China's Peace Disease

Rare Nationalist Propaganda, 1938

[This is more of a policy piece I developed as part of a site devoted to experienced driven commentary. It also includes material for a future book I’m writing introducing Modern Chinese Problems and Strategy.]

Hardware is fairly easy to assess. The speed of missiles, the range of sensors, and the amount of Aegis destroyers are all fairly certain quantities. But how they are used is not. Wars are not simply a math contest and generals are not mathematicians. Strategy, training and surprise matter just as much, if not more than the systems themselves. This is where the RAND report and so many analysts falter. They provide a chilling picture of material imbalance and possible scenarios such as China’s invasion of Taiwan in 2020. But they don’t account for the training and professionalism of the US military. For example, American pilots have been flying missions as part of the war on terror for almost 20 years. While the planes may need spare parts, the average fighter pilot has thousands of hours of combat experience.

China fought its last active war in 1979. There are few if any officers and military members that have experience operating in war time conditions. The last joint naval and land operation occurred in 1955. That means the senior leadership in China’s military has little combat experience. And none of their NCOs and junior officers has seen any combat. The Chinese do have an increasing number of sophisticated missiles, ships, and weapons, but there is little indication of how they will perform complex operations in wartime conditions. Training exercises are important, and China has many of them, but there is little that can replace the skills gained from war time experience. Chinese fighter pilots for example, often go through very basic training exercises and have trouble showing initiative. War time conditions include a great deal of stress, confusion, unexpected events and a limited time in which to make decisions. An untested military using untested technology means their missile threat may be one of the many militaries around the world that look and sound good on paper as they promise the “mother of all battles” only to melt away when the conflict starts. Assuming Chinese forces skillfully use their new missiles, these are a high use and rapidly depleted weapon. In this case it means China would have a strong first punch but little staying power once the missiles run out.

This peace disease is exacerbated by personnel problems. China has had a one child policy that affects their modernization of their military and interacts with general trends. The one child policy results in what Chinese analysts often call the “little emperor” syndrome. These are the only children of parents who are often spoiled to the point that the military lifestyle is rather jarring to them. Almost 70% of recruits are only children and this increases to 80% in some front line combat units. On top of that, the general effect of modernization, such as an increasingly urban and sedentary lifestyle means that recruits, on average, are taller, weigh more, and just can’t fit into tight military equipment built for a different average from 20 or 30 years ago. The pollution for which China is known for limits potential recruits even further. Many of potential recruits have severe lung issues that limit their ability to run and leads to an increase in respiratory diseases. The increasingly technical demands from these fancy weapons systems require recruits with more technical ability and aptitude. Average test scores have risen which suggests China is finding better recruits. But due to the above problems with modern and urban living, they often recruit rural candidates as well that have little exposure to complex technical systems and little ability to master them.

The solution to this has been to relax recruitment standards and hope that China can train them up to military standards. But many recruits don’t stay in very long. Many military assignments are in remote inhospitable locations far from home. Mid-career soldiers often have limited professional development opportunities and their skills aren’t as readily transferable to civilian sectors. Soldiers often receive low pay and benefits which makes retention difficult, and incentivizes a recurring problem with corruption.

On top of having trouble retaining recruits and seasoned mid career personnel, the culture of the military often prohibits independent and local decision making. They often refer decision making to higher units. Their training exercises are often a way for unit commanders to look good for higher ups. There is severe pressure for Red Units to win, resulting in exercises that fail to identify weaknesses. As alluded to above, there is legitimate worry that their fighter pilots are “dumb.”

The end result of all this severely undermines the click bait fearmongering that is popular among many academics. A closer look suggests that Chinese recruits are often physically and psychologically unprepared for combat and the advanced Chinese weapon systems. They have limited training opportunities and retention among the most skilled. They have a training system that often limits junior officers and promotes a culture of delayed decision making that could prove catastrophic in combat. Chinese officials are aware of the problem and doing more to rectify the situation. But only success in combat can truly dispel the dangers and drawbacks that come from these trends.

