Moral Clarity on the Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings

Reposted yearly as a much needed part of the conversation. 

        August 6th marks the dubious day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark controversy. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. And a record low number of Americans are proud of their country. This is somewhat understandable as societal attitudes change and there is a great deal to critique over the decision. But it might also be what the editors at the National Review recently pointed out is part of the crisis of self-doubt gaining traction in America and what Wilfred McClay called a deeply unserious country that doesn’t believe in itself. Yet a proper study of the history surrounding the decision to drop the bombs and an examination of ethics finds the bombing was both justified and necessary.

        During the war both sides held a great deal of racial animus towards one another, which suggests the bomb might have been more willingly used because of racism.[1] Though, the bomb wasn’t ready in time to end the war against Germany so that is hard to gauge. Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3] After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4] (Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid military targets.) Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese that made this completely unnecessary.

        As I will show below, these are all extremely flawed arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context and seem like excuses to blame American and undermine moral confidence today, instead of understanding the tragic but justified decisions of the past. Most importantly, every moral argument against the bombing fails because every blood soaked alternative was worse! 

        The strongest criticism regards peace overtures from Japanese officials. Who doesn’t want the war to end early? This theory argues that the Japanese were ready for peace and only block headed, blood thirsty, and maybe even racist generals kept the war going. These were detailed by a revisionist historian, Gar Alperovitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5] More importantly, this theory cherry picks some information and leave out much more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent and U.S. officials were correct when they disregarded them.

        The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup. Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections from war crimes tribunals.[6] The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.

        Let me stress, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant factions in Japanese leadership wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. The idea is an ahistorical fantasy used by modern pundits to attack America. Moreover, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have secured more concessions.

        Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but really aren’t because these quotes also ignore historical context. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[7]

        With all due respect to Eisenhower and other leaders cherry picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear weapons since his New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[8] Those that blanche at the use of nuclear weapons and hate the national security state should probably avoid quoting a general that as president, threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crises, and unleashed CIA sponsored coups on democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala that still reverberate today.

        Other military critics were vocal against nuclear weapons not because of moral principles, but because of parochial rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[9] Thus it isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals and generals used as props against nuclear weapons respectively preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, or an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

        The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese) dying from an invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[10] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed but called this period the worst of his entire life. By 1945, an estimated 200,000 Chinese a month were dying. Many more on both sides would have died in fighting on the Japanese homeland. 

        

        The various estimates are disputed, often based on ideological preference, but General Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2 million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[11] If the war only lasted another six months to a year that, the heavy combat and conventional strategic bombing campaign would have resulted in 1.2-2.4 million Chinese deaths. The estimated deaths for all combatants (American, Chinese, Japanese) without dropping the bombs would have been between 6.5 million and 13.4 million. But somehow shallow sermonizers against the bomb would have us believe that was the better choice. 

        The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[12] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would have caused more deaths and in a slower manner, arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China and again, it would have been more deadly for all sides than the two atomic bombs. 

        Even then, any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Moreover, starving the population as a tactic is a war crime. The admirals who argued for this arguably unjust and criminal course didn't object to the morality of using the bomb, their objection was simply the result of petty inter service rivalries. Yet they are drafted, out of context, into modern, post hoc debates regarding the morality of using atomic weapons. 

        The quick end to the war had the felicitous effect of forestalling a Soviet invasion. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and Stalin invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, and they stood by while free Poles died in the Battle of Warsaw. (Stalin was so petty he didn't even let allies use his airspace to drop supplies.) It was obviously a benefit to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. 

        After looking at the other options and strategic context in late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact, ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands of lives lost compared to the abject blood bath and tens of millions of deaths is why the allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[13] Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[14]

        In short, every other option was worse than using atomic weapons! Taken in a vacuum, of course nuclear weapons are horrific. It sounds authoritative to declare their use immoral and it makes a nice bumper sticker to sarcastically assert that Jesus would nuke people. But that weapon wasn’t used in a vacuum. It was used against a horribly aggressive regime and it prevented other options that would have killed millions more. The argument about a regrettable use of a shocking weapon to quickly end the war doesn't make a convenient bumper sticker, but its correct and morally superior to the alternatives. 

