[I'm pleased to announce I've been awarded a research grant from American Public University. You can see last year's winners here. The following is the first part of my research grant application and outlines the need for this study and what has already been written. I also include a paragraph that discusses its importance in the classroom. The majority of the archive work will occur at the Hoover Library's Chen Cheng collection at Stanford University, and I'm very excited to pursue this research!]
Mao Zedong is
hailed in largely hagiographic terms as a result of his eventual ascension to
power and victory in the Chinese Civil War.
But there is little critical examination of his early military
leadership. This study seeks to assess
the military leadership of Mao and his chief military officer, Zhu De during
the Jiangxi period of 1927-1934. It will determine the degree to which Mao
deserves his status as a brilliant strategist.
Since the two leaders were often conflated into one person called Zhu
Mao, I seek to study both the strategic and tactical planning as well as the
execution of Soviet military operations to better determine the merits of their
respective leadership. Finally, since the doctrine of People’s War
affects the local population I seek to examine the impact of Soviet military
operations on the people of the Jianxi Soviet.
This period
witnessed Mao’s first actions as leader of a small insurgency in southern
China. The years between 1927 and 1934 also witnessed several important counter
insurgency campaigns by the Nationalist government and it detailed the reaction
of Communist forces as well as the first application of Mao’s strategic
theories. Sinologist William Wei called
this period “more or less wide open” and suggested that an examination of Mao
as a military thinker is “long overdue.”[1]
Many histories of the PLA start at the landmark dates of the Communist victory in
1949, the Long March of 1934, or the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, and
often provide little analysis of earlier periods or analyze them through the
lens of later ones.[2]
Mao himself only
has only has one scholarly piece assessing his leadership.[3] Even then, the article was specifically
intended as a “preliminary assessment.”
That article starts to suffer from the problems above as the author
examined the broad scope of Mao’s career; with the Jiangxi period only serving as
a prelude to the Long March and eventual victory. This did include a
description of Mao’s poor management and often confusing directions to his
generals. My study will focus
specifically on the beginning of Mao’s early military career which allows me to
focus on matters that may have been condensed in the broader examination.
Zhu De only has
two biographies in English. The first by
Anges Smedly, was published in 1956.[4]
While the book fills an important literary gap, Smedly is more accurately
described as a reporter than a scholar. She
traveled with the Red Army through much of the 30s and the book contains
lengthy excerpts of oral interviews from Zhu De. She died before this book
could be completed and it focuses on a personal biography more than a military
history of this man. So it is doubly
important for a military historian to examine Zhu’s life. The other book is by Shum Ki-Kwong, and it
can more accurately be described as a twenty page pamphlet.[5]
There is an unpublished
dissertation that examines Zhu De’s early career and his impact on the
strategic thought of the Chinese military.[6] It remains unpublished, but provides several
excellent points. Russell’s piece is an
excellent scholarly treatment of the subject and it places the development of
Chinese strategic thought in a worldwide, and particularly Russian,
context. His examination ends in 1926
with Zhu De’s defection from the Republican government. Since my examination
begins in 1927, it will act as a case study and test his conclusions.
Russell also
stated that “[this study]…highlighted many gaps in the English language
military history of China…these studies in particular need to address wars at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels…”[7]
Russell went on to claim that in
contrast to the assumption of this being an early example of protracted war, “the
Red Army was, in reality, a hybrid force made up of regular troops, fulltime
guerrillas units, and local part time defense forces.”[8] Thus his study introduces the idea that
Communist operations in this period were not always a clear example of an
insurgency campaign. But Russell’s assertion seems to understate Mao’s three
phase insurgency and may overstate the clear delineations between regular
soldiers and full time guerillas. So my
study will engage a debate concerning the exact composition, strategy, and
tactics of the Red Army.
Francis Grice is a
teaching fellow at the Defense Studies Department at Kings College London and
is studying the influence of Mao on past, current and future insurgencies.[9] The thesis is forthcoming and I don’t have
access to his conference presentations. His research so far appears to focus on
the influence of Mao’s theories around the world in the second half of the 20th
century. My study, in contrast, will focus on the specific development and
execution of his theories in China before his eventual victory. It also
contrasts his leadership and influence with that of Zhu De, and focuses
exclusively on an early period in Mao’s insurgency. I expect my research will
benefit from, but also challenge his thesis...
This study fits
the mission of American Public University by enhancing the breadth and depth of
the curriculum offered. Insurgency is a topic of immense contemporary
importance, and even personal importance for the many veterans in the student
body that serve(d) abroad. China is a
rising world power with relatively few programs offering basic courses on
Chinese history, let alone a course that covers Chinese military history. After consultation with Dr. Richard Hines I
may teach a topical course on Chinese military history, and this research
project will enhance that ability.
[1]
William Wei, “Mao and the Red Army” in An
Introduction to Chinese Military History Robert Hingham and David Graff
eds. (NewYork: Westview Press, 2002),
247.
[2]
See for example, Chen-hsia Huang, The
Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971 (New
York: Praeger, 1973).
[3]
Jacques Guillermaz, “The Soldier,” in Mao
Tse-Tung in the Scales of History: A Preliminary Assessment ed. Dick Wilson
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.)
[4]
Anges Smedly, The Great Road: The Life
and Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956).
[5]
Shum Ki-Kwon, Zhu De (St. Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1982.)
[6]
Matthew William Russell, “From Imperial Soldier to Communist General: The Early
Career of Zhu De and His Influence on the Chinese Army.” Unpublished
dissertation, George Washington University, 2009.
[7] Ibid., 424-425.
[8] Ibid., 422.
[9] http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/phd/grice.aspx
(Accessed, Mar 13, 2013.)
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