The Geographic Strategy Behind the Location of Nephihah

Using the terrain to strengthen your defense is not a new idea. Richard Smail described the early crusader habit of building forts using existing terrain.[1] Such a fortress would be built upon a spur near a pivotal river crossing, and thus be only accessible by one side. This would reduce the need to four high walls, hence both men and material could be better concentrated. Benjamin Wallacker discussed how many Chinese cities could be self sustaining fortresses.[2] This allows the defender a greater degree of sustainability in the face of assault. Finally, David Graff's analysis of the Battle of Huo-I examined how that city was placed to guard the open plains extending away from a narrow river gorge.[3]

This final point has direct application to the city of Nephihah, its importance to the Nephite government, and the actions of Moroni. The Book of Mormon describes plains being near the city and bearing the same name(Alma 62:18). When this city fell Moroni doubted if the Nephite government would survive (Alma 59:11). John Sorenson places the city in a position between the capital of Zarhahemla and the Nephite possessions on the East Sea.[4] So we can assume that the capture of Nephihah opened up another avenue of approach to the capital (the other being on the West sea where Helaman was fighting) and almost fulfilled the Nephite nightmare of being harassed on every side (Alma 52:13-14).

I submit that the strategic importance of this city, evidenced by the internal evidence and geographer cited above, is due to the tactical importance gained from its location. Micheala Stephens has discussed the unique tactical insight from the description of Moroni's night time scouting recorded in Alma 62.[5] Since Moroni needed no ladders to get on the walls, but did need cords to get down OFF of the wall she argues that the city was backed by cliffs on at least one (and presumably the west) side. I support this assertion for several reasons. First, the macro geography of the Nephite nation supports Nephihah as a pivotal city in their defenses. And based on the readings I outlined in the first paragraph, few places are more solid than a self sustaining fortresses that takes advantage of micro terrain and protects a river valley leading to the capital.

Furthermore, the account mentions how Moroni came upon the West side of the city and was able to see the army camped by the East side of the city. While Moroni could see this while standing on the city wall, it makes more sense if he were significantly higher by standing upon the cliff side in the west and able to see the army campfires in the east. An article by William Hamblin described how Saladin used the ruse of climbing upon an unexpected place to surprise an army; so this has verifiable historical correlations as well.[6] Finally, the account mentions the Lamanites attempted to flee out "by the pass"(Alma 62:24). This pass could mean a number of things including the East gate where they were camped or another gate. But it could refer to a mountain pass that would be near Nephihah, especially if it was built into a cliff. And it could refer to whatever terrain is opposite the "plains of Nephihah". This includes the example of Huo-I, which described a city located at the opening of a narrow river valley into a plain.

The brevity of the text and the preliminary nature of Book of Mormon geography preclude a definite conclusion.[7] But the above was a consistent reading of both internal and external evidence that point towards Nephihah being strategically located withing Nephite lands with the benefit of natural terrain such as cliffs and or "passes". And I suggest that Nephihah was located near a strategic choke point along the river Sidon with rocky terrain to one side, and upon plains to the other. The next step would be to correlate the theory presented here with real world geographic models and see what we find!

Thank you for reading. I invite your comments.

***Sources***
1. Richard Smail. Crusading Warfare: 1097-1193 London: Cambridge University Press 1995.
2. Benjamin Wallacker "The Siege of Feng Tian", Peter Lorge Ed. Warfare in China to 1600,London: Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
3. David Graff, "The Battle of Huo-I", Ibid.
4. John Sorenson, An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon. Provo: F.A.R.M.S. Press, 1985, 241.
5. Private Email Correspondence October 24th, 2009.
6. William Hamblin. "Saladin and Muslim Military Theory", The Horns of Hattin, 228-238.
7. But please see this post for why you haters can go screw yourself.

Spiking and Tilting

An article by Bejamin Wallacker titled "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought" gives us the title of this thread.[1] He first presents a translation of the military writer Sunzi:

What enable the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [chi] and the orthodox [cheng]...In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow rivers...In warfare the strategic configurations of power [shih] do not exceed the unorthodox and the orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?[2]

As an explanation of this concept Wallacker cites Samuel Griffith who says:

The concept expressed by cheng, 'normal' [or orthodox] and chi, 'extraordinary' [ or unorthodox] is of basic importance. The normal (Cheng) fixes or distracts the enemy; the extraordinary (chi) forces act when and where their blows are not anticipated. Should the enemy perceive and respond to a chi [or unorthodox] maneuver in such a manner as to neutralize it, the maneuver would automatically become cheng [or orthodox].[3]


This is quite an interesting concept to explain. The best way to describe it would be the debate with the Sicilian from Princess Bride. In trying to determine which cup has the poison, the Sicilian reaches the point where he says something like: "I can expect you to expect me to expect that you are lying, therefore I..." This quote represents the endless nature and connection between the two concepts. And it explains why this concept is so difficult to translate: Since they are expecting the unexpected would the expected then become unexpected?