This kind of in depth analysis isn’t nearly as attractive click bait compared to fearful hot takes about supersonic weapons, drone swarms, and obsolete carriers. But it is very important to move beyond headlines and the short attention span of social media. Chinese analysts like Zhao Hui have pushed back on this narrative. After calling the arguments “untenable, unscientific, rustic, inhibit self-confidence, and may lead to misguided policy …” he provided two examples. In the Gulf War in 1991 Iraq had just fought an eight yearlong conflict with Iran, and the United States had not fought a major engagement since their withdraw from Vietnam 16 years earlier. Yet the lack of combat experience didn’t stop the United States from winning in overwhelming fashion.

The other example comes from World War I. The British had been involved in a long string of colonial wars, including the Boer War. Yet in the first (and almost decisive) phase of the war the British conducted a “continuous retreat” against victorious German forces. The United States in particular should be concerned because their experience comes from counter insurgency brush wars in contrast to a likely heavy weight match with China. Just like the British, their experience might be in the wrong area leaving them over stretched and unprepared for conventional combat.

Zhao provides several good points that I don’t think completely prove his case. It is possible for an untested military to beat a more experienced one. Those armies each had particular advantages in strategy, culture, and training that proved more decisive than the length of time since their last conflict. For example, the German army in World War I had an incredibly high standard of training, their General Staff College was the best in the world other nations tried to copy, and they had a venerable history and culture of excellence. As the Chinese philosopher Sunzi might have said, the German military was like the release of a torrent of water flowing down a mountain, the swoop of a deadly falcon catching its prey, or the release bolt from a crossbow. The German’s lack of recent military experience was a far less measure of their competence than their training, strategy, and élan.

Likewise, the Iraqis fought Iran for almost a decade. But those battles were largely stalemates along a static and somewhat geographically constrained front. The US in contrast had overwhelming air power, faced the Iraqis across a different front, led a large coalition and was fighting a war of liberation in contrast to Iraqi soldiers that were fighting for a dictator. Again, like the Germans, the combat experience was one factor among many that didn’t affect performance in that case.

It’s true the United States is fighting an insurgency and long war on terror. The military faces legitimate dangers of imperial over stretch as their hardware has deteriorated and many soldiers have faced multiple deployments. But the military is upgrading its equipment. The pilots in particular have received advanced and invaluable training that gives them the edge over Chinese pilots despite fighting brush wars for decades. More importantly, while there are examples of inexperienced forces beating ones that have more experience; China has many other problems that raise significant concerns. The Chinese military remains untested, they have trouble recruiting and retaining high caliber soldiers, they have new equipment that hasn’t been integrated into the military in combat conditions, and they don’t have the élan and institutional experience of the United States and German militaries that can compensate for peace disease. America might be overstretched, but unlike China’s peace disease, the institutional experience and quality of the American soldier can compensate while it is doubtful for China.

The major problem with those examples was that victory resulted from a variety of factors more than experience that included military culture, training, and equipment. There are two relevant examples from Chinese history which shows these additional factors.

The first comes from the Song Dynasty. Ruling in the same time frame as the European Middle Ages, the Song fought several wars with the Kitan Liao empire. The Chinese treaty with the Kitan produced long periods of peace interspersed with wars. The Song dynasty performed horrible at the start of these wars. The generals were accustomed to rather pleasant peace time requirements, and the soldiers were untrained. But the baptism of combat quickly produced a trained group of officers and soldiers that rose to the occasion and produced results for the empire. (Or as Mao said, their experience was “paid in blood.”) But they again went through a long period of peace and the same pattern repeated itself when the next war broke out 30 years later. This was a good example of peace disease, as the military performed well in combat with good leaders, culture, and advanced medieval weaponry, including extensive gunpowder weapons hundreds of years before Europeans adopted it. They simply lacked rigorous peace time training.

The next example comes from a military with lots of experience. The Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-Shek unified the country in 1926 and ruled during what is called the Nanjing Decade. This period has the dubious distinction of being before their fight with the Japanese, before World War II eclipsed that struggle, and before the Communists won the Civil War in 1949. As a result, they are often viewed from the lens of defeat in 1949 instead of their victories in the 1920s. New scholarship shows that the Nationalist army had strong espirit de corps and bold aggressive tactics that carried them to victory against the warlords. But they faced defeat, not because of imperial over stretch or because of their lack of peace disease but due to several important factors.