        It is both unfair and shallow to blame America for their barbaric use of atomic weapons while ignoring the context of that fierce war which compelled and justified their use. I bet that many of the pacifists today are descendants of servicemen and women that came home and had babies instead of dying because the atomic bombs prevented so much needless bloodshed. Many of the Japanese and Chinese people today are descendants of those that didn't die because of the millions of deaths the bombs obviated. And all of those people have lived, loved, laughed, hugged, and created beautiful works of art because the war ended without a horrific bloodbath. 

        Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of ever having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the genocidal campaign of Hamas sadly remind us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II. Every American should strive to have the knowledge and tools to properly judge the morality of the past, which in turn provides the moral confidence to justly proceed in the present.

Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.

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[1] For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.
[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.
[3] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)
[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks
[5] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth
[6] Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House, 2001), 97.
[7] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)
[8] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.
[9] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.
[10] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.
[11] Frank, Downfall, 340.
[12] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.
[13] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.
[14] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197

Moral Clarity on the Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings

 

    August 6^th marks the dubious day in 1945 where America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark controversy. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped from 85 to 57 percent. And a record low number of Americans are proud of their country. This is somewhat understandable as societal attitudes change and there is a great deal to critique over the decision. But it might also be what the editors at the National Review recently pointed out is part of the crisis of self-doubt gaining traction in America and what Wilfred McClay called a deeply unserious country that doesn’t believe in itself. Yet a proper study of the history surrounding the decision to drop the bombs and an examination of ethics finds the bombing was both justified and necessary.

    During the war both sides held a great deal of racial animus towards one another, which suggests the bomb might have been more willingly used because of racism.[1] Though, the bomb wasn’t ready in time to end the war against Germany so that is hard to gauge. Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2] The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3] After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4] (Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Nagasaki for example, was home to one of the most important military garrisons and was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained a valid military target.) Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese that made this completely unnecessary.

    As I will show below, these are all extremely flawed arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context and seem like excuses to blame American and undermine moral confidence today, instead of understanding the tragic but justified decisions of the past.

    The strongest criticism seems to be the peace overtures. Who doesn’t want the war to end early? This theory argues that the Japanese were ready for peace and only block headed, blood thirsty, and maybe even racist generals kept the war going. These were detailed by a revisionist historian, Gar Alperovitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5] More importantly, this theory cherry picks some information and leave out much more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent and U.S. officials were correct when they disregarded them.

    The best evidence against this theory comes after the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After the bombs dropped and the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the decision through a military coup. It’s incredibly unlikely that minor officials would have produced peace when the atomically convinced emperor almost didn’t. Let me stress, even AFTER the atomic bombs were dropped there were significant factions in Japan that wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the bombs were dropped. Plus, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to think that more fighting would have gotten them more concessions.

    Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but really aren’t. Many of these quotes also ignore historical context. One example comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[6]

    With all due respect to Eisenhower and other generals cherry picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear weapons since his New Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[7] Those that blanche at the use of nuclear weapons and hate the national security state should probably avoid quoting a general that as president, threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crises, and unleashed CIA sponsored coups on democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala that still reverberate today.

    Other military critics were vocal against nuclear weapons not because of moral principles, but because of parochial rivalries. The bombs were delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[8] Thus it isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize the “barbaric” “toy” dropped by the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar sentiments. In fact, the admirals preferred a blockade of the Japan that would have slowly killed millions, and the army preferred an invasion that would have also killed millions (see below.)

    The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and Chinese) dying from an invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[9] Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed, but called this period the worst of his entire life. An estimated two hundred thousand Chinese a month were dying at this point in the war. An invasion by American forces on the Japanese homeland would have skyrocketed those figures. Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an invasion.[10]

    There was the option not to fight which would have left China and much of Asia in the hands of a regime as bad as Hitler’s. Yet one has to wonder how long the imperial Japanese would have felt comfortable with the U.S. in Hawaii so they would probably have attacked America again anyway. The U.S. could have continued to bomb them. The firebombing of Tokyo and conventional attacks actually caused more deaths than the nuclear bombs so that couldn’t have been a better option.

    The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[11] and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would have caused more deaths and in a slow manner arguably worse than two nuclear bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in their genocidal war against China. So between deaths from famine and deaths from the Greater East Asian War that option would have killed millions more than the bombings. Even then, any peace offering from the emperor would have likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Keep in mind that the admirals who argued for this possibly unjust and criminal course are the same admirals being quoted out of context today for entirely different reasons than the military leaders originally intended.  

