Modern Problems Ancient Solutions

 

  

 I almost named my first book modern problems to ancient solutions. I’ve also mentioned before that I find classical Chinese theory some of the most thorough that I’ve seen outside of maybe Clausewitz. It is all the more amazing because in some cases these theories were expressed thousands of years ago. I was reading a new book Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by James Dubik. I’ve got a book coming out on just war, and there are so many other books on the subject I want to keep abreast as much as I can. The book itself was a bit of a dud.[1] But the important part was that the book brought up important ideas that were addressed a long time ago, hence the title of this post.

    One of the dominant themes of Reconsidered is that a large reason for having a moral strategy determined by high level leaders is to make sure the soldier’s executing it are not dying in vain for it. President Lincoln considered this idea in the Gettysburg Address. Dubik said the soldiers should know that commanders care about soldiers (p. 52). And on page 99 that soldiers are expected to risk their lives, but know their lives are not thrown away, wasted in missions “without achieving something that would give their sacrifices meaning.”

    That sounds nice but isn’t new. Numerous classical Chinese authors, (between 400 and 200 BC) commented on the connection between goals and methods. One of the reasons the great military theorist Sunzi advised that the pinnacle of victory is winning without a fight, was to avoid needless casualties when they swarm over city walls like ants.[2]

    The purported descendant of Sunzi, Sun Bin, said simply that when commander “employs them like earth and grass,” they won’t respect or follow him.[3] One of the leading Confucians, Mencius attacked the leaders who treat ministers like grass.[4] In both cases they referred to the clumps of dirt and grass that were often cast aside without a thought by shoveling day laborers. These examples focused more on battlefield leadership. But they shared high level responsibility of modern civilian leaders and high-level military strategists. 

     The next comparison from Dubik’s book was between the idea about civil control of the military. The founders were concerned about an Oliver Cromwell type figure which is why they required military funding on a yearly basis done by the House. After World War II the civilians in the government passed the National Security Act as a further safeguard. In this case, Dubik said that militaries strong enough to protect were often strong enough to overthrow the government (57).

    This was a classic Chinese dilemma. The generals of the Southern Jin dynasty of the mid-5th century AD could often sweep down the Yangtze River and overthrow their civilian leaders. The An Lushan rebellion (755 AD) started in the periphery because of a powerful general gained power while protecting the frontier. And the final defection of the Lu Wende, inspired by civilian officials fearful of growing power, doomed the defeat of the Southern Song in the 13th century to the powerful Mongol invasion.

    To solve this, Chinese leaders often had what was called Tiger Tallies, which were two halves of a totem that needed to be combined by the civilian and martial leader, or provincial official and representative from the central government before the provincial military leader could muster the military.

    On top of this, there were various ceremonies that reinforced the need to remove a general from his command and source of power before meeting civilian officials. The historical background for one of the seven military classics, Methods of Sima, included this:[5]

[After taking command and hearing news of the enemy’s withdraw] thereupon [the general] pursued and attacked the [enemy], subsequently retaking all the territory within the borders of the old fief, returning with the soldiers. Before [the general] reached the state capital he disbanded the units, released them from military constraints, swore a covenant, and thereafter entered the city. Duke Ching (547-490BC) and the high officials greeted him in the suburbs, rewarding the troops and completing the rites, only afterward returning to rest.

    The footnote explains that removal of military constraints consists of the loyalty required of soldiers to their commander. This has obvious implications and recalls Caesar crossing the Rubicon as the most famous example of a military commander using the army for political purposes. I also noted how there was both a ceremony, implied ritual, before Amalickiah could enter the capital and meet the queen ( Alma 47:33).

    Just  like military officials shouldn’t use their military power to intimidate civilian officials or seize power,  there are multiple examples of how the military commander should not face interference in the field from officials in the court with their often out of date and faulty information. Dubik wrote about the example of President Johnson who brow beat and demeaned his generals to the point that dissuaded the kind of sustained discussion and debate needed for good high-level policy (61,95).

