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This post will discuss the permanence of Nephite armies. I touched upon this in my army composition posts and in my response to Mormon Mesoamerica.
Alma 44:23 states "that the armies of the Nephites, or of Moroni, returned and came to their houses and their lands." And Alma 16 states that the Nephites could not raise an army in the amount of time available. But other verses such as Alma 62:42-43 suggest that the Nephites kept fortifications and garrisons after the war ended. Helaman 1:26 describes the numerous strong armies that were posted in the frontier cities. So which is it? Did the Nephites keep a standing army or not. The answer lies somewhere in the middle. It seems the Nephites kept a small standing army supplemented by what we would call reservists, but with the increasing size of Nephite lands many more full time soldiers were required which changed Nephite society. With this in mind I will discuss what we glean from each verse.
Alma 16 mentions that the Nephites could not gather a "sufficiently" big army. This matches Helaman 1 where the Lamanite leader destroyed the wall guards, anybody who opposed them and small groups of soldiers. It would make sense that these small groups were body guards, and garrison soldiers. There is no indication of weapons being stacked at an armory. Many ancient soldiers were given tax breaks or land bonuses but were required to maintain their own weapons in return. (see Hamblin: Warfare in the Ancient Near East, and deremilitari.org has primary sources from Charlemagne) So many of the part time soldiers would have time to grab their weapons, but were in insufficient numbers and scattered about their lands to slow the big Lamanite army.
Helaman 1:26 also mentions that the "strong armies" were in the borders of the land. Both words could mean different things. "Strong" could mean stronger- implying that there were more than one army. What is a Nephite "army" we have no idea. Brent Merrill suggests that an army was like a Roman Legion. (See Nephite Captains and Armies p266 in Warfare in the Book of Mormon) Ideally, 10 thousand soldiers made up a Nephite army according to Merrill but this was often not the case. Just as Roman Legions were often under strength so were Nephite armies. This could imply that the stronger armies were full strength "legions" while the other armies were just paper legions that would be filled with part time soldiers upon the outbreak of war. The only soldiers available in the paper legions would be full time soldiers such as body guards, military caste, small garrisons and the officers or "captains and chief captains" as the Nephites called them. The United States had a flexible structure like this for a long time. Where the regular army officers would command shadow battalions until the outbreak of war and conscripts would join their units. The other option could be that both the border and inner "armies" were simply full time soldiers. But v.26 implies that Moronihah could contend with the army of the Lamanites, so either he had an actual army in the borders, or he assumed his intelligence would provide enough time to argument his small active duty force with the part time soldiers that lived in the border lands.
V. 28 says that Moronihah immediately ordered Lehi's army to march to Bountiful. Thus Lehi must already have been placed in the other border. (Remember the Nephites had a center, west sea, and east sea: Moronihah was at one, and Lehi at the other with the center assumed to be safe) This suggests that many soldiers remained full time. Perhaps all of the armies were less than full strength and the ones on the borders simply contained a few more men, and more veterans.
Finally, Alma 44:23 said that Moroni and his armies returned to their homes and lands. Again, both homes and lands can mean two things. The assumed reading would mean that like Roman Consul Cincinnatis (or Maximus from Gladiator if you must) they were all part time soldiers that wished to return home as soon as possible. But home could mean a permanent barracks or garrisons, and lands could be a general term used in the sense as "the land of the free". I doubt the latter interpretation since the battle in Alma 43 and 44 occurred just outside of Zarahemla, and there is never a mention of barracks in the Book of Mormon.
Alma 44:23 stronger implies a part time army, but disagrees with latter texts. Critics of the Book of Mormon will naturally proclaim victory and go home. But upon further review this trend from part time to professional soldiers is completely consistent with other ancient societies. P.A. Brunt discussed the problems facing the Roman soldier in the late republic. (See his book: Roman war and society in the Late Republic) The Roman wars were so frequent and far away that the average soldier was forced to leave their lands for years at a time. This caused great resentment among the soldiers as many of them came home to realize they lost their lands and it forced Roman armies away from part time citizen soldiers into professional career soldiers. This changed society as there were an increasing amount of rich and large landholders and a greater amount of landless poor. The landless poor then joined the army or went to the cities for work, changing Roman society and the composition of Roman armies. (see Sidebottom: A Short Introduction to Ancient Warfare) The process happened over the course of many years but it also mirrors the collapse of the Fubing system in the late Tang Dynasty as well. (see David Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare) The change from French Republic to Napoleonic Empire also mirrored this trend too. (see John Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic) Thus in preserving a nation through the use of part time and motivated soldiers, the nation expands into an Empire requiring full time soldiers loyal to their general.