Against the Communists, the Nationalists fought forces that were just as motivated as they were. The extremely rough terrain of Jiangxi province, where Mao based his rebellion, was particularly unsuited to aggressive maneuver. In fact, the aggressive independent maneuver that secured victory against the warlords resulted in devastating ambushes and defeat against the Communists. Against the Japanese, they were simply overwhelmed by a superior military machine with more advanced equipment. The Chinese nationalists fought well, but the Japanese had more and better artillery, which was properly distributed to its front line units. They had support from tactical air forces and naval batteries which pummeled the Chinese units. Chiang Kai-Shek’s units, though experienced, didn’t have the same staying power and offensive punch that the Japanese did and they suffered accordingly.

Peace disease is a very important factor but it is one among many. The current Chinese army has a multitude of problems which suggest they will not be able to perform like the Germans in World War I, Japanese in World War II, and America in the Gulf War. Based on historical precedents they will likely pay for the needed combat experience by the blood their soldiers in the early phase of any conflict despite click bait fear mongering.

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Book of Mormon Geography and the Terrain of a Rocky Conversation

As I’ve been online I’ve started to notice certain behaviors. After reading religious, sports, and political discussion boards I see the same behavior over and over again. I wrote about my deal breakers some time ago. I’ve also discussed the way that words can be abused and manipulated. My research has taken me into robbers, terrorists, warmonger, neocon, and on this blog neo apologist.

I bring those points up because of the minor tempest that occurred between Jonathan Neville and Stephen Smoot last week. The latter wrote an article assessing, critiquing, and essentially debunking the use of a letter by Heartlanders, or those that believe in a strictly North American setting. Instead of focusing so much on the use of the letter in question, or even larger issues of geography’s role in Book of Mormon historicity, this post examines the rhetoric of Neville and its application in striving towards productive dialogue.

First, a couple of caveats. Much like Smoot I don’t have a problem with those that believe the geography of the Book of Mormon takes place in North America, a limited setting, and even a hemispheric model or one that believes the Book of Mormon is some kind of fiction. What does bother me is when some people claim, as Neville does, that if you disagree with his position than you are fundamentally in error and disagreeing with the prophets. I also get annoyed, as I discussed with churchistrue last week, when people critique or scoff at other positions while showing the same negative qualities they critique. These individuals call others dogmatic, simplistic, weird, and literal, even as they are vague, simplistic, weirdly literal and dogmatic in their own positions.

With that introduction I wanted to use Neville’s response to Smoot as an example of the way that loaded terms and nicknames and other terms can be used to shape the discussion and really detract from the discussion. To save space you may assume that all quotes are from Neville’s response and I invite you to read his whole article for context.

M2C intellectuals terrified of Letter VII

This is the title, and it reads like a headline from a rag magazine, so I think it’s great (or really bad) example of his editorializing.

No-wise

Book of Mormon central writes a series of articles called KnoWhys, which are accessible articles written for a general audience that summarize past research on the matter and connect it to larger issues in Mormon scripture study. Neville uses this bastardized version of the term 12 times in his short article including in the second sentence. Just two sentences in Neville displayed two of the most childish ways to engage a discussion.

M2C intellectuals feel threatened

This is editorializing and mind reading. He can’t know exactly what they feel, but he can interpret their actions in the most sinister way possible. I call this the Judge Judy test. I’m a writer that works from home (except for my third job driving for uber on nights and weekends, Viva Las Vegas.) As a result I watch Judge Judy every day, and she does an excellent job of finding out what people say, not the interpretation of what people say. If a witness says they “feel threatened” she would immediately say something like, “No, no, no. I don’t want to know how you felt or your editorializing, what did they actually say and do?” And writing an article, even one as bare knuckle as Smoots, still doesn’t warrant that editorial.

[Like] Ephesian sellers of idols who tried to silence the Apostle Paul.

The second half of the sentence where he said the intellectuals were threatened. This is poisoning the well. A long time ago I wrote a paper that won me the George C Marshall award. In discussing isolationists my roommate wrote: Morgan, I can tell you don’t like these guys. Ever since that point I’ve tried hard, even if I disagree with somebody, to avoid poisoning the well.