Finally, Wallacker studies the etymology of the words Cheng and Chi in order to better relate them to English. He says:

The Sun-Tzu tells us, then, that after 'spiking' the foe, keeping him fixed vulnerably to his position, we bring in our 'tilting' forces to know him off balance and even to topple him over. The English 'tilt' helps us keep in mind also the [unorthodox] nature of the typical Chi maneuver. It is [unorthodox] in direction and method, [unorthodox] also brings in something extra, something the foe cannot take account of.[4]

We have an example of this in the Book of Mormon. In Alma 62 we read that:

30... Moroni, after he had obtained possession of the city of Nephihah...went forth from the land of Nephihah to the land of Lehi.
31 And it came to pass that when the Lamanites saw that Moroni was coming against them, they were again frightened and fled before the army of Moroni.
32 And it came to pass that Moroni and his army did pursue them from city to city, until they were met by Lehi and Teancum; and the Lamanites fled from Lehi and Teancum, even down upon the borders by the seashore, until they came to the land of Moroni.
33 And the armies of the Lamanites were all gathered together, insomuch that they were all in one body in the land of Moroni. Now Ammoron, the king of the Lamanites, was also with them.
34 And it came to pass that Moroni and Lehi and Teancum did encamp with their armies round about in the borders of the land of Moroni, insomuch that the Lamanites were encircled about in the borders by the wilderness on the south, and in the borders by the wilderness on the east.

Thus you have Moroni who pursues the main army of the Lamanites. The narrative places him as the focus of the Lamanite army, and he pushes them to the last Nephite city held in enemy hands, Moroni. At this city the Lamanites are out of options. They have largest army led by the Nephite Chief Captain to their west, they have nothing but seashore to their east, they could admit defeat and retreat to their own territory in the south, they only have to the North (but not really). Moroni has "spiked" them in place, while Lehi and Teancum take advantage of pinned main Lamanite army by expelling the Lamanite garrisons to the north of the city of Moroni, and by merging their forces with Moroni. In short: Moroni spiked them and Lehi tilted them. This piece of military theory and practice sets up the conclusion for war.

Thank you for reading and I look forward to your comments.
*********
Sources:
1. Benjamin Wallacker "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought" Peter Lorge Ed. Warfare in China to 1600 Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2005, p. 235-240.
2. Ralph D. Sawyer Trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, 164-165.
3.Wallacker, "Two Concepts", 296.
4. Ibid., 299.

The Use of Qualifiers in Studying The Book of Mormon

I want to address the criticism concerning qualifying words in our writings. These are words such as "probably", "most likely" and so on that indicate a degree of doubt concerning scholarly research. What follows is a brief response to the charge that scholarship which defends The Book of Mormon is faulty or inadequate because it includes these qualifiers:

I have found that the more I study and the more degrees I get the more I realize how much I DON'T know. In fact, one of the main conclusions of my Master's Thesis was that even deceptively simple topics defy easy conclusions; and the problem only gets worse with ancient topics that have a paucity of written sources, such as pre Nara Period Japan, Shang Dynasty China, Old Kingdom Egypt and Pre Classic Mesoamerica.

In the books I've read even the most simple points are debatable based on how you interpret evidence. So the authors correctly offer qualifiers. I could open to a random page from any academic book and find the same qualifiers that you attack. This process is accelerated the farther back you go in time. These qualifiers acknowledge the limitations of research and represent an honest attempt to allow the possibility that contradictory evidence may be uncovered in the future. Thus is shows that the historian is aware of the limits of his craft and his sources. When there is a rush to judgement, and refusal to allow for additional sources you will probably find somebody begging the question with an ax to grind.

And these "books" that I mentioned earlier are not fluff pieces either, but from the leaders of their fiel such as Bernard Bachrach, David Graff, Peter Lorge, Ralph Sawyer, and John Gallagher. So people who are leaders in their fields with PhDs and years of experience, still qualify many of their arguments; but those at some "Christian" ministry sites, read a few articles from an anti Mormon site and think they can end the debate. So I think a negative reaction to the use of qualifiers says more about your education and scholarly acumen than quality of Mormon researchers.

My spiritual testimony of the book is firm and unbending, but when you enter the academic realm a cautious reading of sources is not only understandable but desirable.

Extirpative War Contrasting with the Book of Mormon

Seeking evidence for The Book of Mormon through parallels is a double edged sword.[1]In the search for tighter methodological controls a third variable is needed. Instead of A is similar to B, as most comparisons go, we need A is more similar to B than C.

In seeking this additional variable John Grenier's First Way of War is incredibly useful.[2] In this book he describes a way of war beyond the normal conventions. In fact he uses the term Petite Guerre which acts as a synonym for irregular warfare. This included extirpative war making, which Grenier describes as warfare "centered often on individual action, focused primarily on...fields, food supplies, and civilian populations."[3] This way of war specifically avoided what we could call standard battles.

We can then take this way of war and compare it to the militarized periods of Smith's life that I have previously discussed.[4] In the Mormon War we find an example of these extirpative tactics. The time period 1837-1838 is between the time period that Grenier outlined, 1607-1814, and the brutal irregular war the Missouri witnessed during the American Civil War 1861-1865. This is one more research topic that I wish to explore in the future and will keep you updated.

Dealing with The Book of Mormon, we have now have our contrasting variable which solidifies ancient parallels. In my research the Book of Mormon features a focus on strategy and tactics between organized armies of men that seek decisive battle. While there are elements of irregular warfare within the book, the narrative and their society seemed focused on regular warfare. This is in stark contrast to warfare in Smith's day which often focused on destructive war against civilian populations and property, conducted by small bands of irregular soldiers.

This is a rough draft of an research topic I hope to pursue in the future. Between Chinese classes, preparing for graduate school, and familial obligations I am sorry to say I can't offer you more. I hope you enjoy and I look forward to your comments.
************
Sources:

1. William Hamblin, "Sharper Than a Two-edged Sword," Sunstone, December 1991, 33-61.
2. John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making On the Frontier London: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
3. Ibid., 13.
4. See "The Military Mind of Joseph Smith", posted on this blog and The Millennial Star