Greetings! If you follow me on social media you know I’ve been posting Come Follow Me posts this entire year. At first, I wasn’t going to post anything, as it sounded like a significant time investment when I’m already working several jobs and have major research projects ongoing. But then I realized I have a blog with over ten years of posts. Most of the Come Follow Me posts have been taken from the archives and shared with a wider audience. I’ve taken those posts and put them into a new book, Come Follow Me 2020, Historical Essays of the Book of Mormon. The regular price is 99 cents, but starting on Saturday and for a limited time you can get the book for free!!! In celebration of this new book I'm running a promotion where you can get my book on modern Chinese strategy, and additional insights into the history contained within the Book of Mormon, for free!!!!! You can't physically put them in your stocking, but you can have hundreds of pages of excellent insights to read over the holidays. Get yours today!!
This is where I publish my preliminary research notes and ideas concerning warfare in the Book of Mormon. This is a spot for civilians, military historians, members of the LDS church and anybody else who enjoys studying the military aspects of the Book of Mormon and its impact on the LDS Church, society and the field of military history.
Friday, December 11, 2020
Tuesday, November 24, 2020
Just and Preemptive War, Who Said it Better?
I’m working on my next project which is a systematic
assessment and the relationship of all the Mormon scriptures on warfare. On
occasion I found something that expresses an idea that I have previously
expressed. This has happened in the past with both preemptive
war and strategy.
I like to share them because it’s a good way to highlight what I’m reading and
thinking as I’m reading. Also because it’s a good boost to know that my
analysis and instincts are so keen that I find them repeated in previously unread
texts!! Those texts are often seminal works in the field and yet you get them
in plain language and for free from your humble blogger.
Here are the newest comparisons. I wrote this back in 2011
(based on a draft written in
2009!! I had the danger of nuclear weapons and the need for preemptive war
when I wrote point #5):
“It is difficult to justify offensive action based on possible future events or latent evil,”[1]
Micheal Walzer wrote:
We can make only short-term predictions, and we have no way that even mimics mathematics of comparing the costs of fighting to the costs of not fighting, since [the first] set of costs is necessarily speculative,[2]
Both examples explain how the argument for war is tough because it’s based on possible events or just speculative.
In my seven-part
series on preemptive war one of the major lessons regarded the benefits of
choosing the time and place of the battle instead of having the enemy seize the
initiative and bring the battle to you. This
is one of several times I make the point:
Just as the people of Zeniff likely learned, it was better and less bloody to fight a battle at a time and place of their choosing, then having to hastily form their own army (Alma 16:3), and then later fight at a disadvantage.
Again, Michael Walzer wrote in the anticipation spectrum
about the difference between preventive and preemptive war. He wrote a nation
must show:
A manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies that risk.[3]
The key point of similarity is that waiting to fight is too
great of a danger and thus a nation must attack.
I hope you enjoy the same insights each said in two
different ways. Who do you think said it better? I appreciate the chance to
read these great texts and that my ideas often match them so well. I’ve got
more research coming and I hope to share it with you soon.
Thanks for reading!! I work as a free lance author. Providing ad free research over the last ten years takes time and effort. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button at the bottom of the page, or buy one of books using the Amazon link at the top left.
[1] Morgan
Deane, “Offensive Warfare and a Defense of the Bush Doctrine’ in War and
Peace: Mormon Perspectives on War, (Greg Kofford Books, 2012) 38.
[2] Michael
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, (Basic Books, 1977) xvi.
[3]
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 81.
Friday, October 30, 2020
Trump as Moroni?
[I shared this on facebook and though it deserved a more permanent place. As someone who specializes in military history and published extensively about Moroni and the Book of Mormon, I am uniquely qualified to comment.]
People are spazzing out about Mike Lee's comparison of Trump to Captain Moroni when I think it was pretty good. Lee's comparison was pretty narrow to begin with, by pointing to a specific scripture that Trump is not seeking power but to tear it down.
Trump has been a disruptive outsider against the Washington establishment. That word was used so much in 2016 that I thought I should start a restaurant called the establishment. I don't like the phrase deep state as it sounds fairly conspiratorial, but entrenched bureaucracy is what I use. We just had a Homeland security official come out as this deep throat type member of the resistance. The phrase resistance itself is rather arrogant as these people somehow thing that their intransigence is part of a noble effort to stop a dictator when they are really partisan hacks undermining the people's elected representative. Even though he worked for Trump who was elected by the people, he bragged that he was part of this noble resistance. Nikki Haley wrote that people as high up as the Secretary of State thought it was their duty to contain and control Trump, as though the people were too dumb to choose a President and executive policy.