I also found that people often use analogies to carry their arguments. Instead of specifically describing the congruities between apologists and idol sellers, Neville makes an allusion and expects his readers to fill in the blanks based on the negative comparison. Thus in a sentence that is painfully short of details and specific arguments, and just the third one in his article, he makes as many as 5 childish and tendentious errors (for the same of brevity I skipped over explaining several of them): mind reading, editorializing, poisoning the well, and two short hand insults.

I could stop now but there are even more egregious examples that demand inclusion:

This [deletion of his article] is typical of the way the M2C citation cartel censors any information that contradicts the M2C dogma.

There is so much in this sentence but the biggest offender is “citation cartel” with dogma coming in second. He explains it later, but he’s upset that other material is quoted and not his. And he is upset that places like Meridian, FairMormon, and church correlation materials will repeat what he sees as unrighteous and pernicious research. Like the word robber in the Book of Mormon, or terrorist in modern discourse, cartel is used for its pejorative and shock value more than its clinical definition and explanatory power. In plain language, he is tossing bombs and insults at people he doesn’t like, and not making a serious and substantive argument.

The Mormon research world is small, but as somebody who is a part of it, I’ve never gone to the meetings of the cartel and with a secret handshake decided to exclude Neville. I ignore his work because I find his behavior odious and his professional work is a joke. My work stands on the strength of my research and arguments, and not because I’m with a certain faction. In fact, I don’t go to Deseret Book because I’m shocked and appalled they carry his crap instead of so many other good books out there. So either the cartel fell down on that one, or he has a vital outlet that many Mesoamerican scholars don’t have and there is no cartel. I can’t speak for Book of Mormon Central and the rest of the cartel but after reading posts like this [start sarcasm voice] I can’t imagine they have any reason to dislike Neville or maybe not use his work.

This title [of the KnoWhy] demonstrates the unrelenting arrogance of these intellectuals.

Playing fallacy cop is on my list of deal breakers especially because debates usually descend into mutual accusations of ad hominem. (It also leads to what I have named Deane’s Dagger: Any critique of a person’s tone automatically invites the same accusations against that writer.) That being said, this is a pretty blatant example of ad hominem that should be identified for what it is. There is also a rather stunning irony here, as Neville’s central case is that the Mesoamerican setting means you don’t believe in the prophets, and yet Neville assumes the role of speaking for church leadership and judging the worthiness of members, which is actually pretty arrogant.

I never agreed to join a church run by intellectuals, but that’s what these M2C ‘scholars’ are attempting to establish.

I’ve never taken the scare quotes seriously and that’s likely because of this sketch. Its funny in SNL, but sad in this case: https://youtu.be/vlDuD8zPMI0?t=8s

If you think that a person has made a faulty case I would like to see a counter argument and specifics explaining why. But scare quotes around the word scholar is petty and says more about the person using the scare quotes than the argument in question.

Conclusion:

This is a debate that many at Wheat and Tares might not care about. I totally understand that if you don’t believe the Book of Mormon is historical, or think the book is providential but don’t care for its location you probably believe the intramural debates over its geography are silly and pointless. That’s great and I thank you for reading anyway. Regardless of the topic, the way we discuss issues matter. Arguments that are light on substance, reason, and evidence but make extensive use of emotionally charged words like cartel, scare quotes, absurd nick names, and excessive editorializing do a disservice to the truth, discussion, and increasingly the fabric of the country in this rancorous age. (Also, Neville’s favorite tactic when called on his tone seems to be forcing people to sift through his 50 blogs for citations. Hit control f and type “citation” on Smoot’s post to see scores of examples.)

Those that think Trump’s twitter feed is the herald of the apocalypse should care as well as those that think denying service to a Trump supporter is awful. I used to teach a class on Pakistan, and my students would often assume a sense of superiority over Pakistanis that riot over rumors of a flushed Quran or believe the CIA and not terrorists are responsible for violent attacks. But people here in America can lose their jobs before they get off the plane, and racist notes can get thousands of shares before turning out to be false. While Smoot threw some elbows, I think Neville’s reaction perfectly displays the major problem our society faces in processing truth and having productive dialogue and its why I discussed it here.

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Its All Greek to Me: Part II

This posts continues my discussion of ideas and notes from reading the Greek sources. This week I cover the issue of fake news, preemptive war, and austere characters among others.

