Publications and My Newest Book on Modern Chinese Strategy

IISH / Stefan R. Landsberger / Private Collection; Recruiting poster from the 1970s. It is the cover of my book and I like how it shows a different facet of Chinese history than dragons or Western stereotypes. 

I’ve got many exciting non Book of Mormon news to share. I published a piece about supposedly new technology revolutions in two different places. Both Real Clear Defense and The National Interest are national publications with wide audiences so they represent good feathers in my cap.

Today, May 24^th, I checked Real Clear Defense where a piece of mine was also published. It was on Sunzi and China’s possible preemptive war.  All of this becomes a nice preamble for my biggest news. It wasn’t on the Book of Mormon so I didn’t talk about it much here, but my book on modern Chinese warfare dropped yesterday. It’s listed at a great price and you don’t have to take my word for its quality, as all of the publications linked to above are from the same author, using the same base of knowledge, and some parts of the above pieces came from the book!! They were good enough for leading publications so they should be good for your coffee table too.  

The title is Dragon’s Claws with Feet of Clay: A Primer on Modern Chinese Strategy. The first half of the title acknowledges that China is doing scary things, but the second half of the title suggests that China isn’t nearly as powerful as the click bait articles say. If you are reader of this blog you probably already know and like my writing style, it’s just on a slightly different subject. Considering China is in the news on a weekly basis you will amaze your friends and be the smartest person in the room after reading this book. Make sure to grab your copy today!!

Notes on Book of Mormon Insurgency from Late Roman History

I’ve been trying to go through the entire thing, but I haven’t made it through yet. I have found some great material that reinforces what I’ve said about insurgency before and provides insights into the Book of Mormon generally. Amminaus Marcellinus was a late Roman historian that provides valuable insight and as Hugh Nibley said, when we come to expect an outrageous collection of potpourri we instead find confirming context.

14.2.1-2: For the Isaurians  too, whose way it is now to keep the peace and now put everything in turmoil by sudden raids, abandoned their occasional secret plundering expeditions and, as impunity stimulated for the worse their growing boldness, broke out in a serious war. For a long time they had been inflaming their warlike spirits by restless outbreaks, but they were now especially exasperated, as they declared, by the indignity of some of their associates, who had been taken prisoner, having been thrown to beasts of prey in the shows of the amphitheatre at Iconium, a town of Pisidia—an outrage without precedent.

And, in the words of Cicero,  as even wild animals, when warned by hunger, generally return to the place where they were once fed, so they all, swooping like a whirlwind down from their steep and rugged mountains, made for the districts near the sea; and hiding themselves there in pathless lurking-places and defiles as the dark nights were coming on-the moon being still crescent and so not shining with full brilliance—they watched the sailors….[then attacked] and since their natural ferocity was fired by greed, they spared no one, even of those who surrendered, but massacred them all and without resistance carried off the cargoes, led either by their value or by their usefulness.

The key comparisons are in bold. This list could get quite long but just a brief look includes “being stirred up to anger” (Helaman 11: 24) and the next verse was “murder and plunder…done from wilderness and secret places” (11:25). They, or their lambskins, were died in blood being great and terrible and recalls wild beasts (3^rd Nephi 4:7). Speaking of beasts Gildas described mountain insurgents as a hive of bees (1.26). They used their tough terrain to hide and defeat Nephite armies: “sally forth from the hills, and out of the mountains, and the wilderness, and their strongholds,” (3^rd Nephi 4:1). (More on the Nephite army’s defeat below) “Get gain” (Helaman 7:21) is repeated frequently throughout the books of Helaman and 3^rd Nephi speaking to their greed.

The most interesting part might be the outrage that stoked them to war. It’s not very popular to say it, (I’ve been called a Marxist Schmuck for doing so) but a critical reading suggests that Nephite misrule gave the robbers legitimate complaints.

From my 2016 FAIR presentation:  

There is evidence that the Gaidnaton Robbers were really just seeking land reform. At the end of this phase of conflict in 3 Nephi 6:3, the peace treaty specifically included distribution of land. It reads that Nephite leaders granted unto those robbers who had entered into a covenant to keep the peace… “lands, according to their numbers, that they might have, with their labors, wherewith to subsist upon; and thus they did establish peace in all the land.” That’s a rather odd peace treaty. If we take a straight forward reading of the text, the Gadianton Robbers revolt for no good reason beyond being influenced by the devil, and having a lust for money and mayhem. After many years of battle and devastation they caused, when they are finally defeated in epic battle they got…more land? And the next verse described the “equity and justice” of the peace (3 Nephi 6:4), which at least infers that those qualities were lacking in Nephite laws and might have inspired the insurgency in the first place.