Alma 44:23 does mention the army was Moronis. And the command of these armies was apparently heredity, since the next commander was Moroni's son. And we witness the rise of a more complex society in the Book of Helaman, and an almost imperial reign of Nephite judges with an increasing amount of pride and stiff neckedness. Ancient Emperors though they were literal representatives of God, a prideful Judge and military commander would think the same thing. As I read the Book of Helaman (again with this new mindset) I assume I will find an increasing amount of pride reminiscent of an Empire that corresponds to the rise of the full time armies mentioned in Helaman 1. Thus Nephite armies seemed to have changed from a part time force into an increasingly full time one. How big these "armies" were we still have no idea, and we don't have enough information to judge if these were simply paper armies meant to be augmented or full time effective forces. But I believe the increasing pride and prosperity of the upper Nephite class suggests that Nephite armies were increasingly full time.
I will discuss the "sins" depicted in the Book of Helaman and how that reflects the changing army composition at a later time. As with much of this blog, these are tentative conclusions that invite comment from other interested scholars.
Friday, February 27, 2009
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Prearranged Battle in the Book of Mormon?
In page 7 of Warfare in the Book of Mormon John Welch describes tactics in the Amlicite War as a "prearranged, open battle". I disagree and find the text unsporting of that claim.
Verses 12 through 15 describe the pre battle preparation and would presumably describe the agreement for battle. In particular v. 12 and 13 say that:
The people of the Nephites were aware of the intent of the Amlicites, and therefore they did prepare to meet them; yea, they did arm themselves[...]with all manner of weapons of war, of every kind. And thus they were prepared to meet the Amlicites at the time of their coming...
It seems that Welch's argument comes from his interpretation of "prepared to meet them" as though they had prearranged correspondence concerning the time and place of their conflict. There is internal evidence to support this, Captain Moroni requested that the garrison in Mulek meet him on the open plains. (Alma 52:20) And the final battle at Cumorah was also prearranged.
In my reading of the Book of Mormmon the strategy and tactics of this war seems similar to the American Civil War. Both Richmond and Washington were very close to each other, and it was a basic conclusion that each side would aim for the others capital. The close proximity of capitals, route of the railroads and ease of gaining intelligence made a direct clash seem scheduled. If we accept Sorenson's model, the city Sidon was more populous and culturally significant than Zarahemla and text suggests that the Amlicites anointed their King and created the apparatus (at least an army) of an independent state. Thus the Nephites were prepared to meet them, not because they arranged a play date, but because the intelligence almost fell in their lap. They already knew a city just upstream was bigger, they had appointed a king, formed an army, and even marked their foreheads with their tribal affiliation. (Alma 3:4-5, which would sure make human intelligence easy)
The tactics surrounding the location of the fight also support a seemingly foreordained battle. The hill just to the east of Zarahemla could have screened the Amlicite force. This hill could also be vital defensive terrain for the city, armies with cannon would love to have a hill top view of the city beneath them. And the text says the Nephite armies went "up" to the hill. The defensive benefits of this terrain would force the armies to fight over it, and make the ensuing battle seem prearranged. Later in the Book of Mormon the Chief Judge Pahoran lost control of the capital due to a coup. But he was able to flee with the government to the city of Gideon. (Alma 61:5-7) Notice v. 7 where the rebellious forces were "fearful" to strike at Gideon despite the fact that they just seized the government. Perhaps a part of his enemies fear was due to his control of the decisive defensive terrain just across the river from the city.
After reading Alma chapters 1-3 I find scant evidence for a prearranged battle. I did find a great deal of evidence that suggests the tactics of this episode were heavily influenced by cultural and physical geography to the point where the battle seemed foreordained. The creation of a new nation and rival army combined with dominant terrain around the city broadcast the intent of the enemy to the point where the Nephites were "prepared" to meet them.
Verses 12 through 15 describe the pre battle preparation and would presumably describe the agreement for battle. In particular v. 12 and 13 say that:
The people of the Nephites were aware of the intent of the Amlicites, and therefore they did prepare to meet them; yea, they did arm themselves[...]with all manner of weapons of war, of every kind. And thus they were prepared to meet the Amlicites at the time of their coming...