    Dropping the atomic bomb quickly ended the war which prevented the Soviets from invading as well. The first atomic bomb was dropped literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and he invaded a day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show trials, mass deportations to the gulags, the Soviet army’s refusal to help the free Poles in the Battle of Warsaw etc., so it was a good option to end the war quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany and Eastern Europe even today. You can easily argue that the Japanese Constitution and rebuilding under MacArthur was far preferable to Soviet occupation.

    After looking at the other options and strategic context in late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact, ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands compared to the abject blood bath and millions of deaths that awaited all sides is the reason why the allied leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[12]  Secretary of State Henry Stimson exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[13]

    In short, every other option than using nuclear weapons was worse. Taken in vacuum nuclear weapons are horrific, but that weapon wasn’t used in a vacuum and its incredibly unfair to blame America for being barbarians while ignoring the context that justified and compelled their use. This is probably because few have studied military ethics in depth, they simply think that some things are “bad.” But again, considering every option and the context of their war the dropping of atomic weapons was justified and necessary. The war was ended more quickly, saving lives, including millions of Asian lives.

    Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of any having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine sadly reminds us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20^th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II.  And every American should strive to have the knowledge and tools to properly judge the morality of the past, which in turn provides the moral confidence to justly proceed in the present.

I work as a free lance writer. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buying one of my books linked in the top left. 

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[1] For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.

[2] Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.

[3] Howard Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html Accessed August 6th, 2021.)

[4] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24.  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6.  https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks

[5] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth

[6] Julian Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the Bomb, The Guardian, August 5^th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history (Accessed August 6th 2021.)

[7] Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.

[8] Keith McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.

[9] Morgan Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017), chapter 12.  

[10] Frank, Richard B. (1999). Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 340.

[11] Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.  

[12] Michael Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.  

[13] Henry L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197.

 

Sunzi and the Moral Low Ground

    

    Whenever I'm not working and have some free time I like to read. I love to engage ideas and usually I engage enough to make a post out of it. In this case I couldn't make it to page 3 of this book (The Choice of War: Iraq and the Just War Tradition) before I found a howler. This author claims that Sunzi "laid great stress on moral aspects of war" as proof the author cites the claim of Sunzi (using an old translation), “to win without fighting.”

    I was so ready to pounce on this incorrect statement I reminded myself of the Office character Dwight Schrute yelling “false.” Sunzi's admonition wasn't out of some moral, pacifistic desire to avoid war. But an amoral desire to avoid costly conflict. His amoral teachings were one reason why Confucians really didn’t like him. His desire to avoid battle was somewhat similar to the legalists in worrying about the productivity of the soon to be conquered province. Dead men don’t pay taxes, burnt farms can’t supply soldiers, and thus the cost of men and material spent in even a victorious battle was astounding and the legalists wanted to avoid costly battle for that reason.

    Sunzi did advise the invading army to seek profit as a way to entice the enemy into battle,[1] (or hopeless prebattle position), and take provisions from invaded territory to lower the cost of war. But these measures were mostly applied to lowering the cost of the invading army. He didn’t talk about ways to incorporate the province and quickly it make it a profitable part of the empire. For example, one of the lesser-known writers of the Seven Military Classics said of the conquered territory: “do not destroy material profits nor agricultural seasons, be magnanimous towards his government officials, stabilize people’s occupations, and provide relief for the impoverished.”[2]  

    Notice the last line that seems in almost direct contradiction of Sunzi. It said to provide relief to the impoverished, while Sunzi advised armies to literally plunder them. The treatment of the people is a huge factor that distinguishes Sunzi from others. My book had three chapters on this subject because it was visited so often and in so many variations by classical Chinese theorists. But outside of a perfunctory statement about winning the people, Sunzi’s writing often relied on pure calculation, force, profit, and throwing soldiers into places which they cannot fleet to stimulate the greatest effort.

    His first line is that warfare is the greatest affair of state, which ignores the second part quoted by most Confucians about protecting the altars of the ancestors.[3] As one writer said, “When a state loses its priorities, the altars of soil and grain will be wronged.” [4] Sunzi instead spoke mostly about tactical positional advantage (designed to produce victory without battle) and not about the Mandate of Heaven, righteousness, or benevolence. He discussed calculations in the temple, but only to assess the prospects of victory, not to pray or invoke Heaven's favor.

