Guest Post: Lamanite Alliances, Spheres of Influence, and Historical Complexity Part II

[This is the second part of a guest post by Ryan Tanner. You can find the first part here.]

This brings us to 72 BC, when Amalickiah arrives in the land of Nephi. By this point the elite in the city of Nephi had settled on a new king. His control over the seven cities may have been very tenuous. The elements of power that must have existed in the city of Nephi would have included those who were originally direct competitors of Lamoni's father, the new elite who rose to power after the Anti-Nephi-Lehis left, the Amalekites and the Zoramites, and the interests of the six other cities in the alliance. The elites who were in control in Nephi would have been entrenched there since the days of Lamoni's father, or longer, and were currently in a semi-stable position since the Amalekite and Zoramite backed contender to the throne, Zerahemnah, failed in his bid.

The new king, whose name is never mentioned, would have been the one person holding the new alliance together. It is possible that he was an outsider, meaning he was not from the city of Nephi, but had been accepted by the elites in the city, possibly by his marriage to the queen, who as we will see later had considerable control over the city of Nephi and the elites who lived there. In effect he was acting as the glue between the seven cities, but the connection was most likely tenuous.

Under the influence of Amalickiah, with perhaps the backing of the Amalekites and the Zoramites, the new king proclaimed his intention to invade the Nephite lands. The tenuous alliance was immediately put to the test when some of the allied cities (we have no idea which ones or how many) refused and banded together under the leadership of Lehonti, who they proclaimed as their king (Alma 47:6). The power base of Lehonti must have been the Lamanites who were not under the control of the Amalekites and the Zoramites, and/or those who were not under the direct control of the city of Nephi.

Thus the new king was in danger of having his newly forged alliances come undone, but he could not attack the rebels directly because then he would have lost even more influence in the surrounding area. He was effectively in the same situation Lamoni was in when Ammon arrived in the land of Ishmael. The king could not order an attack on the army of Lehonti without risking civil war. But other influences were pushing him towards war with the Nephites, and he needed the cities and troops under the control of Lehonti. Thus Amalickiah, like Ammon, presented a way out. If Amalickiah succeeded then the king could further consolidate his power, but if Amalickiah failed then the Lamanite king could easily disassociate himself from the attack. Perhaps the army sent with Amalickiah was composed mainly of Amalekites and Zoramites, and those Lamanites that they could muster out. Thus if the expedition was a failure then the Amalekites and the Zoramites, or whoever the king sent with Amalickiah, would have been expendable allies, or at least allies that were not considered essential to the elites in the city of Nephi.

So let us reconsider the sociopolitical situation that Amalickiah was working with in and around the land of Nephi. A previously cohesive alliance of seven, or more, Lamanite cities had recently been broken up by the very public conversion of a significant segment of the ruling class to the religion of the Nephites. Certain groups, such as the Amalekites, had been exerting influence in Lamanite society for a number of years, but were still considered outsiders. Others, such as the Amulonites, had some influence, but lost it recently. The Nephite dissenter axis was recently strengthened by the addition of the powerful Zoramites, but the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition was not enough to gain control of the seven cities, perhaps due to the loss of their main candidate for the position of king, Zerahemnah.

The elites of the city of Nephi, which we suppose had had control of the surrounding area and cities for some time (i.e. a few generations), were unwilling to relinquish their positions of influence to the Amalekite-Zoramite axis, but had to balance that against the machinations and intrigue from the other six cities in the alliance. Despite the fact that the elites may not have wanted a close relationship with the Amalekites and Zoramites, they were constrained somewhat by the fact that the Amalekites and Zoramites represented the mortal enemies of the Nephites. Specifically they were the enemies of Moroni and his armies, which had entered into an alliance with the people of Ammon, that is, the one group of people that had someone who could legitimately lay claim to the title of King of the Lamanites. Thus the elites in Nephi may have been relying on their alliance with the Amalekites and Zoramites to help prevent the return of the legitimate king, backed by a Nephite army.

After the death of Lehonti, and the treacherous assassination of the king, Amalickiah was in command of an army that was most likely made up of troops from the Amalekites and Zoramites, and from the surrounding six Lamanite cities. There was apparently significant loyalty in this odd assortment of an army to the king since Amalickiah could use the death of the king to motivate his troops. Also it is an indication of the rather tenuous position of the king since Amalickiah could blame the king's murder on the king's own servants and people would believe it. Perhaps his reasoning was somewhat along the lines of, "The servants must have been agents of Anti-Nephi-Lehi who remained in the land to kill the king." Thus giving the Lamanites another reason to go along with the war against the Nephites and their new allies, the Anti-Nephi-Lehis.