It seems that Welch's argument comes from his interpretation of "prepared to meet them" as though they had prearranged correspondence concerning the time and place of their conflict. There is internal evidence to support this, Captain Moroni requested that the garrison in Mulek meet him on the open plains. (Alma 52:20) And the final battle at Cumorah was also prearranged.
In my reading of the Book of Mormmon the strategy and tactics of this war seems similar to the American Civil War. Both Richmond and Washington were very close to each other, and it was a basic conclusion that each side would aim for the others capital. The close proximity of capitals, route of the railroads and ease of gaining intelligence made a direct clash seem scheduled. If we accept Sorenson's model, the city Sidon was more populous and culturally significant than Zarahemla and text suggests that the Amlicites anointed their King and created the apparatus (at least an army) of an independent state. Thus the Nephites were prepared to meet them, not because they arranged a play date, but because the intelligence almost fell in their lap. They already knew a city just upstream was bigger, they had appointed a king, formed an army, and even marked their foreheads with their tribal affiliation. (Alma 3:4-5, which would sure make human intelligence easy)
The tactics surrounding the location of the fight also support a seemingly foreordained battle. The hill just to the east of Zarahemla could have screened the Amlicite force. This hill could also be vital defensive terrain for the city, armies with cannon would love to have a hill top view of the city beneath them. And the text says the Nephite armies went "up" to the hill. The defensive benefits of this terrain would force the armies to fight over it, and make the ensuing battle seem prearranged. Later in the Book of Mormon the Chief Judge Pahoran lost control of the capital due to a coup. But he was able to flee with the government to the city of Gideon. (Alma 61:5-7) Notice v. 7 where the rebellious forces were "fearful" to strike at Gideon despite the fact that they just seized the government. Perhaps a part of his enemies fear was due to his control of the decisive defensive terrain just across the river from the city.
After reading Alma chapters 1-3 I find scant evidence for a prearranged battle. I did find a great deal of evidence that suggests the tactics of this episode were heavily influenced by cultural and physical geography to the point where the battle seemed foreordained. The creation of a new nation and rival army combined with dominant terrain around the city broadcast the intent of the enemy to the point where the Nephites were "prepared" to meet them.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Wickedness and Warfare in Omni
So I was reading my scriptures last night and I realized a couple things. First, much of the military discussion is focused on the two Moronis. The pre Christ (75-60 BC)and final warrior (320-400 AD) Moronis. But upon reading Omni and Words of Mormon I found there were several questions and some possible answers that do relate to warfare and will help us understand further.
The Nature of Wickedness in Omni: I suggest the the Plates of Nephi ended due to the wickedness of his successors as described in Omni. In v.2 Omni admits that he is a wicked man. This could be an example of Nephi's Psalm (2 Nephi 4:15-35), and it could be like the words of Joseph Smith. After confessing to being a sinful Joseph adds that nobody should think he is guilty of any great and malicious sin, but simply subject to the errors of youth. (JS History, 1:28) Since we don't have much we can assume that his sins were bad enough to warrant mention, and could be represented in later events.
The small book of Omni includes many mentions of war: v.3, 7, and 10 as well as the numerous mentions in the next small book. In connection with these wars Amaron mentions how if they would only follow God they would prosper in the land. (v7.) And the great grandson of Omni, Amaleki had to flee from the land of Nephi with the people of God. This could represent a newly made minority seeking a new land. Just as Nephi had to flee his brothers, and Lehi had to flee Jerusalem, the righteous are commanded to flee and gather.
But, even the brother of Amaleki wanted to go back. And Amaleki had no son, living relative, or righteous combination of the previous two that could take the plates. Thus there is evidence that, like the children of Israel in the desert, many looked back during the Exodus towards Egypt/their sinly ways. (See 1 Nephi 17:20-21 for an internal example)
The text reads:
And now I would speak somewhat concerning a certain number who went up into the wilderness to return to the land of Nephi; for there was a large number who were desirous to possess the land of their inheritance. Wherefore, they went up into the wilderness. And their leader being a strong and mighty man, and a stiffnecked man, wherefore he caused a contention among them; and they were all slain, save fifty, in the wilderness, and they returned again to the land of Zarahemla.