Moving back to Amminaus:

14:2.5-6 Anger at [the slaughter of their people by the robbers] aroused the [Roman] soldiers quartered in the numerous towns and fortresses which lie near those regions, and each division strove to the best of its power to check the marauders as they ranged more widely, now in solid bodies, sometimes even in isolated bands. But the soldiers were defeated by their strength and numbers; for since the Isaurians were born and brought up amid the steep and winding defiles of the mountains, they bounded over them as if they were a smooth and level plain, attacking the enemy with missiles from a distance and terrifying them with savage howls. 

And sometimes our infantry in pursuing them were forced to scale lofty slopes, and when they lost their footing, even if they reached the very summits by catching hold of underbrush or briars, the narrow and pathless tracts allowed them neither to take order of battle nor with mighty effort to keep a firm footing; and while the enemy, running here and there, tore off and hurled down masses of rock from above, they made their perilous way down over steep slopes; or if, compelled by dire necessity, they made a brave fight, they were overwhelmed by falling boulders of enormous weight.

In addition to reinforcing the view of the Isaurians as a scary other and the ethno centric stereotypes we see about Lamanites from the Nephites in the Book of Mormon, I think this is simply a more detailed version of the defeat of the Nephites in Helaman 11:27-30:

Now behold, these robbers did make great havoc, yea, even great destruction among the people of Nephi, and also among the people of the Lamanites. And it came to pass that it was expedient that there should be a stop put to this work of destruction; therefore they sent an army of strong men into the wilderness and upon the mountains to search out this band of robbers, and to destroy them. But behold, it came to pass that in that same year they were driven back even into their own lands… And it came to pass in the commencement of the eighty and first year they did go forth again against this band of robbers, and did destroy many; and they were also visited with much destruction.

The Book of Mormon doesn’t say explicitly say this but the defeat recorded above implies it and the history Ammianus’ record provides the likely details. If I were asked to comment on terrain in general I would have suggested that rough mountain terrain would prohibit the deployment of broad military fronts, and mountain dwellers with specialized weapons (slings and boulders), as well as sure footing would prevail. In fact, in discussing the effects of Moroni’s reforms on the Nephites after he passed away as a national hero, I suggested that their heavy armor was a negative in fighting these bands. As I summarized on page 112:

It gave [the Nephites] a tactical advantage in some areas, but also made them more susceptible to fatigue and the hit and run tactics of their enemies. This cost them strategic mobility which allowed robbers to flourish in more inhospitable regions. The heavier infantry may have inspired the hit and run tactics and mountain hideouts of the insurgents. The greater logistical need of the heavy infantry couple with their inability to operate in rough terrain led to an increase of banditry in the land.

14.2.7: Therefore extreme caution was shown after that, and when the marauders began to make for the mountain heights, the soldiers yielded to the unfavourable position. When, however, the Isaurians could be found on level ground, as constantly happened, they were allowed neither to stretch out their right arms nor poise their weapons, of which each carried two or three, but they were slaughtered like defenceless sheep

 As I just wrote, heavy infantry is great on the plains and gives the counter insurgent forces a tactical advantage. The Romans gained the advantage by luring them out on level ground, and the Nephites won their climatic battles against the Gadianton Robbers by doing the same thing.

Conclusion:

This has been a brief overview of what I see as a typical insurgency found in a few short verses from a late Roman historian. The Isurians were viewed as a barbaric and ferocious other, who subsisted on plunder, with complaints against the central government. They were excellent in the mountains and could defeat armies there but when they tried to plunder in the plains they could be caught and defeated.

On a larger point, this once again shows that my writings about insurgency in the Book of Mormon are not radical revisions for those who know history and military history. Heavy infantry has trouble in the mountains, ancient historians depict other ethnic groups negatively, states have trouble extending control in difficult terrain, rebellious groups can cause problems but often don’t have the state apparatus (taxes, agriculture, military) to overthrow the central government. The Book of Mormon fits comfortably within the context of an ancient insurgency and we need to the read the book with the same critical eye that we read other ancient histories. 

Runnells Has an Absolutely Terrible Grasp of Warfare, Science, and Scholarship

I found and then wrote something on facebook that would be useful if posted in a more lasting setting with sources. I never engaged that much with Runnels because he repeats criticisms (badly), that have been refuted elsewhere.  My personal interactions with him, while brief, were incredibly negative and make him seem odious.  Finally, as I say and show in my response below, he just doesn’t practice sound scholarship so his "critical" thoughts are often insipid and mind numbing. 