    Sunzi's theories were criticized by thee Confucian Xunzi as tactics for a bandit army and day laborers, or like stirring boiling water with a finger.[5] Even Wuzi, a fellow military writer often lumped in with Sunzi thought bandit armies that pursued profits were a weakness that could be exploited. He said that armies based on rewards ‘’scatter and individually” engage in combat, and when enticed with profit “will [greedily] abandon their generals to pursue it.”[6]

    Sunzi’s statement about avoiding the loss of life was not a moral high ground. But the results of base temporal concerns like profit and greed. It was disheartening to read such a major mistake so early in the book, and in print which means it got by an editor. But quoting Sunzi is an easy way to spice up a piece and few people know better so everyone from editors, to readers, and generals just go with it. I’ve seen bad quotes and interpretations from the financial review a Master’s thesis, and even General Petraeus. His terse writing and simple profundity lend itself to a wide variety of interpretations. But when compared to dozens of other classical writers a reader can better understand his theories and eliminate the bad interpretations such as Sunzi having some kind of moral objection to slaughter.

I work as a free lance author. If you found value in this ad free, high quality, research please consider donating using the pay pal button below, or buying one of my books linked in the top left, particularly Beyond Sunzi: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft. 

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[1] “Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits from the enemy is material goods.” And, “With profit [the general] moves them” Ralph Sawyer trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China: Sunzi (Westview Press, 1993), 160, 165.

[2] Sawyer, Wei Liaozi, 273.

[3] Sawyer, Tai Kong, 64-65.

[4] Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huanglao, and YingYang in Han China, Robin Yates trans., New York City, Ballantine Books, 1997.

[5] Basic Writings of Xunzi, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 1963,) 64.

[6] Sawyer, Wuzi, 210.

Now Available! Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft

    I'm proud to announce my newest book, Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft is now available for order. Here is the book blurb and I'm still looking for reviewers if you're interested: 

    Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) is one of the most popular and widely known military writers in all of history. His ideas have influenced statesmen, generals, and businessmen for hundreds of years in the West and thousands of years in China. But Sun-Tzu was only one of many competing voices in Warring States China, and many Chinese philosophers and leaders, as well as a few modern Western military historians have questioned the privileged status of his theories. Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft, is the first book to systematically examine the chaotic debates among philosophers in the pivotal Warring States Period.

    Military historian Morgan Deane examines scores of texts from the philosophers of Legalism, Confucianism, Daoism, the Seven Military Classics, and many others to find the truly dominant ideas of Chinese thinkers, areas of disagreement, surprising points of agreement, and a sophisticated synthesis. The result forces us to fundamentally reexamine Chinese military theory and gives us the tools to understand contemporary matters. This "broad knowledge" of Chinese military theory becomes an invaluable tool to help readers better assess the strength of Communist China, the relative unimportance of super weapons, the primacy of winning the allegiance of the people to your government, the importance of timeless counter insurgency methods, and so much more.

New Book! Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft

    I'm proud to announce my new book, Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft is available for preorder. My research into Chinese military history supplies many of the great ideas found for free on this blog. I have unique insights into the nature of warfare, insurgency, military theory, just warfare and so much more. If you find value in this blog, please make sure and check out the book. I keep the prices low so it is a great stocking stuffer for you and your loved ones.

Here is the blurb:

Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) is one of the most popular and widely known military writers in all of history. His ideas have influenced statesmen, generals, and businessmen for hundreds of years in the West and thousands of years in China. But Sun-Tzu was only one of many competing voices in Warring States China, and many Chinese philosophers and leaders, as well as a few modern Western military historians have questioned the privileged status of his theories. Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft, is the first book to systematically examine the chaotic debates among philosophers in the pivotal Warring States Period.

Military historian Morgan Deane examines scores of texts from the philosophers of Legalism, Confucianism, Daoism, the Seven Military Classics, and many others to find the truly dominant ideas of Chinese thinkers, areas of disagreement, surprising points of agreement, and a sophisticated synthesis. The result forces us to fundamentally reexamine Chinese military theory and gives us the tools to understand contemporary matters. This "broad knowledge" of Chinese military theory becomes an invaluable tool to help readers better assess the strength of Communist China, the relative unimportance of super weapons, the primacy of winning the allegiance of the people to your government, the importance of timeless counter insurgency methods, and so much more.