Trump is draining a swamp that fights back on a constant basis, so comparing him to a stronger fighter figure and using a specific scripture where he is fighting the elites of his day is a good comparison.
Most who object to the comparison do so because of their political opposition to Trump. But they are doing so by ignoring the narrow comparison above, and instead use the hagiographic depiction of him as a military stud muffin that ignores the real critiques of Moroni.
The political opponents of Trump should realize that the political opponents of Moroni could credibly make even worse arguments against the latter. They could say he was an angry individual that preemptively seized territory in a time of peace, relied upon deception to win his battles, rejected peace offers to instead call his interlocuter a child of Hell and then threaten to arm child soldiers and pursue a war of extermination against that opponent. He threatened a coup against the government when it suited him and before he figured out all of the facts and seemed like a warmonger. While its not written down, my knowledge of military culture makes me suspect if we were on campaign with him we might find him laughing at the locker room humor similar to an Access Hollywood tape.
We rightly revere Captain Moroni as a spiritual hero. But like Jessica Rabbit, he was written that way. A sober examination of his life and critical assessment of his policies, and most importantly, his fighter attitude against the entrenched opposition to his single minded goals, suggest that Trump is a fighter comparable to Captain Moroni.
Wednesday, October 28, 2020
Mormon Bred
[I wrote the following in a facebook group about Mormon's young leadership.]
I teach a class on
military leadership and one of the major questions I ask is whether the great
leaders were born or trained. Many of the ancient commanders like Alexander the
Great were amazing so it sure seems like they were born geniuses. But I must
remind my students that those born in the elite and upper class had numerous
advantages that others didn’t. Most people lived as farmers barely eking out a
living. If they did have to fight they would be comfortable with farming and
hunting implements but usually not swords. Think of David with his sling, which
a shepherd would need often to ward off predators. Or see Mosiah 9:16. The elites on the other hand
could spend their days training. Therefore, you see people like Ammon, the
former crown prince, who could time and angle his defensive sword strokes in
such a way that he could cut off arms. Mormon and Moroni clearly had language
training as they could read and write. (Moroni provided a discursive explanation of why he wrote in one ancient, obscure language instead of another, Mormon 9:32-33.) Alexander the Great was tutored by
Aristotle and Mormon seems to have been a quick study, we don’t know from who,
to receive his commission at the age of 10. Most farmers were often
undernourished but the elites would be taller, healthier, and have the diets to
build muscle mass.
I read Mormon 1-2 and saw many factors that aided
his leadership. Like Alexander the Great he had many advantages that those from
lesser families and bloodlines wouldn’t have. We might consider this an example
of where much is given much is required and I think he and his son delivered. Mormon
led the people through 70 years of wickedness and warfare and of course we have
the book that bears his name.
Our young men and women living in the modern age need to
take advantage of the education- physical, mental, and spiritual, that are
available to everybody. They need to take their spiritual training seriously.
Unfortunately, we seem to be a sedentary society that doesn’t train our minds
or bodies. Instead of mental gymnasts we seem to be mental couch potatoes. We
eat spiritual
Twinkies instead of diving into the hard work of really understanding and
applying the scriptures. We join the angry mob in cancelling people without
considering how the media and small groups of strident
jerks lead us around by the nose. I think Mormon would be ashamed at how we
squander all the many gifts and tools available to the least of us that used to
be the luxury of a few.
