August 6th marks the dubious day in 1945 where
America became the only power to use a nuclear bomb. This continues to spark
controversy. From 1945 to 2005 American approval of the bombings has dropped
from 85
to 57 percent. And a record low number of Americans are proud
of their country. This is somewhat understandable as societal attitudes
change and there is a great deal to critique over the decision. But it might
also be what the editors at the National Review recently pointed out is part of
the crisis
of self-doubt gaining traction in America and what Wilfred McClay called a
deeply unserious
country that doesn’t believe in itself. Yet a proper study of the history
surrounding the decision to drop the bombs and an examination of ethics finds
the bombing was both justified and necessary.
During the war both sides held a great deal of racial animus
towards one another, which suggests the bomb might have been more willingly
used because of racism.[1]
Though, the bomb wasn’t ready in time to end the war against Germany so that is
hard to gauge. Using an area effect weapon that didn’t distinguish between
civilians and military targets invites condemnation.[2]
The lack of military targets in Hiroshima and the dubious effectiveness of the
bomb makes some people say this was terrorism.[3]
After all, the Strategic Bombing survey revealed that the trains ran normally a
mere two days later and this was often considered a way to stun the Japanese
into surrendering and impress the Russians with the viability of the program.[4]
(Though it should be noted that both cities had important military components. Both
cities house important military garrisons as well as critical war industries, and
Nagasaki was a foremost military shipping depot, and thus remained valid
military targets.) Plus, there were supposedly peace feelers from the Japanese
that made this completely unnecessary.
As I will show below, these are all extremely flawed
arguments that don’t accurately reflect the historical context and seem like
excuses to blame American and undermine moral confidence today, instead of
understanding the tragic but justified decisions of the past.
The strongest criticism seems to be the peace overtures. Who
doesn’t want the war to end early? This theory argues that the Japanese were
ready for peace and only block headed, blood thirsty, and maybe even racist
generals kept the war going. These were detailed by a revisionist historian,
Gar Alperovitz and thus come long after the fact when it became more
fashionable to search and promulgate these theories.[5]
More importantly, this theory cherry picks some information and leave out much
more important events that shows these peace feelers were completely impotent
and U.S. officials were correct when they disregarded them.
The best evidence against this theory comes after the
Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. After America dropped the bombs and
the emperor wanted peace army leaders challenged and almost reversed the
decision through a military coup.
Up until the dropping of the second bomb Japanese officials thought a defense
of Japan could produce favorable peace terms that at times included conditional
surrender, voluntary reduction (but not elimination) of their military, and protections
from war crimes tribunals.[6]
The peace overtures before the dropping of the bomb were impotent, and dropping
the required of unconditional surrender ignores the many other conditions that
Japanese officials favored until the second atomic bombing.
Let me stress, even AFTER America dropped atomic bombs significant
factions in Japan wanted to keep fighting. Peace was not possible before the
bombs were dropped. The idea is an ahistorical fantasy used by modern pundits
to attack America. Moreover, American willingness to negotiate before the bombs
dropped would have emboldened the Japanese and aggressive army generals to
think that more fighting would have gotten them more concessions.
Other critics quote leaders who sound authoritative but
really aren’t. Many of these quotes also ignore historical context. One example
comes from Eisenhower who said: [I believe] that Japan was already defeated and
that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[7]
With all due respect to Eisenhower and other leaders cherry
picked for opposing nuclear weapons, he was thousands of miles and away and was
not privy to the intelligence and decision-making councils that led to it. It
would be like Admiral Nimitz second guessing Eisenhower’s decision to stop
at the Elbe. Eisenhower is a particularly odd choice for opposing nuclear
weapons since his New
Look military relied so heavily on nukes and spooks.[8]
Those that blanche at the use of nuclear weapons and hate the national security
state should probably avoid quoting a general that as president, threatened to
use nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait crises, and unleashed CIA sponsored
coups on democratically elected governments in Iran and Guatemala that still
reverberate today.
Other military critics were vocal against nuclear weapons not
because of moral principles, but because of parochial rivalries. The bombs were
delivered by bombers, and this helped Curtis LeMay argue for the creation of an
independent Airforce. In turn, this would take resources and prestige away from
the Navy and Army chiefs, who were incredibly territorial, had differing
strategies and demands, and wanted the air corps assets divided between them.[9]
Thus it isn’t surprising to find that admirals would elevate the role of
commerce raiding in the defeat of Japan and minimize the “barbaric”
“toy” dropped by
the budding air corps. Their opposition had little to do with the moral
concerns of the time and are especially dissimilar from modern antiwar
sentiments. In fact, the admirals preferred a blockade of the Japan that would
have slowly killed millions, and the army preferred an invasion that would have
also killed millions (see below.)
The sad truth is that the Japanese would not surrender
without the atomic bomb dropping or millions (of Americans, Japanese, and
Chinese) dying from an invasion. The East Asian victims of Japanese aggression
are often forgotten in Western centric debates over the war. But the Japanese
launched the Ichigo offensive in late 1944 which was comparable in size and
scope to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[10]
Nationalist Chinese leader Kiang Chai Shek had seen a great deal of bloodshed
but called this period the worst of his entire life. An estimated two hundred
thousand Chinese a month were dying at this point in the war. An invasion by
American forces on the Japanese homeland would have skyrocketed those figures. General
Marshall estimated 300,000 to 1,000,000 casualties (later updated to 1.2
million). Secretary of War Stimson estimated that 400,000 to 800,000 Americans
would have died, (including 100,000 prisoners of war that were set to be
executed upon invasion), and 5 to 10 million Japanese would have died from an
invasion.[11]
There was the option not to fight which would have left
China and much of Asia in the hands of a regime as bad as Hitler’s. Yet one has
to wonder how long the imperial Japanese would have felt comfortable with the
U.S. in Hawaii so they would probably have attacked America again anyway. The
U.S. could have continued to bomb them. The firebombing of Tokyo and
conventional attacks actually caused more deaths than the nuclear bombs so that
couldn’t have been a better option.