Runnels wrote this in his section of the CES Letter on science:

Native Americans around this time did not have steel swords. Millions of dead natives would have left a trace. And according to historians,[Morgan’s note: this links to the incredibly scholarly reddit] hand to hand engagements did not last that long. We’re talking about a maximum of hours, not several days. Routing, sieges, and hunting down enemies would extend it, but that is not the story being told here. And the final one-on-one battle is so incredibly unlikely, especially when you get to the means of death. A beheaded man doing a pushup and trying to breathe? Not likely.

My response with added sources in parenthesis and footnotes: Just glancing at number 8 his points are superficial and don't engage the text or extant data. There are lots of points about steel. Personally based on the data I think the text refers to an extremely small number of weapons made out of meteoric iron (which is often compared to Damascus steel). And that’s ignoring the literary qualities that make the discussion of the sword of Shule and his band of followers sound more like Excalibur. He then conflates Ether 7:8-10 with the mention of millions in Ether 14-15. There are numerous differences and a rather great time span [25 rulers] between those chapters, so its lazy reading at best, and deliberately misreading at worst to assume there were millions or even more than a few steel swords that we should expect to find.

He has no clue about battlefield archaeology. Even one of the most studied battles at Hastings yields little direct evidence,[1] and historians still debate its exact location. Scholars recently "found" a lost army and so forth.

He then conflates the skirmish warfare of most Northern American tribes with far less social and political organization with the far more advanced cultures from Central America that had rather sophisticated cultures.[2] San Lorenzo and La Venta both had large populations and decent territorial control at a time when Rome was a still a collection of huts on a few hills, and this was centuries before the final battles of the Jaredites.

These societies could sustain rather long conflicts and battles. (For a general discussion of numbers and what Mesoamerican nations could field and sustain see this post.)  Moreover, medical studies show that failing to completely severing the head in one blow, such as by the last standing warrior in a three day battle, the body will go through upper body spasms.[3] Again, Runnels combines a narrow reading of the text with a shallow research to proclaim something as fact, when a careful reading of the text and better grasp of military history would suggest something else.

Overall, Runnells shows he is a dilettante that wouldn't recognize actual scholarship if a stele fell on him. 

Thanks for reading. I work as a free lance author, if you found value in this work please consider donating using the pay pal buttons below, or by buying one of my publications. 

Edit addition on Multi Day Battles: 

Good question. I've been thinking about it more as well. Its a rather poor argument from Runnells to begin with. He has a very poor grasp of battle, including how they are defined and their length measured. He seems to think that battles just can't last very long, but a very short amount of research found many multi day battles. There are various reasons for this including partial sieges, stand offs between armies vying for position, pre and during battle maneuver, and chasing down defeated armies.

He attacks the Jaredite account for having battles that lasted all day for multiple days, but there are plenty of ancient accounts that record similar or multi day battles. The Battle of Fei River and Hulao Pass both had significant stand offs. This is where the armies skirmished a bit, but they both held defensive positions and were trying to see how they could break the opponents position. In the case of Fei River Fu Rong moved his soldiers which precipitated confusion, panic and retreat. The opposing soldiers read the signs in the ground and then pursued them and killed 70-80% of the army (which goes to large numbers of casualties as well.)

The Battle of Red Cliffs also featured a long pursuit through marshes and difficult terrain which might be considered a multi day battle.

The Battle of Hulao pass Li Shimin (ruling name Tang Taizong), made the opposing army hold their position for hours which made them avoid lunch and get stiff, both literally and in their tactical responses. He sent a cavalry force to see how the enemy reacted. When they were slow in responding and reacted fearfully Li Shimin sent a full attack. The pre battle maneuver, stand off, then resulting attack and chasing down the fleeing army and regrouping remnants took more than one day.

In the Sicilian Expedition the Athenian army tried to besiege Syracuse. But the Spartans landed an army in reinforcements and they fought a series of engagements and built counter reinforcements. This shows how classifying battles and determining their length can get confusing (especially when people deliberately apply a narrow definition to prove something doesn't fit with "science"). But they fought a bunch of mini battles, including one at night where one side painted themselves white to better facilitate command and control, and the cumulative total was a spring and summer of near constant fighting. One could almost say that they would "fight all day and conquer not." (Ether 15:15)

In the Battle of Gergovia Caesar fought Vercingetorix. The latter had a commanding defensive position so the former had to rely on a combination of maneuver, siege, fighting, and desperate battle to finally break the Gallic army. Again, its tough to time the individual actions as each element of the campaign (active battle, siege, maneuver, marching), blended into each other. Thats why Runnell's complaint is so odd and poorly stated.