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    I work as a freelance author. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or you can buy one of my books.

Whats Going On?

Most of you have probably noticed its been almost two full months since I posted which is quite awhile for me on this blog. That is due to several specific reasons:

Beyond Sun- Tzu: This is the newest book I've been working on. I discussed the project here as well as some applications it might have for my Book of Mormon research. Much of the free time I have for writing has been taken up with this project. I've finished a draft* and I've started making edits. I have some interest from Routledge Press so lets hope that bears fruit as well.

*There are two sections that aren't done that are a glossary and conclusion. Both of those don't include analysis and are mostly summary so I don't count those.

I forgot to mention one important way this effects my Book of Mormon research. If you have a passionate belief for or against military action with verses or prophetic statements to support it then you already know that there are a variety of conflicting statements on the matter. Those that supported the war in Iraq pointed to Captain Moroni, those against it quoted Mormon.  My project took 30 classic Chinese texts and through thousands of pages to see how they agree, disagree, debate, and interact with each other about warfare. This makes me uniquely qualified to do the same thing with Mormon scriptures and prophetic statements. I hope to start on this soon after my current book is published and situation stabilized (see below).

Life: This category is somewhat vague but extensive because life took over. Shortly after I published my last post my computer fried. I heard a zap and smelled some burning and my computer was dead. Despite several technicians assuring me that it was an easy fix, it took me almost a month before I got a new computer. I was able to keep up with my work on an ancient laptop that works surprisingly well for its age, but I didn't have my notes on my latest blog post. This post is the latest of a series on ancient historians and covered Gregory of Tours and the History of the Franks. I thought this was fitting since the cover of my last monograph on the Book of Mormon was the baptism of Clovis. That post is coming in the next couple of weeks hopefully.

Even though I finally got my computer back during that epic saga of fixing it the free lance outfit for which I write closed down, so essentially I lost my job. I've been spending most of the time I normally spend writing now applying for jobs and going to interviews.  On top of that, I have leaking water from my bathroom to my bedroom which suggests potential leaks, water damage, and expensive cleanup. 

New Buttons: All of this mental energy expended trying to pay the bills and handle one crisis after another (such as spending several hours getting my flat tire repaired yesterday) makes it tough to write about somewhat obscure and at this point less important topics like ancient history. That is why I added two things to the blog. I added a email subscription box, so you can get these posts more often and as soon as they are published. Adding your name to this list might be a springboard to my offering a paid subscription newsletter service that highlights political and military analysis I previously wrote for my last job. I occasionally posted samples here like this piece on China's Peace Disease and I if the business model is viable I hope to offer several pieces like that per week.

I also re-added the pay pal donation button at the bottom of the page. Researching and writing pieces about ancient history and the Book of Mormon is time and energy consuming. I love to do it but often don't have the energy after working three jobs, or now the stress of job hunting.  This has been an add free space for over ten years(!) that provides valuable and unique analysis on the Book of Mormon. If you value this work and wish to see it continued then please consider donating. It will be a valuable contribution that helps me continue this work. If you don't feel like contributing, you might also considering buying one of my books to my newly linked author page at Amazon. I have to run to an interview so I hope to provide more quality work for you shortly. Thanks and have a great day.

Sharpening Swords and Sharpening Oneself- Applying Research

I’m working on new project tentatively titled, A Soldier in Armor Does not Bow: Classical Debates on War and Government Beyond Sun-Tzu.  Sunzi (Sun-Tzu) tends to overshadow the rest of the commentary on classic Chinese military theory. The translations are too many to count and just the famous ones include Giles, Griffith, Cleary and Sawyer. And this is before getting into various proliferating boutique editions sold at major book stores.

But this focus on Sunzi borders on obsession and it blinds the general public to the many more works in existences, hinders those with academic training in military theory from the rich potential of the rest of the corpus, and the texts beyond Sunzi are often ignored by the majority of scholars who specialize in these texts and instead focus their research on the ethical, metaphysical, and literary qualities inside them. Xunzi is an excellent example of this trend. He was one of the most influential and sophisticated philosophers in pre imperial China and is the subject of dozens of books and essays. Yet there is no work that devotes significant attention to Xunzi's military theories, despite the fact he thought the topic of armed conflict enough important to devote an entire treatise to it.