The U.S. could have blockaded the country. The admirals at
the time and later scholars argued that the U.S. had already destroyed much of
Japanese shipping and merchant marine by August 1945,[12]
and this may have been what Eisenhower meant by already defeating Japan, but
then America would have to wait for the country to starve to death. That would
have caused more deaths and in a slow manner arguably worse than two nuclear
bombings. Its effects would have been unevenly felt across the population. With
the elites that caused the war suffering far less than the population that
fought it. It also would have given the Japanese army in China more time in
their genocidal war against China. So between deaths from famine and deaths
from the Greater East Asian War that option would have killed millions more
than the bombings. Even then, any peace offering from the emperor would have
likely faced a coup just like the surrender after the atomic bombings. Keep in
mind that the admirals who argued for this possibly unjust and criminal
course are the same admirals being quoted out of context today for entirely
different reasons than the military leaders originally intended.
Dropping the atomic bomb quickly ended the war which
prevented the Soviets from invading as well. The first atomic bomb was dropped
literally the day after Stalin finalized plans to invade Japan and he invaded a
day after the second bombing. The Soviets treated Eastern Europeans to show
trials, mass deportations to the gulags, the Soviet army’s refusal to help the
free Poles in the Battle of Warsaw etc., so it was a good option to end the war
quickly and prevent the negative effects of Communist rule seen in East Germany
and Eastern Europe even today. You can easily argue that the Japanese
Constitution and rebuilding under MacArthur was far preferable to Soviet
occupation.
After looking at the other options and strategic context in
late 1945, the decision to drop the bomb was moral and justified. In fact,
ending the war for mere hundreds of thousands compared to the abject blood bath
and millions of deaths that awaited all sides is the reason why the allied
leaders considered this weapon a godsend. Even though Michael Walzer opposed
nuclear weapons, he also said that ending a war swiftly with a minimum of causalities
is the greatest kindness a leader could offer.[13]
Secretary of State Henry Stimson
exemplified the latter idea when he said: My chief purpose was to end the war
in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies
which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair
estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to
our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for
accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it
and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face.[14]
In short, every other option than using nuclear weapons was worse.
Taken in vacuum nuclear weapons are horrific, but that weapon wasn’t used in a
vacuum and its incredibly unfair to blame America for being barbarians while
ignoring the context that justified and compelled their use. This is probably
because few have studied military ethics in depth, they simply think that some
things are “bad.” But again, considering every option and the context of their
war the dropping of atomic weapons was justified and necessary. The war was
ended more quickly, saving lives, including millions of Asian lives.
Americans and members of the church must rightly hope to avoid the tragedy of any having any conflict. But Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine sadly reminds us that the specter of war can never be vanquished with hopeful thoughts. Americans can recognize that war, particularly defending life against the most genocidal regimes of the 20th century, was necessary, and the atomic bombings were a necessary and justified choice in World War II. And every American should strive to have the knowledge and tools to properly judge the morality of the past, which in turn provides the moral confidence to justly proceed in the present.
Thanks for reading. If you found value in this work please consider donating using the paypal button below or buy one of my books linked in the top left. If you're attacking me somewhere online about this post, please use the code word: war plan orange, to let me know you've actually read my argument.
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[1]
For a good overview, see John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture,
(New York: Basic Books, 2009), chapter 7.
[2] Micheal
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York, Basic Books, 2015), 250-260.
[3] Howard
Zinn, “Breaking the Silence.” ND. (https://web.archive.org/web/20071201172331/http://polymer.bu.edu/~amaral/Personal/zinn.html
Accessed August 6th, 2021.)
[4] The
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report: 24. The United States Strategic Bombing
Survey: The Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6. https://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=rwu_ebooks
[5] Gar
Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, (Vintage Books: 2010). https://mises.org/library/hiroshima-myth
[6]
Richard Frank. Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire, (Random House,
2001), 97.
[7] Julian
Borger, “Hiroshima at 75: Bitter Row Persists Over US Decision to Drop the
Bomb, The Guardian, August 5th, 2020, (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/04/hiroshima-atomic-bomb-us-japan-history
(Accessed August 6th 2021.)
[8]
Gordon H. Change, He Di, “Eisenhower’s Reckless Nuclear Gamble over the Taiwan
Strait,” American Historical Review 98 (December 1993), 1502-1523.
[9] Keith
McFarland, "The 1949 Revolt of the Admirals" Parameters: Journal
of the US Army War College Quarterly. XI (2): 53–63.
[10] Morgan
Deane, Decisive Battles in Chinese History, (Westholme Press, 2017),
chapter 12.
[11]
Frank, Downfall, 340.
[12] Strategic
Bombing Survey: Summary Report, 11.
[13] Michael
Walzer, Just Wars, quoting Moltke the Elder, 47.
[14] Henry
L. Stimson, as quoted in The Great Decision: The Secret History of the
Atomic Bomb (1959) by Michael Amrine, p. 197