The footnote refers to Mosiah 9:2 which reads from a first hand account of the journey:
Therefore, I contended with my brethren in the wilderness, for I would that our ruler should make a treaty with [the Lamanites in the land of Nephi]; but he being an austere and a blood-thirsty man commanded that I should be slain; but I was rescued by the shedding of much blood; for father fought against father, and brother against brother, until the greater number of our army was destroyed in the wilderness; and we returned, those of us that were spared, to the land of Zarahemla, to relate that tale to their wives and their children.
Lessons: It seems the contention was between fighting for the land through battle, and peacefully possessing the land through treaty. The number 50 also suggests that the strongest survived. Again these could be body guards or full time soldiers.(See Army Tactics and Composition for more) In this case it seems the body guards (the 50 that survived which includes at least one spy) turned against their leader. This somewhat matches the latter rebellion against king Noah, where a wicked and bloodthirsty commander forfeits his right to rule. (Mosiah 19:1-6,19-20) The text also reinforces the suggestion that spies were actually closer to scouts and rangers than cloak and dagger forces. (see Army Tactics and Composition) The familial strife may also indicate that units were tribally created along family lines. And it indicates a simpler level of society compared to the time of two Moronis. In this case right made might- the side that won decided to make a treaty and colonize the land. There also seemed to be less control over tribal secession. Since in Omni there is no indication of government control over tribal movement. (compare to Alma 27:14-15, or the mission to reclaim the Zoramites, or Moroni's aggressive attempts to prevent the King Men escape) Also in Words of Mormon v. 16, there are numerous dissents unto the Lamanites but no mention of control or trying to control them.
Conclusion: I was amazed that I could glean so much from only a couple pages of text. The Book of Mormon continually amazes me, and there is so much research to do concerning warfare in that book. In this short chapter alone we find information about Nephite society, army composition, and even some political detail. Coming soon...Words of Mormon
The Nature of Wickedness in Omni: I suggest the the Plates of Nephi ended due to the wickedness of his successors as described in Omni. In v.2 Omni admits that he is a wicked man. This could be an example of Nephi's Psalm (2 Nephi 4:15-35), and it could be like the words of Joseph Smith. After confessing to being a sinful Joseph adds that nobody should think he is guilty of any great and malicious sin, but simply subject to the errors of youth. (JS History, 1:28) Since we don't have much we can assume that his sins were bad enough to warrant mention, and could be represented in later events.
The small book of Omni includes many mentions of war: v.3, 7, and 10 as well as the numerous mentions in the next small book. In connection with these wars Amaron mentions how if they would only follow God they would prosper in the land. (v7.) And the great grandson of Omni, Amaleki had to flee from the land of Nephi with the people of God. This could represent a newly made minority seeking a new land. Just as Nephi had to flee his brothers, and Lehi had to flee Jerusalem, the righteous are commanded to flee and gather.
But, even the brother of Amaleki wanted to go back. And Amaleki had no son, living relative, or righteous combination of the previous two that could take the plates. Thus there is evidence that, like the children of Israel in the desert, many looked back during the Exodus towards Egypt/their sinly ways. (See 1 Nephi 17:20-21 for an internal example)
The text reads:
And now I would speak somewhat concerning a certain number who went up into the wilderness to return to the land of Nephi; for there was a large number who were desirous to possess the land of their inheritance. Wherefore, they went up into the wilderness. And their leader being a strong and mighty man, and a stiffnecked man, wherefore he caused a contention among them; and they were all slain, save fifty, in the wilderness, and they returned again to the land of Zarahemla.
The footnote refers to Mosiah 9:2 which reads from a first hand account of the journey:
Therefore, I contended with my brethren in the wilderness, for I would that our ruler should make a treaty with [the Lamanites in the land of Nephi]; but he being an austere and a blood-thirsty man commanded that I should be slain; but I was rescued by the shedding of much blood; for father fought against father, and brother against brother, until the greater number of our army was destroyed in the wilderness; and we returned, those of us that were spared, to the land of Zarahemla, to relate that tale to their wives and their children.