    The military theorist Tai Kong explained it well here:

After the General has received his mandate, he bows and responds to the ruler: ‘I have heard that a country cannot follow the commands of another state’s government, while an army [in the field] cannot follow central government control. Someone of two minds cannot properly serve his ruler; someone in doubt cannot respond to the enemy. I have already received my mandate and taken sole control of the awesome power of the fu and yueh axes [symbols of authority similar to the tiger tally discussed above]. I do not dare return alive. I would like to request that you condescend to grant complete and sole command to me. If you do not permit it, I dare not accept the post of general.’ The king then grants it, and the general formally takes his leave and departs.[6] 

    But the Tai Kong only discussed the general being free from meddling. Johnson (and other poor modern leaders) denigrated their advisers. The classical Chinese military theorist Wuzi discussed this danger as well. In my book about classical Chinese thought, I described the danger that theorists described as being the smartest man in the room:

[The general Wuzi] attended a meeting in court where the ruler was often dismissive of his ministers...After the meeting he expressed his concern to the ruler by sharing the story about the King of Chu and the value of ruler receiving wisdom from ministers: I have heard it said there are no lack of Sages in the world and no shortage of Worthies in a state. One who can get them to be his teachers will be a king, while one who has them as his friends can become a hegemon. Now I am not talented, yet none of my ministers can even equal me in ability…This is what the King of Chu found troublesome, yet you are pleased by it. I therefore dare to be fearful.[7]

    As usual, Wuzi seems to bridge the divide between various camps to produce a sound and practical synthesis. In contrast to legalists he is a military official that seems supportive of the ministerial class, but not so much so like Confucians. He supported the basic concept that a ruler should learn from his advisers in order to create the best strategy which doesn’t needlessly sacrifice his soldier’s lives. Wuzi simply argued that a ruler can be far more powerful by listening to his ministers and side stepped the advice of Taoist rivals about being unknowable.

    Supporting a sustained debate to achieve good strategy is offered by Dubik as a much-needed reassessment but he was simply repeating good ideas elucidated thousands of years ago. This good debate was formed, by what he said, was generals that possessed a “broad understanding.” This term was immediately explained to mean an analytic mind that can see coherence amid fog [a possibly Clausewitz term][8] and listen to extended discourse (101).

    This is an exhortation about military leaders could penetrate the bureaucracy. The writings of Guanzi, often seen as the prototype of a good Confucian minister also gave parameters for penetrating fog, but his “broader approach” suggested moving beyond than super weapons or a larger number of soldiers. I chose to include hit here because, Guanzi’s use of the term is broader than the ability of keen generals to offer good policy advice:

The art of conducting warfare consists… of acquiring a broad knowledge of the realm and an understanding of strategy- all to an unrivalled degree… It is impossible for [the ruler] to hope to bring order to the realm if his material resources do not excel those of the rest of the realm. It is [also] impossible even if he excels in material resources, but fails to excel in [the skill of] his artisans, or if he excels in [the skill] of artisans, fails in weaponry. [Likewise] it is impossible even if he excels in weaponry, but fails in [the quality of] his knights, or if he excels in [the quality of] his knights, fails in his instructions. It remains impossible even if he excels in his instructions, but fails to do so in training, or if he excels in training, but fails in terms of having a broad knowledge of the realm, or excelling in terms of broad knowledge, fails in his understanding of strategy….[9]

    The good ideas of the past being so applicable to modern problems is the major reason why I would rather read older books for their wisdom and avoid being so quick to abandon or ignore those texts in favor of modern ideas. One of the most enjoyable parts of being a historian is reading the wise words of an ancient scholar and being impressed by their keen intellect and wisdom. It is the conceit of every modern age to think that they alone have solved all the world’s problems. Yet they only do so by abandoning the past. Such reasoning has resulted in the reign of terror, massacres in the great leap forward, and the folly of pacificism overriding just war theories. I hope I’ve provided even a small part of their wisdom and I hope I’ve inspired you to read them more.

    Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below, or buy one of my books linked in the top left. (If you liked this piece, you might enjoy Beyond Sunzi: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft.)

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[1] It discussed the moral burden resting on politicians and top generals involved in creating a winning strategy. But it focused a great deal on bureaucracy which was fairly typical for a top general trying to offer something new.

[2] Sunzi, in The Seven Military Classics, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Basic Books, 1993), 161.

[3] Ralph Sawyer trans., Sun Bin’s Military Methods, (New York: Westview Press, 1995),200.

[4] Mencius: A New Translation Arranged and Annotated For the General Reader, W.A.C.H. Dobson trans., University of Toronto Press, 1963), 16.

[5] The Methods of Sima, in Seven Classics, 114.

[6] Six Secret Teachings of Tai Kong, The Seven Classics, 64.

[7] Wuzi, Seven Classics, 210.

[8] Eugenia C. Kiesling (2001). "On War Without the Fog" (PDF). Military Review. October 2001.

[9] Guanzi: Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans., (Princeton University Press, 1985,) 132.