Wednesday, September 30, 2020
Moving Beyond Empty Words
Almost ten years ago David Pulsipher wrote about the
“extraordinary agility” pacifists must use to make their case:
Crafting an argument…requires navigating a spiritual minefield…The Book of Mormon…contains the most hazards. Compiled by a seasoned general the text exudes a just war sensibility. To diffuse the power of that story Latter Day Stain pacifists resort to…arguing that a careful observation of the larger Book of Mormon narrative speaks to the futility of violence, its endless cycles, and its inability to achieve lasting peace.[1]
With this in mind I’ve been shocked and bemused to find it exhibited
so frequently by those that write for and follow Latter Day Saint Peace
Studies. I regularly see people who disqualify quotes from the Book of
Mormon as being less than Jesus. They say that Moroni was just a general,
Pahoran just a chief judge (and often mix the two) to say they weren’t
authoritative. They claim that Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount where Jesus superseded
the law means that his words supersede all other scriptures. This especially applies to the Book of
Mormon. Of course Jesus himself said that whether by mine own voice
or the voice of my servants it is the same (D&C 1:38), and that Mormon
wrote that righteous leaders were in fact prophets (3 Nephi 3:19) so I don't buy those arguments and think they are merely picking and choosing which scriptures to accept based on what they like.
But by disqualifying they are missing out on even more.
Finding how seemingly contradictory scriptures interact with each other can
increase one’s appreciation for matters of war and peace, and lead one away
from facile, proof texted arguments. To show an example of that I will use my
research into classical Chinese military theory beyond Sunzi.
Guanzi, considered the epitome of good Confucian ministers
said that good rulers should “vanquish [their enemies] without resorting to
treachery.”[2] This, along with the claim of Confucius that
the “sage is not crafty,”[3]
seems to directly contradict Sunzi’s words that “warfare is the way of
deception.”[4] The
easy explanation is that Sunzi was an amoral cretin. Yet he became the most
famous theorist and was used by emperors and leaders throughout Chinese
history. Like those figures that used deception in warfare and remained good
Confucians, there are ways to reconcile the two.
First, Guanzi mentions treachery which is different than
deception. The Chinese believed in what various translators have described as
orthodox and unorthodox attacks. The orthodox
pins down, or “spikes”[5] an
enemy to prepare for the army’s unorthodox
or “tilting” maneuver. But the difference between the two can become blurred.
If an enemy is expecting a surprise flank attack, the surprising unorthodox
attack instead becomes the expected orthodox attack. So, the definitions of
these terms can often change during one battle, depending on the intent of the
attacker and perceptions of those being attacked.
A conversation from the film The Princess Bride (1987) serves as a memorable illustration.
Westley, the hero, enters a battle of wits with Vizzini the Sicilian. In the
course trying to outwit each other, Vizzini described how he knows that his
opponent knows his mind to predict Vizzini’s next action. Vizzini goes on to
say (with dazzlingly circular logic) that, sometimes, his opponent knows that
he knows, so he must do something completely different. But his opponent must
know that he knows that he knows…so he must do what was originally predicted.
The repetition of “he knows that I know” represents the inexhaustible
permutations between opting for the orthodox and unorthodox and describes the
difficulty in trying to know your enemy while trying to keep your own strategy
a secret.
In short, both armies know they are entering a maze of
mirrors, with complex prebattle maneuvers and fake feints and real deceptions,
then they are accepting the parameters of the battle. There is nothing
treacherous or crafty upon entering a struggle in which both know the rules. On
top of that, a sudden surprise attack from an unexpected direction could
produce a psychological trap, win the battle without a fight, and become a
moral, bloodless, and proper Confucian way to end the battle. As Guanzi wrote: If
one attacks a city or lays siege to a town so its occupants are forced to
exchange their sons for food and crack their bones for cooking, such an attack
is merely to uproot oneself…[6]
Those that resort to deception to capture the city or win the battle can claim
they are being good Confucians by winning with minimal bloodshed.
The second example comes from the impetus and planning for
the Battle
of Maling. The rulers discussed the need to declare war on a mutual enemy
on behalf of their ally. This would honor their alliance and maintain honor
among the other leaders of the Warring States. That was the part that fulfilled
Confucius’ advice for a sage not to be a crafty. But that didn’t mean they marched straight at
the army invading their neighbor. Doing so would have left their allies in a
stronger position even if the won! They would relieve the siege of their ally’s
capital by depleting their own resources for nothing gained except the abstract
concept of honor. Instead Sun Bin
advised that they take an indirect route through their mutual enemies’
homeland. The campaign marched in the opposite direction of their besieged
allies, protected their supply lines, offered an easier battle than lifting a
siege, and left both their enemy and ostensible ally in a weaker position than
the start of the war. This would place them in a stronger position to
eventually conquer both. Thus, they were honorable by declaring war, but showed
how they pursued their self-interest as well.
