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Thanks for the questions. To start I looked at Ralph
Sawyer’s commentary accompanying his translation:
The Nine terrains analyzed in this
chapter appear in two sequences with some variations. In addition, some the
terms appeared previously in Chapters 8 and 10; other are new but apparently overlap
with earlier configurations. This suggests that essential materials have been
lost, the text has been corrupted, or the concepts were in a state of flux and
not yet rigidly defined.
Dispersive: Following Giles and Griffith
[other translations], who use the appropriate term “dispersive.” The commenters
generally understand dispersive as referring to the tendency of the men, while
fighting within their native state, to be thinking of their homes and families
and to be inclined to return there. Consequently, they are neither unified nor
aroused to a fighting spirit. Note that later in the chapter the commander must
unify their will on dispersive terrain (before invading enemy territory), and
Sunzi also advises against engaging on dispersive terrain. This was perhaps a
strategy designed to vitiate an invader’s strength before engaging him in
battle.
Light: Apparently, the soldiers
still do not regard the enterprise too seriously and continue to think about
home and family. Because it remains relatively easy to withdraw but dangerous
to forge ahead, it is termed “light terrain.”
Contentious Terrain: This is ground for which one contends, therefore
“contentious” terrain. (Giles also translates as “contentious,” Griffith as
“key ground,” and it is unquestionably a strategic point.) The configurations of terrain previous warned
against in the last chapter are probably prime objectives under this category
of their great tactical potential if they can be seized and exploited.
Traversable terrain: In chapter 10
this is termed “accessible” terrain. Army movement is unhampered.
Focal: Following Griffith’s apt
term, “focal.” Presumable this is
territory in which major highways intersect and is accessible to major powers
on various sides. Its occupation is the key to controlling vast territory…The
character literally means, “terrain where the highways intersect.”
Heavy: Griffith translates as
“serious.” This term contrats with “light terrain,” the severity of their
situation now being clearly apparent to the soldiers. Their minds are unified,
their courage united. Chu Chun sees the critical element as the cessation of
food supplies, with the soldiers suddenly having to forage and plunder to
sustain themselves, as stately slightly later in the chapter. This weighs
heavily on them.
Entrapping: This seems to also
encompass Heavens Pit and Heaven’s Net. The term is first discussed in Chapter
8.
Encircled Terrain: “Constricted” is
the same term as that used for one of the configurations in chapter 10. (It can
also mean a “gorge.”) The term for “encircled” can also be translated as
“besieged” in other contexts and clearly carries such implications. The
emphasis here is on the necessity to pass through a narrow opening or along a
narrow passage, which constrains the flow of men and material and thereby makes
them vulnerable to being surrounded and attacked by even a small force. [See the Chinese success against the Japanese
army at Pingxingguang Pass, September 1937, for a good example.]
Fatal: Sunzi consistently advocates
exploiting “ground of death” because when troops are deployed on it, the
situation forces them to fight valiantly. The commentators think it would be
terrain with the solid obstacles to the front, such as mountains, and water to
the rear, preventing a withdrawal.[1]
Focal Terrain:
For an example of focal terrain we
might look at Moroni 9:16:
And again, my son, there are many
widows and their daughters who remain in Sherrizah; and that part of the
provisions which the Lamanites did not carry away, behold, the army of Zenephi
has carried away, and left them to wander whithersoever they can for food; and
many old women do faint by the way and die.
Strategically this implies that the
Nephites were pressed on several fronts. All the armies were close to the tower
of Sherrizah, but Mormon could not reach it. So the Lamanite army likely
occupied what is called the central position. This allowed the Lamanites to
shift and mass their forces between the army of Mormon and that of Zenephi as
necessary. While the Nephites armies would each have to attack on their own.
Since Zenephi is not following the orders of Mormon it is unlikely that would
work together, even if they could coordinate an attack with a Lamanite army
between them. Napoleons early campaigns
in Italy, and Stonewall Jackson at the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic
used this to maneuver to great effect.[2] Jackson was being chased by two separate
armies closing in on the North and South. So he delayed one and fought the
other. After his victory he then turned and defeated the other army. The combined armies could have crushed
Jackson if they coordinated properly, but Jackson was able to out maneuver them
and defeat each in turn.
The Chinese held focal terrain
during WWII at the battles of Wuhan (1938) and Hengyang (1944). Both were
pivotal rail junctions, the former had a large concentration of factories and
the fleeing national government, the latter housed important American air bases
and was the junction of several important rail lines in southern China. The first battle featured Chinese forces
defending a central position with Japanese armies maneuvering and defeating
Chinese forces from the North, South, and East. Chinese forces eventually fled
West to Chongqing.