Now Available! Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft

    I'm proud to announce my newest book, Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft is now available for order. Here is the book blurb and I'm still looking for reviewers if you're interested: 

    Sun-Tzu (Sunzi) is one of the most popular and widely known military writers in all of history. His ideas have influenced statesmen, generals, and businessmen for hundreds of years in the West and thousands of years in China. But Sun-Tzu was only one of many competing voices in Warring States China, and many Chinese philosophers and leaders, as well as a few modern Western military historians have questioned the privileged status of his theories. Beyond Sun-Tzu: Classical Chinese Debates on War and Statecraft, is the first book to systematically examine the chaotic debates among philosophers in the pivotal Warring States Period.

    Military historian Morgan Deane examines scores of texts from the philosophers of Legalism, Confucianism, Daoism, the Seven Military Classics, and many others to find the truly dominant ideas of Chinese thinkers, areas of disagreement, surprising points of agreement, and a sophisticated synthesis. The result forces us to fundamentally reexamine Chinese military theory and gives us the tools to understand contemporary matters. This "broad knowledge" of Chinese military theory becomes an invaluable tool to help readers better assess the strength of Communist China, the relative unimportance of super weapons, the primacy of winning the allegiance of the people to your government, the importance of timeless counter insurgency methods, and so much more.

Sharpening Swords and Sharpening Oneself- Applying Research

I’m working on new project tentatively titled, A Soldier in Armor Does not Bow: Classical Debates on War and Government Beyond Sun-Tzu.  Sunzi (Sun-Tzu) tends to overshadow the rest of the commentary on classic Chinese military theory. The translations are too many to count and just the famous ones include Giles, Griffith, Cleary and Sawyer. And this is before getting into various proliferating boutique editions sold at major book stores.

But this focus on Sunzi borders on obsession and it blinds the general public to the many more works in existences, hinders those with academic training in military theory from the rich potential of the rest of the corpus, and the texts beyond Sunzi are often ignored by the majority of scholars who specialize in these texts and instead focus their research on the ethical, metaphysical, and literary qualities inside them. Xunzi is an excellent example of this trend. He was one of the most influential and sophisticated philosophers in pre imperial China and is the subject of dozens of books and essays. Yet there is no work that devotes significant attention to Xunzi's military theories, despite the fact he thought the topic of armed conflict enough important to devote an entire treatise to it.

The project will take advantage of my academic study in Chinese military history, an extensive background in general military thought including both ancient and modern thinkers, and the increasing number of English translations of seminal volumes that remained to be studied.  These include new translations of the Mozi, the Dao De Jing, the Analects of Confucious (Kong Fuzi), Seven Military Classics, Huainanzi, Sun Bin’s Art of War, Shizi, Guanzi, Mencius, Xunzi, Yi Zhou Shu, the Pheasant Cap Master of Heguanzi and the so called "lost classics" of the Yellow Emperor. When combined with the existing the Book of Lord Shang, Han Feizi and fragments or excerpts from the works of thinkers like Shen Puhai and Jia Yi this becomes a sold corpus. Taken together they cover a broad spectrum of Chinese thought and debate among Confucianists, Legalists, Daoists, the methods of Shen Pu Hai and their various combinations and synthesis.

Despite being publicly available, some of them for close to 100 years, very little has been done to systematically assess and evaluate these texts. Focusing on Sunzi to the detriment of the rest of the military thought is a tragedy. That misplaced focus fails to recognize that moral questions that governments wrestled with. Sunzi’s focus on purely rational calculation obscures the debate around moral matters that many writers contend strengthened both the government and soldiers. In some places, Sunzi’s advice directly contradicts sound commands regarding the conducts of army towards civilians, and the treatment of soldiers. Important concepts such as shih and weighing (quan) are elaborated much more fully in other texts.  The misplaced focus also ignores the history of the China and its application. Many leaders such as those that unified China in the 2nd century BC and the Kaangxi Emperor of the late 18th century AD respectively used other theories and called the classics like Sunzi “worthless.”

As part of that project I’ve seen a good deal of material that can be applied to the Book of Mormon and our study of it.

1       

      Why Study? This quote supplies advice about the role of knowledge in sharpening oneself and its relationship to warfare.

Learning is like sharpening. Suppose fine copper from Mount Kunwu and excellent tin from zhufu are worked by the famous blacksmiths of Gan and Yue and forged into a sword. Yet if they do not use both fine and course whetstones on it, then when using it to stab it will not enter, and when using it to slash, it will not cut…Nowadays, people all know to sharpen swords, but no one knows to sharpen themselves. Learning is the sharpening of the self.[1]

If you change sharpen swords to being a jerk on social media it is even more insightful. Now that I think about it, this quote, “Nowadays, people all know how to be a jerk, but no one knows how to learn” sounds like something that would be posted on the archways at facebook.