Xenophon:

ii.4.18-23 hearing the man’s message, they conducted him to Clearchus and told him what he had said. When Clearchus heard [the rumor of Persian movements] he was greatly agitated and alarmed. But a young man, one of those who were present, after reflecting a little on the matter, observed that the imputed designs of making an attack, and of breaking down the bridge, were not consistent. ‘For,’ said he, ‘if they attack us, they must certainly either conquer or be conquered; if then they are to conquer us, why should they break down the bridge? For even though there were many bridges, we have no place where we could save ourselves by flight, but if on the other hand, we should conquer them, then, if the bridge is broken down, they will have no place of retreat…It was then immediately concluded that the barbarians had sent this man with an underhand object…They then prepared for rest, but did not neglect, however, to send a guard to the bridge…but neither did any of the enemies come near the bridge.

The issues of fake news, incivility in shouting down Republicans that try to eat at restaurants and increasingly rancorous tone from politicians seems to be new and dangerous trends. But the Greeks dealt with fake news. Both the common citizen that didn’t have a great deal of education or much to lose, and the generals with the lives and deaths of polities and thousands of people on the line had to process information. In fact, the Greeks in this case had to do it in several instances. They didn’t receive news of Cyrus’s death (their employer fighting for the Persian throne). They had to assess Persian intent based on several messages sent to them, and the likelihood of Persian betrayal. The point is that our modern problems are not so special, and the answers to those problems are not very hard. A bit of calm assessment and self-reflection in the face of fear and great agitation helped the Greeks described by Xenophon make a better decision that in this case literally saved their lives. The Greeks remained alert and set guards, but the bulk of the army rested in security after seeing through the fake news they were given. Some calm calculation, or maybe sitting down and reading a book of Greeks rationally thinking might be better than posting another facebook rant or meme based on incomplete information.

ii.6.9-15 Clearchus is reported to have said that a soldier ought to fear his commander more than the enemy, if he would either keep guard well, or abstain from doing injury to friends, or march without hesitation against foes. In circumstances of danger, accordingly, the soldiers were willing to obey [Clearchus] implicitly, and wished for no other leader; for they said that the sternness in his countenance then assumed an appearance of cheerfulness, and that was severe in it seemed undaunted against the enemy; so that it appeared indicative of safety and not of austerity. But when they were out of danger, and were at liberty to betake themselves to other chiefs, they deserted him in great numbers; for he had nothing attractive in him, but was always forbidding and repulsive, so that the soldiers felt towards him as boys towards their master.

Outside of what seems like an archetype of the man who can’t live without a war, I highlighted the two things that stood out to me the most in that post. Austere is a particular word that also described an enigmatic figure in the Book of Mormon. Zeniff described his commander as an “austere and a blood-thirsty man commanded that I should be slain (Mosiah 9:2).” Using the same word could be just a quirk and doesn’t show much, except that Zeniff also “hesitated” to march against the Lamanites and wanted a peace treaty with them. That is one of the three things listed as deserving punishment from the austere Clearchus. That Greek general also seemed to be “fond of war”(ii.6.6), which might be translated by Mormon as bloodthirsty.

The text of the BoM is so sparse you can’t really say it’s a perfect fit. But I still found this incredibly intriguing. I often use different models from history to try and tease out additional details. The behavior of Clearchus adds color to the story surrounding Zeniff’s two verse account of the inter Nephite conflict and my gut reaction is that this is a strong comparison. The general was good at battle and those qualities that made him seem austere brought victory on the battlefield, but made him friendless and restless in times of peace. When Zeniff hesitated to fight the Lamanites in the middle of what I call a preemptive strike, it sparked those austere qualities in the unnamed general and led to civil war.

Polybius:

i.4 For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot…episodal history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history…It is only by combination and comparison of separate parts of the whole-by observing their likeness and difference- that a man…can obtain a view at once clear and complete and thus secure both profit and the delight of history.

My latest book is on comparative military history that studies a bunch of battles around 400 AD. I thought highlighting different cultures at the same time was novel and a good way to see how geography and culture might affect the development of armies and the conduct of their wars. It’s always nice when I’m reading along and get reinforcements for arguments I’ve already made.

ii.47 But when the war had lasted some time, and Cleomenes had revolutionized the constitution of his county, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a tyranny, and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness- seeing clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well before hand in frustrating their plans.