At this point the city of Nephi is surrounded by a Lamanite army that most likely was not made up of men from the capital city, that is, the city was not their home and they would have no objection to sacking the city. The army may also have been looking for some sort of payment and the capital city may have been a tempting target. Also the army may have contained troops from the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition which were not Lamanites and would have no problem with inserting themselves into the Lamanite power structure.

So in this rather explosive situation the queen of the Lamanites asks Amalickiah to "spare the people of the city", invites him to come into the city, accepts the evidence of the king's murder, and in a move that allows her to maintain the independence of the city and its elites, while preventing the sack of the city, and the potential takeover by the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition, while at the same time not giving preference to any one of the many Lamanite groups that were vying for power, she agrees to marry Amalickiah and bring about a quick end of the recent difficulties. Her ability to maintain her position is evident by the fact that after Amalickiah dies in the subsequent war his brother must return to the city of Nephi to report on his death and consolidate his power before returning to the battlefield.

For the other competing groups Amalickiah represented an acceptable candidate for king. The Amalekite-Zoramite coalition would have accepted him as a fellow Nephite dissenter who was opposed to the expansionist policies of Moroni. The Lamanites from the other six cities would accept him because he was not from the Amalekite-Zoramite coalition, or from any of the seven cities. Thus he would not upset the new balance of internal power among the Lamanites who had to reorganize their power structures after the flight of the Anti-Nephi-Lehis. He was also opposed to Moroni, and Moroni's new allies the Anti-Nephi-Lehis.

If we look at Amalickiah's rise to power in this context we see that there were many competing and complex interests at work. For all these competing and complex interests Amalickiah represented the ideal compromise. Even though he was not their man, more importantly he was no one else's man. In a society that had just four years before gone through a major upheaval, Amalickiah was the one man who could be everything to everyone and not disturb the new and still unsteady power structures. Sometimes we forget or do not account for the impact that Ammon and his brothers had on Lamanite society and power structure. It was only four short years between the flight of the people of Ammon and the arrival of Amalickiah in the land of Nephi. Lamanite politics and society were still in a flux and Amalickiah, rather than being a conniving fiend who duped the easily deceived Lamanites, was actually a significant stabilizing force in an otherwise unsteady time for the Lamanites. It is unfortunate that Amalickiah used, and squandered, his opportunity by perpetuating a war on the Nephites rather than building a more stable and just society.

Now a good portion of what I presented here is speculation and my own thoughts and interpretation of the parts of history that we have in the Book of Alma, but it does provide a different way of viewing the beginning of the Nephite-Lamanite war found in the war chapters of Alma. I would be delighted if others can give additional insights and commentary on this situation because I know that there are several things that I did not cover or consider in writing this. For example, some of these conflicts may have been more to do with control of trade routes, or rich mining grounds, or farmland, than simple political intrigue. So there are definitely more things to consider, but some of those we may be unable to know until we can pinpoint the location of these events and consider the archaeological evidence to give us more insight into what was happening at the time. Until then we must rely on the text to give us the clues.

Guest Post: Lamanite Alliances, Spheres of Influence, and Historical Complexity, Part I

[Ryan Tanner is a student at UNC Chapel Hill pursuing a graduate degree in Physics.  This is the first part of a guest post partially inspired by my previous post about Amalickiah's Coup]

 

I have great respect for Mormon and for his great life's work, even if at times I wish he had included just a little more detail here and there, but I must recognize the already difficult task he had of compiling 1000 years of history into a coherent story with a central religious message. For the rest we must fill in the gaps with the best of our understanding. In that vein I offer these ideas as a way of understanding the Nephite-Lamanite wars in a different light so that we might consider the historical complexity that underlies the history of Mormon's Book.

Previously Morgan Deane has addressed the arguments that Amalickiah might have used to work his way into a position to become king of the Lamanites. It is in that context that we must consider the conditions among the Lamanites that made his rise to power, and the subsequent wars, not only a possibility but also something that must have seemed rational to all those involved. One general rule that I always try to apply when considering the motivations of others is that people, at least in the moment of their decisions, try to act in a way that seems rational to them. Thus while we may look at Mormon's account of Amalickiah's rise to power and wonder why the Lamanites were so easily taken in, if we were to know the full social, political and economic conditions at the time we may not be so quick to think the Lamanites were easily duped by a scheming Amalickiah.