By looking at how both statements can be true at the same
time, to avoid being crafty and pursue a way of deception, we see insight into
the nature of battle in Chinese history, the difference between treachery and
deception, the moral role that deception can have, and how moral decisions can
be used to advance self-interest. The writings of the masters, or scriptures
are not catch phrases from fortune cookies or silver bullets for discussion
boards. They are complex thoughts that try to prescribe moral behavior among an
even more complex world.
After this book is published, I plan to bring the same
amount of analysis to Mormon scripture. Instead of simply having a favorite set
of scriptures and downplaying the rest, or as the Chinese scholars complained
of those that quoted Sunzi, “merely reciting empty words...without penetrating the depths of their teachings,”[7]
we might instead consider how they interact with each other. I’ve already
showed some of the interactions in posts like Nephite
thought on warfare, and the word and
the sword. I’m confident I’ll find more and the interplay between seemingly
contradictory verses will be just as multifaceted as the examples I showed
above. The scriptures deserve more than petty facebook pontificating and crafty
attempts to ignore uncomfortable verses.
I work as a free lance author and researcher. Producing high quality, ad free research for more than a decade takes time and effort. If you found value in this work please consider supporting more of it by donating to the pay pal button below, or buying one of my books through the link at the top left.
***********
[1]
Daivd Pulsipher, “The Ammonite Conundrum,” in War and Peace in Our Times:
Mormon Perspectives, (West Jordan UT: Greg Kofford Books, 2012), 1-2.
[2] Guanzi:
Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans.,
(Princeton University Press, 1985,)277.
[3] Analects of Confucius, Chichung Huang
trans., (Oxford University Press, 1997,)111.
[4] Sunzi,
in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans.,
(Westview Press, 1993), 158.
[5]
Benjamin Wallacker, “Two Concepts in Early Chinese Thought” in Chinese Warfare to 1600 Ed. By Peter
Lorge (New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 235-240.
[6] Guanzi:
Political, Economic and Philosophic Essays Vol I, Alan Rickett trans.,
(Princeton University Press, 1985,) 394.
[7] Questions
and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weikong in The Seven Military
Classics of Ancient China, Ralph Sawyer trans., (Westview Press, 1993),
338,360 "People who study Sunzi today only recite emtpy words. Few grasp and extend his meaning." Thus the study of military strategy must be from the lowest to the middle and then from the middle to the highest, so that they will gradually penetrate the depths of the teaching. If not, they will only be relying on empty words. Merely remembering and reciting them is not enough to succeed."
Tuesday, September 15, 2020
Heartland Starter Pack
I’ve been asked occasionally about the Heartlander theory of
Book of Mormon geography. I’m stumped by this answer, not because I’m
unfamiliar with their research, but because I’m so familiar with it that I
categorically reject that line of thinking. My first encounter with the
Heartlanders was at the Mormon History Association conference in St. George
around 2012. I talked to the representative of their press and when I disagreed
with their geography I suddenly felt like a mongoose trapped in the corner
by a chatty cobra. My short answer to these questions is that their scholarship
is cringe worthy poor, their most frequent tactic is to criticize the faith of
their opponents, and they should be avoided. Here are a few links that explain
that summary.
Historian Ardis Parshall visited the FIRM Foundation Conference
led by Rodney Meldrum. She provides good
summaries of the presentations but an even better explanation of why they miss
the mark and resemble conspiracists more than sincere believers or researchers.
Poor
Book of Mormon Scholarship:
One of the most erudite people I know, Stephen Smoot,
provides an 8 part review of the Annotated Book of Mormon. It’s a shoddy work
that consists of rampant errors, abuse of historical sources and DNA, reliance
on forgeries, and unsubstantiated claims.
Brant Gardner, one of the leading scholars on the Book of Mormon reviewed
two more books here. I like this review because it provides
detailed pictures and analysis about why key pieces of evidence are forgeries.
This one is longer, but its needed to show Rodeny Meldrum’s
DNA evidence is really snake oil and strained proof texting.
Personal Behavior and Apostasy:
By making these claims so iron clad, they are making their
own faith brittle, while at the same time clubbing those who disagree with
them. This post
explains why their obsession will lead them out of the church. This series
of posts explain why their geography theories are often no better, and many
times worse, than what they peddle.