2      The authorship of historic texts: The man named Guanzi is thought to have lived in the 7^th century BC. But his writings weren’t complied until about 26BC and his writings contain a great deal of material that responds to contemporary debates in the late warring states period. This has led to debates among different theories that are repeated in some measure in regards to almost every text.

The two extremes range from it being written by Guanzi or entirely written by somebody else. The middle views are more nuanced and include a corpus of older material that was added by later scholars or disciples. Another theory is that writings from a certain school were written in Guanzi’s name or attributed to him by the editor of his works in 26BC. This means that different authors wrote texts that discussed good ministry, authoritative Confucianism, and good policies towards the people and the unknown authors sought more authority for their works by invoking Guanzi’s name, or it was a way to classify them and the Guanzi School simply became Guanzi.

This has the most application regarding the Book of Abraham. I’m basically familiar with the issues regarding the Book of Abraham though I can’t say exactly how much of the above about Guanzi applies to this. The LDS gospel topics essays says, “[Abraham] is the author not the copyist” which implies that the line, “by my own hand,” in the introduction is a bit more nuanced. This might inspire critics to say that apologists are stretching or twisting to explain away uncomfortable facts when I can read the same debate about almost 30 different ancient texts. So I can say it’s really pretty normal to assume that ancient writings have rather complicated provenance and the Book of Abraham, as an assumed ancient writing, is no different.

3       Anachronisms: This is a favorite hobby horse (or Tapir) of critics but it’s similarly flawed when viewed from a historical perspective. The one that popped out to me the most was an argument from Tai Kong. This text was supposedly written in the later Zhou Dynasty around the 10^th century BC. But then this ancient Tai Kong directly addresses a specific problem to the latter Warring States Period:

“When the people are not engaged in agriculture and sericulture but instead give rein to their tempers and travel about as bravados, disdaining and transgressing the laws and prohibitions, not following the instructions of officials, it harms the king’s transforming influence.”[2]

These are the same types of individuals that legalists like Han Feizi criticized.[3] They were viewed as honorable people but they didn’t fight for the state and actually undermined it so they were often criticized by government officials.

The response to this isn’t that the book is a clear forgery that now has no use. Going back to point one the explanation depends on who you ask. But it could very well be that later writers added things to a core text which introduced the anachronisms. Most anti Mormon critics tend to move the book quickly into the total fraud category, but an alternate explanation is that this represents the long provenance of the book going through the hands of difference editors (such as Joseph Smith translating Mormon’s translation of Ether.) 

4       Related to the anachronisms was the moral outrage over violence and how it contribution to the texts and how people viewed the authenticity of them:  Confucians such as Mencius were quick to disqualify texts like the Tai Kong over their anachronisms because its depiction of brutal violence, spy craft like corrupting with women, and revolutionary nature made it unsalable for Confucians. Sunzi was often criticized because he didn’t seem to care about morality like Confucians did. Guanzi, the good Confucian minister advocated for proper treatment of the people, Sunzi said cast them into hopeless situations in order to stimulate the greatest effort. Sunzi said that warfare was the greatest affair of state but many others would argue that it was the altars of state that was most important.[4]  To the utter horror of Confucian historians the Yi Zhou Shu included how a conquering ruler cut off over 1 million ears and captured another 3 million.^[5]

The point is that editors tell the stories they want to and often make judgements about the veracity of documents based on their personal beliefs. These judgements can be seen by carefully looking at what is included and how it’s included. Before you start to say there I go again, this is the same methodology that Grant Hardy employed when he pointed out the long digression after Nephi comes back with the plates and similar inferences that can be made about Nephi’s actions.

Hardy discussed how Nephi came back from killing Laban and obtaining the plates. Instead of recording Lehi’s reactions it does something really unusual, it details the words of Sariah, and then it says how Lehi made an offering for sacrifice. By reading the text critically and looking at what was included and not included we might tentatively believe, according to Hardy, that Lehi did not approve of Nephi’s actions. The larger point is that a careful reading of the text suggests possible unintended consequences and actions that Mormon (once we leave the plates of Nephi) often tried to massage away from the text. This doesn’t hurt the text but should increase our appreciation of it.

5       Answering Questions that Weren’t Asked: One of the most rewarding aspects of my work is finding that the Book of Mormon actually answers great questions that I never asked until I started reading these Chinese texts. I’ve posted these previously on my blog so I won’t repeat them here. But you can find much more about battlefield morality and the role of ritual in camp.  I’ve got a paper based on this submitted for an upcoming conference so I hope I can present this to a larger audience.

Those are the major factors that apply to the Book of Mormon. My extensive readings and specific examples I provide are reasons why I find the criticisms of both anti Mormons and fundamentalists rather shallow. They often stem from a lack of knowledge and inappropriate use of the limited knowledge they do have. Its too often scholarship warped into a narrow pursuit, which is why I’m so excited about this book that will bring classical Chinese military theory to a much wider audience.  