It is easy for us to slip into an opinion that the Lamanites were a monolithic group who acted mindlessly, violently and vengefully to attack the peace loving Nephites without cause. But to do that would ignore the complexity that we find everywhere throughout history. Rarely (as in never) are large groups of people perfectly unified in a thought and common cause without a large measure of complexity behind their apparent unity. This is to say that political maneuverings do not stop just because a nation is at war, and in many cases the wars are a direct result of the political maneuverings.

To understand the complex landscape of the Lamanite people that Amalickiah entered into when he fled the land of Zarahemla we must go back several years and consider the mission of the sons of Mosiah to the Lamanites. Interestingly enough, their mission provides our best glimpse into the Lamanite political structure in addition to being the impetus that most likely prompted the Nephite-Lamanite wars recorded in the Book of Alma. Even though I am using the mission to the Lamanites as the starting point, in reality we are arriving in the middle of the story in the complex interaction of the Nephites, the Lamanites, and everyone else that Mormon refers to as Lamanites, despite not being descended from Lehi, Ishmael, Mulek or anyone else that came from Jerusalem.

The key date to remember is the year 72 BC, which is the year Amalickiah arrived in the land of Nephi. It is very important to pay attention to the dates since sometimes it is easy to lose sight of how interconnected certain events are when they are separated by several chapters in the Book of Alma. For example, Amalickiah arrives in the land of Nephi in chapter 47 while the destruction of the people of Ammonihah happens in chapter 16, but that only happened in 81 BC, nine years before Amalickiah arrived in Nephi. So sometimes we forget that events that are separated textually are very interconnected and directly related to each other.

So let us consider how the mission to the Lamanites, the destruction of the people of Ammonihah, and the flight of the Anti-Nephi-Lehis made it possible for Amalickiah to become king of the Lamanites.

The sons of Mosiah left the land of Zarahemla in about 91 BC, which is only 19 years before Amalickiah arrives in Nephi. When Ammon arrived at the land of Ishmael, which was ruled by king Lamoni, he unwittingly entered into a rather sticky political situation. As pointed out by Brant Gardner in a paper presented in 2004, the situation that Ammon and Lamoni found themselves in was more complex than we typically think of it.

"The king decides to place Ammon in a position where this condition of being outside the city’s political intrigues might be advantageous: He sends him to water the flocks at Sebus. The dumb thieves who don’t get much from their raids are actually getting everything they want. Key to understanding the story is that whatever ruse was employed to allow the fiction that they were robbers, the reality was that they were well-known to the servants and to the king. They were members of the rival lineage who were attempting to alter the balance of power. By scattering the king’s flocks they were embarrassing the king and therefore diminishing his appearance of total control. Because the rival lineage was sufficiently powerful, the king could not move against them directly without creating civil war. Therefore, the king could not send armed guards. If he killed the members of the competing lineage it would break whatever illusion of cooperation there was and instigate civil disorder. The guards cannot defend themselves for the same reason that the king could not send troops."

This story gives us an insight into the positions of power in Lamanite royalty. What we see here is that king Lamoni was in a situation where he might lose his kingship. His position was not necessarily secure and depended on how well he was able to drive away threats and defend his own land. There were also rival systems of power, or families, that were constantly vying for influence and power. For the king to fail to maintain his influence and power would most likely result in civil war. This insight will be important when we consider Amalickiah.

Later, we don't know how much later (months or maybe even a year), Ammon and Lamoni meet up with Lamoni's father. There are three things in this exchange that come up that give us insight into the power structures among the Lamanites. In the first place Lamoni offers to go with Ammon to Middoni, which was ruled by king Antiomno, because he thinks that he can help get Ammon's brethren out of prison due to the fact that Antiomno is a "friend" (Alma 20:4). This indicates that the king of Middoni is not a brother or even family member of Lamoni. When Ammon and Lamoni meet and confront Lamoni's father, Lamoni's father grants that Lamoni may rule the land of Ishmael without interference and that Ammon's brethren "may be cast out of prison" (Alma 20:26-27).  This indicates that both Lamoni and Antiomno were only semi-autonomous kings in their kingdoms and that both of them owed fealty to Lamoni's father. It also indicates that while Lamoni's father could maintain his hold on some cities by appointing his son(s) as kings of those cities, in other cities he relied on non-family members, or family members by marriage, to maintain control.