Lessons: It seems the contention was between fighting for the land through battle, and peacefully possessing the land through treaty. The number 50 also suggests that the strongest survived. Again these could be body guards or full time soldiers.(See Army Tactics and Composition for more) In this case it seems the body guards (the 50 that survived which includes at least one spy) turned against their leader. This somewhat matches the latter rebellion against king Noah, where a wicked and bloodthirsty commander forfeits his right to rule. (Mosiah 19:1-6,19-20) The text also reinforces the suggestion that spies were actually closer to scouts and rangers than cloak and dagger forces. (see Army Tactics and Composition) The familial strife may also indicate that units were tribally created along family lines. And it indicates a simpler level of society compared to the time of two Moronis. In this case right made might- the side that won decided to make a treaty and colonize the land. There also seemed to be less control over tribal secession. Since in Omni there is no indication of government control over tribal movement. (compare to Alma 27:14-15, or the mission to reclaim the Zoramites, or Moroni's aggressive attempts to prevent the King Men escape) Also in Words of Mormon v. 16, there are numerous dissents unto the Lamanites but no mention of control or trying to control them.
Conclusion: I was amazed that I could glean so much from only a couple pages of text. The Book of Mormon continually amazes me, and there is so much research to do concerning warfare in that book. In this short chapter alone we find information about Nephite society, army composition, and even some political detail. Coming soon...Words of Mormon
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Strategy and military theory in the Book of Mormon
What follows is a preliminary examination of strategy and military thought within the Book of Mormon.
Clausewitzean thought and strategy: Carl Von Clausewitz is the most influential theorist ever and it is fitting we should start with him. In making this list I must confess that I am not an expert on military theory, especially the incredibly dense writings of somebody like Clausewitz. But I have studied application of his words in a publications (In consideration for the Napoleon Series) in conference presentations (2009 Napoleon Conference) on my blog (Clausewitz on Captain Moroni's Genius) and from numerous studies in school (like the debate over Confederate strategy during the United States Civil War). Thus with my credentials at least basically established I will examine a few ways the Book of Mormon accurately conforms to the principles of Clausewitz and other military theorists.
-My post title "Clausewitz on Captain Moroni's Genius" covered how Moroni's actions match the criteria established by Clausewitz
-Strategic Policy: The Nephites attempted to take an active defense but were expressly forbidden by God and their leaders to take the offensive. This corresponds to Clausewitz who states that the weaker power usually goes on the defensive (the Nephites in this case), but a truly passive defensive is fatal.
-Defensive strength: Thus Moroni commanded Teancum to seek opportunity to "scourge" the Lamanites as possible, yet not take any major offensive like reclaiming the city until Moroni arrived. Clausewitz also said that defenses were normally stronger than offensives. The latter had the burden of positive purpose, I.E. they had to conquer to win, while the defender simply had to not lose. The negative purpose of the Nephites worked to their advantage in some cases as they used the threat to their homes and families as a motivator in the fight. One can think of the French thinking of "la patria" as they mobilized and fought with vigor to defend and spread the revolution. There are draw backs to being on the defensive that were of particular concern to the Nephites based on Mesoamerican politics, but I will address that in another post.
-Culmination point: This is the point at which the army on the offensive operates past its ability to gains its objective and the offensive then quickly moves to the other side. In history this is exemplified most by Napoleon's Russia campaign. Capturing Moscow moved Napoleon beyond the culmination point, where he then went on a defensive all the way back to Germany. In the Book of Mormon, Moroni reclaiming the capital, seizing Lamanite reinforcements, and then defeating the last Lamanite force represents the Lamanites moving past the culmination point. Teancum's midnight raid on the Lamanite king also represents a more limited culmination point, since the Lamanites never pursued anything more than a limited offensive in that area for the rest of the war.
Antoin Henri Jomini: While not as famous as Clausewitz, his post Napoleonic writings have influenced contemporary military thought to a great degree.
-General Maxim: The first rule of Jomini was to concentrate all available strength at the decisive point to win the battle. Moroni's tactical maneuvers excel at this rule. In Alma 43, 52, and 56, the Nephites maneuvered their forces in such as way so that they could " fall upon them in their rear, and thus bring them up in the rear at the same time they were met in the front" (Alma 56:23). This could represent a Jominian attempt to apply decisive combat power at the critical place and time.
-Interior lines: Jomini loved to discuss how interior lines are an advantage. To describe this concept think of a circle; the forces on the inside of the circle would have a shorter route and easier time defending any part of that circle compared to the forces outside the circle. A nation on the defensive, and the position of the Nephite Capital with forces on seas to the east and the west could apply the principle of interior lines. They could transfer forces to either side faster than the Lamanites; who had to go "round about" (Alma 43:22) in order to re-engage the Nephites.