Thanks for reading. I work as a freelance author so if found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buying one of my books. It will help me continue my research so I can bring you more of these. Thank you! 

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[1] Shizi: China’s First Syncretist, Paul Fischer trans., (Columbia University Press, 2012,) 58.

[2] The Six Secret Teachings of Tai Kong, in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Westview Press, 1993), 48.

[3] Han Feizi Basic Writings, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 2003,) 106.

[4] Tai Kong, Seven Military Classics, 64; Sun Pin Military Methods, Ralph Sawyer trans., Westview Press, 1995. 84; Five Lost Classics: Tao, Huanglao, and YingYang in Han China, Robin Yates trans., (New York City, Ballantine Books, 1997) 57; Han, Watson, 50; Basic Writings of Xunzi, Burton Watson trans., (Columbia University Press, 1963,) 71, Wuzi, Seven Classics, 206.

[5] Robine McNeal, To Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the Yi Zho Shu, (University of Hawaii Press, 2012), 94.

Maintaining and Manipulating the Appearance of Your Camp in The Book of Mormon and Chinese Theory

I had the pleasure of reviewing an advanced copy of David Spencer’s new book: Moroni’s Command. I offered some thoughts and brief endorsement for the back cover. But there was one particular passage that really stuck out to me based upon my knowledge of Chinese military theory:

When scouts were sent out from Manti to determine the strength of the Nephite force, they discovered that the Nephite force was not too large, so the Lamanite force began to make preparations to attack. Helaman’s own scouts reported the Lamanite activity, and he began to make demonstrations carefully designed to give the impression that his force did not suspect the actions of the Lamanite force. Along the main approach to his camp he dispatched two small forces, one under Gid and the other under Teomnor and ordered them to take up hidden positions to the left and right of the main path (Alma 58:16-17). Meanwhile he made an effort to maintain appearances that everything was business as usual in the Nephite camp, seeking to allay any Lamanite suspicions, so they would approach without caution. Helaman’s maturity as a commander since the Antiparah maneuver is evident in this account, as his forces in the main camp coolly waited until the last possible moment before fleeing from the advancing Lamanite force dispatched to destroy them.  This was an essential component of the plan because, by keeping up these appearances Gid and Teomner remained completely undetected.[1]  

The appearances of an armies camp is an important tool that China theorists prescribed for finding out the strength of the enemy. Since those theorists also described warfare as the “way of deception”.[2] It is no surprise then, that military commanders often manipulated their appearance to fool the enemy. 

Tai Kong wrote:[3]

If [your plans] are heard about, the enemy will make counter plans. If you are perceived they will plot against you. If you are known, they will put you in difficulty. If you are fathomed, they will endanger you.

Thus one excels at eliminating the misfortunes of the people manages them before they appear. Conquering the enemy means being victorious over the formless.[i.e., good at denying the enemy a chance to know your plans…]

To be the first to gain victory, initially display some weakness to the enemy and only afterward do battle. Then your effort will be half, but the achievement will be doubled.

And Wuzi wrote:[4]

In employing the army you must ascertain the enemy’s voids and strengths and then race [to take advantage of] his endangered points. When the enemy has just arrived from afar and their battle formations are not yet properly deployed, they can be attacked. If they have eaten but not yet established their encampment, they can be attacked. If they are running about wildly, they can be attacked. If they have labored hard, they can be attacked. If they have not yet taken advantage of the terrain, they can be attacked. When they have lost their critical moment and not followed up on opportunities, they can be attacked. When they have traversed a great distance and the rear guard has not yet had time to rest, they can be attacked. When fording rivers and only half of them have crossed, they can be attacked….In general circumstances such as these, select crack troops to rush on them, divide your remaining troops, and continue the assault- pressing the attack swiftly and decisively.

And the most famous Chinese theorist, Sunzi, touched upon each of these matters as well. “Thus if I determine the enemy’s disposition of forces [hsing] while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented.”[5]

And he offered a warning to those that judge based on enemy camps:

Thus the strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high mountains; do not confront those who have hills behind them.[6]  Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait…[7]

There is a clear congruence between Spencer’s narrative of how this battle developed, and the way that theorists described the need to study, and sometimes manipulate or avoid being manipulated by the enemies’ organization in their camp.  As I described in my book, this doesn’t mean that Helaman opened up his copy of the Seven Military Classics. But if we assume that military theory categorizes and measures military operations the same way a thermometer can measure heat, then using this theory to analyze the Book of Mormon is no different than checking the temperature on your food.  Moreover, if we assume the events described in the text are historical, then we should notice its relation to historical military texts.  Finally, I should not that I’m not completely convinced this is how the battle happened. I think Spencer fills in some blanks that aren’t readily apparent to this reader. But given that my second books is entirely about filling in blanks and making sometimes large (though well founded) assumptions based on small amounts of text;[8] and I find his description of the events matches up surprisingly well with military theory, so I’m willing to give him the benefit of the doubt in making those assumptions. I rather enjoyed describing connection and I hope you enjoyed reading about it. Thanks.  