Upon his conversion Lamoni's father proclaims that Ammon and his brethren are to be given free access "throughout all the land" (Alma 23:1-3). The phrase "all the land" apparently applied to at least seven cities that we assume were directly under the control of Lamoni's father (the cities are listed in Alma 23:9-12). Mormon also states that Lamoni's father "and all his household" were converted, which would indicate that the conversions happened along familial and social lines. Based on our prior insights we can assume that the conversions spread to the other cities under the control of the king through family lines, and other lines of influence and power. Just as Lamoni was a king over one of the seven cities, Lamoni's brother, whose post conversion name is Anti-Nephi-Lehi, may have also been the king in one of the seven cities and helped the conversion of people in positions of influence and power.

We cannot assume that everyone in the seven cities listed were converted since there would be those who for political or economic reasons would not wish to associate with the political structure controlled by Lamoni's father. Plus we must consider the presence of the Amalekites (possibly the Amlicites from Alma chapters 2 and 3?) and Amulonites who by this time were exerting considerable force in Lamanite society. These two groups were the ones who led the attacks on the newly named Anti-Nephi-Lehis, and as we read in chapter 24 the Amalekites waited until the king, Lamoni's father, had died before they began their attacks (v. 4). Thus these attacks would have been the first major challenge to the power and influence of the new king, Anti-Nephi-Lehi.

Even if the new king had not converted he may have had to face these challenges anyway. The seven allied cities, and possibly more, were under the direct control of Lamoni's father and the new king, Anti-Nephi-Lehi, would have had to exert his influence over these cities to maintain control. There were most certainly some of the subject kings who were willing to try to toss off the yoke that had been imposed on them by Lamoni's father. This challenge would have been expedited by the fact that the king's recent conversion would have signaled an alliance with the Nephites (as noted in Alma 23:18), an alliance which some of the kings in the seven cities would not have been too keen on making for political, cultural, historical, linguistic, or economic reasons.

We do not know when the attacks began, but it must have been shortly before the Lamanite armies, led by the Amalekites and Amulonites, attacked and destroyed the city of Ammonihah, a Nephite allied city, in 81 BC. The result of the attack on Ammonihah destroyed the influence of the Amulonites (see Alma 25:7-9), but the influence of the Amalekites continued unabated. We also learn that the Lamanites who were converted by their experience in that brief war "came over to dwell in the land of Ishmael and the land of Nephi" (Alma 25:13). What we see here is an indication that the Anti-Nephi-Lehis were consolidating into those two cities and lands, most likely for safety. This may also indicate that the sphere of influence of the new king was greatly diminished from that maintained by his father. That is, he may have lost the allegiance of five (and possibly more) cities.

After four years, Ammon, Lamoni and Anti-Nephi-Lehi realized that their situation was very precarious and organized their people and left the land of Nephi and Ishmael. When the people of Ammon left there must have been a general power vacuum in Lamanite society since the old king (Lamoni's father) and new king (Lamoni's brother) and all their relatives/allies left. The new power base that took over when they left must have been concerned about Lamoni and his brother returning since they sent an army to follow them and try to kill them (Alma 28:1-2), but were defeated by the Nephites. All this happened or finished up in 77 or 76 BC, just a few years before Amalickiah arrived.

The power vacuum that remained must have been tremendous. The alliance of seven, or more, cities that had been maintained by Lamoni's father, which had been breaking down since before his death, was thrown into disarray. The traditional power base, or those that remained, in the city of Nephi must have been threatened on all sides. The new power base would have been moving in, but due to recent defeats the Amalekites would still be powerful, but not enough to seize control. Those who wished to ensure that the Anti-Nephi-Lehis would never return had lost significant influence and power due to their military defeats. So who was in control in the land of Nephi, and in the six other cities, may have been an open question.

This brings us to four years before Amalickiah arrives in Nephi. The Lamanite alliance is weak and ready to break. There is no clear king, the Amulonites, and all their influence, had just been driven from the land, and the Amalekites were weakened but not defeated and still influential.

It is in this context that in 74 BC the Zoramites entered into an alliance with the Lamanites and a new Lamanite leader named Zerahemnah. If Zerahemnah was king then he would have been still consolidating his power since he had only been king for a maximum of three years. But if we reread Alma chapters 43 and 44 carefully we see that it never actually says that Zerahemnah was the king of the Lamanites. He did rely on the Amalekites and the Zoramites to form his power base so we can infer that he may not have been king over all the Lamanites. That is, the question of who was king over all the Lamanites (the seven cities) may not have been a settled question three years after the people of Ammon left.