The project will take advantage of my academic study in Chinese military history, an extensive background in general military thought including both ancient and modern thinkers, and the increasing number of English translations of seminal volumes that remained to be studied.  These include new translations of the Mozi, the Dao De Jing, the Analects of Confucious (Kong Fuzi), Seven Military Classics, Huainanzi, Sun Bin’s Art of War, Shizi, Guanzi, Mencius, Xunzi, Yi Zhou Shu, the Pheasant Cap Master of Heguanzi and the so called "lost classics" of the Yellow Emperor. When combined with the existing the Book of Lord Shang, Han Feizi and fragments or excerpts from the works of thinkers like Shen Puhai and Jia Yi this becomes a sold corpus. Taken together they cover a broad spectrum of Chinese thought and debate among Confucianists, Legalists, Daoists, the methods of Shen Pu Hai and their various combinations and synthesis.

Despite being publicly available, some of them for close to 100 years, very little has been done to systematically assess and evaluate these texts. Focusing on Sunzi to the detriment of the rest of the military thought is a tragedy. That misplaced focus fails to recognize that moral questions that governments wrestled with. Sunzi’s focus on purely rational calculation obscures the debate around moral matters that many writers contend strengthened both the government and soldiers. In some places, Sunzi’s advice directly contradicts sound commands regarding the conducts of army towards civilians, and the treatment of soldiers. Important concepts such as shih and weighing (quan) are elaborated much more fully in other texts.  The misplaced focus also ignores the history of the China and its application. Many leaders such as those that unified China in the 2nd century BC and the Kaangxi Emperor of the late 18th century AD respectively used other theories and called the classics like Sunzi “worthless.”

As part of that project I’ve seen a good deal of material that can be applied to the Book of Mormon and our study of it.

1       

      Why Study? This quote supplies advice about the role of knowledge in sharpening oneself and its relationship to warfare.

Learning is like sharpening. Suppose fine copper from Mount Kunwu and excellent tin from zhufu are worked by the famous blacksmiths of Gan and Yue and forged into a sword. Yet if they do not use both fine and course whetstones on it, then when using it to stab it will not enter, and when using it to slash, it will not cut…Nowadays, people all know to sharpen swords, but no one knows to sharpen themselves. Learning is the sharpening of the self.[1]

If you change sharpen swords to being a jerk on social media it is even more insightful. Now that I think about it, this quote, “Nowadays, people all know how to be a jerk, but no one knows how to learn” sounds like something that would be posted on the archways at facebook.

2      The authorship of historic texts: The man named Guanzi is thought to have lived in the 7^th century BC. But his writings weren’t complied until about 26BC and his writings contain a great deal of material that responds to contemporary debates in the late warring states period. This has led to debates among different theories that are repeated in some measure in regards to almost every text.

The two extremes range from it being written by Guanzi or entirely written by somebody else. The middle views are more nuanced and include a corpus of older material that was added by later scholars or disciples. Another theory is that writings from a certain school were written in Guanzi’s name or attributed to him by the editor of his works in 26BC. This means that different authors wrote texts that discussed good ministry, authoritative Confucianism, and good policies towards the people and the unknown authors sought more authority for their works by invoking Guanzi’s name, or it was a way to classify them and the Guanzi School simply became Guanzi.

This has the most application regarding the Book of Abraham. I’m basically familiar with the issues regarding the Book of Abraham though I can’t say exactly how much of the above about Guanzi applies to this. The LDS gospel topics essays says, “[Abraham] is the author not the copyist” which implies that the line, “by my own hand,” in the introduction is a bit more nuanced. This might inspire critics to say that apologists are stretching or twisting to explain away uncomfortable facts when I can read the same debate about almost 30 different ancient texts. So I can say it’s really pretty normal to assume that ancient writings have rather complicated provenance and the Book of Abraham, as an assumed ancient writing, is no different.

