I'm working on several exciting projects. My paper on the Nephite experience in battle is about to be published with The Interpreter. I signed a contract to produce a book on decisive battles in Chinese history, and I'm working on a new paper on preemptive war. Of course I've written about this before, but I've noticed several more verses where it was mentioned. As I considered the matter I found several more, and given my additional research and though on the topic I thought it was worth organzing into a paper that I think will make an extremely meaningful contribution to the subject. I still have to make the bibliography, and tinker with a few things here and there, but overall I think its ready to submit to the Journal of Book of Mormon Studies. This is the section that summarizes the verses I analyze:
The verses will be analyzed in more detail below and only
summarized briefly here. In the Book of Omni the Nephites fled the Land of
Nephi. A few verses later and within a short space of time, and then in greater
detail in Zeniff’s record, the Nephites sent scouts to spy on the Lamanites,
that they might “come upon and destroy them” (Mosiah 9:1). The Nephites had already committed to launch
a sneak attack, and they were looking for the best location. Zeniff changed his
mind after seeing what was good in the Lamanites, but with the benefit of
hindsight he also admitted his decisions were overzealous and naïve. The entire
account suggests a need to reassess his description of the other Nephite
commander as blood thirsty and austere, and that the offensive strategy had
merits.
Shortly later Ammon recorded, using almost the same words as Zeniff,
that the Nephites wanted to “take up arms” and destroy the Lamanites instead of
send missionaries to them (Alma 26:25).
This fabulous success of his missionary work is commonly cited as
repudiation of the supposedly war mongering tendencies.[1]
But various unexamined items that undermine this interpretation include the
martial skills used by Ammon, the need for the new Lamanite king to legitimize
his rule, the innocent victims in the city of Noah, and the soldiers who died
retrieving them suggest unexamined consequences of Ammon’s actions and an under
appreciation of Nephite offensive plans.
Defenders of preemptive war and national security practitioners most
commonly cite Moroni’s preemptive attack in support of preemptive war.[2]
Though there are strong elements in Moroni’s past that support such behavior
and even stronger negative consequences of this policy that remain unexamined. While
the text says that Moroni was making plans to secure the Nephites, a careful
look at his behavior suggests that Moroni’s aggressive tactics contributed
significantly to the start of the last phase of the war. The arguments from the
people speaking in towers for example (Alma 48:1), would have been much more
effective as only slightly more sinister variations of what actually happened
or was about to happen. This includes items such as the possible militarization
of the vote (Alma 46:21), and the seizure of lands during what was nominally a
time of peace, though it might be termed a lull in one long war (Alma 50:7). Amalickiah would have presented the proposed
action to the Lamanite king in the starkest terms. Then it when it actually
happened and a flood of Lamanite refugees were entering Lamanite lands,
Amalickiah’s position would have been strengthened a great deal.
The next examples are recorded in
Helaman 1. As discussed above, the same
chapter contains both the dangers against and motivation for using preemptive
war. The Nephites faced a serious
challenge to leadership and executed somebody for being “about” flatter the
people. But a few verses later the
Lamanites, with both political and military positions filled by dissenters, the
Lamanites capture Zarahemla and smite the Nephite chief judge against the wall.
These verses provide an example of how the distinction between unrighteous and
aggressive preventive wars and increasingly justified preemptive wars is
incredibly thin, and becomes thinner with the rise of modern technology.
The next two verses are the most
cited against offensive warfare.[3]
The chief captain Gidgiddoni said “the Lord forbid” in response to offensive
action (3 Nephi 3:21). And Mormon was supposedly so disgusted with the Nephites
desire for offensive warfare that he resigned his command (Mormon 3:11). Yet, Gidgiddoni’s command is likely a
strategic observation more than command from the Lord. He likely witnessed
disastrous Nephite attempts to root out the robbers before (Helaman 11:25-28),
and he used offensive actions as part of an overall defensive posture to
maneuver and “cut off” the robbers (3 Nephi 4: 24, 26). Mormon moreover,
attacked the Nephites bloodlust, vengeance and false oaths and not their
strategic decisions (Mormon 3:9-10, 14).
Viewing the Nephites outside of the lens of Mormon’s spiritual
denunciations a person sees that the Nephite soldiers actually performed with
great skill and élan. A few verses after
their disastrous offensive they actually ended up at the same place as they
started. Faced with endemic warfare
against a stronger enemy, absent the Nephite’s blood lust, this was actually
their most justified preemptive
action. Of course, none of this excuses their rape and cannibalism, but it does
suggest we can assess the effectiveness of their strategy apart from their
apostasy.
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[1] Joshua
Madsen, “A Non Violent Reading of the Book of Mormon,” in War and Peace in Our Times: Mormon Perspectives, Patrick Mason,
David Pulsipher, Richard Bushman eds, (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books,
2015.) 24. “The mission of Ammon and his brothers to the Lamanites,
specifically in defiance of Nephite cultural stereotypes, ultimately
demonstrates that acts of love and service can break through false cultural
narratives, unite kingdoms, and converts thousand to Christianity where
violence could not…In the end, Nephite just wars did not bring peace, whereas
those like Ammon who rejected their culture’s political narratives and hatred
did.”
[2] Mark
Henshaw, Valerie Hudson et. Al. “War and the Gospel: Perspectives from Latter
day Saint National Security Practitioners,” Square
Two, v.2 no.2 (Summer 2009.)
[3] Jeffrey
Johanson, “Wars of Preemption Wars of Revenge,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, vol.35, no.3 (Fall 202),
244-247. https://www.dialoguejournal.com/wp
content/uploads/sbi/articles/Dialogue_V35N03_244.pdf
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