures the state was generally the religion and vice versa. (William Hamblin called ancient wars "A continuation of God's policy by other means" in Warfare in the Ancient Near East) Now today we have a separation of church and state. But we don't suddenly become atheists when we join the military. The entwined spiritual and martial message of the Book of Mormon are still vital to know and understand for those of us today who interact with war's devastation, personnel conflicts, and demands.

7. Finally, the Book of Mormon has been the symbol of the LDS religion since its inception. Thus how the Book was used within Mormon culture can also lead us to a better understanding of war. For instance, in 2003 President Hinckley used Alma 43 to articulate a Mormon version of "The Just War Theory" to justify the Iraq War. (Ensign May 2003: "War and Peace") So the words of the Book of Mormon inspire modern action and both can be examined to identify the trends of Mormon society, and society in general in how they feel and react towards war.