I could do many more posts about their atrocious behavior
where their favorite tactic is misreading a source, making it binding doctrine
(against the official
church position) and then questioning the faithfulness of those that
disagree. They’ve strapped Joseph Smith
to the hood of their demolition cars so often their logo should be a Mad Max
car. Now you have a few resources that should help rigorously examine their
often too good to be true claims.
Tuesday, August 4, 2020
Moroni's Tactics and the Vandal War
Belisarius led armies from the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman)
empire in the 6th century AD. He fought the Persians on the eastern
front of the empire and eventually fought a long war to reclaim Italy from
Gothic tribesmen. The subject of interest here is the Vandal war in North
Africa. The Emperor Justinian, taking advantage of a revolt against Vandal rule
and a peace with the Persians, sent Belisarius with a small force of ten
thousand men to attack the formerly held territories of the Roman Empire in
North Africa.
One the invasion landed on the beach; Belisarius marched
towards the Vandal’s capital at Carthage. He ordered his soldiers to pay for
their supplies and forbade them from pillaging. As a result, they had the
support of the people and moved “as if in their own land.”[1] Gelimer, the Vandal king, planned an ambush along their likely route. At Ad
Decimum, Gelimer planned a three-pronged attack. His brother, Ammatas, would
attack the advance of Belisarius from the front. Another force under Gibamundus
would attack Belisarius from the left flank. And Gelimer would use his local knowledge
of roads to take an interior route to attack Belisarius from the rear.
The plan compensated for the division of forces by relying
on the surprise of attacking simultaneously form multiple directions. Unfortunately,
the plan collapsed quickly. The cavalry of Belisarius defeated the flank attack
led by Gibamundus and the latter fell among the fighting. A short time later
the frontal attack led by Ammatas smashed into the Byzantine force. He engaged
the vanguard of Belisarius’ army, but the former hadn’t prepared to attack
Belisarius so far north; as a result, Ammatas had his army spaced out along the
road. The forward units were defeated piecemeal as they marched into the
Byzantines, and then as those units retreated, they affected the next column and
forced them to retreat and so on. His entire force ended up fleeing in a panic
back towards Carthage.
Finally, Gelimer arrived and attacked towards the north at
what he thought was the rear, and already engaged, army of Belisarius. If the
plan had worked, the two attacks by Gibamundus and Ammatus would mean that
Gelimer attacked the rear for a coup de grace like Helamans “furious” attack
upon the rear of the Lamanite army in Alma 56:52 with his Stripling Warriors.
Gelimer routed the screening cavalry (the force that defeated Ammatas earlier),
who then fled to the safety of the main camp of Belisarius. Gelimer regrouped
his forces and stood poised to attack the bulk of the army of Belisarius. He
hadn’t achieved his goal of attacking in the rear for the finishing blow, but
still commanded motivated soldiers flushed with initial victory, while
Belisarius, seemingly under attack from every direction, was trying to reorder
his forces. Yet upon seeing the dead body of his brother Ammatus, Gelimer
paused to assess the situation.[2] The
pause by Gelimer allowed Belisarius to rally his fleeing cavalry, and counterattack
with his entire force. Gelimer fled south, and Belisarius had an open road to
Carthage. He took the city, defeated the resurgent Gelimer and reclaimed North
Africa for the Byzantine Empire.
This story provides several insights into the Book of Mormon. The hook that invited
the comparison was the use of hilly terrain to set up an ambush along an
expected route. In Alma 43 Moroni anticipated the expected Lamanite attack. He
hid an army on east side of the river Sidon behind a hill, and two on the other
side. When the Lamanites crossed the river heading west, Lehi “encircled the
Lamanites about on the east in their rear” (Alma 43:35). Lehi drove them where
they met Moroni “on the other side of the river Sidon” (Alma 43:41). The
Lamanites then fled towards Manti taking another route and “they were met again
by the armies of Moroni” (Alma 43:41). [Insert Nibley Map}
Unlike the defeated Gelimer, the tactics of Moroni were
resoundingly successful. Stuck in the trap the Lamanites responded with fury
that had never been seen before which approached the power of dragons (Alma
43:44). But their tactical advantage couldn’t offset the superior positioning
of Moroni’s forces. The Lamanites could not re-cross the river Sidon with Lehi
on that side (though Alma the younger crossed the ford in the face of a hostile
enemy- Alma 2:27), nor could they retreat towards Manti and then their own
lands, and they could not hack their way through the Nephites to their goal of
raiding Zarahemla to the north.