3       Anachronisms: This is a favorite hobby horse (or Tapir) of critics but it’s similarly flawed when viewed from a historical perspective. The one that popped out to me the most was an argument from Tai Kong. This text was supposedly written in the later Zhou Dynasty around the 10^th century BC. But then this ancient Tai Kong directly addresses a specific problem to the latter Warring States Period:

“When the people are not engaged in agriculture and sericulture but instead give rein to their tempers and travel about as bravados, disdaining and transgressing the laws and prohibitions, not following the instructions of officials, it harms the king’s transforming influence.”[2]

These are the same types of individuals that legalists like Han Feizi criticized.[3] They were viewed as honorable people but they didn’t fight for the state and actually undermined it so they were often criticized by government officials.

The response to this isn’t that the book is a clear forgery that now has no use. Going back to point one the explanation depends on who you ask. But it could very well be that later writers added things to a core text which introduced the anachronisms. Most anti Mormon critics tend to move the book quickly into the total fraud category, but an alternate explanation is that this represents the long provenance of the book going through the hands of difference editors (such as Joseph Smith translating Mormon’s translation of Ether.) 

4       Related to the anachronisms was the moral outrage over violence and how it contribution to the texts and how people viewed the authenticity of them:  Confucians such as Mencius were quick to disqualify texts like the Tai Kong over their anachronisms because its depiction of brutal violence, spy craft like corrupting with women, and revolutionary nature made it unsalable for Confucians. Sunzi was often criticized because he didn’t seem to care about morality like Confucians did. Guanzi, the good Confucian minister advocated for proper treatment of the people, Sunzi said cast them into hopeless situations in order to stimulate the greatest effort. Sunzi said that warfare was the greatest affair of state but many others would argue that it was the altars of state that was most important.[4]  To the utter horror of Confucian historians the Yi Zhou Shu included how a conquering ruler cut off over 1 million ears and captured another 3 million.^[5]

The point is that editors tell the stories they want to and often make judgements about the veracity of documents based on their personal beliefs. These judgements can be seen by carefully looking at what is included and how it’s included. Before you start to say there I go again, this is the same methodology that Grant Hardy employed when he pointed out the long digression after Nephi comes back with the plates and similar inferences that can be made about Nephi’s actions.

Hardy discussed how Nephi came back from killing Laban and obtaining the plates. Instead of recording Lehi’s reactions it does something really unusual, it details the words of Sariah, and then it says how Lehi made an offering for sacrifice. By reading the text critically and looking at what was included and not included we might tentatively believe, according to Hardy, that Lehi did not approve of Nephi’s actions. The larger point is that a careful reading of the text suggests possible unintended consequences and actions that Mormon (once we leave the plates of Nephi) often tried to massage away from the text. This doesn’t hurt the text but should increase our appreciation of it.

5       Answering Questions that Weren’t Asked: One of the most rewarding aspects of my work is finding that the Book of Mormon actually answers great questions that I never asked until I started reading these Chinese texts. I’ve posted these previously on my blog so I won’t repeat them here. But you can find much more about battlefield morality and the role of ritual in camp.  I’ve got a paper based on this submitted for an upcoming conference so I hope I can present this to a larger audience.

Those are the major factors that apply to the Book of Mormon. My extensive readings and specific examples I provide are reasons why I find the criticisms of both anti Mormons and fundamentalists rather shallow. They often stem from a lack of knowledge and inappropriate use of the limited knowledge they do have. Its too often scholarship warped into a narrow pursuit, which is why I’m so excited about this book that will bring classical Chinese military theory to a much wider audience.  

Thanks for reading. I work as a freelance author so if found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buying one of my books. It will help me continue my research so I can bring you more of these. Thank you! 

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[1] Shizi: China’s First Syncretist, Paul Fischer trans., (Columbia University Press, 2012,) 58.

[2] The Six Secret Teachings of Tai Kong, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Westview Press, 1993), 48.

[3] Han Feizi Basic Writings, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 2003,) 106.

[4] Tai Kong, Seven Military Classics, 64; Sun Pin Military Methods, Ralph Sawyer trans., Westview Press, 1995. 84; Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huanglao, and YingYang in Han China, Robin Yates trans., (New York City, Ballantine Books, 1997) 57; Han, Watson, 50; Basic Writings of Xunzi, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 1963,) 71, Wuzi, Seven Classics, 206.

[5] Robine McNeal, To Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the Yi Zho Shu, (University of Hawaii Press, 2012), 94.