So Zerahemnah may have been one of the contenders to be king of the Lamanites, with the backing of the Amalekites and the Zoramites. There is no word on how many Lamanite cities supported him so we cannot know how many of the seven cities he controlled, if any. I think we can assume that he did not control the city of Nephi because if he did then he most likely would have been referred to as king of the Lamanites, but Mormon does not refer to him as the king. Zerahemnah was never heard of again after being defeated spectacularly by Moroni so I don't think he lasted very long as king, if he was a king. At any rate his defeat ended his chance at controlling the seven allied Lamanite cities.

A Chance to Vote: Best Historical Post and Best Apologetic Post

This is a quick reminder that they are holding "best of" elections at the group blog Wheat and Tares. I am nominated for Best Historical Post, in discussing the "The Butchers' Apostle: Context for the Anti War Quotes of J. Reuben Clark."  And I've been nominated for Best Apologetic Post, for "Henry V, Hummers, and the Book of Mormon."   I blog because I enjoy sharing my ideas with a wider audience, but it's also nice to get a pat on the back for my efforts.  So please take a couple minutes to vote before this Sunday (Jan 19th).  

For the Peace of our People: Amalickiah's Arguments in Alma 47

Amalickiah’s flight to the Lamanites and subsequent intrigue that won him the Lamanite throne and war against the Nephites seemed a bit too easy.  Everybody in the account seemed to do exactly what he wanted.  But upon closer examination of the scriptures the reader can see that Amalickiah’s arguments were based in mutual self-interest and often justified his actions using the rhetoric of peace.

One of these arguments is listed in the text. After one of Amlickiah’s servants killed the king in verse 27 it reads: And it came to pass that Amalickiah commanded this his armies should march forth and see what had happened to the king; and when the had come to the spot, and found the king lying in his gore, Amalickiah pretended to be wroth, and said: Whosoever loved the king, let him go forth, and pursue his servants that they may be slain.

By killing the king, letting the army see his fake grief, and placing blame on the king’s servants Amalickiah strengthened his loyalty among the army, and his credentials as a “bold” Lamanite. (Alma 54:24)[1] He also removed the only witnesses that might foil his plan and cast blame on him. So in this case Amalickiah presumably enticed his servants by offering him a better position in the future king’s household.  Amalickiah used the fear and self-preservation of the murdered king’s servants to cast the blame on them and he used the natural loyalty of the soldiers to their king to win their hearts. This example is towards the end of the story, but an analysis of the rest of the account shows similarly manipulated emotions. 

In verse one Amalickiah and a small group of men fled from Moroni to the land of Nephi and the Lamanites.  The small group probably consisted of his personal household and fellow elites but maybe included military specialists as well.  They likely followed Amalickiah because of promises of future wealth and success and when they arrived the text says they “stirred up” the Lamanites. Many of his arguments were most likely different versions of events seen in scriptures that Amalickiah embellished or twisted to promote his interest and make it appear in the interest of the Lamanites to go to war.  His argument might have been that the Nephites expelled them and they fled for their lives because they were a peace faction that had tried to prevent the rise of dangerous men like Moroni, and they tried to prevent some of the policies that Nephite elites wanted to implement.  Alma 51:13 recorded how many king-men refused to take up arms when the Lamanites attacked.  Even modern commenters suggested that Moroni’s execution of the king-men and compelling them to fight was a “war crime.”[2] So anciently Amalickiah could have claimed some sort of objection based on real (or more likely feigned or politically convenient) claims of friendship and brotherhood to the Lamanites.  Alma 61:8 described the coup by the king-men that entered into a treaty of friendship with the Lamanites. So again, the scriptures contain evidence that the king-men and Amalickiah might have promoted themselves as a peace party professing friendship with the Lamanites. 