My eyes got a little bigger when I saw this and wrote down: preemptive war. This is important as a source in several ways. I remember a know nothing blogger at a certain place in the Bloggernacle. I don’t want to be mean or start or blog war, so lets just call it the Centennial Bar. He wrote that the constitution plainly forbade preemptive war. Having an interest in the matter (for a reason I’ll explain in a minute), I wanted to know what specific clause stated this. He provided a long screed that attacked drone strikes, never ending war, the military industrial complex, and several items in the same vein, but didn’t provide a specific clause and provision in the constitution. Some others fumbled and said that a “plain reading” of the text supported that condemnation. But as I’ve said before, the “face” in “face value” reading has a similar Latin route to superficial, so I don’t really think that was a strong argument.

In talking about my free lance career I mentioned you have to have a strategy. In order to get noticed a scholar has to plant his flag somewhere. I recently got an email from the Michigan War Studies Group, and I noticed how many books there are on World War II and the Civil War. This reminded me of a visit to the Society Military History years ago historians on those conflicts (WWII and American Civil War) are a dime a dozen. That reinforced to me that something like Chinese history might be a better field to plant my flag. In the field of Mormon studies, I not only focus on preemptive war as a way to distinguish myself from other military historians and scholars, but there are numerous punks and posers in the online world that pontificate and assume a burn the witch quality about the subject. As Colin Gray and Duane Boyce have noted, there is an almost “demonic hatred” of preventive war, and a “reproach without evidence” style to condemning those who supported the Iraq war, or the use of military force in general.[1] So I make sure to write down every reference to it in history, to better add to my tool box when I discuss the subject and Polybius didn’t disappoint with his discussion of Aratus saving Greeks from a tyrant. When I discuss preemptive warfare I won’t have to rely on vague screeds but can instead point to example from Polybius to Epaminondas and Sunzi (Sun-Tzu) to support my analysis.

Thanks for reading. I really enjoyed re reading the classics and look to move on to other texts like the Ruin of Britain by Gildas and The Deeds of Robert Guiscard.


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[1] Duane Boyce, Even Unto Bloodshed: An LDS Perspective on War (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2015), 171-173. Colin Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration, (Strategic Studies Institute Online, 2007), 28. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB789.pdf : For a representative sample of the most extreme and unacademic versions, see Kendal Anderson, War: A Book of Mormon Perspective: How the War Chapters of the Book of Mormon Warn Against Wars of Aggression and the Warfare State, (Create Space, 2014), 21 where “evil power hungry dictators” are the only ones that start preemptive war, and page 42 where he calls the practice an “assault on humanity itself.” For a sample of the voluminous personal attacks on proponents of the practice, Irvin Hill wrote, “A writer proving the Book of Mormon defense of Preemptive war, or just another war mongering propagandist?,” Obedient Anarchy, January 28th, 2015. (Accessed, October 21st, 2016 http://www.obedientanarchy.com/2015/01/28/a-writer-proving-the-book-of-mormon-defense-of-preemptive-war-or-just-another-war-mongering-propagandist/ )

Its All Greek to Me: Herodotus in the Book of Mormon

I mentioned when I discussed Thucydides a little while back that I would move on to the rest of the Greek writings I had. I suppose my old college professors would be so proud I’m reading and reflecting on classic texts. What follows are some of the notes as I made connections and tried to assess the material. As usual, since this is a Mormon themed blog I will focus more on connections with the Book Mormon though I add connections with other writing projects as well. The post got very long so I split this into two parts with Herodotus today and likely Xenophon and Polybius next time.

Herodotus:

vii.9 And yet, I am told, these very Greeks are wont to wage wars against one another in the most foolish way, through sheer perversity and doltishness. For no sooner is war proclaimed than they search out the smoothest and fairest plain that is to be found in all the land, and there they assemble and fight; whence it comes to pass that even the conquerors depart with great loss.

This was a key passage that popped to me as a military historian. Military historian Victor David Hanson described what he called the Western Way of War, and one of the most important elements of that way is the concept of decisive battle between heavy infantry. The Greeks were farmers and part time soldiers with rather small armies. This created an incentive to fight the wars quickly by charging at each other. This preference for shock battle, according to Hanson, inspired what was a way of war that was superior to other cultures. The Persians, for example, scoffed at this way of war but when faced with heavy infantry in a narrow pass such as Thermopaylae, a few hundred Spartans (plus associated allies) could withstand what was recorded as a million man army. If I were teaching a class I would highlight the importance of primary sources at this point.