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[1] David Spencer, Moroni’s Command: Dynamics of Command in the Book of Mormon,  (Salt Lake City: Cedar Fort Books, 2015), 137-139.

[2] Ralph Sawyer, trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New York: West View Press, 1993)158.

[3]Ibid., 68-69.

[4] Ibid., 213.

[5] Ibid., 167.

[6] An army with hills behind them would be in fatal terrain, making them especially dangerous. See chapter 4 of my book, Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents.

[7] Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, 170-171.

[8] And several anonymous reviewers, one in particular, seemed especially nit-picky and ridiculous in offering criticism of that approach. 

Ratings Low? Lets Talk about SEX!

Many people say you can increase the popularity of your product by including sex and violence. Since this blog is about warfare I already have plenty of the latter; and as I was reading some Chinese military theory I did realize how sex can be used as a weapon, and how it has a comparable example in The Book of Mormon.

Introducing Tai Kung's Six Secret Teachings, Ralph Sawyer describes how some scholars believe that it "preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought...[And]The Six Secret Teachings is the only military classic written from the perspective of revolutionary activity.[1]

This revolutionary activity includes striking at the enemies Mandate of Heaven. This includes "using bribes, gifts, and other methods to induce disloyalty among enemy officials and to cause chaos and consternation in their ranks; and further increasing the enemy's profligacy and debilitation by furnishing the tools for self-destruction-such as music, wine, women. Complete secrecy is mandated."[2]

Finally, the specific text tells the revolutionary leader to "introduce beautiful women and licentious sounds in order to befuddle him...when these...are employed they will become a military weapon."[3]

There are several important instructions we need to draw from these words. 1. These instructions come from "secret" texts. 2. Arguably, they come from some of the oldest military thought in Chinese history. 3. These methods were often employed using secret oaths. 4. These methods aimed to overthrow a rival and more powerful state. 5. They advocated using sexual desire as a means of attack.

Now that we have the basic methods described for us, we can examine the text of The Book of Mormon. In Ether chapter 8 we read:

7 And now Jared became exceedingly sorrowful because of the loss of the kingdom, for he had set his heart upon the kingdom and upon the glory of the world.
8 Now the daughter of Jared being exceedingly expert, and seeing the sorrows of her father, thought to devise a plan whereby she could redeem the kingdom unto her father.
9 Now the daughter of Jared was exceedingly fair. And it came to pass that she did talk with her father, and said unto him: Whereby hath my father so much sorrow? Hath he not read the record which our fathers brought across the great deep? Behold, is there not an account concerning them of old, that they by their secret plans did obtain kingdoms and great glory?
10 And now, therefore, let my father send for Akish, the son of Kimnor; and behold, I am fair, and I will dance before him, and I will please him, that he will desire me to wife; wherefore if he shall desire of thee that ye shall give unto him me to wife, then shall ye say: I will give her if ye will bring unto me the head of my father, the king.
11 And now Omer was a friend to Akish; wherefore, when Jared had sent for Akish, the daughter of Jared danced before him that she pleased him, insomuch that he desired her to wife. And it came to pass that he said unto Jared: Give her unto me to wife.
12 And Jared said unto him: I will give her unto you, if ye will bring unto me the head of my father, the king.
13 And it came to pass that Akish gathered in unto the house of Jared all his kinsfolk, and said unto them: Will ye swear unto me that ye will be faithful unto me in the thing which I shall desire of you?
14 And it came to pass that they all swore unto him, by the God of heaven, and also by the heavens, and also by the earth, and by their heads, that whoso should vary from the assistance which Akish desired should lose his head; and whoso should divulge whatsoever thing Akish made known unto them, the same should lose his life.
15 And it came to pass that thus they did agree with Akish. And Akish did administer unto them the oaths which were given by them of old who also sought power, which had been handed down even from Cain, who was a murderer from the beginning.
16 And they were kept up by the power of the devil to administer these oaths unto the people, to keep them in darkness, to help such as sought power to gain power, and to murder, and to plunder, and to lie, and to commit all manner of wickedness and whoredoms.
17 And it was the daughter of Jared who put it into his heart to search up these things of old; and Jared put it into the heart of Akish; wherefore, Akish administered it unto his kindred and friends, leading them away by fair promises to do whatsoever thing he desired.