The comparison reminds the reader that an army is not such an easy thing to maneuver. The hapless General Lew Wallace discovered this on the American Civil War battlefield of Shiloh; Wallace had to march and re-march his soldiers through several different routes because of unclear orders that placed him on the wrong roads; and hence it took him an entire day to reinforce a front several miles away. Gelimer and Moroni had a plan that relied on surprise to compensate for numbers that were likely smaller than their enemies. This was compounded by the fact that their smaller armies were then placed into even smaller sub groups.
Gelimer had to
move three separate forces towards the enemy, and have them attack at the same
time. His force was largely horse based, so maneuvers like this were a bit more
common and easier to pull off than infantry-based armies (and modern readers)
might think. Moroni, in contrast, kept
his infantry-based armies stationary until the Lamanties passed his
positions. This is critical since the
movement of multiples armies to catch a moving army increased the difficulty of
Gelimer’s maneuver. Napoleon was a master and one of the greatest military
geniuses of all time in moving his men in separate columns to engage the enemy
on multiple fronts at the same time to achieve decisive victory.[3] Even
he found it extremely difficult to keep abreast of locations for half a dozen
corps under his command, the need to know their current marching orders and
future locations, the need to modify those orders in relation to the often
fragmentary and conflicting scouting reports concerning a dozen moving enemy
divisions, and the need to move the forces under his command in a way that
brought them into battle in favorable position.[4] The military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz
claimed that Napoleon compared the mass of life or death decisions based on
incomplete information to “mathematical
problems worthy of the gifts of Newton.”[5]
It is no surprise, then, that Gelimer did not catch Belisarius in his snare.
The group attacking from the front and the flank acted too quickly, and only
engaged the leading elements of the army. One attacking group seemed surprised
to see the army. That group entered the battle in fragments and turned what
should have been a decisive surprise into an ineffectual piecemeal attack.
Moroni made sure the entire Lamanite army passed the first
ambush on the east side of the river, which eased the difficulty level of his
maneuver. This also might imply that Moroni adopted a strategy that relatively
untrained foot soldiers could perform. Complex battlefield maneuvers were the
domain of groups like the professional Roman centurions,[6] intensely drilled Prussians, or elite Spartans. The Mongols and other cavalry-based
armies were well trained due to hunting and extensive experience in encircling
and attacking their enemies. But most militaries and most members of the
military in premodern times were part time soldiers impressed into duty during
a crisis.[7] Moroni likely adopted this strategy to compensate for inferior numbers, but
also for an untrained force. Moroni placed his soldiers in a place to succeed
through superior “stratagem” (Alma 43:30) which speaks highly of Moroni’s
skills as a strategist….
Read more in From
Sinners to Saints: Reassessing the Book of Mormon
[1]
Procopius, The Wars of Justinian 3.17.2
[2]
Ian Hughs, Belisarius: The Last Roman
General, (Yardley PA: Westholme Press, 2009) 94. This is different than the
traditional interpretation taken from Procopius in 3.19.3, which laid the blame
at Gilmer discovering his brother’s dead body. Hugh’s claims, and I agree, that
Gilmer discovered the remnants of the battle, and based on its location, and
the location of his dead brother, assumed that Belisarius had already moved
north towards Carthage. Therefore, he paused to assess the situation and
marshal his forces before making the next attack.
[3]
See the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt for a vivid example.
[4] Kristopner
A. Teters, “Dissecting the Mind of a Genius: An examination of the Tactics and
Strategies of Napoleon Bonaparte” Journal of Phi Alpha Theta 9 (2003): 16
(9-21).
[5] Carl
Von Clausewtiz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret trans.,
(Princeton University Press, 1984), 112.
[6]
Victor David Hanson, Carnage and Culture:
Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, (New York: Anchor Books,
2001) 118. He quoted Josephus in describing the professionalism and prowess of
legions: “One would not be wrong in saying that their training maneuvers are
battles without bloodshed, and their battles maneuvers with bloodshed.“ (Jewish War: 3:102-107)
[7]
Morgan Deane, “Experiencing Battle in the Book of Mormon,” Interpreter: A Journal of Mormon Scripture, 23 (2017), 239
(237-252).