Associated with the Book of Mormon, I discuss the use of shock battle by Moroni, which is praised in the text and seems to produce victory in the war chapters. But many people fail to realize how incredibly bloody that kind of warfare is. Remember the phrase from the quote, “even the conqueror departs with great loss.” Which, now that I think about it would have been a good line to include. In discussing his tactics and reassessing his status as a hero, I couldn’t help but note that such a great man of God could perhaps have found a way to win without bloodshed.

vii. 127 On reaching Therma Xerxes halted his army, which encamped along the coast…stretching out as far as the rivers Lydias and Haliacmon…The rivers here mentioned were all of them sufficient to supply the troops, except the Cheidorus, which was drunk dry.
vii. 187 Such then was the amount of the entire host of Xerxes. As for the number of the women who prepared the bread, of the concubines, and the eunuchs, no one can give any sure account of it; nor can the baggage horses and other sumpter beasts, nor the Indian hounds which followed the army, be calculated, by reason of their multitude. Hence I am not at all surprise that the water of the rivers was found too scant for the army in some instances; rather it is a marvel to me how the provisions did not fail, when the numbers were so great…
viii. 115 [During the retreat of the Persian army] all along the line of march, in every country where they chanced to be, [Xerxes’] soldiers seized and devoured whatever food they could find belonging to the inhabitants; while, if no grain was to be found, they gathered the grass that grew in the fields, and stripped the trees, whether cultivated or wild, alike of their bark and of their leaves, and so fed themselves. They left nothing anywhere, so hard were they pressed by hunger. Plague too and dysentery attacked the troops while still upon their march, and greatly thinned their ranks. Many died; others fell sick and were left behind…

These are three quotes that tell a story about logistics. One of the most frequent criticisms is about the large numbers in the Book of Mormon. In fact, I mentioned this in my first post here at Wheat and Tares. But without getting into the details of caloric consumption, we can notice the outlines of his account, and how it holds up historically. I was struck while reading this that even the author “marveled” at the numbers he presented. He commented the armies were so big that the cities would have been ruined if they were forced to provide two meals instead of one of the passing army (vii. 120) and they drank the rivers dry. As soon as the army faced some catastrophe and had to retreat, they suddenly fell victim to hunger, and diseases from drinking dirty whatever, which is likely all they could find. This is a common pattern found in history, and in the Book of Mormon even.

I wrote a post a while ago that was inspired by the supposedly ridiculous logistical requirements of the final Nephite army. In particular, I’m struck with the similarity to the form that Herodotus took:

Moroni 9:16- And again, my son, there are many widows and their daughters who remain in Sherrizah; and that part of the provisions which the Lamanites did not carry away, behold, the army of Zenephi has carried away, and left them to wander whithersoever they can for food; and many old women do faint by the way and die.

While the account is rather brief, in one of the most detailed letters we do see examples of logistical problems that led to combat over limited provisions and starving civilians. Of course, chapter 9 also mentions acts of cannibalism on both sides, so the assumption that they were living on a normal diet, and would need the normal amounts of food listed in such places as Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, Supplying War, and even Aztec Warfare wouldn’t apply in this situation. On top of this, the prisoners taken by the Lamanites were only fed the flesh of their relatives. (Moroni 9:8) So what we have here could be the practical implications of excessive war and large armies in addition to spiritual decay.

Moreover, I’ve often compared the large numbers in the Book of Mormon to the Chinese War of the Eight Princes. Unsurprisingly, given the quotes from Herodotus and the verse from Mormon, a large army was tough to feed and eventually (particularly after military defeat) had trouble feeding itself. As I wrote in Decisive Battles in Chinese History:

The Princes of the Jin dynasty laid waste to the rival cities. The citizens in and around the capital city of Luoyang were almost continuously looted, raided, starved, eaten, conscripted and attacked by Chinese and barbarian forces until one of the largest cities of the 3rd century world and most prosperous regions was desolate. The city of Luoyang had an estimated 600,000 people, and the army may have had as many as 700,000 people at the start of the war. And even suggested peace plans and the heads of rival generals couldn’t stay the slaughter.

