I had the pleasure
of reviewing an advanced copy of David Spencer’s new book: Moroni’s Command. I offered some thoughts and brief endorsement for
the back cover. But there was one particular passage that really stuck out to
me based upon my knowledge of Chinese military theory:
When scouts were
sent out from Manti to determine the strength of the Nephite force, they
discovered that the Nephite force was not too large, so the Lamanite force
began to make preparations to attack. Helaman’s own scouts reported the
Lamanite activity, and he began to make
demonstrations carefully designed to give the impression that his force did not
suspect the actions of the Lamanite force. Along the main approach to his
camp he dispatched two small forces, one under Gid and the other under Teomnor
and ordered them to take up hidden positions to the left and right of the main
path (Alma 58:16-17). Meanwhile he made
an effort to maintain appearances that everything was business as usual in the
Nephite camp, seeking to allay any Lamanite suspicions, so they would
approach without caution. Helaman’s maturity as a commander since the Antiparah
maneuver is evident in this account, as his forces in the main camp coolly waited until the last possible moment before
fleeing from the advancing Lamanite force dispatched to destroy them. This was an essential component of the plan
because, by keeping up these appearances
Gid and Teomner remained completely undetected.[1]
The appearances of
an armies camp is an important tool that China theorists prescribed for finding
out the strength of the enemy. Since those theorists also described warfare as
the “way of deception”.[2]
It is no surprise then, that military commanders often manipulated their
appearance to fool the enemy.
Tai Kong wrote:[3]
If [your plans] are heard about,
the enemy will make counter plans. If you are perceived they will plot against
you. If you are known, they will put you in difficulty. If you are fathomed,
they will endanger you.
Thus one excels at eliminating
the misfortunes of the people manages them before they appear. Conquering the
enemy means being victorious over the formless.[i.e., good at denying the enemy
a chance to know your plans…]
To be the first to gain victory,
initially display some weakness to the enemy and only afterward do battle. Then
your effort will be half, but the achievement will be doubled.
And Wuzi wrote:[4]
In employing the army you must ascertain
the enemy’s voids and strengths and then race [to take advantage of] his endangered
points. When the enemy has just arrived from afar and their battle formations
are not yet properly deployed, they can be attacked. If they have eaten but not
yet established their encampment, they can be attacked. If they are running
about wildly, they can be attacked. If they have labored hard, they can be
attacked. If they have not yet taken advantage of the terrain, they can be attacked.
When they have lost their critical moment and not followed up on opportunities,
they can be attacked. When they have traversed a great distance and the rear
guard has not yet had time to rest, they can be attacked. When fording rivers and
only half of them have crossed, they can be attacked….In general circumstances
such as these, select crack troops to rush on them, divide your remaining
troops, and continue the assault- pressing the attack swiftly and decisively.
And the most
famous Chinese theorist, Sunzi, touched upon each of these matters as well. “Thus
if I determine the enemy’s disposition of forces [hsing] while I have no
perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented.”[5]
And he offered a
warning to those that judge based on enemy camps:
Thus the
strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high mountains; do not confront
those who have hills behind them.[6] Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack
animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait…[7]
There is a clear
congruence between Spencer’s narrative of how this battle developed, and the
way that theorists described the need to study, and sometimes manipulate or
avoid being manipulated by the enemies’ organization in their camp. As I described in my book, this doesn’t mean
that Helaman opened up his copy of the Seven
Military Classics. But if we assume that military theory categorizes and
measures military operations the same way a thermometer can measure heat, then
using this theory to analyze the Book of
Mormon is no different than checking the temperature on your food. Moreover, if we assume the events described
in the text are historical, then we should notice its relation to historical
military texts. Finally, I should not
that I’m not completely convinced this is how the battle happened. I think
Spencer fills in some blanks that aren’t readily apparent to this reader. But
given that my second books is entirely about filling in blanks and making
sometimes large (though well founded) assumptions based on small amounts of
text;[8]
and I find his description of the events matches up surprisingly well with
military theory, so I’m willing to give him
the benefit of the doubt in making those assumptions. I rather enjoyed describing
connection and I hope you enjoyed reading about it. Thanks.
[1] David
Spencer, Moroni’s Command: Dynamics of
Command in the Book of Mormon, (Salt
Lake City: Cedar Fort Books, 2015), 137-139.
[2] Ralph
Sawyer, trans. The Seven Military
Classics of Ancient China (New York: West View Press, 1993)158.
[3]Ibid., 68-69.
[4] Ibid., 213.
[5] Ibid., 167.
[6] An
army with hills behind them would be in fatal terrain, making them especially
dangerous. See chapter 4 of my book, Bleached
Bones and Wicked Serpents.
[7] Sawyer,
Seven Military Classics, 170-171.
[8]
And several anonymous reviewers, one in particular, seemed especially nit-picky
and ridiculous in offering criticism of that approach.