-Sun-Tzu:
-Psychological preparation: Chinese and Japanese writers were intent on being mentally prepared. "Those that excel in warfare first make themselves unconquerable" (Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans, 163) Sun-Tzu also described the effects of certain terrain on fighting skills "Fatal terrain" is one where you throw the army into an impossible situation, like fighting with your backs to a river, and when you throw "soldiers into a place from which there is nowhere to go, they will die rather than flee. When they are facing death, how can one not obtain the utmost strength from the officers and men?”(Sun Tzu, 179, see also David Graff's Medieval Chinese Warfare pg,169). I have a paper under consideration from the Journal of BoM studies that examines one case of Moroni placing the armies of the Nephites in protection of women and children, thus activating a psychologically trigger among what otherwise would be lethargic levies.
-Fatherly care: Sun-Tzu said, "When the general regards his troops as young children, they will advance into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his beloved children, they will be willing to die with him." (177) Compare with the words of Helaman and the performance of his soldiers: And now I say unto you, my beloved brother Moroni, that never had I seen so great courage, nay, not amongst all the Nephites. For as I had ever called them my sons (for they were all of them very young) even so they said unto me: Father, behold our God is with us, and he will not suffer that we should fall; then let us go forth; we would not slay our brethren if they would let us alone; therefore let us go, lest they should overpower the army of Antipus. (Alma 56:45-46)
-Unorthodox tactics: This is a peculiar definition, but according to scholars orthodox tactics were meant to hold an enemy in place so that the unorthodox flanking blow will strike successfully. Thus Nephite commanders would approach a city, and establish contact with the enemy: the orthodox method. Then they would execute some sort of ruse designed to overwhelm the army physically and undo them psychologically, and constitute the unorthodox manner of victory.
De Re Militari and the Strategikon: These are Roman and Byzantine writings, respectively, that describe strategy further. I cannot comment in great detail on these since I have not read a great deal about them. (Geeze, I'm not an encyclopedia) But in writing my book about Book of Mormon warfare I intend to make great use of them, and other ancient writers such as Frontinus.
Conclusion: A preliminary comparison of the Book of Mormon to seminal military texts reveals that the Book generally conforms to established principles of good generalship and seems authentic due to its verification through military theory. There are some differences such as the lack of defensive strength that Clausewitz describes. These can be attributed to cultural idiosyncrasies. A study of military theory from different cultures and time periods allows us more depth in examining what the Book of Mormon has to say concerning strategy and theory. It also bypasses the criticisms associated with "parallel mania" due to the universal nature of good military principles.
I hoped you enjoyed the read, and I look forward to bringing more knowledge and background to the study of Book of Mormon warfare.
Clausewitzean thought and strategy: Carl Von Clausewitz is the most influential theorist ever and it is fitting we should start with him. In making this list I must confess that I am not an expert on military theory, especially the incredibly dense writings of somebody like Clausewitz. But I have studied application of his words in a publications (In consideration for the Napoleon Series) in conference presentations (2009 Napoleon Conference) on my blog (Clausewitz on Captain Moroni's Genius) and from numerous studies in school (like the debate over Confederate strategy during the United States Civil War). Thus with my credentials at least basically established I will examine a few ways the Book of Mormon accurately conforms to the principles of Clausewitz and other military theorists.
-My post title "Clausewitz on Captain Moroni's Genius" covered how Moroni's actions match the criteria established by Clausewitz
-Strategic Policy: The Nephites attempted to take an active defense but were expressly forbidden by God and their leaders to take the offensive. This corresponds to Clausewitz who states that the weaker power usually goes on the defensive (the Nephites in this case), but a truly passive defensive is fatal.
-Defensive strength: Thus Moroni commanded Teancum to seek opportunity to "scourge" the Lamanites as possible, yet not take any major offensive like reclaiming the city until Moroni arrived. Clausewitz also said that defenses were normally stronger than offensives. The latter had the burden of positive purpose, I.E. they had to conquer to win, while the defender simply had to not lose. The negative purpose of the Nephites worked to their advantage in some cases as they used the threat to their homes and families as a motivator in the fight. One can think of the French thinking of "la patria" as they mobilized and fought with vigor to defend and spread the revolution. There are draw backs to being on the defensive that were of particular concern to the Nephites based on Mesoamerican politics, but I will address that in another post.