Wang Qisheng, Professor of History
at Peking, wrote: During the battle of Hengyang, Chiang Kai-Shek sent Bai Chongxi,
the vice chief of staff, to Guilin with the task of coordinating the defense of
the city…. Bai held to a different strategic view than Xu Yongchang [leading
Nationalist commander], but he also disagreed with Xue Yue’s [a local
commander] operational plans. Unsurprisingly, conflicting order confused local
combat units, and the Chinese forces were hamstrung by a lack of
coordination.
A further problem was the lack of
communication between frontline commanders.
The Tenth Army defended [the focal terrain] of Hengyang for more than
forty days. If reinforcements had coordinated their operations with the Tenth
Army inside the city, the defense of Hengyang might have been more effective.
When the Tenth Army tried to force its way out of the city, units outside
offered no support. When units outside attacked the enemy, the Tenth Army
merely adopted a defensive position. The lack of coordination meant that the
Japanese could defeat the defenders piecemeal. [3]
This is good example of the need
for unity in command, and coordination of forces when occupying a central, or
focal position.
Fatal Terrain:
From my chapter on military
philosophy in Ender’s Game,[4]
many Chinese commanders would deliberately place their armies with their backs
to a river or mountain, to prevent fleeing; Sunzi called these kinds of
decisions the use of “fatal terrain.” Of the soldiers, he said “Throw them into
a place from which there is nowhere to go, and they will die rather than flee.
When they are facing death, how could one not obtain the utmost strength from the
officers and men?”[5] At
the beginning of Ender’s training, Graff was asked if he “enjoyed breaking”
students. He replied that he did, but only when they “put the pieces back
afterward, and are better for it.”[6]
The modern slogan “sink or swim” nicely captures this concept. In a military
context, a commander would deliberately place his troops in hopeless
situations, with their backs to the river or in a position with no chance of
escape. The fatal terrain tactic was intended to quickly stimulate the discipline
and effort needed to survive the battle.
Graff used fatal terrain when he
stacked the game against Ender. Faced with daily battleroom contests and twice
the normal number of opponents, and students seeking to kill him on top of
that, Ender had to quickly learn how to “swim.” The final product supported the
thinking of both Graff and Sunzi when Ender showed himself a victorious
commander. Commanding the fleet in attacking the bugger home world, Ender was
thrown in the deep end, hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned. But he called
upon his resolve from his earlier “hopeless situations” and achieved total
victory.
Another military theorist who wrote
in the Seven Military Classics, Wuzi, said: The people do not take pleasure in
dying, nor do they hate life, [but] if the commands and orders are clear, and
the laws and regulations carefully detailed, you can make them advance. When,
before [combat], rewards are made clear, and afterward punishments are made
decisive, then when [the troops] issue forth they will be able to realize an
advantage, and when they move they will be successful.[7]
Conclusion: So we see that focal
terrain requires cooperation among different commanders and a skillful
maneuvering of the armies. Fatal terrain
is used to enhance the effectiveness and moral of soldiers. Thanks for the question, I’m happy to help
and ready to add any clarification if needed.
I enjoyed putting this together, if anybody needs advice or consultation
on military theory or Chinese military history I’m happy to help.
[1]
Ralph Sawyer Trans. Sunzi’s Art of War, in
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient
China (New York, Westview Press, 1993)178, 450-451.
[2] See
the Battle of Cross Shields and Port Republic towards the bottom of the
page. Author, “Jackson’s Valley Campaign
May 21- Jun 9 1862. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Jackson%27s_Valley_Campaign_May_21_-_June_9,_1862.png
[3] Wang
Qisheng, “The Battle of Hunan and the Chinese Military’s Response to Operation
Ichigo” in The Battle for
China: Essays on
the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, eds Mark
Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans Van De Ven, (Stanford, Stanford University
Press, 2011) 414 (403-420).
[4]
Morgan Deane, “Forming the Formless: Sunzi and the Military Logic of Ender
Wiggins” in Ender’s Game: The Logic Gate
is Down ed by Kevin Decker, (New York, Black Well Press, 2013), 81-82
(78-88).
[5] This is Graff’s translation of a key passage
in Sunzi’s Art of War, David Graff,
Medieval Chinese Warfare: 300–900 (New York: Routledge Press, 2003), 168-169.
[6] Orson
Scott Card, Ender’s Game (New York: TOR Books, 1991), 20.
[7] Ralph
Sawyer trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China
(New York: Westview Press, 1993) 245.