Thus we see many of the points described by Tai Kung. 1. In verse 9 we read about secret plans. Its intriguing to note that these plans came from somewhere "across the great deep". The Jaredite timeline would put them in Asia sometime in during the Legendary Sage Emperors of China (2800-2200 BC). 3. Obviously, these method were employed through secret oaths. 4. These methods sought to overthrow an existing dynasty. 5. And famously, the daughter of Jared used her sex appeal to corrupt an official and gain the kingdom for her father.

Normally, I would simply point out that an ancient text agrees with another ancient text in many important details. Details that would make it difficult to believe that Joseph Smith simply guessed right. But in this case I will not only reaffirm that point, but point out the diversity of thought within the subject of military history were even a women's sex appeal can act as a weapon.

Finally, the text suggests a connection between some kind of ancient old world military theory and with a mention of old secret plans from "across the deep" referenced by the daughter of Jared. Hugh Nibley has suggested an Asiatic connection to the world of the Jaredites.[4] And the similarity between ancient Chinese military theory and the Jaredite secret practice reinforces this connection.

What do you think? Is this an example of two different societies independently developing the same practice, or do you think that "across the deep" means ancient China? Did this bring any other verses to your mind? Thanks for reading.

***Sources***
1.Ralph Sawyer Trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China New York: Westview Press, 1993, 23.
2. Ibid., 33.
3. Ibid., 57.
4. Hugh Nibley, The World of the Jaredites.

The Good Emperor

In this post I discussed how the editor, Mormon, went to great lengths to illustrate how the lifestyle of King Noah justified the withdraw of divine favor and his violent overthrow. Now I will show the opposite. Mormon inserted a lengthy speech from King Benjamin, who ruled at roughly the same time as King Noah. King Benjamin extensively details his righteousness, not to boast but to show why he has received God's favor and ultimately why his people have been blessed. I will show from ancient Chinese texts how a ruler had to qualify for the "Mandate of Heaven", and how the rulers mandate then blesses his people.

From the Six Secret Teaching by T'ai Kung we read:

King Wen inquired of the T'ai Kung: "The world is replete with a dazzling array of states-some full, others empty, some well ordered, others in chaos. How does it come to be thus? Is it that the moral qualities of these rulers are not the same?...
The T'ai Kung said: "If the ruler lacks moral worth, then the state will be in danger and the people in turbulence. If the ruler is a Worthy or a Sage, then the state will be at peace and the people well ordered. Fortune and misfortune like with the ruler, not with the seasons of Heaven."...
[King Wen then asks about a worthy ruler from history named Emperor Yao]
T'ai Kung: When Yao was king of the world he did not adorn himself with gold, silver, pearls, and jade. He did not wear brocaded, embroidered, or elegantly decorated clothes. He did not look at strange, odd, rare, or unusual things. He did not treasure items of amusement nor listen to licentious music. He did not whitewash the walls around the palace or the buildings nor decoratively carve the beams, square and round rafters, and pillars. He did not even trim the reeds that grew all about his courtyards. He used a deerskin robe to ward off the cold, while simple clothes covered his body. He ate coarse millet and unpolished grains and thick soups from rough vegetables. He did not, through the [untimely imposition of] labor service, inure the people's seasons for agriculture and sericulture. He reduced his desires and constrained his will, managing affairs by nonaction.
He honored the positions of the officials who were loyal, upright, and upheld the laws, and made generous the salaries of those who were pure and scrupulous and loved people. He loved and respected those among the people who were filial and compassionate, and he comforted and encouraged those who exhausted their strength in agriculture and sericulture....
He preserved and nurtured the widows, widowers, orphans, and solitary elderly and gave aid to the families who had suffered misfortune and loss...
What he allotted to himself was extremely meager, the taxes and services he required of the people were extremely few. Thus the myriad peoples were prosperous and happy and did not have the appearance of suffering from hunger and cold. The hundred surnames revered their ruler as if he were the sun and moon and gave their emotional allegiance as if he were their father and mother."
King Wen: "Great is the Worthy and Virtuous Ruler!"

We learn in this section that a ruler that seeks power must first gain heavenly favor. This ruler does this through a humble lifestlye that does not disturb the people. Emperor Yao was recognized as an example through 1: Not adorning himself with riches. 2: He avoided unrighteous and licentious behavior. 3: He did not overburden the people with excessive building projects. 4: He supported and protected the farmers and widows. 5: He kept taxes extremely low.