Amalickiah also could have stirred the Lamanites towards war over news of a pre-emptive invasion.  While he could have made up any number of plans and there was no way for the Lamanite king to verify it, a short time after Amalickiah’s flight Moroni pre-emptively attacked and expelled the Lamanites in the East and West wilderness. (Alma 50:7-9)  Moroni also rallied the people around his Title of Liberty and mustered the army against Amalickiah and his men.  Amalickiah and his followers could have viewed this as mob like and excessively militant action that infringed on their rights.  Certainly Amalickiah would have relayed Moroni’s actions in chapter 46 in the most sinister terms possible to the Lamanite king. Perhaps the king was inflamed enough by this news to declare war.  Or Amlickiah could have convinced him that a quick strike at Ammonihah, their target chosen in chapter 49 because of the easy attack a  generation earlier, (Alma 16:2) could blunt some of Moroni and the government’s militancy. He might have added that the bloodshed from a quick strike would be less than the bloodshed from a later war after the Nephites had gained more power.[3]   

                But the Lamanite soldiers were reluctant to obey the king’s command.  In verse three Amalickiah gained control of the part of the army which remained loyal to the king. As we later see, those who disobeyed the king’s command were not simply rebellious soldiers, but a full-fledged rebel faction with an anointed king. (v.5-6) But why did the king appoint Amalickiah?  Amalickiah and his men obviously had more knowledge of Nephite territory so they would be natural leaders while attacking the Nephites. (Alma 48:5) But that advantage became a disadvantage in unfamiliar Lamanite territory.  The “place of arms” (Alma 47:5) to which the rebel Lamanites fled was roughly ten miles from the capital city,[4] so terrain wasn’t likely an issue.  The real advantage lay in the added social capital and elites that Amalickiah brought.  He had the above knowledge of (maybe exaggerated) Nephite militancy.  He had military skills evidenced by he and his brother’s later leadership of the entire Lamanite army and war effort, and they escaped Moroni’s pursuit. (Alma 46:32-33)

Brant Gardner argued that an earlier king sent Ammon to the waters of Seebus because he was an outsider and a wild card that could affect the balance of power between rival houses.[5]  The king couldn’t punish those who pillaged his flocks because they were protected by rival elites and maybe even the king’s relatives. But he had to maintain his power so he killed his servants for failing to protect his flocks. Ammon on the other hand, did not have those restraints, so the king placed him in a difficult situation to see what he could do and maybe solve the king’s problems.  Amalickiah could have fulfilled the same role for the current king. In a budding civil war he was an outside force. He could have succeeded in his mission and earned the king a united and more powerful army.  If Amalickiah suppressed the revolt heavy handedly, killed the wrong people such as those with powerful connections, or made the wrong enemies (remember that one man tried to kill Ammon in revenge at the king’s house [Alma 19:22]), he could act as the king’s scape goat. The king might have even used one of his servants to slay Amalickiah.  So we see how Amalickiah used the king to gain command of an army, but the king likely used Amalickiah as well.  

In verse 13 Amalickiah presented the rebel general king, Lehonti, the rebel general king, with a rather attractive offer.  Amalickiah desired him to come down [from the mountain] with his army in the night-time, and surround those men in their camps over whom the king had given him command, and that he [Amalickiah] would deliver them up into Lehonti’s hands, if he would make him (Amalickiah) a second leader over the whole army.

Mormon summarized this offer in a way that made it sound too good to be true. But Amalickiah’s argument probably sounded different.  Amalickiah could argue that the king placed him between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the king forcing him to lead Lamanites into battle against other Lamanites.  But Lehonti had the high ground, possibly controlled the source of their obsidian weapons at the place of arms, and possessed greater numbers. So Amalickiah had to obey the orders of the king to attack, but was likely to fail. His attack would result in Lamanites killed on each side, with the result that whomever won the civil war would be in a weaker position to resist Nephite aggression.  Amalickiah’s offer instead made it so nobody would have to fight. Lehonti would win after a brilliant attacking move. Amalickiah would save his army, and like Ceasar’s pardon of Brutus, Lehonti would appear to have king like magnanimity and appoint Amalickiah as the second in command.   Lehonti likely had a practical need for Amalickiah’s martial skills, and the knowledge of Nephite plans would give him additional leverage to win the people; as Lehonti could use Amalickiah’s knowledge of supposed (or real) Nephite attacks to presnt himself as a defender of his people against Nephite aggression. This agreement saved Lamanite lives by uniting the armies without bloodshed and both commanders benefitted.  Amalickiah, knowing that he was perhaps expendable to the king, extricated himself from the need for a costly and likely fatal frontal assault.  Lehonti appeared as a strong conteder for the throne by uniting the army without bloodshed and appearing conciliatory between the two factions.