And contemporary Chinese historians recorded:

By the [end of the war] trouble and disturbances were very widespread….many suffered from hunger and poverty. People were sold [as slaves]. Vagrants became countless. In the [provinces around the capital] there was a plague of locusts…Virulent disease accompanied the famine. Also the people were murdered by bandits. There rivers were filled with floating corpses; bleached bones covered the fields…There was much cannibalism. Famine and pestilence came hand in hand.

Needless to say, I think there is a pattern in the behavior and supply of ancient armies, and the supposedly ridiculous numbers that would be impossible to feed actually sounds about right. Herodotus marveled at his own account, talked about rivers being drank dry in good times and water borne illness and eating bark in the bad. Back to his account:

viii. 15 The third day was now come, and the captains of the barbarians, ashamed that so small a number of ships should harass their feet, and afraid of the anger of Xerxes, instead of waiting for the others to begin the battle, weighed anchor themselves, and advanced against the Greeks about the hour of noon.

This point immediately recalled the various Chinese fleets that are often forgotten in history but was often the decisive factor in the life or death of a dynasty. The fleet with the biggest impact was that of the southern Song. The northern Song dynasty collapsed on the plains around their capital of Kaifeng. But the southern Song saved themselves for over thirty years in twelfth century because of their impressive navy. They had lost most of their northern territory and faced a massive invasion from the Jurchens, who aimed to finish the job. But the navy broke the pontoon bridge of the invading force, which severed the invading armies’ logistical connection, and this prevented them from retreating to the north side of the river. The eight-thousand-man naval force of the southern Song dynasty tied down a one-hundred-thousand-man army for a significant amount of time. A short time later, it faced another engagement. Despite being outnumbered six to one, the Song navy charged into the much larger force, secure in its superior training, and annihilated the opposing the fleet. The Mongols knew the power of a navy and the necessity of training. They reportedly mustered seventy thousand marines to help conquer Xingyang (a chapter in my book) and built five thousand warships to conquer southern Song.

The similarities between the smaller navies of the Greek and southern Song defeating larger forces because of training and motivation reinforces a methodological point for me. In Mormon studies but also comparative studies in academia there are fierce debates about how similar two items from different cultures and time periods really are. Some people are so narrow, and for lack of a better term, isolationist that they bristle at any comparison. With all due respect I’ve found that sound military principles translate pretty well across time and geography.

Though this approach is not without criticism and danger. It is extremely important not to decontextualize events and do what I call the chicken nugget approach, which I described in a review of a text on Subotai:

[The author’s last chapter] represented the most vivid example of the chicken nugget approach. This used modern army nomenclature, Napoleonic terms, German words, and modern terms interchangeably throughout the book. Some people may enjoy the liberal sprinkling of terms from a variety of eras, I find it distracting. Many of the terms are not precisely interchangeable with the activities of Subotai or carried unneeded connotations or associations. So the chicken nugget method seemed analytically imprecise at best.

At the same time, a judicious and extremely strict comparison of military principles across cultures is extremely useful. I already cited one example of a small but motivated navy defeating a larger one with less training between two cultures separated by thousands of miles and years. In another example I discussed the historical evidence of noise in battle and conclude that the account in Forest of Kings is likely wrong:

Based on the analysis of the chaotic and loud battlefield then, Schele and Freidel’s recreation of Mayan battle fails to take into account the impractical nature of trying to understand each other during this kind of physical stress on a chaotic battlefield.

I could also point to blood letting and ritual fasting, and talked about the use of omens Thucydides account. I definitely fall on the other side of the debate and find judicious and specific comparisons, such as between small and highly trained forces from different cultures and times very useful.

Conclusion:

I’ve enjoyed re reading these accounts, and for this one I even noticed the notes I first made 15 years ago! Herodotus described what some argue is the foundation of Western military history. He cataloged enemy forces, discussed logistics, and a careful reading suggests that ridiculously big armies had ridiculous logistical requirements that often resulted in starving soldiers and civilians. Finally, I noticed that he reinforced a methodological point in dispute about how different cultures and time periods can still produce the same behavior or favorable comparisons.

When is the last time you read Herodotus? What is your favorite part? Is there anything you think I missed?

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