In the Book of Mosiah we read towards that beginning of King Benjamin's speech:

11 But I am like as yourselves, subject to all manner of infirmities in body and mind; yet I have been chosen by this people, and consecrated by my father, and was suffered by the hand of the Lord that I should be a ruler and a king over this people; and have been kept and preserved by his matchless power, to serve you with all the might, mind and strength which the Lord hath granted unto me.
12 I say unto you that as I have been suffered to spend my days in your service, even up to this time, and have not sought gold nor silver nor any manner of riches of you;
13 Neither have I suffered that ye should be confined in dungeons, nor that ye should make slaves one of another, nor that ye should murder, or plunder, or steal, or commit adultery; nor even have I suffered that ye should commit any manner of wickedness, and have taught you that ye should keep the commandments of the Lord, in all things which he hath commanded you—
14 And even I, myself, have labored with mine own hands that I might serve you, and that ye should not be laden with taxes, and that there should nothing come upon you which was grievous to be borne—and of all these things which I have spoken, ye yourselves are witnesses this day.
15 Yet, my brethren, I have not done these things that I might boast, neither do I tell these things that thereby I might accuse you; but I tell you these things that ye may know that I can answer a clear conscience before God this day.
16 Behold, I say unto you that because I said unto you that I had spent my days in your service, I do not desire to boast, for I have only been in the service of God.
17 And behold, I tell you these things that ye may learn wisdom; that ye may learn that when ye are in the service of your fellow beings ye are only in the service of your God.
18 Behold, ye have called me your king; and if I, whom ye call your king, do labor to serve you, then ought not ye to labor to serve one another?...
31 And now, my brethren, I would that ye should do as ye have hitherto done. As ye have kept my commandments, and also the commandments of my father, and have prospered, and have been kept from falling into the hands of your enemies, even so if ye shall keep the commandments of my son, or the commandments of God which shall be delivered unto you by him, ye shall prosper in the land, and your enemies shall have no power over you.


We read that King Benjamin did not seek riches. He suffered "in body" for his people, which could be similar to wearing a simple deerskin coat during the winter. He led by example in living a righteous life, and points out his and his people's avoidance of adultery and "all manner of wickedness". He labored with his own hands to avoid burdening the people with building projects and taxes. He spent his days serving his people. And he concludes by saying that he and his people have been blessed. After reading this I have to remark as King Wen did: Great is the Virtuous ruler!

In conclusion, just as the Book of Mormon matched an ancient editorial insertion in the description of the Bad Emperor, Mormon's inclusion of a Good Emperor's speech is verified by ancient record. This is not a silver bullet that seeks to prove the Book of Mormon's historicity. I don't think their is such a thing. This is one more example of a bulls eye verified by ancient record when we should expect nonsense if this were fiction.

The Importance of Suffering

I found a very interesting verse as I was reading some ancient Chinese theory. In The Six Secret Teaching of Tai Kung we read of "ten errors" that a general possesses. We read that "being benevolent but unable to inflict suffering" is a fatal error. (Ralph Sawyer trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 62) This reminded me of Captain Moroni. He is often lauded for his ability to avoid bloodshed. But according to Tai Kung, his ability to inflict suffering contributed to his success, since "one who is benevolent but unable to inflict suffering can be worn down."

We read in Alma 61-63 that the King men had successfully worn down and taken control of the government. Moroni had different plans however. He speedily marched back to the capital, linked up with loyalist forces, defeated the rebels, and then executed the prisoners. He has been criticized and even called a war criminal for such actions. Yet his ability to inflict suffering won the war.

In a wider sense, we should be grateful that our Father in Heaven was willing to inflict suffering-so much suffering that Jesus prayed to have it removed. (Doc. &Cov. 19:18; 3 Nephi 11:11) And one of the main themes of the Book of Mormon is that the physical suffering can be replaced with spiritual salvation. Starting in the first chapter of the Book of Mormon we read that Jerusalem will be destroyed-but a Messiah will come to save the people. Physically they will meet disaster while being saved spiritually. At the city of Ammonihah the believers were burned, but accepted into the arms of a loving God. (Alma 14:10-13) And Moroni was the cause of sending so many souls to their God, where they still could have been saved spiritually.

I mentioned in one of my first posts, the Book of Mormon has a double helix of spiritual and secular messages. Moroni's ability to inflict suffering recalls the necessity of it in the mission of Jesus Christ. And the ability of his father to inflict it (through requiring the plan in the first place and then allowing it to happen) should be thanked. Moroni may seem like a harsh figure and the ability to inflict suffering is not normally praised among modern society, but his ability to inflict suffering secured the Nephites physical salvation as much as the Father and Son secured our spiritual salvation.