Which is really what you get for relying on reddit when you make sweeping pronouncements on military history. Thats why I went back to the basics in discussing how societies sustain war. The more complex they are, the more they can raise armies and sustain them in the field, which means they can fight multiple campaigns and many battles. There were some tribes such as the Cree who for much of their history were hunter gatherers that fought very few of what we would call battles, most were skirmishes with a few soldiers. But others like the Aztecs raised large armies, sent them on long campaigns, and had battle after battle on those campaigns.

The Jaredites had a sophisticated society, as seen by places like La Venta and San Lorenzo, with large populations that could raise and support large armies. Those armies could then fight a series of engagements: some combinations of pre battle maneuver (Ether 15:8), stand offs (even exchanging messages Ether 15:18), chasing down fleeing armies (Ether 15:10), and then finally it seems they were two punch drunk fighters with nothing left in their armies to maneuver or negotiate and they just came to a place, likely with ritual importance (15:11) and strategic value. In fact, their four year stand off while they gathered strength reminded me of the build up to the Battle of Hulao. They didn't have the logistical strength to go any further, so they fought the pivotal battle (that with the army marching, then standoff, and then battle, then mopping up it all likely took longer than one day) all happened at one place.

Hope this helps. Runnells just really doesn't know what he is talking about in military history.

https://www.amazon.com/Decisive-Battles.../dp/1594162891

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hulao

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gergovia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fei_River

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Expedition...

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[1] John Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex, (Deseret Book, 2014), 383, fn 9.

[2] The best book I found on native warfare is David Jones, Native North America Armor, Shields, and Fortifications, (UT press, 2004.) You might also consider my book that compares and contrasts Cree warfare, which was much less organized, with Mayan warfare from the same time period in the late 4^th century AD, Morgan Deane, From the Cree to Korea: A World History of Battle at 400 AD.)

[3] M. Gary Hadfield, “Neuropathology and the Scriptures,” Brigham Young University Studies 33 no. 2 (1993), 325.  See also Morgan Deane, "Experiencing Battle in the Book of Mormon," Interpreter a Journal of Mormon Scripture, 23 (2017), 237-252. 

Book Review: Maxwell Institute Study Edition of the Book of Mormon

One of the slightest controversies in Book of Mormon studies includes the concept of making the text easier or harder. Readers at Deseret Book often see various scriptures “made easy,” while scholars enjoy what Richard Bushman called wrestling with important questions, or making things harder. The unique joy of the Maxwell Institute Study Edition of the Book of Mormon is that it assembles the text in such a way that it’s easier to read, and thus makes it a blessing for both groups.

The text is reformatted into paragraphs with the markings for chapters and verses added in later additions in Arabic numbers in this edition. I particular enjoy original chapters being marked in Roman numerals. As editor Grant Hardy noted, these were apparently marked on the gold plates, and thus reflect the author’s intent. I found them especially helpful in noticing major themes and sections of the text.

The text is further aided by select footnotes that explain possible emendations to the text, highlight or explain major points, and provide cross references.  I’m currently working on a major project that examines classical Chinese military texts beyond Sunzi (Sun-Tzu). I have plenty of experience noticing how subtle changes in punctuation, spelling, and grammar along with occasional emendations can critically change the meaning of the text. This addition takes particularly trenchant commentary from Royal Skousen’s voluminous and excellent work on the matter and presents it to the reader.

Many of the footnotes, as well as a glossary of short essays addressing pertinent topics at the end of the book provide excellent summaries of existing research and major questions about its provenance and such topics as geography and Hebrew poetry. Simply by summarizing and assessing them in a forthright manner Hardy provides aids to both believers and non-believing but interested academics. Explaining something like seer stones in a forthright manner helps members accept items that may be disturbing in other settings. Providing a careful analysis of past apologetic efforts is more palatable for skeptics studying the book, while still making them aware of pertinent research.

The text also includes basic maps, highlights major figures in the text and its organization through simple charts. Probably the most helpful are the excerpts of primary sources from key people involved with the origins of the book, process of translation, and the testimony of those that saw the plates. These are rather informative on their own, but also show that, as the very least, Hardy and the Maxwell Institute care about grounding the reception and origination of the text by using primary sources and proper historical methods. As a historian this makes me proud, while still leaving unresolved the fact that the new MI seems a bit more interested in the 19^th century than the old AR (ancient research) part of FARMS and the Book of Mormon.

Overall, I highly recommend the text for believers looking to aid in their devotional study of the text to non-believing scholars wishing to familiarize themselves with what some people say is one of the most important books in American history.  This truly fulfills the purpose of being a study edition.