-Culmination point: This is the point at which the army on the offensive operates past its ability to gains its objective and the offensive then quickly moves to the other side. In history this is exemplified most by Napoleon's Russia campaign. Capturing Moscow moved Napoleon beyond the culmination point, where he then went on a defensive all the way back to Germany. In the Book of Mormon, Moroni reclaiming the capital, seizing Lamanite reinforcements, and then defeating the last Lamanite force represents the Lamanites moving past the culmination point. Teancum's midnight raid on the Lamanite king also represents a more limited culmination point, since the Lamanites never pursued anything more than a limited offensive in that area for the rest of the war.
Antoin Henri Jomini: While not as famous as Clausewitz, his post Napoleonic writings have influenced contemporary military thought to a great degree.
-General Maxim: The first rule of Jomini was to concentrate all available strength at the decisive point to win the battle. Moroni's tactical maneuvers excel at this rule. In Alma 43, 52, and 56, the Nephites maneuvered their forces in such as way so that they could " fall upon them in their rear, and thus bring them up in the rear at the same time they were met in the front" (Alma 56:23). This could represent a Jominian attempt to apply decisive combat power at the critical place and time.
-Interior lines: Jomini loved to discuss how interior lines are an advantage. To describe this concept think of a circle; the forces on the inside of the circle would have a shorter route and easier time defending any part of that circle compared to the forces outside the circle. A nation on the defensive, and the position of the Nephite Capital with forces on seas to the east and the west could apply the principle of interior lines. They could transfer forces to either side faster than the Lamanites; who had to go "round about" (Alma 43:22) in order to re-engage the Nephites.
-Sun-Tzu:
-Psychological preparation: Chinese and Japanese writers were intent on being mentally prepared. "Those that excel in warfare first make themselves unconquerable" (Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans, 163) Sun-Tzu also described the effects of certain terrain on fighting skills "Fatal terrain" is one where you throw the army into an impossible situation, like fighting with your backs to a river, and when you throw "soldiers into a place from which there is nowhere to go, they will die rather than flee. When they are facing death, how can one not obtain the utmost strength from the officers and men?”(Sun Tzu, 179, see also David Graff's Medieval Chinese Warfare pg,169). I have a paper under consideration from the Journal of BoM studies that examines one case of Moroni placing the armies of the Nephites in protection of women and children, thus activating a psychologically trigger among what otherwise would be lethargic levies.
-Fatherly care: Sun-Tzu said, "When the general regards his troops as young children, they will advance into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his beloved children, they will be willing to die with him." (177) Compare with the words of Helaman and the performance of his soldiers: And now I say unto you, my beloved brother Moroni, that never had I seen so great courage, nay, not amongst all the Nephites. For as I had ever called them my sons (for they were all of them very young) even so they said unto me: Father, behold our God is with us, and he will not suffer that we should fall; then let us go forth; we would not slay our brethren if they would let us alone; therefore let us go, lest they should overpower the army of Antipus. (Alma 56:45-46)
-Unorthodox tactics: This is a peculiar definition, but according to scholars orthodox tactics were meant to hold an enemy in place so that the unorthodox flanking blow will strike successfully. Thus Nephite commanders would approach a city, and establish contact with the enemy: the orthodox method. Then they would execute some sort of ruse designed to overwhelm the army physically and undo them psychologically, and constitute the unorthodox manner of victory.
De Re Militari and the Strategikon: These are Roman and Byzantine writings, respectively, that describe strategy further. I cannot comment in great detail on these since I have not read a great deal about them. (Geeze, I'm not an encyclopedia) But in writing my book about Book of Mormon warfare I intend to make great use of them, and other ancient writers such as Frontinus.
Conclusion: A preliminary comparison of the Book of Mormon to seminal military texts reveals that the Book generally conforms to established principles of good generalship and seems authentic due to its verification through military theory. There are some differences such as the lack of defensive strength that Clausewitz describes. These can be attributed to cultural idiosyncrasies. A study of military theory from different cultures and time periods allows us more depth in examining what the Book of Mormon has to say concerning strategy and theory. It also bypasses the criticisms associated with "parallel mania" due to the universal nature of good military principles.
I hoped you enjoyed the read, and I look forward to bringing more knowledge and background to the study of Book of Mormon warfare.
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