In verse 15, Amalickiah schemed to gain strengthen the loyalty of his soldiers.  The latter awoke and found themselves surrounded by Lehonti, and begged Amalickiah to save them.  According to the above agreement he did so.  Armies were largely based on personal bonds of loyalty, so it was important for a leader to gain that trust. As an outsider, and maybe even seen as expendable by his rank and file soldiers, the increased loyalty helped Amalickiah, even as Amalickiah fulfilled his part of the agreement to help Lehonti and save the lives of soldiers in both armies. He continued to build loyalty with the theatre surrounding the murder of the king discussed above in verse 27.  In each case Amalickiah further convinced the soldiers that Amalickiah had their best interests at heart. As with any ancient army commander, he had the trust of their soldiers that he would lead them to victory and plunder.  Amalickiah in turn gained by having an army more closely bound to him.  

Verse 33 presented one of the most intriguing items after Amalickiah gained complete control of the army: Therefore, when the queen had received [word of the King’s death] she sent unto Amalickiah, desiring him that he would spare the people of the city; and she also desired him that he should come in unto her; and she also desired him that he should bring witnesses with him to testify concerning the death of the king.

If the queen requested that he spare the people of the city it suggests that the Lamanite army could have sacked the city. Anciently, plunder acted as one of the few reliable ways for an army to get paid, and often acted as a bonus for the success of a campaign.  Like the faceoff between Amalickiah and Lehonti’s army, perhaps the queen still had military force and the inclination to oppose Amalickiah.  But then the queen requested, or possibly ordered, that Amalickiah bring witnesses of the king’s murder. And the next verse says that the witnesses “satisfied” the queen. Hearing testimony suggests some sort of legal procedure. So it’s possible that this served as part of the ritual surrounding a coronation, or more theatre to cover the naked ambition of two joint rulers. The unexpected death of a sovereign often resulted in a mad scramble for power. The queen could easily use her position, and networks of elites to control the capital and remain in power. Amalickiah, in contrast, could use the army as a platform to control the countryside and seize the capital by force. With rival bases of political power, a desire to “spare the people of the city” likely represented a coded political message to end the still simmering power struggle.[6] The queen remained in power; and with Amalickiah she had a partner just as powerful, if not more so, than her late husband. Amalickiah gained by keeping control of the army and possessing a stronger claim to the throne. Not to mention he shared bed with what appears to be the Cleopatra of the Book of Mormon.   

Amalickiah probably assumed the throne claiming he was from the peace faction of the Nephites.  The king-men associated with him often opposed the Nephite conflict with the Lamanites, and they could claim to oppose Moroni’s aggressive promotion of the Title of Liberty and pre-emptive war. Amalickiah could claim that he prevented bloodshed in a nascent civil war as a servant of the king fighting Lehonti, and as a leader of the united army opposing the widowed queen.  He spread the city upon his ascension, and likely promised to protect his new subjects from Nephite encroachment. Of course, modern readers get a version of the story from Mormon.  But every story has more than one side and a careful reading and analysis of Amalickiah’s story suggests he achieved so much because spoke in terms of mutual self-interest, and he often justified his actions using the rhetoric of peace.

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[1] His brother Ammoron used that phrase, but he is treated as an extension of Amalickiah.

[2]John C. Captain Moroni the War Criminal, September 1^st 2008.  http://bycommonconsent.com/2008/09/01/captain-moroni-war-criminal/  (Accessed January 2^nd, 2014.)

[3] Keep in mind that Sorenson proposes the new city of Moroni in those territories as a military garrison right on the border with the Lamanites.  And he cited Helaman where they lose half their territory (Helaman 4:16), when Nephi tried to retrench Nephite society he started at Bountiful (Helaman 5:14-16), and later when Christ appeared at Bountiful,  that the Nephite center of gravity seems to have shifted north and to the east, in many of the new lands they conquered in Alma 50. John Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013,) 49-53. So the Lamanite concern seemed justified.   

[4] John Sorenson, Mormon’s Codex: A Mesoamerican Book (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2013) 330.

[5] Brant Gardner, The Case for Historicity: Determining the Book of Mormon’s Production Culture (2004 Fair Conference. http://www.fairmormon.org/perspectives/fair-conferences/2004-fair-conference/2004-the-case-for-historicity-discerning-the-book-of-mormons-production-culture (Assessed January 1st 2014).

[6] I first discussed this verse here: http://mormonwar.blogspot.com/search?q=spare+the+people  (Accessed January 2^nd 2014.)